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(GENERAL PART.)

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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(GENERAL PART.)

Hans Lassen

BY H. MARTENSEN, D.D.,
BISHOP OF ZEALAND.

Translated from the Danish, with the Sanction of the Author,

BY C. SPENCE.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

IN accordance with the earnestly expressed desire of the author of this work, Dr. H. Martensen, Bishop of Zealand, the present translation has been made directly from the original Danish, and not through the medium of the German edition. It is hoped that the author will thus have suffered less from the disguise of the terse and forcible style in which he expresses himself in his own tongue, than would have been possible if the book had passed through the ordeal of two different interpreters, more especially as the Danish language has far more affinity to English, in the structure of sentences, than to German.

Philosophical terms, such as *moment*, have been left untranslated, both as being doubtless familiar to English students of this class of literature, and also because, if in a few instances this is not already the case, the context will generally bring out the meaning of such terms clearly enough, without interference with the author's choice of words.

It is probably superfluous to remind the English reader, that whenever reference is made to the Decalogue, the division of its parts differs from that to which we are accustomed. Thus, "Honour thy father and thy mother" is spoken of as the fourth commandment, and the first table of the law is said to consist of *three* precepts.

In the work of translation, great encouragement has been experienced from the lively interest manifested in its progress, not only by the venerable author himself, who most courteously supplied information on any point on which he was consulted, but also by many friends in this country, as Professor Calderwood, Dr. Lindsay Alexander, Dr. Macgregor.

C. SPENCE.

PREFACE.

BETWEEN the present volume and my work published many years ago, and entitled *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, there exists connection, in so far as that production of my youth, in which everything was only briefly and generally sketched, finds here more copious expression; but besides this there is alteration, as the necessary consequence of a more profound research into the first principles and the religious postulates on which the science of Ethics is founded. Readers of my *Christian Dogmatics* will find here the same fundamental conceptions which formed the basis of that work, but treated from another point of view relatively independent of doctrines of belief.

The relation between Ethics and Dogmatics, its limits, subdivisions, and methods, are all fully set forth in the Introduction. Notoriously these are questions which have hitherto been answered in very different ways, so that on this subject there are many points still undecided; and, in general, the position of Ethics as a theological science is essentially different from that of Dogmatics. For however many diversities, and even contradictions, may appear in the treatment of Christian doctrines of belief, there is yet a far greater unanimity in the determination of the limits of that science, and in the arrangement of its materials. The reason why the study of Dogmatics thus enjoys a more favourable position than the other, must not be sought only in the fact of its being supported on a great tradition, whilst Ethics, as a *system*, has no such support. The cause of the difference lies in the nature of the subjects. For, whatever may with justice be said of the difficulties of doctrinal knowledge, it may be averred with equal truth, that the divine things revealed to us are far simpler of comprehension than the human; that in revelation and belief, considered by and for themselves, order and connection are much more readily discernible than in human life, with all its labyrinthine multiplicity of acts, far-branching, intertwined, and intricate, which nevertheless Ethics must contemplate in their relations to faith and revelation, although they cannot without great difficulty be brought under one universally valid Schema. Unquestionably much valuable service has already been rendered to this science; yet nevertheless it is scarcely too much to affirm, that hitherto no one has succeeded in weaving together into one complete web this infinitude of finite relations. From the uncertainty and want of harmony in the methods of considering Ethics, no surprise should be excited by the assertion now made, that a systematic treatment of this subject is as yet impossible, and that in the solution of ethical problems we are constrained to confine ourselves to the employment of separate monographs. And undeniably the monographic treatment affords some great advantages, which are denied to the systematic method. Of this, in times antecedent to Christianity, the dialogues of Plato furnish an example; and from the early periods of Christianity, as well as the more modern, we possess treatises of exceeding value on individual ethical conceptions and relations of life, evidently proceeding from a large grasp of the whole, although this lacks development. But this very deficiency, which the limited character of each monograph makes apparent, strengthens the demand for the wider development of Ethics as a complete view of the subject. And, for our part, we cannot relinquish the hope that a want so much felt as that of a connected exhibition of the teachings of Ethics will ultimately be supplied. Signs encouraging this hope are even now visible in theological literature, in the greater unanimity to be found on important points, both as regards the conception of Ethics and its structural foundation. I hope that the present work may contribute to the solution of this problem: How may Ethics be placed on the same platform as Dogmatics?

But whatever weight may be laid on the scientific question, of far more importance to me is the view of the world, and of life itself, which, to the best of my ability, I have sought to express in this form in these pages, and the value of which for life-teaching is quite apart from particular modes of discussion. At what time I may be able to complete the *special* portion of the subject of this work, depends on circumstances beyond my own control. At all events, this section, containing the discussion of the *general* part of it, is complete in itself, and will be tested and judged of as such. I have bestowed great pains on the endeavour to render myself as intelligible as the nature of my subject would permit; and I do not entirely despair of finding readers among educated people, even though they be not theological, if they are disposed for that serious contemplation of some life-questions of deepest import.

I trust that this work, which, in the hours remaining at my own disposal from the occupations of an important office, has braced and invigorated my own mind, may in some measure have the same effect also upon others, serving to confirm them in Christian views of life, or to prepare the mind for the reception of these, and, which is indeed inseparable from such views, deepening the comprehension of the true relation between Christianity and the human race.

H. MARTENSEN.

April 1871.

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ON THE CONCEPT OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

CHRISTIAN ethics is the science of morals conditioned by Christianity. But as a moral course of life is to be found also outside of Christianity, and as much has been written concerning its teachings and motives, we take as our starting-point that which is common to all ethics:

THE MORAL.

§ 1.

According to its general conception, the *moral* is that which regulates human will and action—the norm or rule by which men spontaneously acquiesce in what must and ought to be. Only in the domain of freedom can there exist the moral as opposed to the merely natural, a relation which the ancients expressed by the contrast between ἔθη (manners) and πάθη (appetites, passions, and generally the animal part of our nature). In the conduct of life, that which regulates the will appears as the valid and usual in society, as habit become a second nature. But the concept of the moral is not exhausted by the terms *manners* or *morality*, which mainly refer to actions and the outward conduct; it embraces, moreover, the inner being, the disposition of the mind, or what has been specifically termed "the moral."

The conventional usages, as well as the moral sentiments and maxims, which men at any given time construct, are, however, only derived rules (*normæ normatæ*); whilst the moral itself is an *idea* not originating in use and wont, but itself the unconditioned norm or rule of conduct. All deeper research into the moral leads to the perception of an eternal principle of wisdom, embracing the whole of human life, which is to be realized by man's unfettered efforts; or, in other words, to the idea of an absolute *aim* or *object* for human will and voluntary action. This all-embracing aim is *the good*. *Good* is whatever answers to its end or purpose, and in this common acceptation we apply the term to the productions of both nature and art, to everything, in short, which is as it ought to be. But the *morally good* is to be found only where man realizes the all-embracing aim or object of *free-will* or *self-government*.

§ 2.

The significance of the good, as the all-embracing aim of free-will, is more evident when, following Kant, we conceive existence itself as a "realm of aims."

Nature also shows us a realm of aims, a vast teleological scheme, exhibiting design in every part, a system of wise adaptations. But whilst the purposes of nature are accomplished with absolute certainty, the aims of morality, though in themselves law-appointed and necessary, are only carried out under the conditions of man's voluntary self-government, which may run wholly counter to them, or through mere neglect may fall short of them. For the aims of self-government are something more than mere ideas, which, independently of man, manifest themselves as metaphysical unities amid the changing diversities of the external world, and by which, as Plato expresses it, the finite "becomes partaker of the eternal, the perfect, the truly existent,"—they are, moreover, *ideals*. For ideas become ideals when they present themselves to the free-will as models for imitation, after which each individual course of action is to be shaped and reduced to practice. And between self-government and its ideals there is an inward invisible bond, since man not merely cannot escape from the admission that he *ought* to strive after their attainment; but moreover in his inmost heart there exists an instinct, a longing, often it may be mistaken or misdirected, which can only be satisfied by actual living union with them, as constituting his own true being. Whilst nature may be said to fulfil its proper ends,—though even here a more profound consideration may lead to results modifying this assumption,—self-government is constantly hovering between the ideal and the actual. And even if in a certain measure and degree the former has been attained, there will still always remain even in those conditions of life which are relatively the most perfect, a consciousness, often accompanied by regret, that the reality is not all that it might and ought to be, that there is still something to strive after: as for instance in culture and civilisation, in art and science, in national and political conditions; and each individual man, in the various relations of his private life, will have the same experience.

But the more the attention is thus directed to the diversity of human ideals and the multiplicity of the aims of self-government of all degrees of importance, the more imperative becomes the necessity to acknowledge one aim as the highest, the all-embracing and central, which brings unity and coherence into what was before diversity and plurality; whilst it can then no longer escape observation, that the contrast complained of between real and ideal turns chiefly, nay essentially, on that between the actual life of man and his ideal, or this highest of his aims. This all-embracing and central aim of life, the ideal of self-government par excellence, is the *good*, or the ethical ideal. And if we inquire concerning the contents of this ideal, it can only be described as *man himself*, human personality conceived in its purity and perfection, as the one and *universal* type which shall assume form in a realm of human entities or individuals, where each on his own account and all in unison must work out the realization of this grand aim. Without this unity the individual and separate aims of self-government would inevitably clash, and freedom merge in anarchy. Diversity of will, of talents, and capacity, whilst each followed only his own special object and sought only his own interests, would offer the spectacle of a reasoning animal kingdom, of war between each and all, because each individual—and the greater his genius, power, or foresight, just the more certainly—would seek to exalt his own speciality as alone valid and all-important, and employ his fellows with their lesser gifts as the mere instruments of his egoism. This we see does occur amongst the lower types of creation, and also amongst men wherever the immoral has won ascendency. But the ethical is the harmonizing and centralizing chief end in the realm of self-government, so that the many wills, though each pursues its own specific task, concur at last in one ultimate aim—*the universal human.* We only acknowledge the will of any man as morally good when his individual will is in accordance with this universal-human. It is this characteristic of will or effort which gives personal worth to a man, and it is this which equalizes men and smooths down the social contrasts between the gifted and the ungifted, the rich and the poor, the fortunate and the unfortunate.

The ideal of the good may therefore be more closely defined as the ideal of *humanity*, since it requires the harmonious unity of all human things, and at the same time their centralization in the *aims of personality*. Humanity or human nature, that which constitutes man a man, is on the one side innate, that is to say, when it is considered as the summary of natural gifts, and from this stand-point it is the subject of anthropology; but it is also acquired, and in this view it forms the subject of ethics. In a state of nature the life of the man, like that of the child, manifests the moral, or rather the human, only as instinct and as amiable temper. But self-conscious ethical activity or *personal morality* begins when the man begins, in the spirit of voluntary submission to what appears to him as the common weal or the universal human, to do his *duty*. For duty is the bond between the individual and the community, and duty demands obedience and self-denial. *Obedience* is the fundamental virtue of childhood, and must be the first aim of education. From this point morality developes itself from its lowest to its highest and most noble forms.

We may therefore provisionally define the ethical as the *normal condition of humanity*, in as far as it is fashioned and worked out by human self-government; and we may therefore express the requirement of ethics in the provisional formula, "Strive to realize in thyself and in the community the ideal of humanity;" and as the first step towards this aim, we suggest the maxim of Socrates, "*Know thyself!*" No human aim is excluded from the ethical, it embraces every development of talent. But the development of human talent, which as such is merely a development of culture, receives moral importance only as it serves to the development of personality or character. To cultivate one's natural gifts is not the same as to devote them to the service of morality. To cultivate the natural is to mould it into an instrument and means for the special aims of free-will; to employ it in the service of morality (ethisere) is to mould it into an instrument and means for the aims of personality, to employ culture itself as a means for something higher. An artist may cultivate his talent in the service of art, but he converts it into a moral power when he makes his whole artist-life subservient to the development of his personality, which again will have a reflex influence at once purifying and elevating on the development of his talent. There are great artists over whose productions is spread forth not merely æsthetic ideality, the result of talent and culture, but moreover an impress of purity and power issuing unseen from their personality. That the civilising and the morally ennobling are not one and the same thing may be seen from history, which often shows us dazzling periods of culture and splendid development of talent coupled with a profound decay of morality. The pursuit of every special aim is only moral in the measure and degree in which it is embraced in the aim of entire humanity. Personality and the realm of personality are thus the ultimate and the highest in the realm of aims which existence shows us.

§ 3.

If we endeavour more closely to grasp the moral in its general applications, three fundamental ideas, and along with these, three different stand-points of contemplation, present themselves as absolutely necessary. That is to say, the *good* may be partly contemplated as an *ought*, a demand on man's will as regulating it, or as man's *duty*, partly as admitted into the will, or as *virtue*, as the ability to do good, to produce it, or also to accept it, so far as it should appear, that what we have called the highest aim of the will is something which at the same time must be bestowed on us as a higher gift; and lastly, it may present itself before the thought as the realized aim which flits before man, as the ideal for his efforts and his working, the object of his most earnest desire, as a state of perfection which is for man *the highest good*, in the attainment and possession of which he first finds his final satisfaction and repose. The highest good, however, must not be contemplated from the stand-point of the individual only, but also from that of society; it must be considered as a world, embracing both the individual and society, or as a realm, which we provisionally define as the realm of humanity, considered in its perfection, or with all its ideals realized. The highest good conceived of in its perfect reality must be the sum or total of all good things.

History shows that the science of ethics has been sometimes treated from the first, sometimes from the second, and sometimes from the third point of view. For sometimes it has been considered as instruction with regard to human duties, viz. what ought to be done, and what ought to be avoided; sometimes as instruction regarding the virtues and their opposite vices, or the formation of human character; and sometimes as instruction about the highest good, about that in the life of man which has intrinsic worth, and by which everything else is to be estimated; about that which should be desired or disliked, should be chosen or should be rejected; about what may be truly called a good or an evil, weal or woe, so far as these are dependent on man's own will and behaviour. From this last point of view ethics is often treated as instruction in the way to be happy, sometimes limited to the individual, sometimes embracing the condition of human society. But it is too narrow a conception of the subject which only takes in one of these points of view. A perfect system of ethics must embrace them all, as they only describe three sides of the same thing, and one of them always presupposes the two others (Schleiermacher). Duty cannot be fulfilled without virtue, and virtue cannot be real except as regulated by duty; and neither duty nor virtue can attain substance or completeness if there be not an object which is for man at once the most worthy of admiration and the most worthy of desire, in short, a highest good. And the converse is true, since the highest good itself would lack all moral content if the law of virtue and freedom were excluded therefrom. A happiness, a state of perfection without virtue, without purity of will and disposition, would be, ethically considered, a monstrosity.

§ 4.

Whilst the formal determination of the moral as it has hitherto been presented as the law of humanity, so far as this is fixed by the human will itself, will hardly find any serious opposition, an essential difference becomes very apparent when we come to consider more closely the concept of humanity;

that is to say, when we speak of striving after the ideal of man, what man do we mean? Do we speak of the man who was formed in God's image, who fell into sin, and thereby became fettered into an abnormal condition and an abnormal development from which he cannot free himself, but from which Christ will redeem him? Or do we speak of the man whom paganism describes, who is the production of nature alone, in whom the unaided light of reason has emerged in self-consciousness and free-will; who stands in no relation to any other god than to the god within his own breast, the non-personal reason which is the law of his being; who is his own centre, his own aim, and who on earth must work out only his own kingdom of reason, that of humanity, but not the kingdom of God?

This is the great point in dispute, and has been so from generation to generation.

We speak of the man who was created in God's image. And we propose to speak of the kingdom of humanity as the highest good only in so far as it is redeemed to the *kingdom of God* and transformed thereby, in so far as it is God who bears sway and reigns in the souls of men with a sovereignty of holiness and happiness; we propose to speak of virtue as the redeeming power of God's grace in the free-will of man; of duty as the behests of Christ's love to His followers, which point to the law as our schoolmaster to bring us to Him. But a system of ethics might certainly also be presented with the opposite conception of man, though such a system must in our opinion remain ever an unsolved and insoluble contradiction. From the two concepts of humanity may be developed a twofold morality and merely worldly or *autonomic* morality (*morale indépendante*), in which man is his own lawgiver, and has his aim within himself; and a religious or *theonomic* morality, in which man really acknowledges himself as God's creature, the law of his own being as God's law, and life in God as his highest aim.

Since in the present pages it is the man who was created in the image of God—that is to say, with resemblance to the personal God, and whose chief end is *union with God*—to whom we refer, we may point out more clearly the difference by inquiring as to the *factors* by which the moral is determined. As the moral is the highest and all-embracing *unity* of human life, in so far as this is the practical aim of free-will, so again this unity rests on the specific nature of the contrasts of which it is the unity. As now the autonomic apprehension of man, or the apprehension of man as his own lawgiver, excludes the relation to God, and thus the contrast between creature and creator,—for human personality here stands only in relation to itself and its equals, and to nature as its assumption and dim origin,—so the requirements of morality are here only regulated by the relation of contrast between personality and nature, and by the internal contrast in personality itself, the contrast between the human individual will and the universally received will of reason, between the actual and ideal will of man. The autonomic system of ethics has as factors only human personality (with its inner contrast between the individual and the universal) and nature; the theonomic system has as its factors human personality, nature, and God.

Starting exclusively from the relation between personality and nature, the fundamental concept of the moral must be determined as the normal relation of the will to nature, as the sovereignty of reason over the lower appetites and desires, as the harmonious unity of reason and sense, as the diffusion of the impress of reason over entire nature; and as this problem cannot be solved by an isolated individual, but only by society, the highest good which can be striven after has been determined as a realm of reason in which nature is admitted into the consciousness of man and is organized by man's practical wisdom. This is the view which predominated among the Greeks, whose predilection for an ideal of beauty agreed well with it, since they loved to contemplate the good as the beautiful, the moral personality as the living self-produced work of art. But relation to the living God has no place here. There does indeed appear in Plato a gleam of suspicion that man was formed in the image of God, since he teaches that man ought to strive after likeness to God, and that as God has arranged all things according to ideas, so the wise endeavour everywhere to fashion the ideal in the crude natural substance. But of an actual relation to God there is here no mention; and the likeness of man to his Creator remains nothing more than the glimpse of an idea. In more recent times, when through the influence of Christianity the conception of humanity has burst the limits of the ancient world, the contrast between reason and nature, or, as reason is only in man under the form of personality, the contrast between personality and nature, comes out in a far more universal and deeper significance than in the distant ages of antiquity. For the more personality becomes conscious of itself in its inner infinitude and spirituality, the more it regards nature as at once a limitation and an instrument of freedom, and the greater becomes the desire to reconcile the contradiction.

That this definition of the moral has relative validity can certainly not be denied. It is an important moment in the moral; but if it is given forth as a perfect system of morality, a fragment is substituted for the whole. When thus the moral has been defined, sometimes as the progressive victory of reason over sense (Fichte), sometimes as the progressive harmony of reason and nature (Schleiermacher, Rothe), a moment has been grasped from which we can advance to a higher; but we must protest against this being accepted as the fundamental concept of the moral. The true contrast of personality is not the mere contrast between the personal and the non-personal, or nature, not merely the contrast between the ego and the non-ego, between the will and the want of will, but the contrast between personality and personality, I and thou, will and will. That personality is the right contrast to personality may already be seen from this, that the human personality, as self-consciousness and self-determination, could not comprehend itself as personality if outside itself there was only a non-ego, or nature. The human *ego* becomes conscious of itself only by its relation to another *ego ;* it comprehends itself as willing only by meeting with another will, in relation to which it resolves itself to strife or to peace, to love or to hatred. When Fichte said that an ego only becomes conscious of itself by opposition to a non-ego, it may be rejoined, that a human ego, which, from its earliest childhood has been excluded from human society, and merely placed in relation to non-ego or nature, even if in a certain sense it arrived at self-consciousness, would only attain a self-consciousness and will like that of *Caspar Hauser*.

The individual human personality, therefore, cannot be conceived without a realm of personalities; and the realm of personalities has not merely for its object that individuals should be helpful to each other in bringing nature and the senses under the sway of reason, but it developes from its inner resources, from the depth of soul and spirit, a variety of relations which, though they are modified by human relation to nature and the senses, are yet higher than these. How can the conception of the love of truth, uprightness, mercy, forgiveness, humility, etc., as resting exclusively on the relation between personality and nature, be developed? The requirement, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," or, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is evidently higher than this, "Thou shalt make the nature within thee and without thee the instrument of reason," although this last is certainly the condition for the fulfilment of the first. But the first requirement is the highest, because it expresses the relation of the will to another will, and to its own eternal being, whilst the last only expresses a relation to the non-personal. The realm of personality is, therefore, the first and nearest to which the individual personality is directed; as already every child is placed in contact with its mother and the family, and through the ego of the mother, and the other personalities by which it is there surrounded, it gradually becomes conscious of itself as possessing a will. In the realm of personality, the individual must seek for his life-task, and here he must find the great fundamental contrast, the harmonizing of which is the problem of self-government.

What is then the highest contrast in the realm of human personality, the contrast in the unity of which all the personal relations of life become moral relations, and manifest the good? The autonomic system of ethics, if it does not with narrow and partial vision stop short at the relation between personality and nature, can only answer to this, that it is the contrast between the human individual will and the fundamental will of humanity which requires that wisdom, uprightness, and love shall bear sway in the relations of mankind, the contrast between the actual will encumbered with egoism and the will according to the ideal which alone is socially binding upon men, and to which every individual will stands, by means of conscience, in the relation of dependence and obligation. But with reference to this contrast we observe that it is not a real contrast, not a contrast between will and will; for the contrasts here are only moments, sides of the same thing, namely, of the human will, but not two actual wills. And if we regard human society, or the realm of personality, as a unity, then, according to this view, the whole free life of man, the whole history of the race, can only be considered as the "commercium with itself" of the one human will, a development of the infinite number of relations between the idea of free-will and its reality, between being and phenomenon, etc.

But we cannot stop here. There is a higher factor in this history which will not be ignored. As certainly as human society consists of real personalities, of beings possessing real self-determination, real though limited in dependence, and in a relative signification, life in themselves; and as certainly as this realm of human personalities is not its own author, but has come into existence, and has developed itself from the natural embryo condition, and thereby bears ineffaceable marks of finite and dependent existence; so certainly this self-consciousness and this independence of will, which only by empty assumption and a mere figure of speech can be deduced from nature,—for their appearance in the sphere of nature is a marvel to nature, a transcendental for the whole concept of nature,—must have been *communicated and bestowed by a creator* who is the pattern and archetype of all personalities. The realm of human personality presupposes an eternal *central personality*, or God.

The fundamental conception of genuine humanity is not therefore the conception of man as his own god and lawgiver, or who, if he has a god at all, has him beyond the stars, and is cut off from every vital relation with him. This is much more the conception of man, changed and estranged from his original condition, that is to say, the conception of *pagan humanity.* The fundamental conception of humanity is the conception of man as a free rational being, who is first and foremost a *religious being*, whose life of free-will in the world presupposes the relation of dependence on God. The strongest contrast is not the contrast between human personality and nature, not the inner contrast between essence and phenomenon in the human personality, but the contrast between human personality and a personal God, between God's will and man's will, which has an independence given by God, not merely to nature and to his neighbour, but to the Creator Himself, who has assigned to the free self-determination of man the task of carrying forward in conjunction with Himself the divine work of creation.

The fundamental concept of the moral is therefore the unconstrained unity of man's will and God's will, which signifies that man, in ministering adoration, makes his own person an instrument for the service of God; that in free devotion to the object of creation, and in conjunction with God, he brings the kingdom of humanity into the kingdom of God, which again requires that he, as the servant of the Most High upon earth, should make himself the lord of nature. The basis of the moral is the idea of the religious moral, which in its principle embraces the *whole* of humanity, interweaves the life of man in God with his whole life in the world; and only from this theonomic point of view can we understand the phenomena of good and evil in the life of man, the inmost nature of which falls outside the horizon of the autonomic system of ethics.

The assertion is frequently made, that whilst men differ so widely about doctrines of religious belief or dogmas, there is but one opinion with regard to the moral, or that which belongs to duty and right, especially to right action. The religious should therefore be considered as the non-essential; the moral is the *main thing*, to which we should adhere firmly, and with regard to which, it is said, there is perfect unanimity. But this shallow mode of speech overlooks the fact that *the main thing is the man*, and that with regard to man and to his destiny great want of unanimity prevails in the world. Certainly where a well-ordered moral condition has been established, moral actions have an outward similarity; but the actions, or that which is seen, receive their moral character from the motives and disposition of mind which are not seen, and from the view of life which accompanies these, and which must also remain impenetrable by human vision. The same moral act has thus a different quality when it is done from respect for human dignity and for the impersonal law of reason, and when it is done in reverential obedience and love to God. Two individuals may each work enthusiastically in his calling, with the ideal of humanity before his eyes; but the enthusiasm has a very different quality when the final aim kept in view is in the one case the sovereignty of human reason, in the other the sovereignty of God.

If, however, we determine the religious moral to be the human in its normal condition, a closer development of the *relation between the moral and the religious* is required.

MORALITY AND RELIGION.

§ 5.

If union with God is acknowledged as the final aim of human effort, then must it also be acknowledged that this union would never take place if the personal God did not Himself make advances towards man. The initiative to union must proceed from God Himself, who in His revealed word draws near to man in order to offer him union with Himself. Where no revelation is acknowledged, and thus also no living intercourse between God and man, neither can there be any question of union with God, because man then only stands in relation to the divine but *impersonal law,* but not to the *personal God* Himself; and the god of Deism, who sits idly behind the stars, and once for all has abandoned the world to itself and its own law of development, is to be compared with Homer's Zeus, who has departed to Ethiopia. But if the initiative to personal union proceeds from the personal God Himself, then the first relation of man to God is the religious, in which God works in the human soul to prepare it for Himself as a dwelling, a relation in which man in his inner being is taken possession of by God.

The *religious relation* is the relation of man's dependence on God; the *ethical relation* is the relation of free-will, which, though from the first involved in the relation of dependence, developes itself to relative self-dependence. The first moment in the religious relation is one of *passivity*, in which man bears a passive relation to his Creator, cannot avoid being acted upon by Him, cannot escape the reception of the enlightening and awakening influences which proceed from God's revelation and presence. But this passive relation, which, as such, is only a natural spiritual relation, is perceived on closer consideration tc be receptive and appropriating. For as it depends on man himself whether he will receive and appropriate to himself the communion with God which is offered to him, there appears already in religion itself, even in the relation of dependence, the ethical factor, or the relation of free-will.

Faith, as the expression of conscious personal religion, is not merely the conviction that "God is and will be a rewarder of them who seek Him," not merely confidence and rejoicing trust in God's mercy, but also *obedience*, or the free submission of the human will to the divine. In faith, therefore, the ethical and the religious are in *primitive* union. Pre-eminently is this the case with Christianity, which is specially the ethical religion; that is to say, in it the relation of dependence on God is maintained along with the most binding relation of free-will and of conscience; and it is thus opposed to those religions which, with Schleiermacher, we may designate as the æsthetic, in which the relation of free-will is excluded by that of dependence, whose view of life is therefore fatalistic, whilst the ethical religions (Judaism and Christianity) view the life of the world in the light of a belief in providence. But from faith, as the primitive unity of the religious and the ethical, is developed the ethical in relative independence, and distinct from the religious. In faith man *is* united to God, in morality he *strives to become so*. The realm of aims in which the life of man moves, and the highest expression of which is the kingdom of God, is the summary of both religion and morality, but presents itself under a different point of view to the religious and the moral consciousness. In both of them the whole being mirrors itself, but in different modes. To faith the kingdom of God is come already, and its completion is anticipated in hope; to the moral consciousness, the kingdom of God must first come by the efforts of free-will. Faith possesses the good as a reality, as a divine gift and promise; for God, who has united Himself with man, is the real supreme good, all His acts and all His gifts are good, and His promises, unlike those of men, are never illusory. The moral consciousness has the good before it as a task and a possible attainment. In faith man feels himself in the centre of existence, and rests beside the source of his origin. But from faith, which in its essence is in the first instance the receptive relation of love to the God who receives man and manifests Himself to him, there developes itself the active self-operative love towards God, which not merely remains in the central sphere in contemplation and prayer, but enlarges itself, expands into love to God's creation, to the teeming life of the world, strives to introduce the infinite into the finite in the finite relations of life, to accomplish the will of God so that life in the world may become a life in God.

Morality and religion are thus not at all one and the same thing, but they are indissolubly associated; and so long as man remains in this temporal sphere, so long must he also live his life under these two forms, which is outwardly expressed by our days being divided into working days and days of rest. A faith without works is a barren faith; and a godliness from which the ethical factor is in every respect excluded can only become a mystic absorption in God, a quietism in which man seeks to express the relation of dependence on his Creator by maintaining himself in perfect stillness and inactivity in a state of passivity in order to allow God to work alone in him, a godliness which can only be consistently carried out from a pantheistic stand-point, in which the personality of God and that of man are alike denied. A morality, on the other hand, without religion is a false self-dependence, a free-will lacking foundation, and therefore also resting on an inner self-contradiction.

§ 6.

Whilst religion without morality cannot in our days count upon many advocates, morality without religion finds no lack of such, and ought therefore specially to be the object of our attention. That there is a morality without religion has already been acknowledged in the foregoing pages. To deny it would be to deny a great and universally recognised fact. It is an unquestionable truth that a man's life may be regulated by the mere idea of humanity without the idea of God, by the mere idea of the *humanly worthy* (*honestum*), by that which is seemly for man as a free personality and as the lord of nature, that there is within him a consciousness of what is good and right, and an estimable conduct in accordance with this, without respect to the divine will. We need here only to bear in mind the *Stoics*, and *Kant*, and many other instances within our own experience. But the possibility of this fact becomes explicable to us, just by man's religious organization. For in order that the relation of religious dependence may be truly of *free-will*, that the theonomy may be truly *free* theonomy, man must possess a *relative* autonomy, must have an imparted self-dependence, must in a limited sense be his own centre and his own law. Man must be able to apprehend himself as his own aim, must in a relative sense be able to develope the realm of humanity as his own domain, and along with it to develope morality as his own; all which he is capable of, since he can regulate his conduct in relation to himself, his fellow-men, and nature by reason,—which is his own law, in so far as its universality and its necessity constitute the very essence of human free-will. For in order that religious morality may exist, man must be careful of developing a worldly morality (the term "worldly" is here employed *sensu medio* without the secondary signification of sinful) as determining his life in relation to himself and the world, without at the same time the relation to God being thereby fixed. But the wider aim and purpose of this relative autonomy and worldly morality is not by any means that it should remain stationary in its self-glorification as a final result. It is its teleologic design that man should employ it as *means* for a higher relation, namely, that of religion; that he should use it as an *instrument* for God's Spirit and God's kingdom,—that is to say, that man should hallow this worldly morality by that of religion, should let his autonomy be transformed into theonomy, should find the ultimate principle and the deepest motive of morality in his religious relation; that thus he should do all to the *glory of God*, which would be impossible if he could not also do all to his own glory, and were not in possession of an actual reality, which he might take, though certainly as a "robbery," and appropriate exclusively to himself.

If worldly morality is not apprehended merely as a means, as a teleological moment for a higher aim, which alone is absolute in itself, it becomes entirely incomprehensible and inexplicable. Truly, if the light of religion be extinguished, no reason is perceptible for leading a moral life in all these finite and temporal relations. Religious morality alone explains that of the world, and from the religious stand-point we comprehend that in their *normal development* theonomy and autonomy, religious morality and worldly morality, would be in harmonious unity, because the latter in its relative independence, which was given by God Himself, would acknowledge itself as moment and means for the development and realization of religious morality which proceeds from God, and through the world leads to God and God's kingdom. In our present abnormal development, which is subject to sin, they are separated, and worldly morality presents itself in false self-dependence as man's *own* self glorifying morality (in opposition to that operated by God), and claims to be itself the end and not the means. This abnormal condition may be pointed out in history from the very beginning, namely, the fall of man, and is specially the fundamental assumption of paganism. As the heathen in the olden times had a religion, which may be called man's *own* revelation in opposition to the revelation of God, a religion which was addressed to the mythical deities of Olympus, but was the expression of the relation of dependence spun from men's poetical visions of the divine; so paganism, after its awakening from this mythic dream, and having cast away faith in the gods of the poets, and emancipated itself from the relation of dependence on these, fixed its foundation in self-consciousness and the autonomy of free-will, and developed *its own* morality, making human self-consciousness to be the regulative norm, and man to be "the aim and object" of all things. This process is repeated also in the Christian world, by an emancipation from the Christian revelation, that is to say, when men think they have discovered that Christianity too is a myth, and that the relation of dependence on Christianity was vain and illusory, only befitting the time of the nonage of our race.

History everywhere corroborates the assertion that abstract autonomic morality only appears at those seasons when there is also religious decay. It was during the decline of religion in Greece and Rome that the moral philosophers appeared, and, so to speak, they enunciated their new doctrines from the ruins of the temples. And in times in which the Christian religion has seemed to be in a dying condition, the cry has ever been renewed, that morality will come to the rescue, and that now the age of unselfish virtue and pure free-will has arrived. In our own times, which at once show us a wide-spread decay of religion and a beginning of religious revival, there is heard on one side loud-voiced declamation to the effect that salvation is to be sought for in the purely ethical and the purely human, whilst on the other side are calmer voices, which maintain that the true conception of humanity demands that man shall not desire to have morality as his *own*, but as founded on God and on man's relation to God; shall not desire to have a righteousness of his own procuring, which must ever lack efficacy, but a better righteousness, namely, that of God and the kingdom of God. These calmer voices at the same time recall to memory the fact that Christianity, just by reason of its *ethical foundation*, its principle of personality, is distant as the poles asunder from the mythical, in which the idea of *holiness* is entirely absent: that while the mythical in its conception belongs to the prehistoric ages, Christianity came forth, in the midst of the times treated of by history, nay, in the midst of a period of prevailing scepticism and incredulity, with its announcement of a supernatural revelation concerning the salvation of mankind, and therefore must either be received as truth, which "by manifestation of the truth will commend itself as such to the consciences of men," or must be considered as a deliberately planned but clumsy forgery. At the same time these calm voices call attention to the fact that Christianity throughout eighteen centuries has shown itself possessed of the peculiar power of recovering life when apparently almost defunct,—a peculiarity entirely absent in every mythology, which when once dead can never be restored, but remains for ever in the realm of shadows; that Christianity has a phœnix-nature, and after every historic death arises anew from the grave; and that along with the resurrection which Christianity has had in our days,—although many do not believe in this resurrection,—has also arisen from the grave the *true conception of humanity* in the living and indissoluble union of morality and religion.

As the present work is designed to be a contribution in this direction, we add to what has been set forth above, that morality devoid of religion, in so far as it really is morality at all, and is determined by the idea of personality and of human worth, has its significance also in our own day, in opposition to the denial of spirit, to the materialistic and eudemonistic tendencies of the period, as an evidence of the breaking through of free-will into the domain of sensuality, and of the victory of the spirit over the lower nature, but that its conception of the dignity of man is far too limited. The true excellence of man is not his own excellence, but that which is *given* him by God in His grace. If man merely endeavours to maintain harmony with himself and his own excellence, he is not in a position to give true unity to his life. In spite of all his efforts he remains fixed in a contradiction, for the solution of which he does not possess the means.

§ 7.

The contradiction which lies in a morality destitute of religion will become manifest if we take as our starting-point the old contrast of the Stoics, between those things which are within our power and those which are beyond it (*τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν* and *τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). This stand-point of so-called pure morality may be sharply defined thus: that I have only to concern myself with that which lies within my own power of action, and thus rests on my own free-will. I have only to do my duty, and consider everything else as indifferent. But in this exclusive devotion to the idea of duty there arises a contradiction if those things which are not in our power are insurmountable limits to free-will, unless the law of the universe is essentially one with the law of morality, unless the power to which human destinies are subjected is itself the ethical, the good power. We maintain that this belief is dimly present in every serious moral effort, and that within it lies the germ of religious morality, though it may be that this germ most frequently finds only an inadequate development. If there are atheists who say, "I do not believe in God, but I believe in my duty," and if such men evidence by their self-denial and self-sacrifice that they are sincere in their belief, then we regard them not as atheists, but as believers in religion, in so far as in their consciousness of duty there is manifestly "an altar to the unknown God." For to believe in duty, and to be ready to sacrifice worldly honour, possession, nay, life itself for the sake of duty, is just to believe in the ethical as the highest reality in existence, which is one and the same thing as believing in the final victory of the good and right over all opposition. Not to believe in this victory is distrust of the power which binds my will: neither is it comprehensible why I should unconditionally sacrifice myself in the service of a power which is unable to carry through its object. Unlimited faith in duty, therefore, contains a hidden faith in a moral government of the world, a hidden faith in divine providence, which victoriously achieves the good, and ensures that labour in the service of duty shall not be in vain. No moral activity which is self-conscious can dispense with this faith in the moral government of the world. Therefore we have also seen how Kant and Fichte, who began with a morality which was to be absolutely self-dependent, and in all respects stand on its own feet, end with religious postulates; because the contradiction between moral effort and the course of the world can only be removed when the highest power in existence on which both man and nature are dependent is the ethical power itself. The position of absolute free-will and self-dependence with which they began thus ends in a relation of religious dependence, although this religion is not that of Christianity.

But the self-contradiction in morality destitute of religion is yet more evident if we contemplate not merely human activity, but also human *suffering*. For how shall we comfort ourselves when even moral activity is made impossible, or is suspended by pain and sorrow? The morality which is destitute of religion can here afford no other retreat than absolute resignation. In resignation, however, free-will resolves itself into its opposition, a relation of dependence; for in the act of resigning myself I bow to necessity. But if this necessity is only blind fate, the unconscious power of nature, we find ourselves involved in a fresh contradiction. For it is certainly the most glaring contradiction to the moral dignity of man that free-will should bow to the dictates of nature; and the contradiction is not got rid of by saying that free-will though resigned defies, and in defying withdraws into its inward independence. For the fatalistic power of nature mocks this free-will anew by annihilating its works, by rendering its future activity impossible, by forcing upon it at last the conviction that labouring to do good is nothing further than the incessant upheaving of a Sisyphus stone. The contradiction can only be explained by religion, when the power from which sufferings come, in the last resort, is God; when sufferings themselves are but paths to the final triumph of God's kingdom, and the means of discipline for individuals, which Christianity expresses in these words, "For all things work together for good to those who love God;" when thus, suffering from constrained dependence on nature and destiny becomes the dependence of free-will on the personal God, whose power is the power of wisdom and of love.

The self-contradiction in morality destitute of religion is still more evident if we consider from another side the contrast between those things which are within our power and those which are not within our power. We have assumed that only external things, happiness and unhappiness, physical and intellectual endowments (which are both properly external), are not within our power, but that the will on the contrary is within our power, and that here we are sole governors. But when it now appears that neither is our will within our power, that our will is impotent to accomplish the good to which we are engaged,—when we are constrained to complain, "The good which I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do;" when the consciousness of guilt discourages us in fighting the good fight; when contrition may indeed fill us with purifying pain, but cannot remove the past, and cannot bestow on us the new powers which we require,—what then shall help us? Indeed, the conclusion appears unanswerable which is specially insisted on by Kant: "Thou *oughtest* to fulfil thy duty, therefore *thou canst*, for it would be self-contradictory for the law to demand the impossible." But it is worthy of remark that Kant, who in the sphere of theory has pointed out so many autonomies or contradictions in which the reason of man finds itself necessarily involved, has not gone into this practical antinomy, at least not to its final consequences. "Thou *must* by virtue of an absolute necessity; but thou *canst not do* what thou *must do*, and art deterred therefrom by another necessity;" which certainly is a paradox for natural reason, but finds its solution and explanation in Christianity.

Thus it is the teaching of Christianity, that since the entrance of sin into the world, and its continuance as a sorrowful heirloom of human nature, we are not able to achieve the truly *good*, because we ourselves are not good, because our will is clogged by a natural corruption, and we need help from above to do what we ought to do, or to acquire a really good will. It is the doctrine of Christianity that we need *to be* *regenerated*, not merely to receive by grace the forgiveness of sin, and to be acknowledged as just before God, but also, as an apostle says, "to become partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. i. 4), which is the alone good; "for none is good but One, that is God" (Mark x. 18); and that only in this way can we obtain the possibility of even *beginning* a really moral life, or as Christianity expresses it, a life of holiness, as it is also the teaching of Christianity that the human will, though enslaved by sin, has yet the power to receive or reject the divine aid which is offered to it. It is finally the testimony of Christianity, that the whole development of free-will in man, in order to be normal, must have its foundation in grace, and in an invisible kingdom of gracious operations, and that thus the relation of free-will at every point is regulated by the relation of dependence on the God of grace and of redemption. But as the antinomy here referred to, "Thou shalt, but thou canst not," is a practical antinomy which can only be learnt by experience in the inner contest of life, so the solution of Christianity is not merely theoretic but practical, and no one can be persuaded of its validity unless he will himself make the experiment in unconstrained submission to the gospel.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY CATHOLICISM AND PROTESTANTISM.

§ 8.

What is peculiar in Christian morality rests on its religious assumptions. These may all be summed up in the one: the incarnation of God in Christ. Through Christ as the only begotten Son of God and as the Son of man we arrive at the true conception of God and the true conception of humanity, and the contrast between sin and grace, the redemption of the world, and the perfection of the world are revealed to us. He is the Religious Mediator or the means of man's union with God, the Revealer of God to man, the Propitiator, the Redeemer through whom we are justified before God, and receive the forgiveness of sins and the adoption of children: He is the head of His Church, since, as the risen Saviour in the power of the Holy Ghost, He is with it through His word and His sacraments. But as the Religious Mediator He is at the same time the Ethical Mediator, or Mediator in man's moral efforts after union with God: "Behold, I make all things new" (Rev. xxi. 5). These words are fulfilled also in the domain of morality. He reveals the highest good in a form which neither Plato nor Aristotle knew, and breaks through the political and national boundaries of the old world through the ideal of the kingdom of God. He reveals virtue in a form which in the ancient times had only been seen by glimpses, and had been the object of longing desire but not of actual possession. For He has not merely given us instruction, not merely uttered moral precepts, but "He has left us an example that we should follow His steps" (1 Pet. ii.). What the Greeks shadowed forth in their conception of "The wise man," an imaginary personality in whom the ideal of free-will is realized, and who, therefore, although humbled and despised among men, is a king, although fettered is free, though in poverty is rich, and so on; what to the people of Israel was shadowed forth in the representation of the "righteous servant of the Lord," who through suffering and hard struggle finishes the work of the Lord, God's cause upon earth,—this is fulfilled and manifested in Christ, not merely as an idea, but as a reality. Concerning the moral precepts of the law He has given us enlightenment which was new alike to Jew and Gentile. And as expounder and ensample of the law He ceases not to be the Redeemer and Mediator who gives His disciples strength to follow Him.

On His advent Christ discovered a moral world in the process of dissolution; but what is peculiar in Christ's relation to the world is not merely that He is willing to deliver us from that which men call the *immoral*, but that He will deliver us even from that morality which is *only our own*, since this is included under *sin;* nay, He will rend us loose from the morality which has its source, its object, and its means in man, in order to raise us to that which has its source and aim in God, and from Him receives power for its realization. Not only that morality which is destitute of religion is self-righteousness, but every species of it outside the domain of redemption, even when it is religious, is more or less of this nature, since man imagines himself able by means of his own procuring to achieve the normal. "For they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their *own* righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God" (Rom. x. 3). We find this not merely in the Pharisees, whose morality is religious from first to last, only not of the right sort, but also in other theistic forms of belief, where there is indeed faith in the God of creation and providence, but where sin and redemption are ignored, and where man rests on his own powers to accomplish the good; or, in so far as he perceives his inability, blames his finite condition alone, which he concludes must of necessity have a claim on the divine forbearance, but does not acknowledge sin and guilt in the sense of a supernatural atonement being necessary. All those creeds which suppose it possible for human nature by itself to produce the moral, and which we, along with the Church, designate Pelagian, have that conception of Christ which the Church rejects as the Ebionitic; that is to say, they see in Christ a man like ourselves, though highly-gifted, who to his doctrine added an example worthy of admiration. But they do not acknowledge in Christ the divine mediator who will impart to the human race glad tidings which all need, but which none can procure for himself; and though they laud His example, they do not acknowledge Him as a type in the sense that He is at the same time the prototype or the absolute ideal.

Since we thus determine Christian morality as that which developes itself in the relation of dependence on Christ, the question arises: How then is it related to the aim of life in the world, or to the worldly circle of life which lies outside the purely religious? Does Christianity acknowledge the worth of a worldly morality (we again employ the term "worldly" *sensu medio*, without the scriptural significance), or does it require that all morality should be *immediately* religious? The first must be maintained and the last denied. There is a view which we may designate as the Manichean, or at least akin to Manicheism, which teaches that the relation of Christianity to the world is purely negative, world-denying, because Christianity and the world are absolutely opposed, and no communion can exist between them. But this view leads back to the conception of Christ's person which the Church has rejected as the Docetic, or that which denies the reality of Christ's human nature. For to deny the reality of Christ's human nature contains also the denial of Christ's ability to enter into organic relation with the human nature outside of Him, the denial that Christ and His kingdom can incorporate themselves in the organism of humanity. But just this, that Christ can still enter into organic union with the human nature outside of Him, is the evidence that He Himself was manifested in a real human nature and not merely in a semblance of humanity, a visionary body. In contrast to this caricature of Christianity which establishes a deep impassable gulf between man's religious life and his earthly sphere of action, between life in God and life in the world, true Christianity requires that all shall be summed up under Christ as head (Eph. i.), which would be an impossibility if Christianity and the world were *absolutely* opposed in their nature.

Real Christianity will not disturb or uproot moral life in its worldly sphere (the family and the state, culture and civilisation), but will hallow it, making it the organ, instrument, means, for the building up of God's kingdom on earth. But if it is really to be an instrument for this end it cannot be fettered and enslaved. Christianity requires free and willing instruments which have a certain independence in themselves and a special domain for their liberty, for only thus can their devotion and obedience possess a real value. Therefore we find, moreover, that the deeper Christianity has struck root in history the more it has operated not merely in redeeming from the power of sin, but also in emancipating man, freeing him from all unworthy and unauthorized external restrictions, helping him to personal liberty, to the full use of his innate talents and endowments, even in the worldly sphere of action, in order that he may become more completely the servant of God on earth. This is just the crown of the sovereign power of Christianity, that it desires to reign over freemen, over servants, who in other respects are themselves masters; and it can only exhibit its spiritual wealth where there is a free sphere of worldly action, with a multitude of life problems which are not religious, but in which religion may be the animating and enlivening principle, the ultimate and inmost motive of action, and where it may evidence its divine power in an infinitude of operations, not merely direct, but also indirect. Therefore the Christian life must not be confined within the limits of the immediately religious sphere, but also go forth into every-day action. And experience teaches us that the disciples of Christ may be found in all ranks and conditions, in every human occupation; that the spirit of Christ may be present not merely in the church but in the market, in the artist's studio, in the still chamber of the poet and the philosopher, that it may accompany the mariner across the ocean, and the warrior during the tumult of the battle. The religious has here its seat not in the object but in the subject, in the personality, in the faith, as the great and often *silent* spring of action and of suffering.

The relation of Christianity to the world has been pointed out by the Lord Himself in two parables. "The kingdom of heaven," says He, "is likened unto a pearl," in exchange for which a merchant parted with all his possessions; and the kingdom of heaven is also likened "unto leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened" (Matt. xiii. 33, 45). The first parable represents the kingdom of God in the purely religious sphere as the one thing needful, for which all other things are to be sacrificed. The second parable represents God's kingdom in its worldly sphere as an all-penetrating, all-transforming principle. Christianity meets with a moral life in the world, the family, the state, art, science, etc. Into this it sinks down like leaven. As the leaven is diffused in the mass, so will the Christian principle diffuse itself in the life of the world, will not immediately let itself be seen, will only appear indirectly, will be known only in its operations. To fix the attention on one of these parables to the exclusion of the other, leads to a one-sided apprehension of Christianity. If Christianity is contemplated exclusively as the pearl, it then becomes also entirely a world-renouncing asceticism, as we see with monks and pietists, who will only admit the purely religious as valid. On the other hand, if Christianity is contemplated exclusively as the leaven, the independence of religion is denied, and the idea arises that the Church will ere long become superfluous, and be merged in the State, in worldly morality, and in culture. Among the more recent expounders of ethics, Rothe, notwithstanding his unquestionable excellence, can hardly escape censure for a one-sided apprehension of the kingdom of God as leaven, by which the central importance of Christianity does not receive perfect justice.

§ 9.

Since Christianity appears under the two great conflicting creeds of Catholicism and Protestantism, a division may be further instituted between *Catholic* and *Protestant* morality. The difference in the religious doctrines is mirrored in that of their respective codes of morality. In Catholicism the primary relation of dependence on Christ is repressed and put in the shade by the relation of dependence on the hierarchy of the Church, a hierarchy on earth (the priesthood) and a hierarchy in heaven (the Virgin Mary and the saints), a host of self-elected mediators between God and man. It was the task of the Reformation to bring Christians back from this false and illusory relation of dependence, from these false authorities to the true dependence, and thereby to restore true evangelical liberty. The character of the Reformation, at once moral and religious, shows itself in a pregnant manner at the point of its commencement, since it begins as the reaction of the wounded and abused *conscience* against the misleading of the people in the sale of indulgences, as a solemn protest against the making merchandise of holy things, as *e.g.* that money, in virtue of the authority of the Church, should take the place of personal repentance, and that that should be offered for sale which can alone be given by the free grace of God, and appropriated by a humble heart and a broken spirit.

Essentially the return to the true relation of dependence is expressed in the *formal* and *material* principle of our Church. From the yoke of human teaching, from the false traditions of men, it turns back to the original document of revelation, the *Holy Scriptures*, as the supreme rule and guide in doctrine. Only God's word must have supreme authority in the Church, and every other spiritual authority must be subordinate to this. But the relation of dependence on Christ is not merely an outward relation through the Scriptures. We have a living present Christ, who not merely gives His testimony outside of us, in His Church, in His word, and in His institutions, but also within us, in the Christian regenerated personality, in which "God's Spirit witnesses with our spirit that we are the children of God" (Rom. viii.).

The cardinal point in the regenerated personality is *justifica-*

tion by faith. That sinful man may be justified before God, or acknowledged by God as righteous, means, that the atonement of grace, which is Christ's work, is appropriated by the individual man, that the forgiveness of sins is bestowed on him, and that he is received by God as His child. In justification by faith alone, and not by works, the relation of deepest dependence is one with that of the utmost freedom of will. No human action can avail to make me righteous in the sight of God, or to place me in normal relation to Him. No effort of my own, no self-purification, can blot out my sin and my transgression. In free and abounding mercy God has forgiven, and man can only act the part of receiver, can only "allow himself to be reconciled with God" (2 Cor. v. 20), can only as hungering and thirsting receive the fulness of grace which is poured forth on him, can only, as the naked, permit himself to be clothed upon with Christ's righteousness. But this receptive relation cannot find place unless man has trust and confidence in grace. This trust or confidence is an act of the most cordial free-will, in the midst of deep and perfect dependence, though it has itself its origin in grace, is the work of grace in the heart, for the natural heart of man does not venture to believe that God could bestow such abundant mercy so disproportioned to the merit and deserving of mankind. Justifying grace is for Protestantism the one pearl of great price, in exchange for which all human justification and all human wisdom must be relinquished. It is opposed to the merely historical faith of Catholicism, which is only an external relation of dependence on Christ through the testimony of the Church; it is an inward personal relation of dependence, the living bond between the human personality and the crucified and risen Christ, through which man in his inmost being is united to the Redeemer and thence to the triune God.

It is not, like the faith of Catholicism, satisfied with being a creed, an acquiescence in the teaching of the Church, and a reception of the same; it requires the total appropriation of the heart by Christ. This was indeed the pearl of great price which Luther found, when in the cloister he had vainly sought peace of conscience by self-imposed penances and laborious exertions, and in the possession of this he became happy and courageous. Justification by faith is not merely a tenet, not merely an axiom, but a principle in the highest sense of the term, a living *first* principle, bearing in itself a whole world of consequences. What has been called the principle of subjectivity, or the principle of personality as belonging to Protestantism, is entirely contained within it. It implies not merely the preciousness of the human personality in the sight of divine love, which is not willing that any one should be lost, but also this, that salvation is a matter between man and God, between man and his Redeemer, that no priesthood, no human authority, dare interpose between man and his God. "Thou must thyself decide it," says Luther, "for thy life is at stake."

And this evangelical principle of *freedom* is inseparable from the evangelical principle of *equality*, that all Christians are alike before God, and that there is here no difference between priests and laity. It is this which is expressed in the doctrine of the *universal priesthood* of Christians. This is not meant to exclude what the Lord has Himself ordained, namely, a ministry for the proclamation of the word and the administration of the sacraments; for God is not the God of confusion, but of peace and of order. And as in the Church there may be a diversity of spiritual gifts, so also there may be a diversity of offices. But this it does imply, that all Christians have the same access to God's grace, and that there is no longer any need for a high priest who shall place himself as mediator between God and the people. It implies that all Christians have the same right to become partakers of the means of grace, the same access to Christ's cross, from which no papal or priestly infallibility can debar. It implies that arbitrary exclusion from the visible Church does not of necessity entail exclusion from the invisible.

From justification by faith is developed *evangelical morality*, which we may describe as a life of freedom and love by the grace of God. In Catholic morality, the religious basis of which is the obedience of faith towards the Church, obedience to God must be inseparable from obedience to the ecclesiastical law of ceremonies, and an external rule of service is mixed up with everything, even with that which is essentially the same as the evangelical practice. There has also, indeed, appeared within the Catholic Church, both in older and in recent times, a tendency to mystic devotion and inward freedom. But this too is circumscribed by externality, because the true principle of freedom or justification by faith has not obtained its right position.

§ 10.

Through justification by faith, and through discriminating between justification and sanctification, Protestantism places religion and morality in their normal relation to each other. Real unity is everywhere conditioned by real diversity, real distinction. The Reformation was obliged to introduce a number of radical distinctions between those things which in Catholicism were obscurely mixed together. As it distinguished between the word of God and the teaching of man, the Lord's appointments and man's devices, divine and human right, so also between law and gospel, justification and sanctification, faith and good works. We are justified by faith alone (*sola-fide*), and not by works,—that is not to say that good works and moral efforts are matters of indifference; it only means that religion and morality are not one and the same, and ought not therefore to be confounded. Each of them ought to be placed in its right position; each has its own peculiar power and influence, and should have the honour which belongs to it. I cannot be justified before God by my own exertions, cannot by merit procure the forgiveness of my sins, but only by faith receive it as a gift of grace. Then only has my life found its right commencement, and only when I have a merciful God can I work out my sanctification. Catholicism, on the other hand, confounds justification and sanctification. It says, we are not justified by faith alone, but by faith *and* good works. But in this manner the religious consciousness does not obtain its rights.

If the forgiveness of my sins rests on my sanctification, then I must be in continual uncertainty. For in my best actions there is always something which requires forgiveness, and I dare not, therefore, rely on them as making full satisfaction, or as supplements to the merits of Christ: moral effort is an alternation of rising and sinking, of advancing and retreating. I am, in the most favourable case, only in an approximation towards reconciliation. But my certainty of reconciliation requires a stedfast and immovable foundation. This is Christ

Himself, the perfect One, appropriated by faith. The doctrine of Catholicism, that we are justified by faith and good works, has its foundation in its meagre conception of faith, which, according to it, is a mere enlightenment, a reception of the teaching of the Church; and it therefore endeavours to supply this deficiency by another principle, active love, sanctification. The Protestant faith is the heart's appropriation of the crucified Saviour who stretches out His arms to man; it is the lively appropriation of the words: "Sacrificed for you, for thee." The Protestant controversy with good works is not therefore directed against morality itself, but only against a morality *usurping the place* of faith,—good works which profess to purchase what no morality can purchase, man's reconciliation with God. This controversy is not merely in the interest of religion, but even in that of morality itself. By its deeper teaching concerning faith Protestantism establishes the principle of true morality, and thereby proclaims the indissoluble union of religion and morality. For assuredly "good deeds do not make a man pious, but a pious man does good deeds" (Luther).

Faith is the fruitful mustard seed which developes into a great tree. It is not a mere assent, but as the appropriation of Christ, it is, as Luther says, "the restored will, the upright heart, the new understanding. Faith is not a useless and lifeless thing which lies hidden in the heart of a dead sinner. A faith which bears no fruit is not the true faith. Like a tree destitute of leaves or blossom, and which is fit only to be burnt, so also with a barren faith. Faith is not like a dead fly in winter, but is lively and active. It is impossible that it should ever cease to do good works. Neither does faith first inquire if it is imperative to engage in such works, but it anticipates the demand, and is ever busy in its performance."[1] Yet Luther would not build his salvation, the forgiveness of his sins, on his good works, but only on Christ appropriated by faith; on the Redeemer who had already received him in baptism and adopted him into the fellowship of the triune God.

With this distinction between religion and morality there is closely connected another of extreme importance to the whole of human society, the distinction between the *religious* and the *worldly* sphere of action, between purely religious morality and morality in relative independence on religion. This is shown specially in the distinction between Church and State. According to the principles of Catholicism, in which the hierarchical Church identifies itself with the kingdom of God, the State must borrow its authority from the Church; and thus the popes of the middle ages aimed at an earthly kingdom of God, in which kings and princes were the pontiff's vassals. Catholicism desires a theocracy, a condition of things in which all worldly matters must be placed under the government of the Church, where all Christendom must be one great ecclesiastical state, where all worldly aims must be disposed in reference to the service of religion, that is to say, of the Church,—in other words, where the worldly, the secular, the non-ecclesiastic must be the bond slave of religion. With the Reformation this became altered. The same principle of freedom which is inherent in religion will now also take form in the various concerns of every-day life. Along with liberty was also diffused in society *discriminative justice*, and for the second time this word of the Lord received universal significance: "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's,"—that is to say, give to the aim of religion what is due to it, but let other aims also have fair play. The State does not require to borrow its authority from the Church, for it is itself a divine institution, though it ought certainly to maintain its connection with the Church and with religion; for the ultimate security of the State lies in religion, since morality and every right sentiment must have its basis here.

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[1] See especially Luther's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, and his Preface to the *Epistle to the Romans.*

What is here said of the independence of the State is equally applicable to every other sphere of ordinary life. Every purpose or design which is grounded on the economy of creation and on human nature must develope itself after its own fashion according to its relative autonomy, the independence given to it by God. Accordingly, there must not be merely ecclesiastical art and ecclesiastical science, but art and science have their own special spheres independent of the Church. It is involved in the principle of the Reformation that religion must continue to be the highest, the all-governing, all-penetrating power; but its sovereignty must be that of the Spirit, it must only work by means of the Word and the Spirit, to which it is referred by our Lord, whose kingdom is not of this world. It must not endeavour to maintain God's kingdom by the sword, as Peter sought to do when he smote the servant of the high priest and cut off his ear, in which he was a type of the Romish Church, and of so many of the so-called successors of Peter, who have desired to come to the help of Christ by employing the sword against His opponents, not remembering the words of the Lord: "Put up thy sword into its sheath." Religion (the gospel) must be the central power in social life; but in order that it may be the perfect centre, the circles on the circumference must be circles of freedom, must in a relative sense have their centres in themselves. Its relation to the forces of ordinary life must not be external and mechanical, but dynamic, since it must inwardly exert its transforming and emancipating influence. We speak here only of the principle, and consider the subject generally; for with regard to this historical execution there is not a little to remark, and more minute definitions need to be added. The historical reducing to practice of this great principle, which embraces no less than the organic relation between authority and liberty, between true dependence and true liberty in all spheres of life,—for as every sphere of society has its special relation of freedom, so has it also its corresponding relation of dependence,—this cannot be done at once, but requires time and circumstances favourable to its development. Sometimes a spirit of thraldom has found entrance, and during long periods obstructed the unfolding of Protestant principles. Sometimes Protestant liberty has been perverted into libertinism. For there is danger that the relative autonomy, which through Protestantism is restored to the purposes of ordinary life, may be taken as an absolute autonomy. Then step forth to view morality without religion, and the State without religion.

If we contemplate *social life* in the present day from the ethical view-point, we perceive, so long as our observations are confined to the general aspect of things, three principal tendencies. Of these, we name first the two following: the *evangelical Protestant* tendency, which desires to remain on the basis of the Reformation and strives after moral aims, in their connection with religious principle; next, the system of morality and of politics, which *disclaims religion.* This last, namely, non-religious politics, is interwoven with the doctrine of the rights of man, brought forward during the last century by Rousseau and by the French Revolution. The *truth* contained in this doctrine is included in the principles of the Reformation. For, from the infinite value of human personality before God, from the conception of the free personality in God, springs also the claim of personal right in the sphere of earthly matters, the claim of civil and political freedom, of religious freedom, freedom of scientific research, etc., and especially this claim, that no man ought to be merely and barely a means for the benefit of others. But this truth became negative, and practically destructive of the cohesion of society, because liberty tore itself loose from authority, from the true as well as from the false, and acknowledged no other relation of dependence than that which may be established and abolished by the determination of the majority. It is of no use to abrogate false authorities if the true are not set up in their place. Revolution under diverse metamorphoses has continued to go round the world to the present day, and still the wants of society may be thus described, that it cannot discover the right authority towards which it may take up the required position of dependence, which means, in brief, that it cannot find its true relation to religion as the highest invisible authority; for an authority which is only visible and external, cannot aid this generation, and the deepest contrast of our times is the contrast between belief and unbelief. The third great tendency is *Roman Catholicism,* which has never yet yielded any of the pretensions it asserted in the middle ages, without, however, being able to carry these into execution, and therefore makes its appearance, wherever it can, as a genuine reaction. As it has resolutely refused to learn anything either from the Reformation or the Revolution, which it classes together under the same condemnation, it seeks to bring back the world to obedience to the Church. This is shown in a striking manner in the recent declaration of the dogma of the Pope's infallibility, which is doubtless intended to meet the requirement of our day for authority, but which, unfortunately, has set up an authority which does not "by manifestation of the truth commend itself to every man's conscience" (2 Cor. iv.), and in which even those within the

Romish Church can scarcely believe. It cannot, certainly, be denied that the Romish Church, along with the false traditions of ancient Christianity, has also preserved the true, and that, therefore, it deserves its comparison with the immovable rock (*Petra*), which stands firm amidst the surgings of broken thraldoms round its base. But neither must it be forgotten that the most violent of all revolutions broke forth, not in a Protestant, but in a Catholic country, and that the Roman Catholic Church, notwithstanding its stability and external authority, was quite impotent to curb or to allay its fury. And since Catholicism has been re-introduced into France, this gifted nation finds itself in a condition of unresolved dualism, inasmuch as it possesses a fair degree of liberty in the sphere of worldly matters, whilst in religion it is fettered,—a dualism which has not proved salutary in times bygone, and can scarcely be expected to succeed better in the time to come.[1] For an abundant measure of liberty in the sphere of worldly matters, and blind obedience to an external authority in that of religion, are such extremely heterogeneous principles, that they can scarcely subsist together in the same consciousness, and seem inevitably to lead to doubt, denial, and unbelief, even if outward reverence for religious forms be preserved.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND DOGMATICS.

§ 11.

In the relation between morality and religion developed above, the relation between ethics and dogmatics is given at the same time. Ethics is related to dogmatics as morality to religion, as the relation of liberty to the relation of dependence. On account of their relationship and essential unity, it was long believed that they could be treated under one. But it must certainly be considered as a step in advance, when ethics was separated from dogmatics as a distinct study, which was first done in the Lutheran Church by Calixtus (Callisen, a native of Slesvig).[1] For if ethics be only taken along with dogmatics and distributed among the various portions of this subject, it cannot receive justice, being only treated, so to speak, incidentally. If, on the other hand, it finds within the consideration of dogmatics a satisfactory amount of attention, this can only be effected at the expense of the other, which it must disturb and perplex. Nevertheless, although dogmatics and ethics are to be treated as different and distinct sciences, yet the difference between them is only relative. The one always bears testimony for the other, and constantly evinces their twin nature, although dogmatics is the first-born, and thus enjoys a higher dignity. Dogmatics as the Christian doctrine of faith is ethical; for it treats of a revelation from the personal God, who addresses Himself to the free personality of man. And ethics as the Christian rule of life is dogmatic; for it treats of a life of free-will, which is lived in faith, and the doctrines of which are grounded in the doctrines of faith. Dogmatics treats of the being and the attributes of God; of the divine decrees, and the divine execution of these in the works of creation, of providence, and of sanctification, the aim of which is the kingdom of God in the kingdom of man's free-will. Although dogmatics sets forth that the accomplishment of the divine decree, or the constant progress of God's kingdom in the human race, is qualified by human free-will, it nevertheless represents as paramount this divine decree—the final realization of which, in spite of all earthly opposition, in spite of all the aberrations of human free-will, and in spite of the apparently doubtful issue of the conflict, *must* yet be accomplished—as the fore-ordained purpose of God, which is specially demonstrated in Christian eschatology, wherein the prophetic enunciation of the perfect victory of the kingdom of God is clearly found. Ethics, on the other hand, represents the kingdom of God, or the highest good, in so far as this is the task of man's free-will, and is to be striven after through it. Dogmatics teaches what is, and was, and what infallibly shall be; ethics, what ought to be, and along with this what ought not to be. In dogmatics we recognise pre-eminently God and His dealings in relation to man and the world, and man's dependence on God and these dealings. In ethics we recognise pre-eminently man and his acting in relation to the life-tasks appointed him by God. The teaching of the law of God thus appears both in dogmatics and in ethics. But in dogmatics, the law is specially considered from the view-point of God's revelation and His educative guidance of the human race: in ethics, from the view-point of human action as the obligatory norm or rule for man's will and conduct, or as man's *duty* which developes itself into a system of duties. Sin also, as the contrast of the good, as that in the life of man which ought not to be, must appear in both dogmatics and ethics. But in dogmatics, sin presents itself especially as an existing derangement, an abnormality in human nature, which, in the beginning of man's being, found entrance through his liberty under the divine permission, and which unfolds its necessary consequences pursuant to the law of development, to which God has subjected our race in this present world. In ethics, sin presents itself especially as an abnormality in the self-conscious life of free-will, both of the individual and of society, who have not merely received it as an inheritance, but have themselves, moreover, shared in it. In dogmatics, sin is acknowledged principally as universal depravity in its necessary development: in ethics, it is considered principally in its manifold individual instances, both in social life and in regard to each person separately, and, moreover, in its transition from possibility to actual commission by free choice. "God hath concluded them all in unbelief,[1] that he might have mercy upon all" (Rom. xi. 32). This is dogmatic. "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man: but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed" (Jas. i. 13, 14). This again is ethical.

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[1] The German translation of this work by the Rev. A. Michelsen bears the following footnote on the passage indicated: "These words were written before the outbreak of the recent Franco-German war; yet in the latest destiny of France, and in many of the circumstances which occurred during the course of this terrible contest, they find strange confirmation."

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[1] Born 1586, died 1656.—MICHELSEN.

Also the doctrine regarding the person of Christ must have a place both in dogmatics and in ethics. In dogmatics, however, Christ is acknowledged emphatically as the Redeemer; in ethics, He is represented as the model for our imitation. Sanctification, too, comes under these two different phases. In dogmatics, it is regarded chiefly from the stand-point of the operations of grace; in ethics, from that of free-will. "It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do" (Phil. i. 13). This is dogmatic. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling" (Phil. i. 12). This is ethical, as the ethical development of sanctification further expands this teaching through a multiplicity of *virtues*. The doctrine concerning Christ's Church appears both in dogmatics and ethics. But in dogmatics the Church stands forth pre-eminently as God's work, institution, and ordinance; in ethics, as a human institution, which is produced by the activity of believers in building on the foundation of the divine appointment and institution. "The gates of hell shall not prevail against my Church" (Matt. xvi. 8). This is dogmatic. "Seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the Church" (1 Cor. xiv. 12). "Let all things be done decently, and in order" (1 Cor. xiv. 40). This is ethical.

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[1] *Under disobedience* in the Danish version of the passage.

§ 12.

Just as dogmatics must have a biblical character,—since the Holy Scriptures are not merely the highest criterion and rule of doctrine, but also contain the fulness of truth, from which Christian thought must constantly draw its supplies, and through which it must constantly afresh be fructified,—the same holds good with regard to ethics. But ethics appears as a distinct science, inasmuch as it places itself in the same primary relation to the Holy Scriptures as dogmatics. To read the Scriptures with a dogmatic eye is not the same thing as to read them with an ethical eye; and the ethical consideration of Scripture, in the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles, will bring to light matters which a merely dogmatic consideration would not take into account. This is especially the case in regard to the central point in Holy Scripture—the person of Christ. Ethical Christology, which apprehends Christ as our model for imitation, must represent one side of His glory, which is only partially given in dogmatic Christology. But as the ethical Christology presupposes the dogmatic, so it may also come to exercise both a completing and correcting reflex influence upon it. On the other side, a step in advance in dogmatics may have a striking effect on the treatment of ethics. We may here mention an example of some significance. In our own times no small progress has been made in the treatment of Protestant dogmatics in the province of Christian eschatology, or the doctrine concerning final results, through a deeper comprehension of the course of God's kingdom through history, and its completion: by which means a consideration of the entire history of our race becomes possible, which was not accessible to the theology of former times. Ethics in the days of prevailing orthodoxy took essentially as its subject only the life of the individual, under supposition of law and gospel, as the whole doctrine of the way of salvation. It is true that it exhibited also a social teaching, yet only in so far as it treated of the individual forms of society—the family, the State, the Church. On the other hand, it lacked the idea of God's kingdom as distinct from the Church; or to speak more correctly, this idea could not at that time exercise any beneficial influence, as the idea of a divine-human, invisible-visible organ, embracing human society both in its separate forms and individuals, the course of which through all the generations of our race down to its glorious completion gives the history of man its deepest significance. Only Bengel[1] and Oetinger and their disciples form an exception in this respect amongst all our older Lutheran theologians, since their whole religious teaching bears a predominant impress of eschatology and history, and is pre-eminently a theology of the kingdom of God. Since now the idea of the kingdom of God has again been revived in the dogmatics of our times in an eschatological direction, it cannot and ought not to be without a quickening influence on Christian ethics, which is thereby enabled to develope a practical *conception of the world*, which was wanting in the ethics of former times. For it may be described as the most conspicuous deficiency of this system of ethics, that it is without conception of the world and without an historical background.

And just as dogmatics must have an ecclesiastical and confessional character, so, too, ethics must bring to consciousness the contrast between Catholic and Protestant morality. In accordance with the mode of proceeding in dogmatics, we should also in ethics go back to the written confessions of faith of our respective churches, which, however, we can only accomplish here in a much narrower extent than in dogmatics; because the dogmatic differences in our symbols are treated with far greater minuteness than the ethical. That the relation to Catholicism is not merely polemical, lies in the nature of the matter. For as the Evangelical Church, especially in its Lutheran division, bears in its bosom a tendency to genuine catholicity to the universal Christian, evangelical ethics has thus an interest in seeking within Catholicism for evangelical elements and points of agreement, in order to arrive at a deeper comprehension of the moral; and we need only to recall the mystics of the Catholic Church, and such names as Pascal, Fenelon, Sailer, to be reminded at the same time of an esoteric tendency in Catholicism, from which we—if there still remain behind an ultimate and highest difference—may yet in many respects receive instruction.

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[1] Bengel, born 1687, died 1751. Oetinger, born 1702, died 1782. German translation.

The contrast also between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic creeds cannot but have an influence on the treatment of ethics, although this contrast is of an entirely different nature from that between Catholicism and Protestantism. Immediately to deduce the ethical distinction between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic or Reformed Church from their dogmatic differences, could hardly be accomplished in a satisfactory manner. After all, it will scarcely be possible to express this difference in a single formula. Yet history shows us a characteristic distinctive individuality between the two. Though both stand in common opposition to the external legalism of the Catholic Church; though they both rest on justification by faith alone; yet evangelical liberty appears more lively in Lutheranism than in Calvinism, as reflected from the personal characters of the two men, Luther and Calvin, the latter with his sternness and rigorous church discipline bearing the impress of a moral dictator. Speaking generally, the Lutheran communion shows a greater faculty than the Reformed for cultivation of the inner life, whilst the Calvinistic has more energy in acts of outward practical activity; and, in this respect, we may say that the contrast between Mary and Martha—the Lord loved them both—is mirrored in these two communions. The Lutheran Church has its strength in contemplation, in mysticism and theosophy, in hymnology, in worship and art; the Reformed Church has its strength in foreign and home missions, in voluntary associations for Christian objects, such as slave-emancipation, assistance to the poor and the sick, the diffusion of the Scriptures and of religious tracts. Whilst political interests and those of Church organization lie further removed from the original and peculiar character of Lutheranism, Calvinism has displayed great capacity in this respect. In regard to the State, Lutheranism, from the commencement, has had a preference for the principle of monarchy, whilst Calvinism has attached itself to the republican and representative systems. The universal priesthood of believers is acknowledged by both communions; but Lutheranism maintains the independence of the pastoral office in a deeper sense than Calvinism, which also exerts an influence on the constitutions of the churches. In recent times both communions have approached each other more nearly,—an approach in sentiment and mode of thought which must be acknowledged as a fact, even if it cannot be acknowledged that as yet there is any real union. On both sides it is freely admitted that there is much to be learnt and to be received from the other. Yet granting that the Lutheran Church might receive ethical instruction from the Calvinist, this ought not to be a mere imitation of the Reformed practice and institutions, but a free and independent adoption in harmony with its own individuality and its own historic past. And thus a system of ethics will then be produced on the stand-point of the Lutheran Church, bearing its individual impress, which will distinguish it from a system of ethics proceeding from the stand-point of the Calvinist Church.

§ 13.

But as Christian dogmatics ought not to be merely the representation of the traditions of Scripture and the Church, but the scientific discernment of the inner truth of the Christian doctrines of faith, so, too, it is incumbent on ethics to discriminate Christian good in its intrinsic excellence, and to lay the foundation of moral instruction on the scientific connection of the whole subject. The Evangelical Church acknowledges that what sanctions Christian doctrine to us finally, is the witness of God's Spirit (*testimonium spiritus sancti*). But this must not be received merely as a witness in feeling and conscience, but also in thought, in so far as the thought of divine wisdom manifests itself to human contemplation. And as in dogmatics we speak of a Christian idea of truth, so also in ethics we speak of a Christian idea of morality, which in the believing and regenerated consciousness is a source of perception from which, in co-operation with the dictates of Scripture and the Church, the contents of Christian ethics are evolved.

But ideas, it will be asked, do they not belong to reason? And are there other ideas than those given in reason, of which the chief is the idea of the Good in its unity with the True, as the existent in the highest sense of the word, as the absolutely priceless, that fixes the value and position of everything else in the whole universe, and which is therefore the highest object for the human will? Are there other ideas than the eternal principles of reason, without which we should not be in a condition to recognise the True and the Good, when we encounter them in our experience? We reply: These are the same, and none other than those which are treated of in Christian science. But the difference is, that these ideas without Christianity, and as bare and so-called "pure" ideas of reason, lack the fulness of life and fixity which revelation bestows, and are more or less formal generalities, as also without Christianity they lack their true central-point in the living God. Therefore, in Christian ethics we speak of the same matters as those of which pure reason treats, and yet they are not the same. For the Christian idea of morality stands in the same relation to that of pure reason which the positive and concrete holds to the abstract and general. Only the Christian idea of morality possesses the possibility of real progress, because it developes itself by means of the facts of revelation, and in a consciousness in which revelation and redemption themselves have become facts, whilst the mere idea of reason has no possibility of a vital progress, although it is the necessary condition (*conditio sine qua non*) for the reception of revelation.

Of the fructifying power of the Christian idea of morality we may convince ourselves by a glance at the history of the Church, which shows us many forms of Christian morality which have not been deduced from Scripture, as they relate to circumstances which were entirely unknown at the time when the Scriptures were written, and yet their Christianity is genuine. If the Christian idea of morality as an internal source of knowledge be denied, then Christian consciousness must present itself in the character of a mere *tabula rasa* over against the letter of Scripture. Thus with sects who receive our Lord's sermon on the Mount literally, and not according to the spirit which it breathes; and, for example, refuse to take the oath of citizens, because it is written, "Let your communications be yea, yea, nay, nay;" as in like manner they also consider the profession of arms incompatible with Christianity, because it is written, "If any man smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." The same holds good of the mistaken conception of Christ as our pattern, in which many persons have imagined that the imitation of Christ meant copying Him outwardly. The relative *à priori* in Christian morality in virtue of the witness of the indwelling idea and of the Holy Ghost, must have been clearly perceived by Luther when he says: "If we have Christ, and keep hold of Him, then we may soon make laws, and be correct in all our judgments; nay, we may even frame a new decalogue, as Paul does in all his epistles, Peter also, but especially as Christ Himself does in the gospel."[1] That is to say, if we have the Spirit of God as our life-spring, then we may produce new moral forms, and solve the new problems which life offers us. Nevertheless this *à priori* is only to be taken relatively. For if by despising it we arrive at a false and mechanical dependence on Scripture, on the other hand, an exclusive reception of it will land us in an antinomian relation towards Scripture and the Church. The truth is, that the idea must be developed in living alliance with the positive assertions of Scripture.

Our stand-point of perception in regard to Christian morality differs, therefore, equally from a supernaturalism, which takes its stand on revelation to the exclusion of human research and inquiry, and from a rationalism, which takes its stand on its own power of thought, to the exclusion of faith and revelation. Such a supernaturalism ignores the fact that revelation is exactly conformable to reason, and that reason must be consonant with revelation. That is to say, the fundamental questions of reason must just be those to which revelation gives the reply, and reason, when enlightened by God's Spirit, must always learn better how to inquire and how to comprehend the reply which revelation gives: should there be an absolute opposition between reason and Christian revelation, then must reason and the natural revelation given in reason have another god as its source than that of the Christian revelation; or else human nature must be so disturbed by sin, that sin and darkness have become man's substance, by which means human nature certainly would become the absolutely heterogeneous as regards Christianity, and Christianity the absolute paradox for man, which, however, is opposed to Scripture and the doctrine of the Church, and is expressly rejected as heresy by Protestant divines. On the other hand, the rationalism which takes its stand on reason, to the exclusion of revelation, ignores that the natural reason is darkened by sin, and that Christianity holds the same relation towards reason as it does to the entire human nature, partly as redeeming, partly as perfecting and developing to perfection. Whilst we thus then assert a certain degree of unity between reason and revelation, this unity cannot be absolute so long as sin still endures; it contains, therefore, a relative opposition between reason and revelation, an opposition which cannot be perfectly overcome in this æon, on which account there always continues to be in our perception a transcendental, to which knowledge does not attain.[1] This is the reason why Christian knowledge never can outgrow the Holy Scriptures and the eternal fulness of revelation therein contained, but must constantly again return to it, in order that the subjective consciousness may more intimately embrace the objective Christianity. If our assertion of a relative unity of reason and revelation should shock those whose motto is, *Aut Cesar aut nihil*, and who demand either an absolute affirmative or an absolute negative, we reply, that relativity is at present the ineffaceable mark of our world, in which, even after atonement has been made, and the absolute principle become reality, the insuperable opposition between ideal and actual yet remains. Experience also teaches that a supposed absolute knowledge is no more satisfactory than absolute ignorance. The history of philosophy abundantly demonstrates that the whole of the so-called science of pure reason, in spite of all its pretended absoluteness, is yet in reality very relative, even when it has endeavoured to fix the boundaries of knowledge, and has determined itself to be ignorance. For every new system of philosophy has hitherto commenced with the assertion that reason in the preceding systems had only had a relative self-knowledge, and had thus been relatively alien to itself. The fragmentary character of our knowledge is not to be got rid of during this state of existence and under these earthly conditions.

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[1] Luther's Works. Walch, 19th edition, page 1750.

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[1] See Martensen's *Dogmatics* and his treatise on *Faith and Knowledge.*

From what has been here said follows our reply to the question, How shall we determine the relation between Christian ethics and philosophic ethics? That there is any real opposition between the two we do not admit, as philosophic ethics may very well be also Christian, and Christian ethics philosophical. The difference here will only be analogous to that between the philosophy of religion and Christian dogmatics. On the other hand, we certainly acknowledge an opposition between Christian ethics and non-Christian, or a system claiming to found the teaching of morality on means of its own, independent of revelation. Nevertheless, the relation of Christian ethics to the non-Christian is not merely a relation of opposition, but in a certain sense also a relation of unity. For as the ideal of humanity, to which Christianity seeks to redeem and perfect man, is the same for which human nature was originally designed, but the development of which was checked and disturbed by sin, there must be, since the disturbance was not absolute, a human ideal common to both Christian and non-Christian ethics. And so, too, the formal moral concepts, the concept of the normal both for individual and social life, of free-will and the Good, of duty and virtue, are the same for Christian ethics as for non-Christian. But the contents are different, and thence the relation of the former to the latter is partly critical, reviewing and correcting, partly completing and perfecting; whilst it points out that only through Christianity can these general conceptions receive life and completion, attain their true character, and accomplish their just object. Just because Christian ethics must develope the true ideal of humanity, nothing belonging to humanity should be alien to it; and it should be its task to exhibit the unity of the Christian and the human, that the human which denies the Christian is not genuine humanity; as, on the other hand, it ought to show that the Christian which denies the human is not genuine Christianity.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MODERN HUMANITY.

§ 14.

The demand here expressed for the union of the Christian and the human, receives in our times a peculiar significance. The characteristic of the age, its leading thought and tendency, may be aptly described in the one word, humanity. Although certainly a twofold ideal of humanity exists at the present day, yet the prevailing ideal is the autonomic. It is not by chance that the Promethean myth, from different sides, and in different connections, has, as it were, brought itself into the memory of this generation, with its aspirations after "the human."[1] Prometheus is a Titan, who holds it for a robbery to be equal with the gods, yet steals fire from heaven. It is he who imparts to men culture and civilisation, arts and sciences. It is he who makes them polished and intelligent, but not pious or benevolent, rather haughty and god-defying like himself. Their knowledge is without the fear of God; their freedom is without obedience and reverence. While men thus by unlawful means had attained civilisation, Prometheus, as the representative of humanity, was by the command of Zeus, in punishment of his crime, chained to a rock, where an eagle constantly tore out his liver, which as constantly grew afresh. Every third day "the winged hound of Zeus" returned to feed upon the freshly formed liver. This liver, which never dies, is a type of the desires and passions which cannot die; and the eagle which again and again devours it, whenever it has grown afresh, represents the tortures which are inseparable from the desires: Prometheus himself in his suffering is an image of the human ego, escaped from communion with God. With the fetters of necessity, hard as iron, he is bound to the bleak rock of reality, throughout ages devoted to tortures unutterable, from which he is first delivered by Hercules, a son of the gods, who with his arrow slays the eagle and breaks the chain of Prometheus; in this respect a type and image of the Redeemer, who brings deliverance to the sinful and enslaved race of man. Prometheus, as

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[1] Dorner in his *Yearbook of Theology*, i. p. 361; and H. Martensen's work, *Recollections of J. P. Mynster*, p. 44 and onwards.

Schelling says, is not an idea which has been conceived in the mind of some individual; he is rather one of those primary ideas which force themselves into existence. It is not merely the genius of the Greeks,—which in this myth gave forth a mysterious shrift, in which it acknowledges itself as free and yet as fettered, because its freedom is not legitimate, whilst at the same time it expresses a hope of deliverance,—it is the genius of mankind which speaks here. For this myth is of universal significance. And in our own day the Promethean myth has found a fresh fulfilment. For in more than one respect the present generation has acquired its great advance in civilisation, its many treasures of science, and its sovereignty over nature, in the Promethean way. It has attained these possessions, according to its own vain-glorious imaginations, through emancipation from belief, from obedience and from love to God; and its guilt may be described in the words of Isa. xlvii. 10: "Thou saidst, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thine heart, I am, and none else besides me." And therefore is this generation in its emancipated freedom at the same time so fettered and given over as a prey to secret pangs and anxieties, and to a weary tempestuous waste in its inner world. Incessantly it struggles for freedom, and strives in vain to break its fetters by continued efforts after advances in civilisation and in civil liberty. But it can only be redeemed by the way which leads from without to within, only through the Saviour, through the gospel of Christ.

It is true that we must again and again press the fact, that cultivation, that art and science are not evils, but, on the contrary, belong to a perfect condition of human existence; nay, it may even be said that knowledge and refinement are necessary conditions for the development of morality and religion, which can only be very imperfectly evolved under circumstances of barbarism and ignorance, insomuch that Christianity itself implants the germ of refinement where this was before absent. But what concerns modern humanity in this is, that its possession of culture should be legitimate, and be placed in the right position towards religion, which it can only be when man receives his sovereignty from the King of kings as his liege Lord, and is willing to become God's vassal and steward upon earth, instead of wishing to be himself sole master and proprietor. This is that process of redemption by which the race shall be delivered from its Promethean tortures;[1] this constitutes the deep mystery which is to be fulfilled in this age. That science is not able to save this generation does not require assertion. But nevertheless Christian science assists in the *perception* of saving truth.

And just on this account Christian science must not entertain mere indifference or contempt towards the Promethean humanity of our times, but acknowledge the enslaved moments of truth in this emancipated consciousness of the world, and seek in this the point of union for the Christian. It must also be acknowledged that very many among those who stand under the influences of this emancipated humanity have not so much adopted its Titanic sentiments, as they have, without themselves knowing how, become participant in its mysterious sufferings. Many seek deliverance, and would receive it with joy if it could be brought to them; they seek something new, and know not that this new thing which they desire is Christianity rightly understood. Christianity, which is not, as it has often been represented, something alien, nay, hostile to human feeling and life; but, on the contrary, that which can satisfy its deepest craving. Orthodoxy and Pietism have not a little cause to reproach themselves in reference to this worldly humanity, which they have too frequently regarded exclusively as composed of ungodliness, emptiness, and vanity, instead of acquiring the right to utter such a sentence by first instituting a rigid self-examination, and asking themselves if they too have always placed Christianity in the right relation to humanity, and are thus blameless, when those on the opposite side have placed the human in a false relation to the Christian. We will here in particular direct attention to a single point. It cannot be denied that the older theology of our Church, as also the pietistic school and party, have themselves contributed in no small degree to call forth this spirit of free-thinking, by too exclusively fixing the eye on the kingdom of grace, whilst closing it entirely on the kingdom of nature, the primary kingdom of creation, which is the presupposition of that of grace. They were so absorbed in the doctrines of salvation, of

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[1] Eph. i. 9; Rom. xvi. 25; Germ. trans.

Christ's special work, that the doctrines regarding God the Father, the Almighty Maker of heaven and earth, did not receive the attention and elucidation befitting them. The creation was regarded in a partial manner from the view-point of sin and corruption; and the present life was considered too exclusively as a preparation for that which is to come, whilst it was overlooked, or at least not sufficiently brought forward, that the present life can only in truth be a means for the future, when it is at the same time an object in itself, when life in this state of existence, which has been appointed for us by God, is pursued seriously and with due interest. Doubtless it was set forth in the teaching, that sin is not a constituent part of man's being; that the creation, though disturbed by sin, is still God's work, not the devil's. But these just assertions were not carried out and applied with judgment, and perception continued blind to many phenomena in the natural life and soul of man. A new perception was certainly awakened in the 15th and 16th centuries by what may be called the rediscovery of Greece and Rome, and of their respective literatures. But what was then awakened was again extinguished, especially in the 17th century, which not unjustly has been termed the Middle Ages of the Protestant Church. The perception of the human awoke first to an extent and with an intensity unknown before, in the great intellectual revolution which took place in the 18th century and still continues in our own.

This revolution had in many respects the character of an emancipation from Christianity, and assumed a position towards the Church partly hostile and partly indifferent; in so far as it is contemplated from the standpoint of emancipation, it has received expression in Goethe's famous poem, Prometheus. But although, on the whole, God had become to this race an unknown God, as to the Athenians of old, yet there arose on the spiritual horizon a kingdom of divine ideas in which the human soul recognised its own essence, and which spread such a dazzling brightness over this earthly existence, that the present life now appeared to many as so sufficient, that they felt no necessity for a future. The perception of the beautiful was developed by great poets and great artists, and it was discovered that there is an enjoyment in the beauties of nature and in the productions of art which has its value, though it is not religious. The idea of the Good, of the moral, was interpreted and set forth by men of genius, and it was announced that there is a morality, a consciousness of free-will and submission to the requirements of law and of the ideal, which claims respect although not bearing the stamp of Christianity. The joys and sorrows of the human heart, its secret workings and experiences, the genuine human struggle for life's ideals, were all depicted by poets, and powerfully influenced society. The characteristics of the universal human were scrutinized; human nature in all ages, under every clime, of every creed, was investigated; and by the magic lamp of genius were conjured forth from the realm of shadows, the gods both of the north and south, the Teutons and the Greeks, that these, the natural ideals of human life, might stand in spiritual presence. History was recognised more and more as human history, and along with this historic perception, and as the result of the exigencies of the times and the political revolutions, in which a new political Prometheus was at last chained to the rock of St. Helena, the spirit of nationality, the love of fatherland, awoke. Through philosophy the idea of the True was revived; human self-consciousness became the test and touchstone of truth in opposition to mere authority; men became absorbed in the nature and essence of the Ego and self-consciousness,—they searched into the laws of thought and of existence,—they attempted the solution of the great problem of life, and the discovery of this was announced with enthusiasm. Now it certainly may be justly asserted, that much of this was obtained in the Promethean way, and that Christian salvation is not within its range. But because salvation is not found within it, it does not by any means follow that there exist between them *no points of contact.* It may be said that the whole of this realm of humanity lacks the highest Good because it lacks God. But because a generation lacks the highest good, it does not necessarily follow that it may not possess a relative good. It may be said that the whole of this modern faith in progress and civilisation has within itself an unreconciled contradiction, and that all is vanity; which is more clearly shown in the fact, that what began so radiantly ended in the materialism of the present day and in prosaic efforts in the service of Mammon, whilst the moral condition in so many various fashions has been undermined. It may be said, and for our own part we propose to say it at greater length, that not optimism but pessimism is the view of life suited to the man of intellect who is without God and without Christ in the world. But before we can honestly designate the matters above described as vanity, we must first have appreciated their beauty. The same holds good with the maxim, that all is vanity, as with the declaration of Socrates, that he knew nothing. Such an admission from the lips of an ignorant man would possess little interest or significance; it only receives importance when uttered by a sage, who declares his knowledge to be nothing in comparison to another and higher wisdom; which was precisely the case with Socrates, who, although in possession of the profoundest erudition of his age, yet confessed himself ignorant in relation to the higher wisdom of which he was in search. Thus is it also with the maxim, that all is vanity. If it is merely expressed concerning that which in itself is emptiness and illusion, folly and frivolity, the saying is trite and pointless. It only receives its just, its tragic significance, when it is expressed concerning that which in truth is a reality, an actual object of glory in the world, but which in relation to the highest Reality, or God, from whom it has been separated and torn loose, appears only as vanity. But that there is reality in this world, that the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them are not mere vanity and emptiness, is made evident not by pagan writers alone, as in the fable of Prometheus. That which is stolen from heaven is not the empty and the unreal, not foam and vapour, however it may afterwards change into a torment for him who was guilty of the robbery. No, the gospel itself represents it under a beautiful and familiar image, to which we have already referred. It compares the kingdom of heaven to a merchant seeking goodly pearls; who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had and bought that pearl. These possessions which he sold were not mere counters and old rags, but had an intrinsic value, a real worth. Christianity thus ascribes to fallen man in a sinful condition, possessions, wealth, opulence, nay, glory. It is this which the older orthodoxy and the pietistic school ignored, whilst they too frequently represented man in a state of sin as a beggar, stript of every spiritual dignity, and honest and upright only in the very narrowest sense of the term. And how often we still find that many good people are too rash in their exclamation, "All is vanity!"—for example in philosophy, before they have yet learned to understand the reality which is found there, for which reason their complaint itself becomes vanity and emptiness. Modern civilisation and progress are, indeed, to each one capable of appreciating them, eminent evidences of the power and wealth which humanity possesses outside of Christianity and the sphere of religion. When it is now said that we ought to exchange everything for the one pearl, that we should forsake all things and follow Christ, this is only one side of the matter. We should forsake worldly-mindedness, and that worldly contemplation of things which considers earthly blessings as the ultimate and the highest. But the other side of the matter is described in the Redeemer's words: "Every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundred-fold, and shall inherit everlasting life" (Matt. xix. 29). If we give up these worldly realities for Christ's sake, we shall receive them again in a higher sense; they shall be restored to us in a higher connection, not merely of contemplation, but of life, so that we know, feel, and experience all these blessings in their true position towards that One who is their living centre, and take our own position relative to the relative, and absolute to the absolute. Nothing of that which belongs to genuine human nature shall be lost, but human life must move around another centre, namely, God, whilst previously it only moved around itself. The task which modern civilisation sets us, we may therefore compare with that which the reformers had to accomplish in regard to the classic humanity of their day, since the relation which they assumed to it was not merely critical and judicial, but also appropriative and developing.

THE DIVISIONS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

§ 15.

The Good, as the subject of ethics, presents itself to our observation, as has been already remarked, under a threefold point of view. Partly as the kingdom of God in its perfection, the highest object of our effort; partly as the personal perfection of the individual, which developes itself in imitation of Christ (virtue); partly as the law of God, God's demand on our will (duty). The question then arises, which decides the whole plan of the system: In what order of sequence are these subjects to be handled? should we first treat of the ethical doctrine of the kingdom of God and human society (the Family, the State, the Church), next the doctrine of the imitation of Christ, and lastly the doctrine of law and duty, or take these subjects in the reverse order? There are opposite opinions on this matter, and it is notorious that the most famous writers on ethics of the present day, Schleiermacher, in his treatise on *Philosophic Ethics*, and Rothe, in his work on *Theological Ethics*, both demand that the commencement shall be made from the consideration of the highest Good, as the principal and most perfect conception, which requirement must be fulfilled by a thorough examination of the principles on which society is founded; and when this has been made clear, then first may the consideration of virtue and duty be fitly introduced. Others again recommend the opposite course, that law is the proper subject to take first; since they maintain that the subjective factor in the Good, especially individuality and disposition of mind, do not get their proper position when the subject is commenced by the consideration of ethics in its totality; that this objective mode of representation is better suited to the ancient teaching of ethics than to the Christian; that it is a hazardous matter thus to place the subjective, individual side in the shade; and that it does not answer to shift the law from its just position, since this is the rock of moral teaching, which reaches down to its deepest basis. They point also to the apprehension of our Protestant Church with regard to law and gospel, which requires that we begin with the law, as schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.[1] We, for our own part, acknowledge the weight which must be laid on this last consideration, and agree entirely in the opinion that it is not judicious to begin with a compendium of social doctrine, which is more befitting for ancient ethics than for that of Christianity. Not the less do we acknowledge that those who desire to begin with the highest Good, or the ultimate object of life, maintain a point of view which is likewise perfectly justifiable, although in our opinion it should be employed in a different manner, and within other *limits*, so that to us the point in dispute does not assume the form of *either—or*, but rather of *likewise—also*.

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[1] Schmid, *Christian Moral Teaching*; Palmer, *The Morality of Christianity*. In my *Sketches of a System of Moral Philosophy* the commencement is likewise made with law.

In the treatment of ethics there are two interests at stake requiring satisfaction, one pre-eminently theoretic or contemplative as applied to *principles*, and the other pre-eminently practical as applied to the concrete *forms of existence* of the moral. This twofold interest can, in our opinion, only be properly treated by a twofold representation, by means of a twofold range of ideas, each of which has its predominant point of view, so that the fundamental ideals of each will be treated in reverse order to that of the other. When we speak here of a contrast between the contemplative and the practical, it must be constantly borne in mind that we regard this difference as merely relative, and that it is a difference *inside* the practical, since the whole of ethics is practical.

The contemplative interest is pre-eminently applied to the objective and universal, to fundamental ethical concepts, in so far as they are principles for the moral world, in which both the individual and society are moments. This interest demands an ethical *view of the world* in its main outline. But if it require this view of the world, that is to say, a knowledge of the moral world according to its final aim, and also according to the moving power and norm of its free movements, then the highest Good, which is the object of movement, the kingdom of God in its fulness, must be the concept from which we set out; for this is the determining idea which casts its light over the moral world and moral effort, and without this all the other elements are in darkness or in twilight. The ethical view of the world must lead us to understand the real condition of the world, to appreciate human efforts, to fix the value or the worthlessness of human things. Therefore in setting forth these doctrines, the representation must begin with the absolutely perfect, in which we have the scale of measurement. But this we do not require to search for, in so far as we stand on the view-point of Christianity, where it is already given us.

The representation of the view of the world and of life in accordance with Christianity, must therefore begin eschatologically, must begin at the end, and proceed retrogressively, or backwards to that which in the order of development is the beginning. That now an exhibition of the world which contains the key to the comprehension of history and of the present time (although it is not one with the philosophy of history, which has a far wider compass) has a valid claim on ethics, seems to us beyond all doubt. Whence comes it that so many delineations of ethics, excellent in essential points, are yet on the whole so unsatisfactory? Is it not because both individual and social ethics stand isolated from the background of the world's life, without connection with history and existence as a whole; that they show us so little concerning the course of the world, concerning principles and powers which closely surround us and exert a co-operative influence on the whole of our moral development, and just on this account should be brought into consciousness by ethics? The more strongly the question is agitated in our day, of the relation between the Christian and the human, the more fiercely the contest rages between opposite views of the world and of life, the more necessary does it become that ethics should not shrink from the duty incumbent upon it. In the midst of the ethical system to insert a single paragraph about the ethical view of the world is obviously insufficient. It demands a special and independent representation, which however is not the whole of ethics. It confines itself to the general determining ideas, the ethical universalia, which penetrate and enlighten the whole of the moral world in its concrete forms. Thus far, however, it embraces also the individual, the single personality; for the moral kingdom is indeed a kingdom of personalities, and the principle of personality the all-governing principle; on this very account it remains not a mere conception of the world, but becomes also a *conception of life.* For in so far as there is difference between them, the conception of life is the same, seen from the view-point of the individual, as the conception of the world is from that of totality. Only the representation referred to always limits itself to the general, to the development of the ethical principles of the world, to the principles and norms of life, which yet by no means are the *abstract* general, just because they are principles of reality. But if the representation be not kept within such limits, but from the highest Good as the starting-point in continuous sequence develope the whole ethical system with all the varied forms of the moral, and also at its commencement take up the special organizations of society, it may be satisfactorily accomplished. Only when the entire system of ethics is exhibited on this plan, however high and admirable may be the scientific qualities, the objections of those yet retain their validity who complain that the subjective factor does not receive justice, and has thus to be taken up afterwards (as with Rothe in his otherwise excellent treatise on Duty, in which the law as schoolmaster to bring us to Christ can get no place), and that the whole plan bears the impress of ancient, one-sided objectivity. Rothe remarks, that wherever ethics has been treated speculatively, it has always in the same degree been treated as teaching concerning the highest Good, and this concept placed foremost. But this is just the question at issue, if the speculative interest, or as we may more minutely define it, the concept of speculation, which is always a theoretic and contemplative interest, ought to be the *predominant one* in the discussion of the entire subject of ethics, if there is not another interest present which by its paramount importance obliges us to change the order of sequence of the concepts.

That is to say, we may examine the subject of ethics from another point of interest than the contemplative. It may be sought for in the purely practical interest, since it is desired that ethics should be life-teaching in the more stringent sense of the term, and must be a system of instruction in immediate concrete connection with life and earthly existence, which is not by any means the same thing as a conception of life in its general outline. It has been said, from a one-sided contemplative point of view, that ethics is the most interesting of all sciences so long as it is occupied with questions of general principles, of the various fundamental views of the world and of life, but the most tedious and the most trivial of all when it comes to deal with detail. But where the practical interests are genuine and living, we cannot by any means concur in this sentiment. The practical interest must undoubtedly investigate principles, but its chief consideration is their employment, their application to actual life in its diversity and its copiousness. Here it is required that ethics shall place before us not merely a conception of the world and of life, but an image of the moral life, which is lived and carried out under the influence of this conception. It must not merely depict principles and ideals, but the moral life in its *development* towards the ideal, through its separate concrete forms of reality. But the moral development is first and foremost the development of personality. And not merely does the practical interest require that ethics shall be a representation of this, but moreover it must be a guide and direction towards it, must point out the means which are to be employed for the growth and progress of the moral life, the obstacles which must be overcome and the dangers which must be encountered; so that it must thus bear a *disciplinary and pædagogic*, an educative and training character. Among pagan thinkers we may refer to Epictetus in his treatises and his manual (*Enchiridion*), since he delineates the practical philosopher as one who will not merely instruct his disciples in generalities by communicating to them ideas, but will assist them, reform and improve them,—make of them philosophers not merely in their views and opinions, but in the whole conduct of their lives. But in the Christian Church we may point to the whole didactic literature from the earliest to the most recent times, to writings like Tauler's work on the *Following of Christ's Life of Poverty*, Thomas à Kempis on the *Imitation of Christ*, or Arnd's *True Christianity*, and many other books of a like character; for whatever here is given in a purely didactic and hortatory form, ethics should unfold in scientific connection.[1] But if we set forth from this practical interest and make the development of personality the predominant consideration, then our starting-point cannot be totality, the world or realm of morality, though of necessity this must be *presupposed*, but we must begin with the individual personality, and thence proceed to the realm of personalities, of which the individual forms a member. Here, in the realm or total organization of personality, the separate organizations of family, people and state, church and congregation, come under consideration as ethical subjects, as individuals included in the great whole, which have their own tasks to fulfil, their difficulties to conquer, their crises to pass through, and the development

[1] Culmann, *Christian Ethics.*

of which must be regulated ethically; which forms no barrier to these same organizations being considered from another point of view as portions of the Good, as relatively realized aims, which are moments in the highest Good, in the progress of the kingdom of God on earth. According to this mode of looking at the subject, it may seem natural that in the narrower signification, practical ethics should begin with the teaching of the imitation of Christ, and from this point go forth into the circles of society. But life in imitation of Christ presupposes life under the law and sin, in conjunction with the false abnormal development which is its result, and which must be broken off by repentance. If therefore the development of personality is to be perfectly represented, we must take our starting-point from life under the law and sin, and we thus get the reverse order of sequence from that which is required by the contemplative interest.

Being thus of opinion that the twofold interests of ethics should be satisfied, and that this, in order that the one may not be sacrificed to the other, must be accomplished by a twofold order of thought, in which each preserves its predominant viewpoint, the subject of ethics divides itself for us into two parts: a theoretical or contemplative part, and a practical. In this sense we may adopt and follow the old division of ethics into a general part and a special, in regard to which it need only be observed, that our special ethics is not by any means a simple subdivision of the general, a mere addition to it or continuation of it, but has its independent ground of division, its independent structure, in a distinct standpoint.

We cannot, however, immediately pass over to the representation of the ethical view of the world and of life. For before doing so, it is necessary briefly to set forth the *postulates*, without which Christian ethics neither in one form nor another is possible, and in which it has its basis and its roots. We have, in the foregoing portion of the work, referred to these postulates, but we make them now, though with necessary brevity, the subject of particular attention, which we shall take up in the general part.

THE GENERAL DIVISION.

POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

THE THEOLOGICAL POSTULATE.

THE ETHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD. GOD THE ALONE GOOD.

§ 16.

"NONE is good but One, that is, God" (Matt. xix. 17). But God could not be the alone Good, if He were not the perfect personality. We only acknowledge personality where a being asserts itself as Ego, and maintains itself self-consciously or wills. This is the highest form of existence, and must therefore, when freed from the limitation of the created Ego, be eminently suited to the greatest of beings, if this last be supposed to exist at all. However many attempts have been made to apprehend God as a superpersonal being (transcending the conception of personality, because this must be too narrow, too anthropomorphistic), yet all these attempts have only led to the result, that God has been apprehended as a being *beneath* personality, whether He were represented as an abstract *logical* being, unconscious reason, blind wisdom, or as a physical being, a blind natural power, or lastly as a union of both, an undefined ideal-real principle, which altogether is of inferior dignity to the knowing and willing spirit, incapable of furnishing grounds of certainty to a world of self-consciousness and free-will, a world of morality, and unable to guarantee the validity and final victory of the Good. The Good, in the ethical import of the term, is not to be found except in personality, and within its realm; and if there exists a principle which in the absolute sense is good, if there really is an infinitely worthy,—which is the settled conviction of the human heart,—this can only be found in an absolute personality, which in the infinite riches of its attributes, in perfect union of being and existence, determines itself to be the perfection of free-will, and the aim of its will to be the highest Good. The postulate, without which ethics could not subsist, is therefore the ethical concept of God, which does not exclude the logical and physical, but contains them both as its moments. Perfect goodness has perfect knowledge and power as its attributes. God, the perfect in will, is at the same time the All-wise and All-powerful.

It has been asked if the Good is good because God *wills it*, or if He wills the Good because it *is in itself good.* The Scotists in the middle ages maintained the first, Plato and Thomas Aquinas the second. With each of these theories great errors have been associated, and the right answer can only be educed from the concept of personality itself. The Scotists say that the Good is good because God wills it, since in His omnipotence He determines what shall be held valid as good; but if He appointed the opposite, then that would of necessity be the good also. It is the prerogative of God's majesty, of eternal omnipotence, to determine the Good, and thus God is represented in the same analogy as the ecclesiastical and papal authority of the middle ages, which in like manner decrees what it chooses, and requires this to be acknowledged as good because it has willed so. But in this sense to say that the Good is good because God wills it, is the same thing as to deny God's ethical personality. If omnipotence be placed as the superior power in God, which rules over the ethical as subordinate, which it can determine according to pleasure, we find ourselves actually landed in a physical concept of God. God's personality hovers then over the ethical as an arbitrary despot, and the good loses all necessity, has no intrinsic goodness, retains no absolute worth.

In opposition to this view, which degrades the ethical below the physical, appears the theory that God wills the Good because it is in itself good. But with this, also, misapprehensions have not unfrequently associated themselves. That is to say, men often represent to themselves the Good as an idea, which, without God, and independently of Him, is the object of their recognition, or which is the external law or rule, to which they subject their wills. But just as it is contradictory that God should be governed by anything external to Himself, so is it also contradictory to suppose that there can be anything external to God possessing an absolute worth, or constituting an absolute aim, since everything which has value has it only for an intelligent will, which determines the value and therein finds its satisfaction, and an aim presupposes a personality which appoints it. The solution of these difficulties must be sought in the conception of personality itself, and the two theories must be recognised as expressing two sides of absolute personality. Personality itself in its totality is the Good. God wills the Good because it is good in itself, not as something which is external to Himself, but because the Good is His own eternal essence. God cannot do otherwise than will His essential nature, which constitutes the eternal necessity of good in Him "in whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (Jas. i. 17), and which God Himself cannot change, since it is impossible that His will should decline from His own being. But, again, it may be said that the Good is good because God wills it, not as if there were arbitrariness in God, but because His will alone in truth is good, in so far as He freely actualizes His being. For the idea of personality is not merely to concur, but to originate; not merely *to be* the Good, but also *to produce* the Good. This holds good, with necessary modification, not merely with the human personality, but also with the divine. If God is good only of necessity; if He is, so to speak, only determinately and fatalistically swayed by His nature, His being; if the movements of His will are only forms of a process of nature; then He is still encumbered by a physical destiny, which prevents the perfection of goodness, then His will is indeed the substantially good will, has in itself the contents and the fulness of the Good, but lacks the moment of *subjective* free-will, and with this perfect spirituality. From this view-point we repeat: The Good is good because God wills it, because the Good has only absolute value when it is determined not by necessity but of free-will. And every one who believes in the holy love of God will admit, that this love could not possess an absolute value for us, could not be the object of our incessant prayer and desire, if God only loved from the necessity of His nature, if we might not with perfect truth speak of God's free love, of God's free grace. God is the perfect unity of the ethically necessary and the ethically free; and thus the perfect realization of the Good, the eternal origin and prototype for the whole world of created spirits.[1]

§ 17.

As the perfect realization of the Good, God is raised above the contrast between the actual and the ideal, in which each free creature finds itself. It is this which is contained in Christ's words to the rich young man: "Why callest thou *me* good? There is none good but One, that is, God." Not merely from the world of sin, but from the whole world of created spirits, He points to God as in the full signification of the word *really* good, the source of all goodness in creation. Nay, though He Himself is mediator between God and creation, the express image of God's being, the manifester of good upon earth, yet in connection with this, He points away from Himself. For so long as He still finds Himself in His temporal condition, and in His estate of humiliation, He must also find Himself to be in contrast between His reality and His ideal. As yet He has not undergone all trials and temptations; as yet He has not been able to say, "It is finished;" as yet He has not returned to the Father. But in God, the alone God, there is no contrast between ideal and reality. His will is not, like that of man, subjected to a "*must*" and an "*ought*" which has to be fulfilled by a temporal development and effort; He is not tempted by evil; His will cannot be altered like that of a man, it is unchangeable, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. This thought not merely calls us to humility, but at the same time breathes into us hope and consolation. For under the disquietude of life, under the great contrast between the ideal and the real, how tranquillizing the consideration, that there is *One* who is good;—that above all the confusion of the world, above the fickle and changing will of man, above folly and sin and misery, there yet exists a will essentially good, to which belongs power and dominion, a will in itself holy, which throughout all earthly changes and vicissitudes remains the same, throughout eternity maintains fidelity towards itself, neither deceives nor denies itself! Not because we believe in omnipotence, but because we believe in the Good which has omnipotence for its minister, can we rest confident that the Good at last shall reign victorious. To believe in the Good not as a personal, but only as an impersonal idea, is an incomplete faith. For then it is only *we* who must realize the idea, and the Good then remains a personal question only. But that the good, the highest all-embracing idea, the unconditionally excellent, which assigns its place to everything in existence, to which everything else is subordinate and nothing co-ordinate, that this should be only an unsettled question, and never exist in perfect fulfilment, is to place a contradiction in the highest itself. For the Good is an idea which is not, like abstract truths, indifferent to realization, or that can be satisfied with a partial realization; but, on the contrary, it demands a realization which is in all respects *complete.* But complete realization of the Good can only be accomplished in a perfectly good will. And it is a deeply-rooted belief in the heart of man, that however much the human will may shift and veer in inconstancy, "there is yet one God, there exists yet one holy Will."

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[1] We refer here to Dorner's striking and able treatise "On the Unchangeableness of God." *Yearbook of Theology*, vol. iii. p. 623 and onwards.

§ 18.

But God is not merely perfect freedom, but also perfect *love.* Love is only present where a being might indeed exist for itself, and yet in unfettered devotion and sympathy desires to exist in and for others. Now it is essential to the conception of personality not to be alone, not to be solitary, but to institute association with other personalities. And the divine personality has created a world of personality, in order to fill it with His fulness. Plato had already said that the Good is not merely in itself complete, but that it is *disposed to impart;* that its most obvious emblem is the sun, which not merely makes things visible, but also bestows on them life and warmth and growth; that the Good is something higher than knowledge, something higher than existence, but that it communicates all this to us, and makes us participant in itself. (Plato on the *State,* sixth and seventh books). From the standpoint of the natural world, he has here given us a glimpse of that mystery which is only perfectly revealed in Christ. For in order that we may be able to speak of the love of God, it is indispensably necessary that this love has communicated itself to us. The personal God cannot be perceived *à priori*, but must Himself come forward to meet us. And as He has revealed Himself to us, so ought we to receive Him, and only by His own Spirit seek to understand and conceive the things which God has prepared for us (1 Cor. ii. 9).

§ 19.

That holy love is the principle and eternal source of the world, the principle not merely of a spiritual world but of a material world, which exhibits to us entire contrast to the ethical, would be inconceivable, if the holy will of love were not at the same time the will of perfect wisdom, which is able to manifest itself through a teleologic system of aims and means. And it would likewise be inconceivable if the holy will of love were not also that of *power* unlimited, if a *physical omnipotence* did not stand at the bidding of love. In other words, the ethical or the love, which is the essence of God's nature, must have the logical and the physical intelligence and power as its potencies. The three principles to which all reflection on existence returns as being the ultimate,—the physical, the logical, and the ethical,—must in the unity of the divine will be eternally united as one indissoluble life (ζωὴ ἀκατάλυτος), in which there is a relation of supremacy and of subordination, so that the ethical or love is the subject, the others its predicates. It is this which, already with the most perfect clearness, is seen in the first article of the Christian faith: belief in God the Father, Almighty Maker of heaven and earth. For here it is expressly said, that God, as Creator, is the unity of love and power; and if it is not also expressly said, it is undoubtedly implied, that almighty love creates with wisdom, that is to say, teleologically, or with certain ends in view. The Christian ethical concept of God is here already in the first article of the creed exhibited in the contrast of its principle to that of paganism, to which the idea of a free creating-God is alien. For either the pagan thought apprehends God as unconscious nature, which from an eternal germ (a nucleus of the universe) has developed itself through the lower forms of existence to the higher; or, as has been the case with deeper thinkers, it remains fixed in a dualism between mind and matter, between the ethical and the physical. But in both cases the ethical does not receive justice, cannot be determined as in itself perfect, and maintains an oppressed existence.

This is most clearly seen in Plato, just because he, more than any other of the thinkers of paganism, philosophizes in the direction of the ethical concept of God, and remains a witness of its validity, although he only very imperfectly possesses it. For he certainly places the idea of the Good foremost in the realm of ideas, and subordinates all others to it. He certainly acknowledges God and the Good as one; he designates God as the Father of the Universe, whilst he further adds that it is difficult to find Him, and difficult to make Him known to others when we have found Him; again he says that the Good is self-imparting. But independent of God and outside of Him, whilst like Him eternal, Plato holds that there is a physical essence or chaos, an unformed matter (hyle), as a resisting object for the divine energy. In this matter, from which all the evil in the world is generated as from its ultimate source, God fashions His ideas of the Good, and reveals Himself therein, not as the almighty Creator, but as an artist, an artificer of worlds, a Demiurge. In His demiurgic, constructing, moulding, forming energy, God can only by degrees overcome this principle, which is not merely ungodly, but opposed to divinity, and is never altogether vanquished. There always remains behind something unconquerable, and incessant must be the struggle between the divine and the dim *hyle*, the blind necessity of nature. Nay, in the *Theætetos* of Plato, Socrates says expressly, that evil can never be completely overthrown, because there is a necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) that there should always be something which is opposed to the Good. That this dualism must have had a powerful influence on the Hellenist's ethical view of the world and of life, may be readily perceived. It is this which spreads a veil of melancholy over the world of sense, brings the thinker to contemplate the body as the soul's prison, the great aim of the wise man to die to the lower sphere of being, and prompts him to prefer the contemplative life to the practical, because that in contemplation we may live in the undisturbed consideration of mere ideas.

In opposition to this dualism, Christian teachers have from the beginning maintained that God is the unity of love and almighty power, whilst they also opposed the notion of a material existence independent of God and antagonistic to Him, by the significant assertion, that God created the world out of nothing. But it is in contrast to the declaration that there was matter independent of God and existing before Him, that this formula must be understood. The nothing out of which God created the world was not, as has been frequently imagined, the absolute nothing, for from it proceeds nothing but the relative nothing. The relative nothing is not that which in no sense of the word exists, but that which, in relation to a higher absolute existence, is to be considered and described as a non-existent. The non-existents out of which God has created the world are His eternal possibilities, which are not only logical, but also physical. In these He has both the material whereof He frames the world, and the means and instruments by which He produces them. And we thus take the words of the apostle literally, when he says: "All things are of God" (Rom. xi. 36).

Whilst thinkers, both in ancient and modern times (J. Böhme, Oetinger, Baader, Schelling, Rothe, and many others), have spoken of an eternal nature or corporeity in God; and while this conception is ever gaining ground in modern theology and the philosophy of religion, yet certainly great errors have often been associated with it. Yet the admission of an eternal nature in God is inseparable from the ethical concept of God; for only as lord over nature can mind and free-will fully manifest their energy. But it certainly depends on *the manner* in which the relation between the eternal nature and the divine personality is determined, whether we suppose the personality to develope itself from nature as from an obscure cause, over which it gradually acquires the mastery, and thus subject God to a temporal process (as with the earlier Schelling); or, if we regard the nature in God as appertaining to the eternal, self-conscious love as ministering potency for it. This last is our opinion, which may also be expressed thus, that almighty power from eternity belongs to love as its minister. But the concept of omnipotence cannot be carried through without the concept of an eternal nature. Only let us not blend in confusion the ideas of nature and of matter. Nature is the living impersonal, which is the opposite of mind and idea;

but is exclusively appointed to be means, organ, instrument for mind and idea, and in its normal condition is exclusively determined by these. Matter is also impersonal, but thrust out from union with the spirit, unpenetrated by it, and resisting it. To speak of a nature in God, is therefore not at all the same thing as to speak of a material substance in God. But if the concept of God's omnipotence be carefully considered, it is difficult to perceive how the idea of the eternity of nature can be excluded. If God is really to be apprehended as the absolute will-power, which is a moment in the eternal will of love, then He must also have a *dominium*, a universe of real forces over which to reign. It is certainly quite true that God created all things by His word (in regard to which it must be remarked, that the word itself contains the idea of soul and body, and that when we name "the word," we already pass beyond the purely spiritual and ideal); and it stands written: "He spake, and it was was done; He commanded, and it stood fast." But this does not prevent that the power of His will, His sovereign will from eternity, must have had legions of forces at command, which come when He bids, and execute what He wills. The Holy Scriptures themselves lead our thoughts in this direction. For when they speak of an eternal pleroma, an infinite fulness in God, this idea can only be perfectly comprehended when we grasp not merely a fulness of idea or thought, but also an eternal fulness of power, a totality of physical but supermaterial forces. And as we cannot do otherwise than represent to ourselves this fulness as embracing an infinite variety of powers which are penetrated and enlightened by divine wisdom, it is inadequate, along with some of the ancients, to depict the eternal nature in God as a roaring sea, a limitless ocean, as it, on the contrary, being enlightened by wisdom, must be viewed as a system or as an organization of living forces, which as such is the basis and presupposition of the created world, to which it bears both immanent and transcendent relation. However little the discourse may here be of concrete conceptions, however fully it may, moreover, be admitted that here we can rather touch on the matter than embrace it, still we are brought back to this theory, if we seriously consent to the oft repeated assertion, that omnipotence is not merely an ideal but a physical (natural and essential) attribute of God, and reflect that the power of God, of which we so often speak, must include an infinity of power. Materialism and naturalism will always hold their ground in the assertion, that from the mere naked idea, there could never issue a corporeal universum; that those mighty spheres which roll in heaven's broad arch, the mountains on earth's surface, as the Alps and the Dovrefjelde, could not be brought forth by mere thought or by a will without the producing power, which to God here stands in place of *materia prima*, and yet were something entirely different from the bare thought or will. If we are then to preserve the ethical conception of God, there appears to be only the choice between a supermaterial nature, physis in God, from whose infinite *potentiality* all these things may proceed, whenever the divine will commands it, and His plan of creation requires it—or a dualism like that of Plato, which supposes a body of matter equally eternal with God, which gradually, by the power of ideas, became moulded into organic forms, a representation by which the ethical always remains hampered with an impotency.

That God is not spirit without nature, is testified by the Holy Scriptures on every page. The Scripture knows only the living God. But the living God we cannot imagine otherwise than in relation to nature eternally subordinate to Him. And when the Scriptures speak of God as an indissoluble life (Heb. vii.), we cannot conceive this except as the indissoluble unity of the contrasts of life, of which we only know the contrast between mind and nature, the ethical and the physical. Those portions of Scripture which represent the living God as actively engaged in the concerns of the world, speak of Him throughout in anthropomorphisms. But the truth of the religious anthropomorphism rests upon the nature in God. Earnest piety at the present day will not dispute that God has eyes and ears, hands and feet, "an arm which is not shortened," and will never cease to seek for His finger in the great events of the world, and in the lives of individuals. For although the figurative, the symbolical, is perceived and acknowledged in such descriptions, although everything belonging to the limited condition of the creature must be kept far removed from our idea of God; yet still it must be maintained, that to all this there must be something in God which really corresponds, in other words, that God must have *organs of manifestation, instruments of action.* It was this idea which must have hovered before Tertullian when he ascribed a body to God. "Who will deny," says he, "that God, though He is mind, is also body?" Nay, he maintains that there is nothing which is incorporeal, except that which is not; by which he makes the body an inseparable condition of existence. Although Tertullian gave great offence by this assertion, yet his meaning in it was perfectly orthodox,—namely, that God ought not to be conceived as mind without nature, that God must have an organism corresponding to His supermundane existence.[1] The Holy Scriptures speak further of God in anthropopathic representations, ascribing to God human feelings. But to this representation also we must deny all truth if God is only abstract mind, if there is nothing in God corresponding to that which we call soul in man, which again is not conceivable without an organism. We hold by the belief in the God who has a heart to compassionate our misery; and when Christ says, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," we receive it as perfect truth that such is the appearance of the Father. And what does the figurative language of the Scriptures become for us if an idealism and a spiritualism wholly destitute of nature are to be accepted? Not only when the Scriptures speak in parables, but when using plain and literal language, all the most important expressions concerning God and divine things are never abstract-spiritual, but always a union of the spiritual, the ethical, and the physical, which is particularly noticeable in the writings of John, where we find so much reference to the *word*, *life* and *light*, *death* and *darkness.* We must acknowledge that old Oetinger is in the right when he requires that we shall not by a hollow spiritualizing weaken the force of Scripture and make everything thin and airy, but that we should in a much greater degree than is usual understand the Bible *physice*, and strive after far more solid and substantial conceptions regarding it. The standpoint of the inspired writers is a spiritual realism alike removed from both spiritualism and materialism, which are continually at war with each other, each constantly obstructing the other's progress and success. According to an old metaphor, this airy idealism may be represented as a timid courser rearing at sight of materialism, which lies like an immense block of wood or stone across the highway.

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[1] Tertulliani *Advers. Praxeam*, cap. 7; *De carne Christi*, cap. 11. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, i. 127. Hamberger, *Physica Sacra.*

The fundamental importance to ethics of what is here set forth is obvious. Whilst the dualism of Plato brings along with it a contempt for the body, which was considered as the prison of the soul, and incites the thinker to die to the world of sense and turn back to the world of the purely ideal and incorporeal, to the Christian view the visible and bodily world—though at the present time subject to corruption—presents nothing in itself hostile to the spirit, but, on the contrary, in its normal condition, its true essence, it is the exterior of the spirit and its ready instrument. The highest spirituality is not that which has thrust away from itself all recognition of the visible and bodily, but that whose superior purity and perfection clothes itself in the bodily, penetrating and enlightening it. The characteristic mark of Christianity is just this, that it is at once the most spiritual of all religions, and nevertheless before all other religions holds the body and the bodily world in high respect. For "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us;" our bodies are appointed to be the temples of the Holy Spirit; we look for the resurrection of the body, and with it a new heaven and a new earth: "the end of God's ways is corporeity." If in our day the opponents of Christianity speak of it as a spiritualism antagonistic to nature, which fixes a yawning gulf between soul and body, this attack can only prevail against those partially Platonic tendencies which have crept into Christian speculation, or those one-sided ascetic fallacies which were generated in the cloisters of the middle ages; but it does not strike at Christianity itself. Whenever Christianity is characterized as abstract spiritualism and dualism, such a description must be declared to rest on indefensible misconception.

§ 20.

God as eternal love is designated in the first article of the creed, the Father, Almighty Maker of heaven and earth, who brought forth the world in order to manifest Himself to it. In the second article He is designated the Son, the Word, who became flesh and dwelt among us as the Saviour of the world; and in the third as the Holy and Sanctifying Spirit, the pervading and governing principle of a realm of spirits, but the ultimate perfection of which is glorified corporeity. As Father, Son, and Spirit, as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, God reveals Himself as the perfect manifester of His character. Though our Christian consciousness may only know one God, one eternal Being of love, still we are conscious of the One in Three, and in a threefold manner we address our worship to the One: to the Father, who reigns over us; to the Son, who came down to our world, where He comes to meet with us; to the Spirit, who works in our inmost soul. The simple faith in Father, Son, and Spirit, which is expressed in the apostolic symbol, has found its wider development in the teaching of the Church regarding the Trinity, and in dogmatic treatises. We here limit ourselves to point out the importance which faith in the triune God has for ethics.

The admission that God is love leads us necessarily from God's revelation in the world back to His internal revelation of Himself, or to the inner life of love which God lives within Himself. Whatever definition we may give to love, we must always determine it as a relation between person and person, I and thou, a relation of the closest reciprocity, since love can only be satisfied by love. But if love is really God's *eternal essence*, then God must also from eternity have possessed a perfect object for His love, and the world cannot be its first and essential object. That is to say, if we suppose that God has no other object for His love than the world, then the existence of the world becomes as necessary as that of God, and creation was then only a necessary requirement of God's nature to produce His complement, His other Ego, namely personal creation. Then there was a time when the love of God was without its object, only possessing it in thought, in possibility; for the kingdom of God, in which God loving is beloved, has first come forth in the fulness of time, and that point of time still lies in the dim distance, when the kingdom of God shall be perfected and God be all in all. Moreover God must then have required creation for the perfection of His own existence in the relation of love. But God can only be independent of the world if He also without the world and before the world lived in the fulness of love, and not merely in longing for the grateful love of His creatures,—a longing which would not differ from a passion, an effort to penetrate through interminable obstacles and restraints. God's love to the world is only then pure and unmixed holy affection, when God, whilst *He is sufficient to Himself* and *in need of nothing*, out of infinite grace and mercy calls forth life and liberty beyond His own being, spontaneously submits Himself to a relation of reciprocity between Himself and His creation, and thereby enters into the contrasts of time, nay, in Christ devotes Himself to self-humiliation and suffering in order to found a kingdom of grace and salvation. But this free power of love in the relations of God towards the world presupposes the existence of perfect love, or of love *realized within itself*, the love of the Father and the Son in the unity of the Holy Spirit. It is this which forms the proper substance of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and gives to it its greatest importance, that God has within His being personal diversities and inward threefold relation of love to Himself, by which also God's relation to His inner mind and will is determined in a threefold manner. (See the Doctrine of the Trinity in the author's treatise on Dogmatics.) Whichever then of the different dogmatic solutions of this mystery we may receive, the practical side of the matter is this, that God must have in Himself the eternal and perfect object of His love, must live in Himself a perfectly satisfied life of love.

Faith in the triune God, or, in other words, faith in the eternal love as that which not merely at a far distant period *shall* be realized, or even as an infinite requirement, but as that which is realized in itself, from eternity satisfied and enjoying its own bliss, is the basis of the Christian ethical view of the world, which must proceed from the perfection of Good in God, and cannot be content that God from the beginning be considered as existing in the contrast between the ideal and the actual. The representation of the realm of the Good or the kingdom of God, which appears in history as the growing kingdom of love, loses its ethical character and becomes the representation of a process, necessary even for God, in which He is dependent on man, if as postulate for this ideal, which is to be realized in history, it has not already the eternally realized ideal, that is to say, the eternal and prototypical realization of love. If therefore Christian dogmatics had not asserted and developed the doctrine of the Trinity, ethics must postulate it in its own interests.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL POSTULATE.

MAN FORMED IN THE IMAGE OF GOD. MAN AS A CREATURE POSSESSED OF SOUL AND BODY.

§ 21.

The object of creation cannot be an impersonal nature or universe, which could never satisfy the perfect spirit, but could only be a realm of free-will and of love conceived in its highest perfection. Therefore God created man in His image. "We are God's offspring" (Acts xviii.). These words could not be said of any mere natural creature, but only of the personal creature that calls itself *Ego*, and is thereby not merely a member of nature, but belongs to the *realm* of *self-consciousness* and *self-government*. Whilst the mere creatures of nature move in the circle of nature, man has a *history:* not only does he live in the present, but also in the past and in the future; he can go back to the first beginning of things, and can turn his glance towards the infinitely distant horizon whither the aim of his life beckons him. But the idea of personality is inseparable from that of society and of love; and the personality of mankind is appointed to develope itself into a realm of love, where God, who is love, must be loved in all persons and all things. Man's formation in the image of God must therefore be more closely defined as his fitness for God's kingdom. For the kingdom of God is wherever God is acknowledged, obeyed, and loved by His creatures, and where the creatures love one another in God, where God thus reigns not merely by His power, but by His holiness and love. But in order that God's kingdom may really be the kingdom of free love, and also of free devotion and obedience, it is necessary that man should possess a relative independence towards God; he must, in a certain relative signification of the term, have a kingdom of his own; he must in a certain sense be master, so that he may in truth become the servant of God. In virtue of his participation in the divine idea, or the eternal thought of wisdom, in virtue of the inherency of reflection and law in his consciousness, he has also the power to build up a realm of morality in relative independence on religion, or his relation to God. By reason of this twofold character in the destiny of man, the great human community divides itself into a multitude of circles, which must be separated into their proper relations to each other, of superiority and inferiority. Human society must appear as civilised society, since man is destined to employ nature, whether within himself or external to him, as the implements and symbols of the mind: it must appear as the society of mutual love between men, but at the same time as the society of justice; for whilst love binds men to one another, the idea of justice requires the normal separation of the social relations, so that every relation may be kept within its proper limits. It must appear finally as religious society, as the society of love in God, which must embrace and penetrate the circles designated above; and to that last named the others must be subjected in the relation of voluntary subordination. The unity of the kingdom of God and the kingdom of man, conceived in its completeness, is the perfection of the Good, and the fulfilled destiny of man.

§ 22.

It belongs to the idea of personality not merely to find itself, to be given to itself (to be self-conscious), but also to evolve itself, by voluntary determination to bring its being into action. Man can therefore only be created with endowments abundantly fitting him for the possibility of the moral, but cannot be created as a moral personality in the strict sense of the term, since he himself must co-operate, certainly under divine guidance and assistance, as fellow-worker with God in the perfecting of his being. Moral personality, as that which has made itself what it is, therefore presupposes personality as that which is itself *given*. The consideration of the elements of human personality as *given*, the complete representation of which belongs to anthropology and psychology, is inseparable from the admission, that they are destined to an entirely different development from mere natural necessity.

As the creature formed in the image of God, man is a being possessed of soul and body, a union of mind and nature, which is not like the divine life indissoluble (Heb. vii.), but shall only become an indissoluble life in a future, more perfect existence. The mind is the portion of our being superior to sense, which connects itself with the world of ideas and with God, and the element of which is the general and universal; it is the kingly principle in man, which gives him the stamp of sovereignty, and by means of which he exercises dominion over the earth, and makes discoveries in arts and sciences. According to the Greek pagan theory, the mind is the Promethean in man, recalling the memory of the stolen spark and the pride of man, the principle which would set itself in the place of the gods, and which is therefore hated of the gods. According to the Christian theory, mind or spirit is *given* to man by "the Father of spirits" (Heb. xii. 9). The body, which, according to the expression of Scripture, is taken from the earth, is the contrast of the mind or spirit, appointed to be its ministering instrument. But the soul is the bond of union between mind and body, and as the union of both, it is twofold, so that it has at once a natural (physical) side—the seat of which, according to Scripture, is in the blood—and an intellectual side. Through the soul, the mind corresponds with the body, and the body with the mind; and between mind, soul, and body there is constant mutual intercourse, of which every person may be convinced by daily experience. The whole is a sort of living circumvolution, "where the one incessantly locks into the other, the one cannot slip the other, the one demands the other."[1] But the central point is the soul, which is the most human thing in man, or man himself. It is the soul, the immortality, the bliss or the misery of which we principally discuss, which, however, does not prevent us from contemplating the immortality of mind and the resurrection of the body, but only as something secondary and consequent, which must of necessity accompany the immortality of the soul, because the soul requires both as its moments, and if one of these were absent, could not exist in perfection. It is by the qualities of soul that we characterize the ethical personality; and if we have said that the mind is the kingly principle in man, it by no means follows from this, that the highest which can be said of any man is that he possesses mind, or is intellectual. For the highest destiny of man is not his sovereign relation towards nature, but his relation of love and service towards God and his neighbour, which can only be accomplished in the soul; and it is the perfection of the mind to combine with soul, by which, in truth, it first becomes human. That this is so, becomes readily observable from the various works of genius, of which those which are destitute of soul or geniality of temper excite no enthusiasm, however great their other excellences. It is the soul that loves and is loved. For mere genius we have respect, and bow before it; but we find there no bosom whereon to rest. In the soul, on the other hand, we can place confidence, and for it we can conceive affection, and look for its sympathy in return. For it is not like the mind, a purely ideal essence, which is principally directed to theories and generalities; it is, if we may use such an expression, divested of the ideal stateliness, the abstract character, which is inseparable from pure intellect developed in a one-sided direction. The soul can sympathize both with the intellectual and what is apparent to the senses, the heavenly and the earthly, the infinite and the finite, because it is itself the marvellous central being which is the union of both. And just on this account we feel drawn towards it, and disposed to yield it our confidence. On this account it was necessary that Christ should have a human soul, because only thus could He have sympathy with our infirmities and draw us to Himself. Human souls destitute of mind certainly exhibit a fallen state of humanity, but the same holds good of human intellect devoid of soul. When the Gnostics, in olden times, divided mankind into three classes—the animal, where the body was the predominant power; the warm-hearted, where the affections ruled; and the intellectual, assigning the highest position to the last,—we can only admit this conclusion, if by the word intellectual (pneumatic) we are to understand mind united to soul, and animating and elevating it; but we can by no means consent to receive as the most excellent among mankind the unpractical, body-despising, and soul-ignoring intellectual beings which the Gnostics describe.

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[1] Schelling, On the Connection of Nature with the World of Spirits (Clara). *Works*, i. 9, p. 46.

As the faculties of the soul, we generally name perception, sentiment, and will. But of these, *will* has the first place. Our will is emphatically our very self, our inmost being. If any would object that the inmost part of our being is sentiment or feeling, we reply, that all feelings, gladness and sorrow, hope and fear, are affections of the will. And if any would object that the Scriptures speak of the heart (or sentiment) as the most essential part of the life of the soul ("Give me thy heart!"), and of good and evil thoughts as issuing from the heart, we observe, that the heart is the will in its union with sentiment, specially considered from the practical side.

The superiority of man's destiny to that of all other creatures, his ethical destiny, displays itself not merely in his possession of mind and soul, but also in his bodily frame. Not his upright walk alone, but also the human countenance points him out as the lord of nature, and as the being who has a divine mission to execute on earth. Only in union with his body can man utter *words*, by which means he imparts what his own mind and the mind of God communicate to him, and by which he gives things names and takes them in possession. Among those bodily organs which in an emphatic manner suggest man's ethical destiny, we specially name the human hand. For whilst the corresponding organs in the lower animals are only adapted for the single purpose of giving support to the body, or of assisting the beast to procure its prey and its food, men's hands are not restricted to such a narrow circle of employment, but are fitted for a free, universal activity. By means of his moulding, fashioning hand, man stamps his impress upon nature, and founds his sovereignty of civilisation. By means of this implement of all implements, this instrument of instruments, the use of which goes along with his upright posture, he becomes the inventor of many arts. Therefore it may be said with truth, that "hands are far better than wings." By furnishing man with hands the Creator has clearly indicated it to be his destiny to develope his being by a series of *actions* (*Handlinger*, literally hand-doings). For to act is to execute plans and determinations. And though we may also speak of inward acts, yet the action is only completely finished when the purpose is executed in the outer world, which is principally achieved by means of the hand. With the hand man performs alike his good and evil deeds, his acts of noblest heroism and crimes of deepest dye. Thus he folds his hands in prayer in token that in presence of God he disclaims all self-dependence and self-dominion, and humbles himself under the hand of the Most High. He bestows his blessing by the laying on of hands, and gives his hand to his neighbour in pledge of amity and good faith. Chiromancy, or the art of reading men's characters and destinies by the shape and lines of their hands, which thus declares the hand to be the man himself, may with all reason be designated a fantastic delusion, which should be left to gipsies. But it suggests, however, a correct conception of the specially human importance of the hand, its importance to the entire man.

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY. THE SOUL'S RELATION TO ITS ORGANISM.

§ 23.

Personality, as the universal human, appears in the form of individuality. As a link in nature, and as a link in the world of spirits, man developes himself into a human race, which is subdivided by the distinctions between men and women, families and nationalities. Every human personality has a fixed individuality, an inherent originality, by which this single being is distinguished from all others, by which indeed its limitations and defects appear, and must be remedied by association in affectionate intercourse with others, but by which at the same time appear its special endowments, its *very own* in the deepest sense of the word. Whilst individuals of the lower creation, belonging only to nature, are merely specimens of species, the human individual is an inscrutable unity, because he is a special form of God's image, fitted for a place in God's kingdom. Although each human being is an offshoot from his parents, and although his peculiarities may be a blending of those of his father and his mother, yet still there is in every one something original, which has not been so before, and which will never be exactly the same again. The perception of this original element in every creature that comes into the world is the truth contained in "creatianism," or the theory that souls are not merely born, but are created. Every man is an eternal individuality framed in the image of God, and bears within himself the possibility of eternal life in bliss; he is not merely a continuing link in the long series of the human race, a repetition of what has gone before with inherited properties, but moreover at the same time a fresh point of commencement in this series. (See the author's work on Dogmatics, § 74.) Or as it has also been expressed, every man is a "Genius," whether this genius is predominantly productive or receptive (J. H. Fichte). The essential part of the conception of genius is not the creative power, for instance in art, which is only a speciality, but the supernatural, immortal, individual existence, which reveals itself in the midst of nature. And to endeavour here to draw a sharp and insurmountable line between the highly gifted and the scantily endowed, would be to introduce a dualism into the human race not less objectionable than the division into castes, or into freemen and slaves. The boundary is here only a shifting one, and the difference between the men to whom we ascribe the great name of genius and the weakest of their brethren, is shown by an infinite number of intermediate and transition links to be only in degree and not in essence, a truth which will obtain more and more acknowledgment the more intellectual cultivation spreads itself over the world, and Christianity, to which every soul of man, without exception, is an immortal soul of infinite value, unfolds its operations. Besides, what importance would creative genius have for the world if those who were to receive its revelations were not congenial? To deny the presence of the eternal individuality, because that in many men it does not show itself by visible tokens, is the same thing as to deny that man is formed in the image of God. And if we admit that every man is *capable of being perfected*, fitted for mental growth and progress; if we are constrained to allow that even the most savage and uncivilised tribes may be awakened and developed to culture, morality, and religion; if we admit that all tribes and nations must be christianized; how can we escape the assumption of the eternal individual possibility in the case of every man, a possibility which cannot have its source in nature, but is in advance of nature, although it may still require many natural conditions for its development? Every man is infinitely richer in his being than in his performance, is infinitely more than he shows himself or can show himself to be. Therefore we divide between his merely natural individuality, given in immediate experience, which is only a basis, a foundation for the higher life, and his eternal or essential individuality, which must be ethically moulded throughout this present time, in order to be perfected in a future state beyond the existing world.

Individuality stamps not merely the soul of man, but also his bodily frame. It is not by chance that a certain individuality of soul carries along with it a certain bodily form, for it is the soul which fashions the body. This old idea, which was maintained by G. F. Stahl,[1] but afterwards fell into disfavour, is now again recovering its position, and can scarcely be gainsaid if kept within its proper limits, if by the soul we understand not merely the self-conscious soul, but the soul antecedent to consciousness in its indissoluble union with the plastic power, or the power to form its bodily frame. We say expressly, *to form*, not create or produce. For we do not overlook what has been acutely urged during the recent discussion of this matter between J. H. Fichte and Lotze, namely, that in the formation of the human frame, moulding and alteration of materials are necessary, which the soul can never effect, chemical processes, which independently of the soul follow their own laws; that the soul thus even from the first act of its existence is subjected to conditions, a natural mechanism, which is not in its own power.[2] But we maintain, that as the human body is not an accidental heaping together of matter, but an organized form, it cannot be produced except under the presupposition of a schema, as the ancients called it (a pattern or model), after which it is fashioned. This schema must necessarily be supposed as pre-existing in the soul, which by an instinctive activity, or as Fichte describes it, by a pre-conscious plastic activity of fancy, forms its own body in conformity with it, in so

[1] 1660–1734.

[2] J. H. Fichte, *Anthropology*, and by the same writer *Zur Seelenfrage.*

far as it is capable of doing so under the given conditions. Mynster[1] has already essentially expressed this thought when he says: "There is evidently for the body a schema, a fixed form, according to which the material portions collect and arrange themselves in so far as external obstacles permit it; these obstacles the power issuing from the interior constantly labours to overcome, and the new material portions, which it incessantly appropriates to itself in lieu of that which is passing away, arranges itself in the body according to the original schema. If this schema or impalpable form did not exist, we could not properly say that man has a body, for the material incessantly changes; but the schema, the real body—not the evanescent flesh and blood, which cannot inherit the kingdom of God—constantly arises afresh in new material." And further: "It is quite arbitrary only to admit the use of the word soul, after consciousness has been awakened. It is likewise the soul which developes itself, which comes to consciousness; it is it which appropriates the bodily to itself and fashions it after its own schema."

A teleological harmony between the bodily frame of a man and his predominant disposition of mind is often observable, especially in the case of highly gifted individuals. The musical genius is thus equipped with a fine ear, and a corresponding apparatus of the nerves. It is related of Mozart, that as a child he became impatient and cried whenever he heard a false note. According to the theory now advanced, he became a great musician not because his fine ear and the nervous system accompanying it were accidentally or by an external mechanism combined with his musical talents, but because this genius already prior to self-consciousness, no doubt under favourable conditions, formed, harmonized, and, so to speak, attuned its chief instrument, namely, the body, incorporating itself thus in accordance with its mental character. A similar agreement between the bodily organization and the character of the mind is exhibited in other spheres: with the philosophic genius, whose brain is formed to be the instrument of severe and continued thought; with the painter, whose eye not merely from exercise but by nature is better fitted than those of other men to observe tints of colour and outlines of material forms; with the mechanical talent, which even in childhood shows itself skilful in the use of the fingers. No doubt examples of the contrary may be brought forward from experience,—instances where there was a want of harmony between the bodily organization and the mental endowments, where the soul must strive with unfavourable conditions which appeared antagonistic, nay, well nigh fatal to success. An instance of this is be found in the case of the optician Saunderson, described by Baggesen[1] as blind from his birth, who, in spite of the terrible disadvantages of his position, made discoveries, not indeed in regard to colour, but in the science of light. With his inward eye he must have beheld the light, whilst he made use of his other senses, along with his knowledge of mathematics, to furnish him with analogies.[2] But these discordances, these disturbances and obstacles, are a problem by themselves,—in the deepest signification also a religious and ethical problem, since we are reminded by the apostolic declaration that the "creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly" (Rom. viii. 20). These examples, however, do not shake our fundamental assumption. That is to say, we by no means deny that the assimilation of the body to the soul (*Sjælens Corporisation*), or the soul's embodiment, is subject to more or less favourable conditions which are not within its own power. We only maintain that the soul has the original tendency to form its body in accordance with its own character, to carry out its schema and the required harmonizing of its bodily instruments, and instinctively to do this with all its might. But we do not say that in every case it is successful in overcoming obstacles. It is not merely in the formation of the human body that nature exhibits disorder and irrationality.

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[1] The former Bishop of Zealand, who died in 1854.

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[1] Danish poet.

[2] J. Baggesen, *Philosophic Legacy*, vol. i. p. 248: "Saunderson, whose inner eye unquestionably perceived the light, was able to specify the gradations of brightness according to some symbolic analogy of his remaining senses, or altogether through pure mathematics, uninfluenced by the accidental colour which he did not distinguish, and this with greater precision than any seeing optician who had put on spectacles coloured red, blue, or green. Saunderson, who was born blind, who had never seen the sun, nor the tiniest drop of dew, never in fact any external mirror of the Almighty, cried out when dying: '*God of Newton and of Clarke have mercy on me!*' I cannot write it down without shedding tears."

The point in which it is most generally acknowledged that the human frame is an expression of the mental character, is the physiognomy, especially of the face, in which is perceived a visible index, not merely of the intellectual, but also of the moral being, the inherent qualities of the individual, whether considered as character, or only as individual capacity or possibility of development in a certain direction. But here an important difference appears between the soul of man and the soul of beasts. The soul of the beast, which forms its body, is so entirely incorporated with it, that it may in the strictest sense of the term be said, that for instance the body of the wolf or the lamb, the eagle or the dove, is the creature's visible soul. But the human soul is not one and the same with his bodily frame; the first has an inward infiniteness, an invisible amount of resource which does not come into view. And this is the cause of the uncertainty of physiognomy, since more is contained within the human soul than ever appears. On the other hand, the great charm and attraction of the pursuit is just through the visible to discover the invisible. And whatever are the objections which, justly or unjustly, are brought forward against physiognomy, men still preserve their faith in it, if not unconditionally, at least within certain limits, and its advocates will always be justified in the assertion, that there is scarcely a single individual who can fully and entirely free himself from the persuasion that the countenance is the mirror of the soul, or who is entirely indifferent to the features and the eyes of the person with whom he holds daily and intimate intercourse. If physiognomy be entirely without truth, why do the arts of the painter and the actor stedfastly maintain their hold on mankind, and why are the demands on these not merely for pathognomic but also for physiognomic representations? And how can the desire be explained, which has existed from earliest ages and exists to the present day, to *see* any person who has been distinguished in any way whatever, whether for good or for evil,—a desire which would be altogether meaningless without a belief in the correspondence of the external appearance with the inner being? But the observations of physiognomy will obtain an entirely different

The art of reading in the face the qualities of the mind, outward appearance result according as they are brought to bear on the naturalistic or the ethical conception of humanity. The naturalistic theory, which regards man as only the product of nature, as the animal developed to intelligence, will lay special stress on the many resemblances to the animal world to be observed in the human countenance,—resemblances to the lion, the horse, the dog, the cat, to fishes and birds,—and from these will seek to strengthen its assertion, that mankind had its origin from below and not from above.[1] The ethical theory of man, which regards him not merely as the work of nature, but of the Creator, will, on the contrary, through all the intellectual and moral varieties of which the human countenance bears witness, seek to discover the impress of the Creator, or the impress of the *good* as a possibility, as a tendency which proceeds from the alone Good.

We are here reminded of Lavater. However much of what is perishable and untenable may be found in his *Physiognomic Fragments*, which he wrote for "the promotion of the knowledge and love of mankind," there remains behind as imperishable his *ethical* conception of man, his theory of man as created in the image of God. He therefore demands that we endeavour to read God's handwriting in every human countenance, because he maintains that no face of man is so hideous that there is not to be found in it traces of the dignity of human nature and its likeness to God. What Lavater calls God's handwriting we may also call the ideal physiognomy, the physiognomy for which man in the depth of his individuality is designed, and which differs both from the natural or congenital physiognomy and from the physiognomy of habit, which has been formed in the course of years through the continued action of the man, and which in persons of a high stamp of morality frequently shows us interwoven with it elements of the ideal. According to his view, this ideal physiognomy becomes perceptible in a striking degree in the case of many dying persons, whose features assume an ineffable expression of refinement and beauty, as also after death, and that too in regard to individuals whose character during life had not been marked by anything extraordinary; yet when the sufferings and anxieties of this world are past, and the rest of death allows the original handwriting of God to appear, these show us traces of God's glory amid the ruins of decay. But in every living countenance he seeks to read this handwriting, even through many obscurities and veilings; and he has often succeeded in tracing it in men sunk in depravity, as an evidence that these were destined for something far better than what they had made themselves in reality, or than what they had actually become. With regard to Lavater's physiognomic efforts, which of course also embraced the physiognomy of character or habit, it may with justice be said, that in its application many exaggerations, mistakes, and confusions between the essential and the accidental found place. It may be maintained with reason, that physiognomy will never attain to a science, much less, as Lavater himself unfortunately enough expressed it, to the rank of an exact science like that of mathematics; and this for the obvious reason, that no individuality can be perceived and comprehended through general definitions and abstract rules, to which science is confined, but can be grasped only by intuition, by an immediate and individual glance, which at the same time must be able to separate between the accidental and the essential. Nevertheless Lavater is essentially in the right, even if the system as a whole be rejected, and if by the side of a great amount of accurate observation much may be pointed out which is not accurate. He is in the right in maintaining that human individuality is *of one piece*, and is not composed of two separate independent parts, and that the soul forms for itself its bodily expression, though under certain limitations in which there is an indefiniteness, which indefiniteness Lavater did not sufficiently take into account, and thereby gave Lichtenberg occasion for his celebrated persiflage on physiognomy. He is right in this point,—and in it he stands forth as one of the great representatives of humanity,—that every person, even the most insignificant, is *an eternal individuality*, or genius. The connected observation not merely of the actual attainment of the individuality, but also of its inmost essence, of the fettered genius within the man, insight into the twofold being of our kind, the actual and the ideal, the traces of which he sought in the human countenance—it is this which belongs to the imperishable in Lavater. If naturalistic and pessimist physiognomists, who fix their eyes exclusively on the actual life of man, assert, that when we except a small number of handsome faces, a small number of intellectual faces, and a small number of genial faces, of which last, however, not a few border on the sheepish, there remains a preponderating number of human countenances ugly, stupid, and indicative of inward depravity, melancholy and pitiable to behold, wearisome and monotonous; nay, when Schopenhauer declares that individual faces bear the impress of such vulgarity and stolidity that one wonders that any person is content to go abroad with such an exterior, and does not prefer to wear a mask; we by no means contest the relative truth contained in this theory, for in our opinion there are many human countenances, in which by sin the handwriting of God has been well-nigh obliterated or written over by the scribblings of worldliness. But even if Lavater's view should be in danger of declining into optimist illusions, yet unquestionably it is right when it asks, if the reason why so few human faces are to be found which are fitted to awaken interest should not be sought for partly in a want of the faculty of observation, partly in a want of benevolence? Lavater's view of mankind, whether as a physiognomist he is correct in details or not, is the ethical, just because he always inquires about the *possibility*. It is this which makes the most insignificant person interesting to him. The *merely* pessimist physiognomist's view of mankind is on the contrary immoral, deterministic, and fatalistic, because it closes its eyes to possibility, and looks exclusively to actual achievement. The immortal soul in Lavater's work, in spite of the ephemeral character of his system, is the spirit of philanthropy with its great impulses, which through an inexhaustibility of turnings seeks to open our eyes to the fettered genius within man.[1]

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[1] In reference to these resemblances of the animal world to human countenances, which must have been observed by almost every person, see Lotze's *Microkosmus*, ii. 108 and onwards.

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[1] For instance in the 79th *Fragment:* "When a neglected youth or boy meets thy glance, alas! that brow was marked by God to seek and to find truth. In his eye rests wisdom undeveloped; on his lips trembles a spirit, which entreats thee to loosen its bonds and set it free. His mind and his hands are fettered. Priest and Levite pass by on the other side—but not so thou; look at what he is, and what he may become!" This appeal recurs again and again, and thus he passes over into ethics.

[Michelsen translates a different passage from this as his footnote, and it

§ 24.

Man's eternal individuality, the basis of his character and his faculty, is given him by his Creator and determined unalterably beforehand; no human being will ever be able to attain a higher degree of perfection than has been planned in the possibilities of his existence, although all men, both in regard to will and talent, are destined to be in *the image of God,* and in so far to the same state of perfection. To one, two pounds have been entrusted, to another five; and he who has the two may gain other two, he who got the five, other five, each thus in proportion to the original gift. But the development from possibility to actual achievement may be more or less normal or abnormal, productive or unproductive, as with the slothful servant, who digged a hole in the earth and hid his lord's money. This then, the ethical development of personality, must be effected through the natural individuality, which is determined by bent and disposition, feeling and temperament, and in which the intellectual tendency and talents move instinctively in the dawn of feeling. The natural individuality is from the first relatively changeable. We say relatively, for there is a fundamental impress which remains unalterably the same from birth to death, a natural determination, an innate disposition which the man must carry along with him throughout all the stages of life, and from which he can no more separate himself than he can separate himself from his own Ego, which remains the same under all change, the same in the old man as in the child. We may thus contemplate the temperament or the natural dis-

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runs thus:—"For instance *Physiogn. Fragments*, 2nd Essay (Leipsic and Winterthur, 1776), page 28 and onwards: 'The most wicked, depraved, worthless man is still a man, and of necessity a denizen of God's world, and capable of a darker or clearer perception of his individuality and indispensable requirements. Oh, brother man, look at what *is present* there, not *on what is lacking. Humanity, in all its distortions, is still always humanity, worthy of admiration.* No man ceases to be a man, even when he appears to sink far below the dignity of manhood. So long as he is not a beast (and as little as a beast can become a man can a man become a beast), so long is he capable of improvement and perfectibility. Behold what may be brought out of it!' This appeal occurs frequently, and it is just this through which he proceeds to ethics. (See Lavater's *Biography* by Bodemann, p. 230. Selections of beautiful passages from *Fragm.* 79, new edition)"] position in the organization of soul and body, which disposes the individual to certain feelings and emotions of the mind, to a certain manner of assuming the duties of life, earnestly or lightly, energetically or calmly and passively. Yet the natural individuality is plastic and susceptible of modification. It is not at first mature and finished, but rather to be compared to a rough sketch, an outline, which must be further filled in, and which may be developed either for better or for worse, in harmony or in opposition to the ideal, the prototype which the man bears within himself; which harmony or opposition is the source of the individual's blessedness or misery. The life of a beast is the necessary unfolding of its individuality; and all that a beast does, it does because it is so formed once and for all. But with regard to man, the requirement is made that he shall form, overcome, rule, and modify his natural individuality into an organ of personality; that is to say, not the abstract personality, but that which has been determined from eternity as the character of the individual.

§ 25.

The psychological primary forms in which the development of personality is effected, whether this be normal or not, show themselves in the first place as *assimilation* and *production*, as appropriation and producing, forming energy. But of these two, assimilation is the most important, and specially demands our attention, because all activity is conditioned by it. Assimilation is not merely a physical, but moreover a mental process, on the normal execution of which the health of the spiritual existence depends. It begins with us all as a process of nature. As we find ourselves corporeally in an atmosphere which is sometimes purer, sometimes less pure, but which we cannot avoid inhaling, so also in the spiritual and intellectual. We breathe in the atmosphere of our age, the atmosphere of our surroundings, and receive from our earliest years a multitude of traditions, ideas, examples, which unconsciously and unobserved we transmute into our own. Incessantly these mental influences flow in on us. From childhood we are nourished not merely by bodily but also by mental food, and the health of the soul as well as that of the body is affected by the material which we receive and assimilate. The assertion of the materialists, that man is what he eats, contains a far deeper truth than they themselves are in a condition to perceive. As, now, the atmosphere which we inhale, the mental foods which we employ, are of a very mixed character, and contain heavenly, earthly, and demoniac elements, divine and human, transitory and imperishable, hence appears the necessity of a mental *separation* (*excretion*) of the useless, hurtful, and pernicious materials, and especially the necessity of a mental as well as a bodily system of dietetics. What the beasts do instinctively in only appropriating to themselves that which is fitted to be serviceable, men must perform with consciousness and free-will. And what at first is only a process of nature must pass over into a process of ethical appropriation and corresponding separation or excretion of the deleterious matter. The more culture and civilisation advance in the world, the greater the abundance and variety of mental food produced, so much the more important becomes the requirement to be careful about appropriation. With justice the present age is vaunted on account of its abundant opulence in learning and science; but is it not an alarming idea, how thoughtlessly and carelessly the great majority of persons swallow this mixture of mental food, give up their mind to the varied impressions without making distinction between pure and impure? How frivolous, for instance, many persons are in the choice of their reading, allowing entrance into their mind to all and sundry, opening wide the portals of their souls, so that all the fowls under heaven may lay their eggs there! Not first in the Levitical law, nay, but in Paradise, was man directed to discriminate in the choice of his food, since he might eat of the tree of life, but not of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Not as if he must not know the evil, but he must not *eat* of it, must not assimilate it, must not change it into his own flesh and blood, which he was to do with the fruit of the tree of life. We may here also recall the circumstance that in the Gospel Christ names Himself the bread of life (John vi. 51); an expression which must be taken in its most real sense, since He thus offers men, who have only access to impure and mixed food, not merely His teaching, but *Himself* as the right, pure, and heavenly food. For as is apparent in every relation of love, personality alone can serve for the nutrition and refreshment of personality.

What man appropriates to himself or assimilates, he must work out and perfect by his own exertion. We have said that the man is what he appropriates, but we may also say that the man is what he does. For in action he displays what he has really made his own, what power it has gained in his being, if he has really changed it into his own flesh and blood (*in succum et sanguinem*), or if it has remained lying within him as undigested substance. "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. vii. 16). As appropriation is the condition of action, so also is action on the other hand the condition and means of appropriation; for only through action can appropriation be perfected. We are here again reminded of the words of Christ, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish His work" (John iv. 34). Through His working the work of the Father, His constant submission to the will of the Father, in which He does nothing of Himself, but everything by the Father, He draws to Himself the heavenly, nourishing, and fructifying powers,—He is filled, so to speak, with the Father,—the eternal Word assumes form in Him. The same holds true in a general psychological sense of us all, that through our continued activity we acquire influences and powers from the intellects, ideas, and powers in whose service we engage, and to which, during our action, we devote ourselves, whether the mental food we thus procure prove perishable or imperishable, quickening or life-destroying, fertilizing or causing sterility in the inward being. We may therefore also say, the man is or becomes more and more like to what he loves, or to that to which he devotes his service. For man was not made to live for himself alone, but to live also in and for mankind, and in the deepest signification of the term to live for God and for God's kingdom. Without love man cannot exist; love he must, whether he will or not, though the object of his affection may be of very different characters. He cannot help, also, serving the universal powers which use him as their instrument; nay, finally, he must serve God or the world, or endeavour, that which none can accomplish, to serve two masters. To the contrasts mentioned before must therefore now be added that also between egoism and love, *selfishness* (which seeks to exalt one's own) and *self-denying devotion*, as fundamental forms for the development of personality.

In the unity here described of appropriation and productive energy, of assimilation and excretion, of self-seeking and self-devotion, the soul fashions for itself its body, its instrument in a new and higher sense than that mentioned before; for now it is no longer in a preconscious but in a conscious state. What we receive by appropriation and assimilate into our own being becomes in the closest signification our own. Our deeds not merely leave a stamp on the outer world, for this is often soon obliterated, but more specially they leave behind them an enduring impress on our minds, verifying the Scripture, "And their works do follow them" (Rev. xiv. 13). The powers in whose service we have placed ourselves impress on us their mark and seal, and these we must bear. This more or less complete possession of our inward being is as closely united with our Ego as our outward body is, and we may therefore describe it as our inward, spiritual, and intellectual frame or body. Man labours incessantly to form both his outward and his inward frame. The outward body is fashioned as instrument and expression of the personality, and assumes in many ways an impress of the moral or immoral (the physiognomy of character—*characteer physiognomiet*); the inward or mental frame is fashioned by the perceptions and maxims of the soul, its affections and its aversions, efforts and achievements, its passions and its fancies,—by everything which through the process of life becomes the individual's own property, and by repetition and habit its second nature. Though from time to time a change may occur in the mental food, yet the essential inward character remains. We all work at this inward frame whether we are aware of it or not. Incessantly we spin, weave, and knit our inward garment, which, unlike our outer garment, can never be cast aside, because it is interwoven with our Ego, and in it our soul, our will, shall be arrayed, when, after laying down the material body, it shall enter eternity. Everything will then depend on the material of which we have fashioned our inward organism, on the spiritual power to which our Ego has devoted its service, and for what kingdom we have been ripening.

The view here stated, that the soul itself fashions its inner organism or its inward frame, is to be found already in several of the old mystics and theosophs, who had a great idea of assimilation, of the import of mental appropriation and nutrition, to which also the doctrine of the sacraments, particularly that of the Lutherans, must be held to point. In Rationalism the processes of assimilation and of nutrition have been entirely ignored; and without the feeding and nourishing of the soul all must issue in mere producing, acting, working, which must therefore be barren and unfruitful. A deeper psychology and theology must lead back to the truth of the old doctrine founded on Scripture. (Examine specially the parables in Scripture which represent the kingdom of God under the figure of a feast.)

BENT OR INCLINATION AND FREE-WILL—SIN.

§ 26.

The destiny of man is shadowed forth in human desires and inclinations. The bent or inclination is the inmost nature of the created, finite, and limited being, striving for development. It is the created life itself which relates itself to itself as its own special aim. As *blind* will, the inclination stirs and moves itself in the natural ground of personality, and drives forward the development of personality, because it wishes to be received into the *seeing* self-conscious will, and thus necessitates this last to determine itself, *i.e.* to fix its choice between the varied attractions of the inclinations. With bent or inclination there is always associated a deficiency, a want, which is sought to be removed by the satisfaction of the former. The permanent satisfaction of the bent or inclination is called a good; and as many things may be enumerated as good for man, so also may we speak of many bents, inclinations, or desires. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction is associated with the feeling of pleasure or disgust, which may rise to affection or emotion of mind. The inclination itself, through longing or desire, may mount to passion.

There have been disputes about the subdivisions of impulse or inclination, and there are some who have maintained that there is but one indispensable impulse in man as in every living being, namely, that of self-preservation. Thus Spinoza, who determines essential impulse as the effort of every being to preserve existence (*appetitus unius cujusque rei in suo esse perseverare*). This may be accepted if by self-preservation we understand the unhindered development of all the moments of the life of personality. We may then, in relation to the foregoing, name as essential impulses, that of appropriation and that of production. And as man can only develope himself in harmony with his being, can only maintain his personal existence when he not merely lives to himself, but also lives as a link of the entire chain for that which is different from and more than himself, we may further name as essential impulses, that of egoism and that of love (the autopathic and the sympathetic), though they cannot be abstractly separated from each other, since they are to each other as manifestations of the same life. Yet these oppositions may be included in a higher one, because all depends on the principles of appropriation and production, and the kindred nature of the aims of self-interest and those of affection. The classification of impulses must proceed from the good things or benefits towards which the impulses are directed. And as the human life of personality has the twofold destiny of a life in God and a life in the world, we name as the deepest, all-embracing, essential impulses of human nature, the worldly impulse, or the impulse to life in the world, its dignity and pleasure, which embraces all relative goods, and the impulse of God's kingdom, or the life in God's kingdom as the highest good. God and the world are the highest universal powers which stir in human nature, and through the corresponding impulses make man their instrument. For although the world is God's world, yet in a modified sense He has permitted it to have life in itself. He has bestowed a relative independence and self-dependence on it as being other than God; and this principle of the world's independence and the world's autonomy aims at establishing its sovereignty in man and through him by means of these impulses. As man is appointed to be God's representative on earth, so too is he the representative of the world and its autonomy, which in him comes into consciousness; and it is this twofold character in his destiny which man in a normal manner must bring into unity. The deepest contrast in the elements of man's nature is therefore not the contrast between mental and physical, between sympathetic and autopathic, but between *sacred* and *secular, or* *worldly*. Every other classification of impulses has the defect of making no clear distinction between the principal spheres in which the life of man seeks its development. Both the worldly impulse and that of God's kingdom has its autopathic and its sympathetic side, and each of them strives after both appropriation and production.

§ 27.

The worldly bent or impulse is the inclination to a complete and entire life in the world, to a harmonious, self-satisfied worldly existence, which we designate by the term *happiness*. It determines itself more closely as impulse and desire after appropriation of the world, appropriation of the world's goods, whether this be sought in external things, in the relations of human society, or in the realm of thought (for instance in the pursuit of arts and sciences). Through the appropriation of the world is sought not merely an outward possession, but the actual enjoyment, in which worldly possessions are assimilated as food, satisfaction, fulness for the life of the individual. But as the worldly impulse incites man to appropriate to himself the goods which are given to him and prepared for him, so it also urges him to production, to take the world as material out of which he may fashion and build for himself a new world, towards which he may relate himself in the same manner as to his body. Both in regard to external nature and to social relations this impulse appears in the individual, in however narrow a sphere, to arrange, fashion, and determine his surroundings in accordance with himself, his temper, mode of thought and will, which is very conspicuous in the inclination to rule and guidance, sovereignty and encroachment. Thus it appears as though the worldly impulse were purely egoistic or autopathic, employing everything as means for the individual. Yet such is not the case. The higher the object of appropriation, the greater its intrinsic worth, the loftier the aim of production; the more do the impulses of appropriation appear to be combined with the disposition to acknowledge this object for its own sake, its value in itself, with the disposition towards devotion, towards placing itself in a ministering relation in regard to it. The impulse to life in the world may in the form of self-devotion urge man to set his life on an idea, as is abundantly shown by history both in politics, arts and sciences, discoveries and inventions. It expresses itself also as the impulse of morality, as an impulse to subject the will to a higher norm or rule; and the energetic working in the service of the idea becomes itself a principal moment in the happiness. But the worldly impulse as such has its aim in the world, and does not lead us beyond the horizon of the consciousness of the world and of ourselves, although in a certain sense this may be also termed an infinite horizon, namely, in so far as *ideas* are immanent principles in the world.

The impulse towards God does not aim after happiness, but after *blessedness*, the full and perfect life in God and in God's kingdom, for which life in the world is only the lower, ministering basis, the means by which the life of bliss may obtain more abundant substance and fulness. The impulse of God's kingdom leads man beyond the world, incites him to seek his centre not in himself, or in the world, but in God. In the world as the summary of relative goods, man cannot find full contentment, but only in God, the highest Good. The impulse towards God is the impulse to the appropriation of God—appropriation of God in His revelation, His word, His gifts, the workings of His grace, His power in creation—as the only suitable and imperishable food of the soul. More especially it determines itself as an impulse of production for the kingdom of God's sake, to make of the human an instrument for the divine, to make humanity a dwelling for God and for His Spirit, an effort requiring a deeper appropriation of the world than is demanded by the mere worldly impulse. The autopathic and the sympathetic, self-esteem and love for others, are closely combined in the relation to God. The individual desires bliss, therefore he seeks to appropriate to himself God in His gifts, that God may become his possession, his own. But this appropriation is impossible without the unconditional devotion and sacrifice of the individual's own will. Thus faith is an act of the highest appropriation, and at the same time an act of deepest devotion. Thus prayer is at once appropriation of God and sacrifice to God. Thus every action which is wrought in God is a work of appropriated grace and of man's free efforts. And inseparable from the impulse of devotion with the ardour of love is the impulse to obedience, or conscience. For conscience is not merely consciousness or knowledge, but also bent or inclination, a living prompting of nature, a desire and necessity in the inner part of man urging him to obey God, in reverence to submit himself to His holy will, to respect everything which bears the impress of this will, this supernatural authority, its law, its ordering of human life. As the conscience also has an immanent side from which it may be considered as man's own voice, a worldly mode of thought may deny its supernatural character; but such a view has always man's own inmost consciousness opposed to it, conscience witnessing to the eternity of the individual, and the relation to God, elevated above all worldly relations, as the fundamental relation of man. Conscience incites man to set aside self-interest, nay, to sacrifice property and life, for the cause and will of God; and not the less is it the deepest impulse of self-preservation which urges the man to care for his true well-being, that he may not, even if he could thereby gain the whole world, injure his own soul.[1]

But with man, impulse is not, as with beasts, irresistible and absolute in its government. Man has faculties of consideration and reflection; he can ponder on his impulses, and estimate their significance in the light of self-consciousness and divine revelation, in the light of God's holy commandment, the contents of which are not merely the good as an idea, but as divine will. How far impulses shall become governing motives, in what relation they shall stand towards each other, which impulse shall become predominant, all this rests from the first on man's free, self-conscious will. Where free-will determines and acts, and thereby actualizes its possibilities, there first begins the ethical as such.

§ 28

If the development of the human race had been normal, then the worldly impulse would have been subject to the impulse to God's kingdom, life in the world would have been the subservient prop and support of life in God, the ideal of happiness in its qualified significance would have been subordinated to the ideal of bliss as the unqualified or absolute. There would then have existed upon earth a condition of justice, in which everything would have been in its proper place, in which man would have prized every good according to its real worth, and thus have loved God above all else. But after sin entered the world the relation was changed, and a universal condition of injustice was introduced, in which the really subordinate has assumed the position of superiority. It is the characteristic of the human race in its present condition, that the worldly impulse is the predominating, that the impulse towards the kingdom of God is repressed and fettered, and that with so strong a chain, that the normal relation between life in God and life in the world can only be restored by redemption. Man would not be the world's master as God's servant, but allowed himself to be seduced into wishing to be its master in his own right. In disobedience he forsook the relation of service towards God, and thereby he sank into a false dependence on the world and on himself: "for whoso exalteth himself shall be abased."

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[1] Sibbern, *Psychology*, 2d edition, p. 326.

The characteristic feature of man in the condition of sin may be designated as *worldliness* (which is no longer to be understood *sensu medio*),—a condition, a *habitus*, a course of life in which the relation to God, though assuredly not absolutely removed, is disturbed and weakened; in which life in the world is developed at the expense of life in God. Man has become a man of the world instead of a man of God, a child of the world instead of a child of God, a citizen of the world without right of citizenship in heaven. Both appropriation and production give evidence of this. His appropriation is predominantly appropriation of the world, and he feeds not only his body but also his mind essentially with worldly matter, assimilates only worldly food, whilst his capacity for receiving what is holy is blunted; and in order that he may be brought to receive and appropriate to himself divine things, and partake of imperishable food, some powerful awakening is generally necessary. His producing energy is essentially directed towards worldly aims and interests, fields and merchandise, wife and children (Luke xiv. 16 and onwards), politics, art, and worldly science; but to work for God's kingdom he is too slothful and unfit. His devotion is only devotion to the world. He may indeed set his life on an idea, may bring sacrifices for ideal aims, but he has no sacrifice for the living personal God, towards whom he does not stand in any personal relation.

Although he believes on God as the God of the race, yet he does not know Him as his own God; and although the consciousness of God and religious emotions may momentarily appear, yet the relation to God forms no determinate factor in his life. Whilst he carefully developes his worldly talents, he is generally quite passive in regard to the perfection of his religious endowments, although conscience often reminds him of his obligations, and he resembles the slothful servant, who hid the talent entrusted to him in the ground. But incessantly he chases after earthly ideals of happiness, mere relativities, which he imagines to be the absolute, and to which, in spite of the numerous disappointments which he has already encountered, he still continues to knit the greatest hopes for himself and for the world. This is repeated not merely in the life of some individuals, but also in that of nationalities, entire communities, nay, even in that of the human race. The expression of historic worldliness is paganism, by which we would understand not merely ancient paganism, but also the paganism which developes itself in the midst of Christianity. The characteristic of worldliness is seen from first to last in the religions of paganism, the divinities of which are only personified powers and energies of the world. It is seen in its philosophy, in those pantheistic systems which acknowledge no other God than the universe. It is seen in the practical mode of thought corresponding to pantheism, which may be adopted without any philosophy, and which only considers the individual as a link in the whole race,—only gives significance to the individual in consideration of what he may become in the world, what position he may come to hold in the community, in the nation, but has no thought of the eternity of the individual, his destiny to live his life for God. The characteristic mark of worldliness is seen, lastly, even in that worldly morality which is destitute of religion. We repeat it, to guard as far as possible against misunderstanding, that we do not deny its relative value in a world which now is as it is. But every serious reflection on this point must, on the presumption of a living God, lead to the acknowledgment that there must be something wrong with a world in which religion and morality can be disjoined, and that this points back to a falling away from God.

Within the wide domain of worldliness is found an endless variety of individual character; and at all times there is here a relative difference between good and evil, honesty and dishonesty; between such men as have a desire for salvation and an aspiration after it, and such as know not even the desire, but only sink deeper in worldliness; between such as are not far from the kingdom of God, and such as are far from it. But even the sin present in worldliness we describe as the union of the false love of the world and the false self-love in separation from God. Whether we consider the phenomenon of sin in men who are called sinners above others, and we plunge into the annals of crime, or into sketches of life in our own time setting forth the decay of morals, or into revolutionary and anarchical circumstances, where all bands are loosed, and the passions, which are at other times restrained by the laws of society,—for we always stand on a volcano,—burst forth unchecked; or if we contemplate sin in those men who are virtuous above other men, or in the great multitude who exhibit to us what has been called the average of human morality; or if we, as is indeed indispensable to our accurate perception of it outside of us, trace its manifestations in our own life; in all these different researches we are always led back through multifarious diversities to this fundamental phenomenon: the want of faith in God, worldly desires, and dependence on the good things of this world, egoism, which wraps us up in our own interests, and in accordance with its nature has boundless demands. As sin had its origin in the desire of man to be master, without at the same time being willing to be God's servant, and thus arose in disobedience to God; and as sin in the human race is the continuance of this disobedience; so egoism must be adjudged, as the subjective moment of worldliness, to be the prime mover in the kingdom of sin, because it is the selfishness in itself reflected, which in reference to the love of the world has the higher spirituality. Indeed it is to be remarked that human egoism is not like the egoism of the fallen spirits, from the very beginning a direct hostility and rebellion against God; it does not attempt to take heaven by storm; rebellion was not, in fact, man's aim, but only the inevitable condition on which the forbidden fruit which tempted him could be enjoyed: thus man is not opposed to God, but only wishes to use and rule over the world *without* God. Not the less is this false independence and usurpation of authority, therefore, disobedience, which constitutes sin as such. Human egoism also developes itself the more it advances and increases, till it attains the Titanic and Promethean character, till it becomes the man of sin, seating itself in God's place, and desiring to be worshipped as God (2 Thess. ii. 4). It was self, his own will, which man wished to enjoy in the forbidden fruit. It must not also be overlooked, in this milder view of the fall of man, that he allowed himself to be deceived into the expectation, that by the use of the forbidden fruit he should himself become as God, should himself become the centre of the world (*Eritis sicuti Deus*).

§ 29.

As man is a being composed of soul and body, egoism may develope itself as either predominantly physical or predominantly intellectual. In the first case, man sinks in self-degradation *below* the position and dignity which God bestowed on him, sinks down into matter: in the other, he elevates himself by a false self-exaltation *above* his sphere, and seeks to take to himself a higher place and dignity than God has appointed him. Here is verified in its deepest import the saying: *Medium tenuere beati,*—blessed are they who remain in that middle position assigned to them by God, and who thus remain in God, as the centre of their existence. This false self-degradation and false self-exaltation, sensuality and arrogance, are both fundamental forms of sin. In sensuality he who ought to be the lord of nature becomes its slave; the more he devotes himself to the lusts of the flesh, the more dependent he becomes on the body; for this last, which ought to be the tool or instrument of the soul, is emancipated to a false independence, so that instead of obeying its rightful sovereign it tyrannizes over it. It is this carnality, emancipated to a false autonomy, to which the apostle refers, when he speaks of the law in his members which takes man captive, so that he cannot do the good which he would (Rom. vii.). And inasmuch as this carnality exerts a pressure on the life of the soul, it has led Platonists, and also ascetics, into the error of regarding the bodily condition in itself and essentially as evil; whilst evil has its seat in the will, which, fallen away from God, has sold itself to the flesh, and materialized itself. In false self-exaltation, in the lust of dominion, the pride of knowledge, and an imaginary intellectual perfection, in which he dreams himself a god, man soars to aerial and unreal heights, where all safe footing is absent, and whence he must infallibly topple over.

Although this spiritual arrogance, which may even go so far that the man would wish to have no body, because this reminds him that he is a finite creature, and though in an airy idealism he may seek to reason away the whole material world, though this arrogance and sensuality are opposed to each other, yet they are always found together, and there is no individual who sins exclusively in the one direction. As it is the soul which has sinned, and as the soul is twofold in its nature, having a spiritual and a carnal side, so must the human Ego exist at the same time in sinful spirituality and in sinful carnality. The whole man must become impure, but the impurity in each region corresponds with its own nature. If therefore the great majority of men sin in the direction of sensuality, giving the reins to material impulses, yet nevertheless arrogance has a place in their being, and shows itself when opportunity occurs. And although, on the other hand, many may sin in the supermaterial and spiritual direction, still the fleshly appetite slumbers in the being of all, and reveals itself in one or other of its forms. When the soul desires to fix itself exclusively in a false spirituality, it is driven by necessity over into sensuality, and *vice versa*. For it is the destiny of the soul to exist in unity of the mind and body; and as this harmonious unity has been destroyed by sin, it must exist in a false, discordant unity. Accordingly the history of asceticism, monachism, and particularly of spiritualism, affords many examples of men who had determined to soar above the bodily state, and had devoted themselves to a so-called pure spirituality in which they believed themselves to be raised above sensual impulses, and which they have also succeeded for a considerable period in maintaining, but who have suddenly plunged into the grossest sensuality from an overwhelming rebellion of the lowest impulses (*le saint et la bête*). On the other hand, experience shows that men who have materialized themselves, and given themselves over to licentious pleasures and debaucheries, which they will not forsake at the call of conscience, are constrained to form for themselves a *theory* in excuse and justification of their evil practice, and are thereby driven into a region of false and lying spirituality, and become theoretic materialists, atheists, and mockers at religion. This passage from sinful spirituality to sensuality, and *vice versa,* is strikingly set forth in those two imperishable forms which, like Prometheus in the verse of the ancients, take their place among real personages, Faust and Don Juan. Faust begins in a false spirituality, in the arrogance of knowledge, in self-exaltation above the limits of humanity; and from this he sinks down into sensual love, lust, and passion, as an evidence that man is not merely mind, but also soul, and as soul, cannot rend himself asunder from the world of sense. Don Juan, on the other hand, begins in sensual lust and passion, and he is thereby impelled by an inward necessity into the realm of thought, when he insolently impeaches the retributive justice exercised against himself,—an evidence that the soul, however desirous it may be to do so, cannot get quit of the mind, and that it is in the region of intellect that its ultimate destiny shall be accomplished, in accordance with its relation to God. But what poetry and history exhibit to the imagination in great ideal shapes, is shown to us in daily life in a multitude of minor prosaic forms.

In characterizing arrogance and sensuality as the fundamental forms of sin, we must remark, in order to guard against misapprehension, that we take the conception of arrogance in a wider sense than that in which it is often employed, since arrogance is frequently limited to the relation towards other men, whom the arrogant are disposed to overlook and despise. Although this is a striking feature in the sin of arrogance, still it is not the essential characteristic. This is rather to be defined as the exalting of self above the limits fixed by God, and thus above justice, above truth, above the law of God, and at the same time without regard to others; an inward self-exaltation in a false estimate of self, because the Ego contemplates itself and its belongings as reflected in a magnifying glass. It was in such a false mirror that Lucifer and other kindred spirits beheld themselves so great, that they found it beneath their dignity to continue the servants of God, nay, even imagined themselves as equal in inherent majesty with Him, able to contest the sovereignty with the Creator. And in such a mirror, too, man beholds in himself a greatness which increases the oftener he regards it. This doctrine will of course be rejected by many, who will maintain that the self-exaltation and self-glorification here described have no place in the constitution of their inner life. But from this we dissent, affirming that the exaltation of self assumes an infinite number of forms, and only attains these great dimensions under progressive development, without opposing forces; and that there is one form of self-exaltation to be found in most people, namely, self-justification, which may easily subsist along with the conviction that we are all frail and sinful men. For in the mirror which self-justification holds up to man, he sees his faults as trifling blemishes, for which he can easily forgive himself, or which God cannot but forgive him, since it was the Creator who formed him thus; whilst, on the other hand, he beholds in himself so many good qualities, that taken on the whole he believes himself to be in the *normal* condition of his being. This is self-exaltation, albeit unconsciously exercised; for though the self-righteous man, though the Pharisee, may take the position of a servant, he yet places himself in relation to God infinitely higher up than God has placed him; moreover, it must be borne in mind that there are different degrees in the grossness or refinement of self-righteousness, and that the Pharisee may also exhibit himself disguised as a publican, who exalts himself on the ground of his consciousness of sin. On the other hand, we observe that in designating as the second radical form of sin, sensuality, we did not merely refer to gluttony, drunkenness, and debauchery, but also to that negative species of self-indulgence which exhibits itself as indolence and decent inertness, a characteristic to which Fichte ascribed such importance, that he even attempted to deduce from it all sin; a hankering after ease and comfort, the *dolce far niente* in which man shirks every toilsome exertion, and will not fulfil his mission.

The more strongly sin developes itself as self-exaltation, the more closely does man come to resemble the devil and his angels. It is an ancient belief, that the devil fell through arrogance, and thus became the father of *lies.* Because he kept not his first estate (Jude 6), the place assigned to him by God, he was obliged in the maintenance of his false position to fabricate for himself a false theory concerning God, the world, and himself, and to seek to surround himself with other creatures whom he seduced into the same arrogant delusion as his own. Although in the case of men sensual motives may conduce to falsehood, and although from the great misery which sin has introduced into the world earthly wants and necessities may tempt to the employment of lying and deceit, yet it is essentially and originally in self-exaltation that falsehood is generated;[1] and in falsehood man betrays himself, weaving round himself and others a network of illusions, whilst from this one sin spring dissimulation, infidelity, treachery. And the greater dimensions self-exaltation assumes, the more strongly is developed the lust of dominion, until the arrogant Ego, only desiring to employ men as means for its own ends, at last cannot suffer any second person, any *thou*, to stand beside itself, and hatred, envy and slander, cruelty, malice, bloodthirstiness, destruction for the sake of destroying, with all their train of horrors, raise their heads. The more sin advances in a sensual direction, the more men resemble beasts. But between swine and demons there is an inward connection.

Between these extreme points there is in the realm of sin a middle region, which is occupied by covetousness in its various forms. Covetousness, as essentially the lust of possession, has its root in sensuality, but has, nevertheless, in a certain sense an ideal or transmaterial side. The covetous or avaricious man is the slave of his senses, not however immediately, but only by a relation of reflection, since he is dependent not on the enjoyments themselves, but on their *representative*, that is to say, on money. The avaricious man does not give himself up to the actual enjoyment, he subjects himself to great privations, and exhibits great control over his sensual appetites; but it is his passion to possess the means of gratifying physical wants and desires. It is these means which he heaps together, whilst he never devotes himself to the aim, or the physical enjoyments themselves. These last he loves *in abstracto*, but not *in concreto*. He deifies the representative, but will have nothing to do with the reality. As a rule, the avaricious man is anxious about his future, and is afraid that he may come to poverty in his old age. In order to ward this off, and to surround himself with securities against it, he subjects himself to the very thing which he dreads as the worst that can befall—want, distress, and an anxious existence. This incongruity in the relation between the means and the end is evident folly, and from this side of the matter the avaricious man appears a fit subject for the comic writer, to whom he has frequently furnished a theme. We must, however, permit ourselves to observe that the comic here is scarcely sufficient to veil the tragic from our sight, and to prevent the loathsome impression of the naked prosaic egoism, which shows us a dead heart clinging to dead matter, as is specially the case in Moliere's *L'Avare*. The marvel is, that avarice in its extreme form is found in old age, in those who stand on the brink of the grave, who cling fast to life, because they cling to gold. The lust of possession assumed a more reflective and demoniac form in Caligula,—the same who wished that the heads of all the Roman citizens were joined to one neck, that he might slake his thirst for blood in one fell stroke, and who delighted in literally wallowing in gold.[1] Here there is no aim at physical enjoyment or self-exaltation present. In this gold bath he, so to speak, concentrated all the sensual enjoyments of the world, and instead of devoting himself to this individual pleasure or to that, which already palled upon his taste, he, in symbolic fashion, quaffed them all at once. Here is the union of the beastly and the demoniac which so often appears in the Roman emperors.

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[1] See Julius Müller, *Die Lehre von der Sünde*, i. 221. (Clark's translation, vol. i. 136.)

But covetousness may also show itself in other forms than that which proceeds from sensuality. It may moreover cast its desires on ideal objects. And here may be specially named ambition, with its offspring vanity, which last flutters low, and has for its element triviality. Ambition, which term we here employ in the sense of craving after honour, inhabits the same middle region as the meaner covetousness described above, but it has come there from the opposite side. Whilst the meaner or lower covetousness originates in sensuality, ambition proceeds from the mind, from arrogance. But not the mental as such, not the reality of the thing, is the object of desire with the ambitious man, but the appearance of it, the reputation of it, its possession in the *opinion* of others. It is his highest aspiration to contemplate his own image as reflected in other men's views regarding him, and to behold this image in as brilliant colours as possible. Nothing is more intolerable to him than that this his representation, which is yet not unfrequently very different from his actual being, should in any way be injured or set aside. That which ambition has in common with the lower covetousness, that which is common to all forms of covetousness, is thus the craving after possession of good things, whether physical or mental, yet not the realities of these, but only their *representatives.*

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[1] Suetonii *Caligula*, cap. 42: "Sæpe super immensos aureorum acervos, patentissimo diffusos loco, et nudis pedibus spatiatus, et toto corpore aliquamdiu volutatus est." See Sibbern, *Psychology*, ii. p. 271.

The Apostle John, in warning the disciples against the false love of the world ("Love not the world, neither the things which are in the world"), names as the principal forms of this sin, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life (1 John ii. 16). The lust of the flesh and the pride of life designate the two extreme points of egoism of which we have already treated; and by the lust of the eye is doubtless intended that covetousness in different forms, in consequence of which man contemplates what he has, and what he *appears* in the eyes of the world, and in the contemplation feels an egoistical pleasure. Some one of these three lusts exists in every man, and they constantly pass over into one another; but the principal sources of sin are arrogance or self-exaltation, which is akin to the demoniacal realm, and sensual appetite, which is akin to the realm of beasts. Of these two great sources of sin, arrogance lies deepest, so that very often the man himself is entirely unconscious of it, whilst quite aware of his offences in the direction of sense. It is self-exaltation and the illusions bound up with it which Christianity first attacks, because it is necessary first and foremost to break down self-righteousness. It begins by making man humble; for only on this basis of humility can there be dealings between man and his God.

§ 30.

"All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God"

(Rom. iii. 23). But where sin is, there also is reckoned guilt. The theory that the human Ego is accountable amounts to this: I myself have done my own deeds, and have not been constrained to do them by the irresistible necessity of my nature; no, I have *willed* them: my deeds, then, are *transactions* [*handlinger*, literally, doings of the hand] executed with will and purpose. And not our deeds only, nay, our whole personal condition, in so far as this rests on the will, must be accounted for. That we are accountable amounts further to this: that we are answerable for what we have willed, not merely before men, not merely before our own conscience, but before the bar of God's judgment, where we shall give account of the stewardship of our lives (Luke xvi. 2), and shall be declared just or unjust; and that we, if we are declared unjust, or among the number of those who have offended the laws of God in His world, are liable to His righteous sentence of exclusion from His presence; as debtors, servants indebted to their lord (Matt. xviii. 23–25), are under sentence of condemnation if the debt cannot be discharged for us, if there be not "a forgiveness of sins," a remission of the debt with which we are burdened. But the ideas of guilt and responsibility stand or fall with the idea of the freedom of the human will, which now remains to be considered according to its fundamental moments.

THE WILL AS FREE AND AS BOUND.

§ 31.

What is meant by the will of man being free is, that it has the power, within certain conditions appointed by God, by its own determination to realize its being. We say expressly, within the conditions appointed by God. For human freedom is not, like that of God, absolute, but conditioned, a freedom in created dependence. It is not merely dependent on God and on His holy law, but it is also dependent on nature,—not merely on that nature which is external to man, but on that which concerns his own constitution. Human personality is restricted by individuality, natural characteristics not merely physical, but also mental, which are *given* to the man before all self-consciousness and self-guidance commence, and which may indeed be moulded by the will, but can never be entirely altered; and in his individuality each man has not only his endowment, but also his limitations. The restricted nature of human free-will appears, moreover, in the fact that man is subject to a development in time, and that not only his physical being, but also his mental, developes itself from an obscure natural source. This will presupposes impulse and desire; his self-consciousness unfolds itself from the unconscious, obscure, embryonic abyss. The human soul leads a twofold existence, one clear as day and self-conscious, the other obscure and unconscious, and in its dim abyss it holds some contents which never fully emerge into the light. But the free-will of God is perfect, just because it does not develope itself from an obscure basis, because this dualism between mind and nature, between the self-conscious and the unconscious, between day and night, in God is overcome from all eternity, "because God is a light wherein is no darkness at all." Just on this account—that is, in virtue of the dualism in which man is bound, so that he never obtains full command of his fundamental constitution, and, so to speak, cannot see his own back—has the Creator reserved to Himself power over His creature, and in the creation of man has followed the principle: *Divide et impera.* For only when man devotes himself adoringly to God, and in faith permits himself to be borne up by the arms of eternal love, does his natural disposition cease to be an imprisoning barrier to him, and becomes the assisting and supporting basis of his free-will. On the other hand, when man wrenches himself away from God, and determines wilfully to wander his own way and overstep the boundaries assigned him by the Creator, his natural disposition is perverted into a chain on that rock which bears the bound Prometheus.

§ 32.

Whilst, however, the Creator has reserved a power to Himself, He has conceded to the personal creature a relative independence, "a derived absoluteness." The destiny of man, his ideal being, is liberty itself in its unity with love. We designate this eternal power, or possibility of man to will, as his *essential* liberty. But in order that this may be realized, man, whose actual will is at first relatively unconscious, must attain to a consciousness of his independence, his power over himself. Liberty must therefore determine itself as *freedom of choice*, as the ability to choose between two masters, between the principles of holiness and of worldliness, or what is the same thing, as the ability to choose between good and evil, in order that love, through unconstrained, self-denial and obedience, may become realized. Through freedom of choice, which is not restricted to one single moment, but extends throughout a series of acts of choice, the will must stand its test, must be tried and tempted; whilst evil presents itself to man as a possibility, but which, as a possibility overcome, should serve as a deeper ground for holy love (Gen. ii.). Therefore freedom of choice, or as it has also been called, formal freedom (because it has not yet produced its contents), is not perfect freedom, but only a moment therein, has only significance as a passage to the *true, the divinely perfect freedom*, because man through his continued development shall thus ever more and more closely unite himself with God, and will no more choose, since liberty and necessity are one in love, which is the freedom of God's children. But whether the development of the man through freedom of choice be determined normally or not, the character of the human will is always produced by choice. For the *character* is the radical impress which the will assumes from the series of its acts. However, then, the will may choose, it must always through the choice be adding to its own contents, and thus be assuming the nature of those powers to which it devotes itself. Both in good and in evil, and in the endless admixtures of these, which experience shows us, the character is the imprinted will, which not merely is imprinted, but has given and continues to give to itself its own impress. Man is the *self-characterizing* creature. He alone of all earth's creatures acts not merely according to the inward necessity of his nature, which is also true of plants and animals, but within certain necessary limitations himself draws forth his being, his reality, from the fountain of possibility.

§ 33.

In its actings the will is determined by motives, or considerations of the value of the thing, which set the will in motion, and by incentives or promptings from within to a certain line of action. And as it is determined by motives which set the will in motion, so, too, is it by sedatives or quietives which set the will at rest, as *e.g.* by considerations of the value of the thing, grounds of re-assurance under the disquietude of passions and affections. Motives and quietives are essentially the same, in so far as they are both grounds of determination for the will. But they point to two opposite movements of the will, since this either determines itself as striving, pursuing, craving, labouring, or on the grounds of suffering and adversity, as resigning, relinquishing its aspirations. One does not perfectly understand a human character if one only knows the motives for its actions, without at the same time being acquainted with the quietives, the sources of calm and soothing, by which it allowed itself to be determined under privation and reverses. For example, the character of a Napoleon I. can certainly not be understood at all if only the motives which urged him on his path of military glory be taken into account, without considering also the quietives of which he made use at St. Helena to set his will at rest. The ethical nature of the quietives corresponds, moreover, entirely with the motives of the same individual. But neither motives nor quietives are causes of the will, as if they only were active and the will passive, without any causality of its own. These representations, whether they tend to motion or rest, become only motives and quietives so far as the will appropriates them and makes them part of itself. What kind of motives or quietives shall affect me, rests on the inmost determination or direction of my will, or if this is not yet stamped on it, on my choice. That in this choice there is a mysterious incomprehensible point must be admitted. The incomprehensible thing is not that man should choose the good, or determine his course by motives of love, because he thus acts in accordance with his own being and freedom of choice in a teleological and consistent manner, and moves toward his aim, the divinely accomplished freedom. What is incomprehensible is, that man chooses the evil, or determines his course from motives of egoism, because he thus sets himself at strife against his being, and his freedom of choice moves contrary to reason, or absurdly. "It is inconceivable that thou canst act so!" we say often in daily life. But this expression is true also of the phenomenon of sin itself in the human race. For indeed it may be said, that it is not inconceivable that a sinful will should determine itself after its sinful tendency. But the mystery lies in the first choice; therefore, as sin had no part in man when formed in God's image, its appearance is most inexplicable in the fall at the commencement of human history, but next to this in every subsequent relative fall, in which man has had a relative first choice. For though we may be able to grasp the possibility of the fall, we cannot deduce its occurrence from any necessary ground of reason. Experience shows us, however, that sin, namely *that which ought not to be,* does nevertheless actually exist, nay, is become a universal power in human nature. Although the Good is in itself natural to man, yet experience shows that in his present condition it is only by the most strenuous exertion and self-denial, and only by the assistance of redeeming grace, that he is enabled to choose the Good, to determine himself by the Good, and fully to receive it into his will.

§ 34.

If the contemplation be fixed exclusively on the conditioned in human free-will, then appears Determinism, which teaches that human liberty is only a concealed necessity. Religious Determinism teaches that the will of man, by the fall, and by the universal and hereditary sinfulness which was thus originated, has become an enslaved will (*servum arbitrium*), so that man outside the sphere of grace and redemption cannot do other than sin, and only through the creative influences of grace, to which the will of man is related as a passive vessel, can again become free. In Adam we have all sinned, we are branches of the degenerate tree of the race which can only be restored by a new creation, and Adam's guilt is imputed to us as our own. This religious Determinism, or Augustinism, with justice opposes its antagonist Pelagianism, in so far as this last denies the fall and natural depravity, teaches that man yet maintains his normal condition, regards the individual as entirely distinct from the race and independent of all surrounding influences and effects, and asserts for him a power every instant to determine his own choice of action. But the unsoundness in this religious Determinism consists in not perceiving the freedom implied in the bondage, and that in the sin of the individual it only sees that of the race, and thereby annihilates all individual and personal responsibility. Doubtless we cannot overlook the fact that the human individual does not stand alone, but is also a *member* in the organism of the race, partaker in the sin of the race; that sin as inherited depravity is an innate natural condition of the individual, and that its development in many respects is dependent on its surroundings. But the individual is not *merely* a member of the race, the central point of his life is in himself in relative independence on the race. For though inherited sin is an innate natural condition, and in so far is not guilt but fate, yet this fate becomes guilt in the will, since the individual does not by any means preserve towards this natural condition the relation of suffering blamelessness, but voluntarily appropriates it to himself and voluntarily produces new sin. And when it is maintained that we cannot do other than sin, the truth in this assertion is only that we cannot be free from sin; that we, as born in sin, are bound to an abnormal course of life, in which we cannot fulfil the law of God according to its spiritual import, cannot realize the highest Good or the kingdom of God. But it is not true that we are incapable of receiving or rejecting the redemption and emancipation which the gospel of Christ offers to us, and therefore we are personally responsible for our reception or rejection of the offer. We propose the following questions to the experience of our readers: Have we, though not free from sin, yet been forced by our depraved nature to commit such heinous and such numerous offences against God's law as has been actually the case? Does not inner consciousness tell us that there have been times and seasons when it was in our power to have made a far more strenuous resistance than we did against evil, our pride, our self-indulgence, our sloth and apathy? And have we not known in the heathen world instances of men worthy of our esteem, nay, of our admiration, since in an honest struggle for self-knowledge they have by the energy of their will not indeed overcome the world, they have not been able to redeem themselves, but yet they have made a powerful stand against evil, and in self-denial have vanquished evil inclinations? And would this esteem and admiration in any great degree have been yielded by us if we had here contemplated not a struggle for freedom, but only a process of nature? If this is granted us, then the points in question are conceded, namely the freedom, not absolute but conditional, of the human will, and the reasonableness of individual and personal responsibility.

§ 35.

But independently of the religious postulate of Christianity with regard to sin and grace, Determinism also appears as a universal philosophic doctrine, which, supporting itself on psychological grounds, with justice attacks its opponent Indifferentism, in so far as this teaches that man at every moment has an unconditioned and unlimited freedom of choice (*libertas indifferentiæ*). According to Indifferentism or Indeterminism the will is never in any sense fixed, but hovers indifferently over all motives. The man has at all times the option of acting differently from what he does act, may independently of his antecedents, when it pleases him, make a new beginning in his life; from which it follows that the virtuous may at any moment fall off from virtue and resolve to tread the paths of sin and depravity, the vicious at any moment may be capable of soaring to holiness and self-denial. This naïve, or rather this shallow conception of free-will, finds its refutation in the actual life of man, and must yield before a growing acquaintance with human nature and our own being. For even where man's sin and need of redemption are not acknowledged, still experience necessitates the conviction, that the human will in many ways is determined by the natural individuality of the person, by innate disposition, by former acts, by habit. And whilst, according to the indifferentistic view, every man must be absolutely unreliable, since one cannot know whether he who through a long series of years has exhibited a proved integrity may not to-morrow break through all promises and engagements, life, on the other hand, leads us to conclude that every man whose character we know is, if not absolutely, yet at least relatively reliable, and that in many cases we can judge with overwhelming probability what we ought to expect from him. He who in need would claim assistance from his fellows, does not appeal to the avaricious and hard-hearted, but to him whose benevolence and helpfulness are already known to him. And he who purposes with the aid of another to perpetrate a crime does not seek counsel with the man who is distinguished for his incorruptibility and strict probity, but rather with him who is already an adept in dishonest practices, and has made progress in the art of drowning the voice of conscience. Exactly opposed to this doctrine of the unconditioned indifference of the will, which makes impossible every development of character, stands forth Determinism as its counterpart in one-sidedness, since this last teaches the absolute unchangeableness and reliability of human character. This must certainly be described as a standpoint, which in regard to that naïve doctrine of freedom gives evidence of a closer acquaintance with human nature and a larger experience of life. Yet Determinism combats the theory opposed to it as a falsehood, and denies undoubted facts in moral consciousness with the object of annihilating indifferentism instead of leading it back to its limited validity.

§ 36.

Psychological Determinism proceeds from the law of motives, or from the law that no resolution can be taken without a corresponding motive, which arises from the conjunction of individuality and circumstances. And this idea is further developed by the opinion, that where several motives (or quietives) exist, the will must of necessity follow the strongest; so that the persuasion common with men, that in many cases they might have acted otherwise than they actually did, is an illusion. Only that which I actually did, could I do, must I do. Schopenhauer,[1] who strenuously maintains Determinism, seeks to illustrate the subject by the following example:[2] "Let us suppose a man standing on the street and saying to himself: It is now six o'clock in the evening; the day's work is done; I may then take a walk, or I may go to the club, or I may ascend the tower and see the setting of the sun, or I may go to the theatre, or I may go and visit this friend or that one, or I may run out at the city gate into the wide world and never come home again. All these things are in my own power, I have perfect freedom to do any of them. Yet now I will do none of them, but equally of my own free-will I will go home again to my wife." "This," continues Schopenhauer, "is exactly the same as if the water should say: I can heave huge billows (yes, doubtless in the open sea in a storm); I can rush furiously along (yes, in the bed of a river); I can leap down bubbling and foaming (yes, in a waterfall); I can mount like a sunbeam in the air (yes, in a fountain); finally, I can boil, and boiling disappear (yes, at 80 degrees of heat on Réaumur's thermometer); however I will do none of these things, but remain of my own accord in my tranquil dam, smooth as a mirror." As the water can only do any of these things when the exciting causes of one or the other of them are present, so can the man only do what he imagines he is able of himself to determine under the same conditions. So long as the cause is not present it is impossible to him; but when this enters, he, like the water, *must* do it if presented under corresponding circumstances. The man must thus go home to his wife. For this idea, that he could also will all the other things, go to the club, etc., is purely imaginary, meaning only that he might will it if he had not rather willed something else, namely, to go home, if this conception were not for him the stronger motive. In reality he can only do this one thing, and this he must do.

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[1] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1866).

[2] *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, 2d edit. p. 4.

Our principal objection to the whole of the foregoing is this, that Schopenhauer regards the human will entirely from the same point of view as the water, namely, under natural necessity, and as destitute of personality; that he regards motives as physical causes, therefore as constraining and necessitating, whilst they are only incentives (disposing, not compelling); that he regards every act as the product of the motive and of an individuality not subject to change or modification, whereby the will in the moment of determination and action becomes a mere passive, impersonal point. But the will is not passive and inert. The will may be favourably or unfavourably disposed towards the motives, it may reject the one and resign itself to the other. The defect in Schopenhauer's reasoning is partially concealed by the circumstance that the most of the actions to which he refers in his illustrations are indifferent actions, belonging to what are called middle things, the ethical character of which can only be understood when we know more intimately the individuality and circumstances of life of the man; and that the one action which he mentions which is not indifferent, namely, to run out into the wide world and never come back again, thus to run away from his wife and his duties, stands here only as a conceit, a play of fancy, which can never come into comparison with going to the club or the theatre. The error in regard to our moral consciousness in this reasoning of Schopenhauer would be more apparent and palpable, if this man standing in the street at six in the evening had found himself in a serious struggle between motives of duty and of inclination, between motives which proceed from conscience and those which originate in earthly desires or earthly necessities; for in this case would he first have discovered himself to be seriously placed between an *either* and an *or*. For our inmost consciousness and moral experience tell us that in the strife between the spirit and the flesh, between duty and inclination, the will may strive to make the motive of duty, to which it finds itself in conscience bound, dominant and prevailing; it can avoid temptation and resist evil; can, in order to maintain its consciousness of duty, *gather up all its force;* can summon to its aid encouraging considerations so as to bind itself more firmly to the Good ("watch and pray"). We do not say that this power of resistance is found at every time and in all circumstances. We might also imagine an example of a man standing in the street at six in the evening and forming the resolution to run out into the wide world away from his wife and his duties, and, in his desperation, his moral corruption not being capable of acting otherwise, because he is so entirely under the thraldom of sin that his soul has become like water lashed by the storm, so that the motives opposed to duty are no longer impulses, but operate as compelling powers of nature, whilst conscience not the less bestows on him the bitterest reproaches. But what does such a condition indicate? It indicates that at an earlier point of time he has neglected to resist evil and to strengthen his will by the exercise of the motives of duty, on which account his present corrupted and enslaved condition must be considered as the result of the foregoing series of omissions and transgressions. Through the continued practice of sin he has formed for himself in a spiritual psychical sense an organism of sin, an inward body of sin, on which he has become dependent. That men may sink so deep in the thraldom of sin that they have no longer any choice, does not disprove the assertion that there is a sphere of liberty in which by severe effort we may attain the capability of making the motives of conscience, duty, and honour dominant in our lives, and that we are responsible for whether we have honestly striven or basely shirked the fight.

In indifferent actions the formal power of self-determination in the will frequently exhibits itself in a very evident manner. We are reminded of Buridan's often quoted ass, which, standing between two bundles of hay of equal size and excellence, under the postulates of Determinism died of hunger, because equally strong motives drew it on both sides. No man will be such an ass as to starve between two portions of food because he is equally attracted by both, but each individual will make use of his liberty and turn either to the right or to the left, though in itself it is entirely indifferent to him to which side he turns.

§ 37.

As the efficacy of the motives is determined by the individuality, as a motive can only obtain influence over me because I am what I am, Determinism may be also expressed in the assertion that every life of man is only the necessary development of the man's individuality under the given circumstances. "Human actions are only utterances of the special nature of each individual, and as thou art, so thou actest! A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, and *vice versa.* However much, then, actions may be modified by circumstances, the essential tendency of the will, its line of sentiment and aspiration, its desire and inclination, remain unchangeably the same." Schopenhauer teaches that every individual, by an act which lies before all time, has made himself once for all what he is, and that his life in time, with the whole range of his proceedings, is merely the detailed performance of this pre-existent act. Others who cannot be satisfied with this obscure representation, by which Schopenhauer, following in the path of Kant and Schelling, involves himself in many contradictions, and becomes liable to answer many difficult questions, proceed simply from man's individuality with its intellectual and moral endowments as being fixed. But all Determinists are at one in the belief that the human character is unchangeable. "It is folly," says Schopenhauer, "to think that one can change his own character or that of others," and he here appeals to universal experience. "We often imagine that we would act otherwise than we have done if we were to come again into the same situation, and just as often we discover that this was a mistake. After the course of many many years we catch ourselves and our old acquaintances at the same tricks as formerly. And although life may teach us that we were mistaken in the means by which we sought to attain our aims, yet the aim continues to be unalterably the same although we now seek it in another way. From the cradle to the grave man directs himself towards the goal which nature fixed for him, and in which he hopes to find his satisfaction, *his good;* and the significance of the Spanish proverb ever holds, What is sucked in with the mother's milk is poured out in the shrouded corpse. With years we only gain this advantage, that we become freed from the illusions which we had entertained regarding ourselves and others, and learn to know both parties better. Towards the end of life it therefore happens as at the close of a masked ball, where the masks and disguises are laid aside. We then see those with whom during the course of life we had come into contact with their real faces, and in their true form, learning what they have really been; but at the same time we discover what we have been ourselves. Time and experience having cleared away our illusions."[1]

It cannot be denied that this theory contains a truth which is confirmed by the growing experience of life. But its value still merely amounts to this, that no man can divest himself of his original nature, which in its essence remains the same from the cradle to the grave, and, moreover, that in our appreciation both of it and of the character we are often mistaken, and only through experience get rid of illusions; that there are few judges of human nature, few physiognomists of whom it could be said, as it was said by Goethe of Lavater, "If he were not such a good man, it would be unpleasant to find one's self in the neighbourhood of a person who every moment sees through one, and looks into the inmost corners of one's mind," and that there are still fewer who know the inmost corners of their own minds. But it is not true that in the original nature of man there is no capacity for moulding and culture, a variety of possibilities which also in entirely different modes may come into development on the way from the cradle to the grave, from the mother's milk to the shroud of the corpse. It is not true that this original nature cannot at the same time be moulded and fixed by that which is higher than nature. For man's natural individuality is at birth only a first outline, which requires to be fully carried out by further moulding and remoulding, which do not immediately come of themselves. It is true that we often, after the course of many years, may catch ourselves and our old acquaintances at the same foolish tricks, on the same illusory pursuits, and building the same air-castles as in earliest youth; but it is untrue that this is not in a great measure our own fault, and that of our old acquaintances themselves, in neglecting the means and assistance which were offered us to tread in better paths. The truth is, further, that the character is fixed by a succession of actions, that the will, by persisting in sin and worldliness, may frame to itself a false organism, a body of sin, in which it is enslaved and held fast by its own antecedents; but it is not true that throughout the course of life there may not occur some turning-point in the development of character, in which may take place conversion, a change of mind, and a man *repenting* may break with his past life. Here Determinism encounters a fact which it cannot explain. If the life of man is merely the development of his individuality as fixed by nature, then the world of humanity becomes nothing more than an intellectual animal kingdom; and as the wolf and the lamb, the lion and the ox, must each follow its nature and cannot change it, so also the different human individualities will be as little capable as the beasts, of repentance, or of coming into contradiction with themselves. But man is not merely a natural individuality, he is first of all an eternal individuality, formed in the image of God; the individual will stands in relation to the universal, to the being in the divine image, which man must realize in his acting, in the development of his life. That man is a personality implies that there must be ascribed to him essential freedom of will, and the power of self-government in relation to his universal being or the Good. The beast never feels any contradiction between his individuality and the universal being of his kind. But a man whose individuality partakes of the nature of the tiger or the wolf, and who yields to it, will infallibly experience the contradiction between his individuality and the universal being of humanity, which in conscience urges its demands. A Nero, a Caligula, a Richard the Third, must by their melancholy, their restlessness and inward dispeace, bear witness to the image of God in them, or that they are not mere natural individualities, but individual *personalities.*

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[1] Schopenhauer, p. 249; *Parerga and Paralipomena*, i. p. 523.

Unquestionably we are led by the contemplation of human individualities, and of the great diversities in their innate talents and dispositions, to the acknowledgment, that the idea of fate is here not without application, and that one man, in a moral aspect, is born under a more favourable star than another. Not merely is the one man born and brought up under more favourable circumstances and intellectual influences than the other, but also, apart from this difference, there is a great diversity in temperaments, since some individuals, although all are included under sin, have relatively good dispositions, are relatively noble, pure, and benevolent, whilst others from birth carry along with them evil dispositions, are impure, malicious, venomous. It is to this inherent difference of nature that Shakespeare refers in King Lear, where Kent, in contemplation of the noble, affectionate, self-sacrificing Cordelia, who is so unlike her heartless, abandoned sisters, exclaims:

> "It is the stars,
> The stars above us govern our conditions,
> Else one self mate and mate could not beget
> Such different issues."
>
> *Act IV. scene 3d.*

But how far Shakespeare is from conceiving that Fate, that which nature has fixed, should abolish freedom of will and responsibility, is shown in another part of the same drama, where these words are put into the mouth of a reprobate: "This is the excellent foppery of the world! that when we are sick in fortune (often the surfeit of our own behaviour) we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and stars, as if we were villains on necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and tricksters by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on; an admirable evasion of whore-master man to lay his goatish disposition on the charge of a star" (*Act I. scene 2d*). That the poet here refers to the astrological ideas of his age is of no importance to us, it does not change the matter in the smallest degree. For whether we are knaves in consequence of the irresistible influence of the stars, or, as it is termed in our day, in consequence of the power of "circumstances," and of the "situation," which with us takes the place of the constellations, of the planets, in combination with the overwhelming impulse of our own nature, we are thus in any case knaves by necessity, which is just what we deny. We assert the successive conquest of the evil dispositions, because, behind the natural individuality, there exists eternal individuality, along with essential freedom of will, and, moreover, the possibility to fight, although the victory can only be won when the redeeming influences of Christianity come into operation. But certainly the power of resistance may be set down as nil where the conscience has not awakened it, and where man is still to be regarded as a mere natural being, as in the conditions of childhood and of barbarism, as well as in every case where this power, through the individual's own neglect and submission to the thraldom of sin, has been ultimately lost.

A Determinism may now also be adduced, which admits essential liberty, but denies freedom of choice. It teaches then that essential free-will is fettered by the natural restrictions of the individual, and can only be realized by a breaking through, a higher natural process, which in some individuals is accelerated by favourable conditions, but in others is retarded by unfavourable conditions throughout the entire course of life. And from this breaking through is explained the phenomena of contrition and repentance, by means of which man breaks with his past life and dies to his earlier existence. But although this Determinism resembles the Christian doctrines of free-will enslaved and regeneration, yet in it the essential liberty which it admits becomes mere seeming, just because freedom of choice is denied. Essential freedom is not merely a higher natural necessity, but ideal self-government. And in order that it may be realized as self-government, self must attain the consciousness of its own essence, or feel its power to determine for or against the law of its being. Freedom of choice and essential free-will point mutually to each other. By denying freedom of choice, Determinism denies that man has a history. For the conception of history contains this, that in the course of time something unfinished shall be completed, that something unfixed shall be determined; and it is this critical element in the development of liberty which gives history its interest.

§ 38.

The fundamental maxim of Determinism, that all doing proceeds from being (*Operari sequitur Esse*); that as thou art, so thou actest; that as the tree is, so is the fruit; and that men cannot gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles,—certainly contains a fundamental truth. The general voice has established this in expressions like these: "From him nothing else could be expected." "I am not the man to engage in the like." "Now it is seen what he is: now he has been found out." But this truth, "As thou art, so thou actest," must, in order that it may not lead to error, be completed by this other: "As thou actest, just so wilt thou become and continue;" that is to say, by thy actions, by thy assimilation and thy whole course of operation, thou art thyself determining thy future being, or what shall become of thee. This truth is also confirmed by universal consciousness in such phrases as these: "What a pity that he has not turned out so well as he might have done!" in which it is implied, that a man by his actions and his omissions may vitiate or repress his natural abilities; whilst Determinism asserts, that every man becomes all that he can become, and that it is only illusion to complain of the contrary. Or in such expressions as this: "He is not at all the same as he used to be: in important points he is now quite different," it may be for better or for worse; whereas Determinism, on all unlooked-for changes which occur in a man, must restrict itself to saying: "He is the same that he has always been; but I have been mistaken in him: now I see what he really is." But a greater authority than universal consciousness is the divine word: "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation;" "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall;"—and this pregnant word of the Lord: "Either make the tree good and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt" (Matt. xii. 33); for as the Lord here goes on to say that "the tree is known by his fruit," He implies therein that the nature of the religious and moral tree of life depends on the man's works, through free self-government and action. It is exactly the concept of the development of character, that what had been undetermined shall be determined, that man must mould and set the stamp upon his will, must *make* his tree of life good or corrupt. Therefore there occur also in every development of character various turning-points, in which freedom of choice must pass through a crisis, and in which it is specially necessary to watch and pray. In the passage from childhood to youth there occurs a turning-point of this kind of deepest importance, which has already been depicted in the myth of Hercules at the parting highways. When Determinism asserts that every character must be absolutely reliable, so that if we perfectly understood a man's inner being we should be able to predict how he would act under certain given circumstances, and predict it with the same security as that with which the astronomer announces beforehand an eclipse of the sun or the moon; then we must maintain, on the other hand, that although some things may in general be thus reckoned upon, there still remains, as long as man continues in the condition of development, a relative unreliableness. This unreliable element does not appear where life is making its usual round, where the character only expresses itself in the accustomed relation, and, so to speak, only reproduces itself in the routine of life. But it shows itself in turning-points where fresh problems arise, and the development of character must pass over into a new stage.

Determinism is wont, in support of its doctrine of necessity, to appeal to the case of the dramatic writer, on whom it is inexorably binding to make his personages true to their character. But it cannot at all be inferred from this that the characters depicted by the drama were from the first complete, or that in their natural disposition they have only one possibility, which, when external conditions admit, they *must* by inevitable necessity realize. On the other hand, it is demanded of the dramatic writer that he should satisfy in his representations the requirements of both Determinism and of Indeterminism. It is required that he should represent fixed individualities, and that his personages, neither in their utterances nor in their actions, should go beyond the compass of the possibilities implied in their individualities; and these the author must be able to exhibit. It is further requisite that the characters of a drama show themselves as having been moulded by earlier circumstances and actions. But then it is also necessary that the dramatist should represent a real development of character, with all its turning-points. And there remains further this indispensable requirement, that these turning-points should not simply appear as mere processes of nature, by which the action becomes only a product of the situation and of the power which sways unconditionally in the individual, but as crises in the free-will itself. Just in those critical moments which the poet presents to our view we have the feeling, that the object of our interest might act otherwise than he does; that the ideas of guilt, duty, and responsibility are here binding; that the present moment, the instant period of time, is so important, so full of expectation, because there is here something unfixed and indeterminate, which is now to be determined,—something incomplete, which is now to be completed,—a possibility which rests with the agent himself whether or not he will put it into execution. Where this is not shown and made palpable by the dramatist, the interest is lacking which should engage our sympathy. On the other hand, after the agent has once chosen his course, the poet should then allow the truth of Determinism to appear in its full power, by representing the inevitable consequences of the act. It is this which is so admirably shown in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, where Macbeth, after he has yielded to the temptations held forth by the powers of darkness, from which he at first recoiled with shuddering, whilst he declared that he "would go no further in this matter" (*Act I. scene* 7*th*), comes more and more under the necessity of working evil, and is hurried on from crime to crime, without the possibility of return.

But Determinism appeals not merely to dramatic poetry, but also to *tables of statistics.* Statistics, which in our day have raised themselves to a position of importance, appear also as moral statistics. And thus there are not wanting those who announce, that the science has now advanced so far in the knowledge of the *eternal* and *unchangeable* laws of the universe, that it can predict not merely how many deaths will occur during the next year, how many marriages will be contracted or dissolved, but also how many illegitimate births will take place, how many felonies and suicides will be committed,—nay further, at what season of the year these shall happen, in what classes of society, and what instruments will be employed; and that it may cherish the hope at no distant period of bringing all human concerns under needful control, so that there will no longer be any question regarding the freedom of the will. There are those who listen to these scientific discoveries with "a devout shudder," whilst they, however, submit themselves to the comforting expectation that such theories will work for the advancement of humanity, by introducing a milder spirit into criminal legislation, and making malefactors more the objects of compassion than of punishment. And it cannot be denied that this last consideration in our days finds great sympathy: that both in judicial tribunals and in legislative assemblies a predominant inclination is often shown to regard the grossest offenders as irresponsible, as "knaves by necessity."

Moral statistics, which hitherto have only appeared as the statistics of sin and passion, since they do not embrace virtues and right actions, are, however, only dangerous to a doctrine of free-will which apprehends the individual atomically and separate from the rest of the human species, and which denies the relative value which belongs to Determinism. The statistic information about divorces and female prostitution in the great cities, of felonies and suicides, certainly forms a terrible contribution to the history of human sinfulness, to the doctrine concerning the enslaved will, and its dependence on the powers of nature—a state of thraldom in which great masses are involved. We are led here by another way, to look down into the abyss before which Augustine stood when he spoke of the mass of corruption (*massa perditionis*), and a dark shadow overspreads the whole community, where these corrupt individuals are members of the social body. But it is a great error to imagine that in these vessels of corruption and dishonour we behold a revelation of eternal and unchangeable laws of the universe, *excluding free-will*, and claiming a yearly returning sacrifice of victims. If law is at all to be in question, it cannot be spoken of as eternal, but only as temporary law, or rather—as it is an evident though frequent abuse of the term to speak of the law of nature, or the law of the universe, where at any rate *universality* and *necessity* cannot be ascertained and authenticated—of a temporary regularity, which is purely *empirical*, and thus cannot be known as universal and necessary. This temporary regularity rests, on the one side, on the sinful dispositions which at a given time are found in a number of individuals whose free-will is so dominated by the natural impulses and passions, that they live more like beings governed only by nature than like moral beings, so that their mode of action resembles that of the lower animal world; on the other side, it rests on the circumstances under which they live, whether these be poverty and want, or other provocatives to sin, which their will has not force to resist. But all must admit, that the given state of society which exhibits these regularly recurring phenomena may in the course of time *be changed*, and that just by the energy of free-will; that, for instance, the amount of crime may be lessened by regulations preventing idleness and vagrancy, by moral and religious influences, by improvements in legislation, in education and school management. The Home Mission, which has successfully employed these tables of statistics to ascertain the directions in which its exertions should specially be turned, has here effected not a little. By such moral influences, which aim at strengthening good motives, another condition of society may gradually be formed, which sufficiently shows that we have not here to do with eternal laws and an unchangeable destiny, but with a regularity founded on temporary and changing relations.[1]

Further, it must not be overlooked that such statistics, especially those above mentioned regarding future crimes, are still only calculations of *probabilities*, and only predict the approximate result, since the averages rise and fall from year to year, so that the estimate must always be relative. And, before all the rest, it must be borne in mind that the crimes that are thus calculated on are no evidence at all against the essential liberty of the individuals concerned. They only show that liberty is enslaved, that as enslaved it may be regarded as nature, and so far be reckoned on, and that this enslaved freedom needs redemption. And neither do they in the smallest measure controvert the assumption that, if the individuals in question were placed under the influences of redemption, they would not in the accepted time, in a day of salvation, be able to receive the offered grace. If we examine the confessions made by some of these characters, it cannot certainly be denied that not an insignificant proportion of criminals are Determinists and Fatalists, and sometimes cast the blame of their offences on external circumstances and unfortunate positions, sometimes on an inevitable fate, an unlucky star above them, sometimes on their innate individuality: "I have always been so; it is my nature." Nay, there are those who in the hour of death have declared that, if they could again be set at liberty, they would anew commit the same bad actions as before, and even worse than these, because their nature impelled them to do so; just as a beast of prey, escaped from its cage, resumes its predatory habits. To such evidence Determinism appeals, and finds its system thereby strengthened. But opposed to this evidence stands a range of other witnesses, which show another side of the matter. For there are many who have not merely accused their fate, but in remorse of conscience have acknowledged their guilt. There are also those who have acknowledged that there was a period in the course of their lives when another and a better way was open to them than that which they pursued, and who have mourned a lost opportunity; whilst it has also been their earnest desire to be vouchsafed a fresh opportunity to become other and new creatures, if not in this, at least in a future state of existence. And if the avowals of such deterministic and fatalistic minded criminals be more narrowly examined, it will be found that conscience and a sense of guilt, as evidences of essential liberty, not seldom peep through their fatalism.

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[1] See Drobisch, *Moral Statistics and the Freedom of the Will;* Oettingen, *Moral Statistics.* This last voluminous work contains extensive and very interesting materials for statistic observations.

It thus remains that in the doctrine of free-will the two maxims must be combined: "As thou art, so wilt thou act; and as thou actest (in consequence of the force of assimilation), so wilt thou be;" whilst Determinism holds exclusively to the first maxim, and tells us that through all our actions we only come to the *comprehension* of what we originally and unchangeably are. The category which Determinism ignores is that of *possibilities*. It acknowledges only physical possibility, which it transfers to the ethical world. In the physical sphere, possibility passes immediately over into reality whenever the conditions are observed, as the corn of wheat cannot do other than sprout and grow when moisture and heat are present. But in the sphere of ethics, possibilities do not immediately pass into reality, but are transferred thither by free self-government, which is also the power to repress its possibility. Whilst Determinism ignores this, it teaches that in a given moment there are not two lines of action, but only one, which is possible for a man. This is specially shown in the deterministic conception of the history of the Fall, in which it assumes that in the temptation there was but one possibility for Eve,—namely, to allow herself to be seduced, and to bring sin into the world, through which God Himself is made to appear as the author of evil. This repeats itself in every human life. A man who, under the assumptions of Determinism, looks back upon his course of life, will conclude that no circumstance, no scene in his experience, no action, no suffering, no struggle, could have been otherwise than it was; that it is true wisdom not to give way to vain imaginations and reveries concerning what might have been in place of certain actual occurrences. And it is asserted that this mode of contemplation is a rich source of comfort and tranquillity. Yes, if conscience did not exist; if we only had one nature instead of two; if all peace and equanimity for us did not rest on the maintenance of harmony between our two natures, the higher and the lower, and in this of our relation to God and to ourselves! In opposition to this deterministic assertion, we, from our standpoint, maintain that even the best among us, when they look back on their past lives and make conscientious confession, will acknowledge that there are many things there which not merely *should* and *ought*, but also which *might* have been otherwise; and in this the fault has been their own. But, no doubt, we cannot press this acknowledgment as one can press a physical acknowledgment drawn from sensible experience, or as one can demonstrate a logical or mathematical maxim. For the reality to which the determinist constantly refers us, shows us undeniably only what we have done, not what we might have done; what we have become, not what we might have become. The determination of the question here discussed, sifted as it has been times unnumbered, yet recurring from generation to generation, lies in the still region of the possibilities of conscience and of ethics, —possibilities which are higher than the physical and the merely logical; wherefore also the ultimate decision of this question is of a purely personal nature.

THE COSMOLOGICAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL POSTULATE.

THE MORAL ORDER OF THE WORLD. PROVIDENCE AND REDEMPTION. THE AIM OF HISTORY, AND THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE.

§ 39.

THAT the human individual, notwithstanding his sinful condition, has yet the possibility of good, would be a contradiction, if the economy of the world did not contain conditions for the realization of this possibility. The order of the world which we inhabit is a moral order, in which nature is appointed to be the instrument and means of liberty; where the law is predominant in history, that what men sow, that shall they also reap, and where every abuse of liberty sooner or later carries with it its necessary and inevitable reaction; where all that befalls man of prosperity or adversity hides within it a moral substance, which it is the task of man to extract and employ; where the law of the Good and of conscience is at the same time the *law of the universe;* where all things must work together for good to those who submit themselves under this law, and all must work together for evil to those who resist it. It was specially the elder Fichte who maintained this opinion, whilst at the same time he taught that there is no other God than this same moral order of things, because the conception of a personal God contained difficulties to him insuperable; and in our own days there are not lacking to him successors, who speak about "God in history," but understand by this only an epitome of the moral laws of the universe. But when this same philosopher teaches that in this government of the world account is taken of every individual human being, nay, that the hairs on our heads are all numbered, he strengthens that which he denies. A moral order of the world, where account is not made of each individual, is indeed inconceivable, because the moral world is a world of free individuals, where each has an eternal and infinite value. But that account is made of each individual, and that each has his own special task and his own special conduct of life, is inconceivable without a living, personal God, who is the creator and instructor of these individuals. No; we affirm not merely a moral government of the universe, with its eternal laws, but a *freely acting* God, whose providence guides the history of both the race and the individual to its goal; a God who is not merely concealed in the laws of the universe, but enters into personal reciprocal action with these created personalities.

When, in fear of an "arbitrary" conception of God, and desirous that His government of the universe should be acknowledged exclusively in His eternal laws, it has been advanced that it is far better to live in a state where judicious laws reign unrestricted, and enjoy all the protection which is possible, than in one where everything does not rest upon the laws, but much on the will of the monarch, and that the more this last is diminished, and everything is regulated by law, the more perfect is the condition; and when this theory is applied to the divine state and the divine government, we will not dispute the excellences or defects of the various human forms of state government. But we cannot regard it as an advance in the knowledge of the divine government (*civitas Dei*), when instead of the living, personal God, there is set up as the object of our worship a mere system of impersonal laws; or although the idea of a personal God be received, to regard Him in the light of a limited constitutional monarch, or like the gods of the Epicureans, as only a spectator of what goes on in the world, because He has once for all bestowed His sovereignty on the powers of the universe; or although it be conceded that the Almighty has not worked once in the creation of all things and then ceased, yet limits His continued operation to "the giving forth of laws,"[1] unceasingly preserving order, but yet concealing Himself in His laws, and never revealing Himself. Arbitrary action should certainly be excluded from the conception of the divine will, because this term refers to what is groundless and irrational, nay, to the whims and caprices of a human despot. We conceive of the divine will as a will of eternal wisdom, which has not merely embodied itself in the system of the laws of the universe (the immanent working), but also reveals itself in its diversity from the world (the transcendent working) as the Lord of nature and of the course of the world, but always in harmony with the law of its own being, of love and holiness. And we should not be happy at all in a divine state, where there was no relation between man and God; where we were referred exclusively to laws, but where the divine personality never entered into relation with us; where God never revealed Himself, never let His face shine upon us; where thus there was no personal relation of love between God and man, and where prayer and the influences of prayer were excluded.

Whilst we consider the moral world as the world of providence, we understand at the same time the concept of providence as including that of the world's redemption. As man is fallen, his history bound in sin, and nature itself participant in the results of this spiritual fall, the economy of providence is forced to assume the character of an economy of redemption and regeneration (*œconomia salutis*), in which the law was given by Moses, but mercy and truth came by Christ. The highest revelation of God's providence we behold in Him in whom the Eternal Word of the Father became flesh and dwelt among us, the Son of man and the only Son of God, who testifies, "Whoso hath seen me, hath seen the Father;" in Him who has established reconciliation and redemption, and who has left us an example of true liberty and love; and in this kingdom of God founded by Christ, the highest earthly instrument of which is the Church, where the Lord will be with His people continually through the means of grace and the Holy Spirit; whilst at the same time, as the risen and exalted Saviour, He appears throughout the events of the world's history as the imperishable Sovereign and disposer of time.

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[1] H. C. Orsted, *Aanden in Naturen* (The Spirit in Nature), 2d ed. p. 49.

§ 40.

The Christian view of the world is opposed to the fatalistic and deterministic apprehension of history, which regards this as a process of physical necessity. This doctrine of necessity acknowledges also the necessity of evil, and teaches that all the incidents in the history of the race and of the nations could not have happened otherwise than they did, and that it is folly to speak as if any other course of events had been possible. But where the ideas of providence and of freedom are seriously held, this doctrine of necessity cannot be adopted; as it also becomes inexplicable whence all the rationality which is actually to be found in history obtained entrance, if historic development be only a logically necessary development and nothing else. The purpose of God *must* be fulfilled, but the *manner* in which it is brought about is conditional on freedom of choice, and in the course of events there is always something incalculable, hypothetical, and problematic. Without this, history would not be a drama, time and the present moment would be without significance; nothing would be decided in time, but all would be already fixed and finished from eternity. This conditional element in the execution of the divine purpose is expressed by the prophet Jeremiah in this remarkable passage (Jer. xviii. 7–10): (7) "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; (8) If that nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. (9) And at what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build, and to plant it; (10) If it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them." God's dealings with the human race must be regarded as educative dealings. But education assumes liberty on the part of those who are to be instructed, as on the other side it assumes superior wisdom to that of the disciple in him who is the guide. The will of infinite wisdom does not prevent the fall of man often repeated, but it introduces new and unforeseen developments, by which means the schemes of blind and weak humanity are turned aside, and by a circuitous course are made to fulfil what God had planned. And the process of human development may be considered under the type of the wandering of the children of Israel through the desert to the promised land, which they attained not by the straightest and shortest road, but only by many circuitous routes, many delays, and many turnings back. (See the author's work, *Dogmatik.*)

§ 41.

Whilst every consideration of history which does not know or which despises the light of revelation, groping in darkness, inquires concerning the aim of history and the significance of the confusion in the occurrences of life, Scripture refers us here to the *education of man for the kingdom of God,*—an idea to which Lessing adverts as the principal view-point in the philosophy of history, and which has also flitted before Herder. Doubtless we are here met by the sceptical objection, that this idea could only have validity if it were always the same individuals who were subjected to this educative process. But in history races change. One race passes away without its education having been completed, passes away half educated and half matured, not to speak of the many who depart entirely uneducated. Another generation appears on the stage of history, and in the course of life leaves it as unformed as the previous one, and so on; so that the perfect education of the human race never is achieved. This objection would still only have significance if these changing, constantly succeeding generations were without all mutual connection, if the children and grandchildren were not bound to the parents, and if revelation had not given us its light concerning the future life and the end of all things. But there is a solidaric, an organic connection between the members of the human race; and although every generation in a certain sense must begin over again and make its own experiences, still there is a tradition, a transmission, an inheritance, a capital of experience, which passes from generation to generation, by means of which the consciousness of the unity of the human race and the intellectual and hearty connection between forefathers and descendants are preserved, and thus the children *appropriate* and *carry on* their fathers' lives and achievements—certainly not alone in what is good, but also in evil; whilst in this same human race, the contrast is ever becoming more apparent between those who voluntarily place themselves under the educative guidance of God, and those who wander in their own way. And according to the glimpse which revelation gives us of the future life and the realm beyond the grave, we venture to believe that there subsists between the generations that have passed from earth to this realm, and that which still remains on earth, a mysterious connection; so that the struggles and victories of God's kingdom here, have importance and contribute to the perfection of His people yonder. They would not be perfect without us (Heb. xi. 40). And lastly, revelation enunciates most clearly that there is a common goal of perfection for all, and a common judgment, before which at the close of the course all shall be placed, whether they have submitted to God's enlightening and saving grace or have rejected it.

§ 42.

Whilst we then hold fast the idea of the education of the human race, it is not by any means our understanding, that it is the race as a mere general entity which is to be educated. On the contrary, it is individuals which are to be educated, just because the human race is an organization of personal individuals, and the kingdom of God to which they are to be educated is a realm of saved and sanctified individuals. When, in opposition to a view which only regards the race as the actual and permanent, and individuals as evanescent, it has been asserted that history is not changed for the sake of the individual, we give our assent to the proposition, if only the *grave error* of our times be not associated with it, of considering individuals atomistically; forgetting the organic connection, or that individuals, as they are in themselves totalities, microcosms, are thus also links in the great chain of society, in which they are combined solidarically into a common personality,—an individual on a large scale. Accordingly, whilst we abjure the individualistic onesidedness, we maintain that history is, for the sake of the realm of personality, the realm of love and of freedom, or, in other words, the kingdom of God.

A philosophy of history which sacrifices individuals to the whole, and makes it the aim of history to develope an impersonal idea, or, like Hegel's philosophy of history, makes a dialectic process of the general powers of the universe, in which individuals are only disappearing points of transition, cannot in reality attain any aim for history. Since for whom shall the idea and its emotions be an object? Whom shall all this profit? And for whom has it value? When we say that anything has value, there must be a will for which it has value, which finds therein a good, an enjoyment, a satisfaction. This impersonal idea cannot assert itself as an aim, and avow its own unconditioned worth. The great majority of human, evanescent individuals, who are involved in finite and subordinate aims, cannot perceive the idea for which they themselves are only dependent means and instruments. There remains at last no one behind who has pleasure and satisfaction from this process of universal history, except the speculative philosopher, who in the moments of thought perceives it. And even he has not found in it a good which cannot be taken away from him. As an individual, he is even himself evanescent. The ideal casts him aside, and proceeds with logical necessity forwards in its process, which in its totality benefits no one, and where there is no place for any permanent Good.

In contrast to a philosophy of history which, like that of Hegel, determines as its moving principle an abstract idea or thought, we fix on the principle of personality as accomplishing this end. Only in this manner can the historic phenomena both of good and evil be explained, because it is only in the power of this principle that there can be any question of good or evil. This principle is not merely that of Christianity, which requires that the kingdom of God shall come to every man, and ascribes to every human soul an infinite value, seeks the strayed sheep and the lost penny; but it is also that which works itself forward on the territory of worldliness, that which more and more presses itself forward in our days in forms both true and false. The epochs of history must, as F. G. Geiger has demonstrated, be considered as epochs in the development of the principle of personality. But then history must not be considered merely as the history of the world, by which in general is only understood the kingdoms of the world, state history, which is only a particular history. If we wish to understand history in its bearings, we must from the many special histories, from political history, church history, art history, that of trade and industry, and many others, go back to the history of man as the history of histories.[1] But the history of man is not merely the history of man in his many worldly relations, but before all the rest in his relation to the divine personality, its revelations, its instructive guidance. The end and aim of history coincide with that of man; and the end of man is super-terrestrial, cannot be attained in any earthly form or condition whatever, because the whole of this earthly existence has only the character of preparation, continues to retain the stamp of patchwork, the unfinished, which under these conditions never can be finished. The element of truth in the doctrine of eternal progress (*progressus in infinitum*) is this, that no ideal can be completely realized under earthly relations; that there must always be a higher to be sought; that the true higher, in which rest is to be found, is not under heaven nor on this earth; that this earthly life, in whatever forms it may show itself, is hampered with an unsatisfied craving. But a beginning and coming fulfilment of this aim of humanity and of human history is found already under the following conditions,—namely, wherever the Good, wherever the kingdom of God, is realized in the human soul, wherever personalities are moulded and ripened for the kingdom of God. A higher aim than this does not exist, and cannot be imagined. But then we maintain also, that the aim of history, in the restricted sense in which it is here used, is not realized merely on the stage of the world's history, where the fate of nations is involved, but also in the simple every-day story of an undistinguished life. It is an illusion, which must be combated again and again, that the race has an aim *essentially* different from that of the individual; that there can be for the history of the world an aim which is higher than the ethical, higher than the Good and the kingdom of God. Every-day history and the history of the world are only different forms of *human* history; and in an order of the world confessedly moral, to desire something higher than the Good is self-contradictory. Every historical event owes its intrinsic value or worthlessness to its relation to the Good; in making which assertion we by no means forget that this concept, as well as that of the kingdom of God, contains an infinitude of ideal provisions, which are not at all immediately religious: to the importance of its bearing on the progress and perfection of personality and the realm of personality. It is an illusion constantly recurring, that the aim of history lies first and foremost in outward conditions, circumstances, and institutions, instead of lying within man himself ("The kingdom of God is within you," Luke xvii. 21); in which assertion it is always forgotten, that outward perfection can only come when the inward state is ripe for it. Again, another illusion in connection with the foregoing is, that men exist for the sake of the works which they produce; as if the works were higher than the men themselves, as if it were our mission to produce works external to ourselves, whilst each one of us is called to win the kingdom of God. God desires not merely outward action; He desires first of all to have regenerate *men*, prepared for every good work. All human deeds and efforts, all incidents and vicissitudes in the life of the individual, all national revolutions, are in their *ultimate* significance only means,—stuff and material through which and out of which human personalities may construct, mould, and prepare their intellectual and spiritual frame, their imperishable possession,—means not merely for the individual, but the ripening of humanity for this future kingdom. Human orders of society—the Family, the State, nay, even the Church in its earthly constitution—are only temporary forms, which must be broken down when perfection arrives. As earthly forms, they are types which point to future blessings. God desires a temple of living stones,—a temple which throughout time, though concealed, ever waxes in greatness and extent, but which shall only shine forth in eternal glory and brightness when this world is at an end, when the day dawns. That, in the full significance of the term, we should become not blind instruments, but fellow-workers with God in the building of the temple, is our highest earthly destiny.

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[1] Geiger, *Foreläsningar ofver Menniskan's Historia* (Lectures on the History of Man).

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL POSTULATE.

THE END OF HISTORY AND THE COMPLETION OF GOD'S KINGDOM. THE ETHICAL FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS.

§ 43.

THE cosmological and soteriological postulate will be classed with the eschatological, or doctrine of future happiness in the realm beyond the tomb; of the completion of God's kingdom through the final judgment, and the dissolution of this world; of the new heaven and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. The teaching of Christianity concerning the final result of all things, tells us that history has not merely an aim, but also an *end:* it is not merely opposed to the comfortless contemplation of the course of the world as an endless rotation, in which life becomes, without object and without aim, a continued variation of the theme—"Everything germinates, ripens, and withers away;" but also of the not less unsatisfying representation of an aim which is never reached, of a progress in the terminable. However paradoxical the representation of a universal catastrophe may appear, by which the fashion of this world (schema, 1 Cor. vii. 31) shall pass away, to be succeeded by a new one, after which creation longs, earnestly expecting to be redeemed into it, because this form or fashion is that for which it was at first designed (that of righteousness, where all things, visible and invisible, are in their right places), —however paradoxical it may appear to our worldly consciousness, limited as it is by the present conditions of sense, and disposed to believe that the present arrangement of the world always has been, and always will continue to be, yet every view which does not contemplate this catastrophe is not ethical. The old Northmen, with their myth of Ragnarok, had in this respect a far deeper apprehension than many more recent searchers into mysteries, who imagine a history without end, and a goal of perfection which constantly removes further from us as we approach it. For this modern view perpetuates eternally the struggle between the Good and the Evil, perpetuates eternally the impure mixture of tares and wheat, and thereby denies the possibility of the complete victory of the Good and Righteous, of the kingdom of God; in other words, it denies that the Good and Righteous, after which we should strive as our highest aim, can at any time in an absolute and unlimited sense be realized. But the Good and Righteous demand in all respects complete realization. Opinions like these, that the *history of the world is the judgment of the world*, that through the lives of individuals there was also a doom, that in our inner being there is a secret reward or punishment, that we are always already sentenced in this life, are only half truths, if intended as the ultimatum with which we are to rest contented when we crave the realization of the Good. Every judgment in time, whether it be in the history of the world or in the history of the individual man, is only a partial judgment, which moreover very frequently is very imperfectly apparent to the man's own consciousness. After every historic crisis there remains behind more than one unrectified and even unperceived injustice or grievance—an impure mixture of justice and injustice, of truth and falsehood. Every partial judgment, therefore, points to a future and more perfect one; and all half-executed judgments to one which shall be final and decisive, by means of which the Good shall attain the realization, the sovereignty which belongs to it. When even theistic philosophers in our days think that Christian Eschatology can be dispensed with, and that repose may be found in the revelation of justice which exhibits itself in this present time, and therefore assume the motto, "The history of the world is the judgment of the world," we perceive herein only the remains of a pantheistic leaven even yet not swept out. It profits little to fix an aim for history, when this is only determined as an ideal for the imagination. The Good is just that which is not merely a subject for the imagination, but which actually exists.

§ 44.

The summary of postulates embraced in what has been said may be compared to the soil from which the fundamental principles of Christian Ethics spring forth, and in which they have their widely branching roots. As the progression continued in history of the kingdom of God, and its final perfection, are contingent on the free-will of man, this kingdom determines itself as the ideal of free-will, the unbroken realization and completion of which must be partly produced in *hope*, partly waited for and striven after. The will which strives after the kingdom of God, and which is productive, is the will as redeemed and renewed by Christ, which, in dependence and appropriation of Him as Saviour and example, aspires to lead a life in imitation of Him, in accordance with the law of God as set forth by Him. On the postulates in question rests the difference between Christian and Pagan ethics. Pagan ethics, in greater part of its forms, is without hope, is without eschatology, and can therefore only determine the highest Good, as something in this earthly existence which still soars upwards, or continues to be an unsatisfied craving. It knows not providence, nor the economy of sin and redemption; is without a Saviour, and without a pattern: its virtues thence are left to themselves and their own human means. It does not know man as created in God's image, and is therefore very imperfectly acquainted with the divine law, although through the voice of conscience it has a dim perception of the super-mundane character of this law. And as it knows not God the Father, the Almighty Maker, it is fettered in the dualism between mind and matter. As, in what follows, we wish to develope ethical principles in their Christian preciseness, and in their full significance as normative or law-giving to the moral world and moral life, our explanations are given through the view of life and of the ethical world belonging to Christianity in its relative distinction from the dogmatic.

Only from the view-point of eschatology can we fully comprehend the problems of human life. For only when we know the ultimate object of existence, can we also perceive the aim of human effort. Therefore the summons from ancient times: *Respice finem!* "Look to the end!" For it is according to the final object, according to the ideal which survives all the rest, and is not to be destroyed by any, that all relative ideals must be estimated, and it is according to this that the scheme of life must be planned. It is in the light of these last things, of the ultimate aim for which God designs the guidance and education of man, that God Himself looks down from heaven on human history, on human actions and achievements, on human aspirations after earthly ideals; and therefore *Respice* *finem!* is an admonition which meets man at every turning throughout the Holy Scriptures. It not only under the old covenant calls on men thus, "Remember thy latter end" (Sir. vii. 37); but also under the new covenant it reminds us "that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ" (2 Cor. v. 10). The high importance of this all-embracing point of sight is made specially clear from the circumstance, that the coming judgment and the resurrection of Christ from the dead were the first subjects of the apostles' preaching; as also that Easter, the feast of the resurrection, is the first festival which was introduced into the Christian Church, because Christianity desired to begin by showing men the result to which it would conduct them, and for which the present life must be the preparation, desired to show them the future blessedness and glory. Christian dogmatics, which is designed as a representation of the facts of revelation in their successive order, begins archæologically with the conception of God, the creation, and terminates eschatologically with the end of all things. Christian ethics, in so far as, under the postulates of dogmatics, it is designed to represent a practical view of the world and of life in its outline, begins eschatologically with *final destiny*, or with the highest Good.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS,

AND THE

ETHICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD AND OF LIFE.

I.

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

GOD'S KINGDOM THE HIGHEST GOOD. SALVATION AND HAPPINESS.

§ 45.

THE universal concept of the kingdom of God which comes through history, is the concept of a community and an invisible order of things,—a total organization of created personalities, of powers, influences, and gifts, in which God reigns and rules not merely by His power, but also by His world-redeeming and soul-redeeming love and mercy, in which, whilst ransoming His creatures, He makes them partakers not merely in His holiness, but also in the fulness of His love. The kingdom of God, as the highest Good, which already in this present existence is coming, is not merely the sacred realm of liberty and love, but, moreover, the blessed realm in which man finds his last and final satisfaction, or his peace; is not merely that after which man ought to aspire, because it has a sacred claim on his will, a demand on his activity and self-sacrifice in its service, which cannot be set aside, but besides all this, it is, further, that which from his very nature must be the object of man's deepest longing and desire, the most attractive of objects to him, because it harmonizes with his own inner nature. A good thing is, in general terms, that which man desires and craves, in which his bent or disposition finds its satisfaction, that of which the possession is necessary to his well-being and comfort. We can thus discriminate between physical and mental good things, which only become ethical good things when they are placed in relation to the holy law of will in man, when that which man desires is at the same time that which he ought to desire.

The highest Good may now be taken in a double sense: that is to say, it may partly be regarded as that which is superior to all other good things (*bonum supremum*), that which ought to be preferred to all others,—the final Good, in which man finds peace and rest, which he can find nowhere else; partly it may be considered as the perfect Good (*bonum consummatum*), the epitome of all good things, containing within it the fulness of all perfection, in which every want is supplied, the desires of all men, nay, of all creatures, satisfied. In both significations the kingdom of God is the highest Good. It is the one thing needful, the heavenly pearl, which is to be purchased by the sacrifice of all else (*bonum supremum*), because man in its possession has obtained essential blessedness or salvation, even if he is obliged to dispense with relative blessings: the one thing needful not merely for the individual, but also for society, which, without the kingdom of God and its righteousness, lacks blessedness, even if it be in possession of all earthly good things.

But the kingdom of God is also the highest Good as the perfect, the completed Good (*bonum consummatum*), that which comprehends in itself all perfection (*omnibus numeris absolutum*), the final Good in the sense of the future heavenly glory, in which we contemplate not merely the life of bliss in the middle state, in which the highest Good has not reached its utmost finality, but also on the perfection of all things at the second coming of the Lord, on the advent of the new heaven and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, where the tabernacle of God is with men, and where there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, for the former things are passed away: that condition in creation in which both faith and hope are at an end, because faith has passed into sight, and hope into fulfilment, and where only love remains behind.

Although now the kingdom of God as the perfect Good is the eschatological Good, which can only first enter when the form of this world disappears, yet still in a *relative* signification there may be mention of the kingdom of God as the perfect Good within these earthly conditions as a typical representation of the future, in so far as the kingdom of God is destined to penetrate the natural life of man, to elevate and enlighten human nature, to form the centre, the divine unity in the relations of his earthly existence. We contemplate, then, the kingdom of God as the totality, the epitome of ethical good things, which within these earthly limitations are possible as an all-embracing organization of society, in which every aim of humanity, both individual and universal, Family, State, Church, Art, Science, are centralized in the one holy aim, which is the ideal of the kingdom of God upon earth. It is this kingdom of God upon earth which, under the postulate of appropriating activity, is the task of ethical *productivity;* whilst the heavenly (the transcendent) kingdom of God is the task or problem for ethical expectation and *receptivity,* since we should prepare to receive the Lord. But, undoubtedly, it must be acknowledged that the earthly ideal of God's kingdom can alone be realized under great relativity, and that it must not be overestimated at the expense of the heavenly, the eschatological ideal, by which, though in another way and in another form, we should return to the Jewish error concerning an earthly Messiah. So long as the kingdom of Sin subsists alongside of the kingdom of Holiness, so long as the tares are among the wheat, so long as death reigns in creation, the perfect Good, in the absolute sense, cannot be realized. So long as sin and death are not expelled from creation, this earthly existence and all human efforts will continue to retain the impress of the fragmentary, of the separation or splitting into parts of the moments. The glory of God's kingdom will, during this stage of existence, continue to have a veiled presence; and even where Christianity in moments is revealed as the conquering power of the world, it will in one or other respect be suffering and struggling. The highest Good, in its full significance, can only find entrance along with the completed *harmony of the world,* where the fragmentary has given place to the perfect.

We are here reminded of Kant, who determined the highest Good as the unity of virtue and happiness, in a kingdom of free rational beings; and because he perceived that this conjunction of virtue and happiness which reason demands cannot be realized under the present conditions, where the kingdom of nature does not coincide with the kingdom of liberty, nor the law of nature with the law of morality, he postulated a future order of things, in which virtue and happiness will be combined in a harmony of the worlds of nature and of liberty. By this eschatological postulate, with which Kant concluded his philosophy, after he had, as he thought, in his criticism of Reason, made an end of all theology and dogmatics, he furnishes a proof of his energetic belief in the reality of the Good. For the Good would not be the highest reality, if the natural universe must not at last serve to its glorification, and become the temple of mind and liberty,—if there never enters a harmony of the world, in which holiness is the all-dominant key-note, with which all other notes in creation harmonize, without, as in the present existence, the admission of any disturbing dissonance. But when he determined the highest Good as the unity of virtue and happiness, then, according to our view, the definition must be altered to the union of holiness and eternal happiness or bliss, because virtue and happiness are only relative degrees. Thus, by introducing these relativities into the future world, the highest Good can only be realized in an interminable approximation, in a multiplicity or proportions between happiness and virtue, which brings us back to finiteness and indefinite progress, without our having attained that really infinite or perfect blessedness which can be bestowed upon man by free grace alone.

§ 46.

Since we have determined the kingdom of God as the kingdom of eternal bliss, or, which is the same thing, as the holy kingdom of love in the perfected harmony of the world, it remains to fix more closely the relation between bliss and happiness, in order that these terms may not be transposed and misapplied, and the heavenly be confounded with the earthly. Both words indicate a harmonious existence, a condition satisfactory in itself. But bliss, though it begins in this earthly existence as peace and joy in God, has its true home, its proper sphere, in the heavenly, super-mundane realms, in the new life, where the cosmic relations are qualitatively different from those of the present time, where creation is no longer subject to decay, and where there is no more marrying or giving in marriage: whether we conceive this world to come as the completion of all things, as the state of *glory* (δόξα), as the new heaven and the new earth, or imagine it as paradise in the intermediate state. Happiness, on the other hand, is limited exclusively to the earth and the present life. Nay, whilst bliss, even if not defined as Christian, must still always be determined as religious, religion is not in and for itself essential to happiness. Happiness (Eudaimony) is an earthly conception (see § 27), is but the idea of perfect well-being and prosperity, without necessarily including relation to God. If we cast a glance on the ethical systems of Paganism, we find that they all occupy themselves in determining wherein the highest Good consists, and how it is to be won, and that most of them give directions for attaining a *happy* life. But Pagan Ethics is without hope, and happiness is limited to the life on earth, without any reference to that which is to come, or any connection with the personal God. It was not the Cyrenians and Epicureans alone who sought to direct men to a perfect enjoyment of life, to the mind always pleased and contented, burdened with no anxieties. Even the Cynics and the Stoics, although they represented virtue in contrast to enjoyment, and maintained that the first of these is itself the highest Good, and that nothing further is required, yet lay down a doctrine of happiness; and their system, more closely examined, may be described as a higher form of Eudaimonism: happiness is their final aim; in the case of the Cynics, Ataraxy; in that of the Stoics, Apathy, or the undisturbed tranquillity of the mind, that inward imperturbability, in which the wise man, being absolutely satisfied within himself, is sufficient to himself, because he has made himself independent of everything external, and in which he enjoys the majesty of his inner being. Stoicism and Epicurism both arrive at the same goal, though by different routes. Epicurism desires to make itself independent of desires and necessities, by as far as possible satisfying them all. Stoicism seeks to accomplish the same end by making itself independent of them, by a complete renunciation of their satisfaction, or at least by treating this with perfect indifference: so that Stoicism may be found on the throne and in the hovel, at the splendid banquet and at the anchorite's frugal meal, in external prosperity or under the greatest sufferings; and in all situations it exhibits the same unchanged countenance. But both Epicureans and Stoics desire happiness, or that undisturbed tranquillity of mind, as the highest, or, as the Stoics say, the only Good, which the wise man still holds in possession at all times; nay, even if he be cast into the fiery furnace of the tyrant Phalaris, he yet maintains his equanimity. But of a hereafter, of a kingdom which is not of this world, in which the soul can first find true repose, of a future glory from which suffering and death are excluded, there is here no thought or mention.

The Christian martyr, on the other hand, when bound to the stake, is not happy, but blessed, that is to say, in the *hope* of the coming glory, which hope does not vanish from before him under present agonies, as history attests in many noble instances. The Cynics have often been compared to the mendicant monks, because both alike reduce the necessities of life to a minimum, in order to become independent of worldly things. But the great difference is, that the Cynics only aspire after happiness, after Ataraxy, which belongs exclusively to the present world; whilst the mendicant monks aspire after eternal bliss, the imperishable treasures of heaven. In Aristotle, also, we find Eudaimony as the ultimate aim, that is to say, as a harmonious condition of energy and enjoyment, limited, however, to the present world; but Plato, whose philosophy is characterized throughout by its supra-mundane tendency, occupies in the ancient world an exceptional position in this respect, that he makes "likeness to God" the final aim of man, and teaches immortality in a future life. According to him, all true philosophy consists in a continued dying to this world, and death he considers as a release from the vain show in which we are entangled, as an entrance to a higher and purely spiritual form of existence, a life in the world of eternal prototypes (ideals), of which this lower world only exhibits to us the shadows, and in which we shall first come into complete possession of the highest Good, by being ourselves united to it. There is here a conception of blessedness, which, though not the Christian one, is yet superior to Eudaimony,—a transition of the whole present existence into another and higher, in which those who in this present world have seriously sought the divine, come nearer Divinity and its glory than is possible under the conditions of earth; become independent not merely of the sorrows of life, but even of its joys, which they have ceased to crave; are ransomed to that perfect liberty in likeness to God which needs no earthly happiness to fill its measure, has not the necessities of which man on this side of time can but partially make himself independent, whether he seeks to accomplish this by satisfying these necessities, which is to draw water in the vessels of the Danaïdes, or attempts to pursue the thorny path of resignation. We are here reminded of the dying Socrates, who ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Æsculapius, the god of medicine; thus expressing in a mythical symbolic manner his conviction that he was about to obtain a perfect *cure*,—a state of re-convalescence, as after severe sickness, with its many disquieting dreams and delirious imaginations.

In the Eleusinian mysteries also, in which immortality is taught, there is to be found a conception of blessedness, since those who were initiated into them were supposed to anticipate the condition succeeding death, after having first been subjected to a series of probations and significant ceremonies. For, in imitation of what it was imagined the soul underwent immediately after death, they were obliged to begin by groping in darkness, and with difficulty discovering the way which led to the interior of the temple, whilst distracted by terrible voices, and by flashes of light, which alternately dispelled the gloom and showed them hideous forms, calculated to produce the shuddering and cold sweat of abject fear. But if they sustained these trials, there kindled before them at last a tranquillizing marvellous light, and they attained the green fields and meadows of Paradise, where the sacred chorus-dance was executed, and where they listened to sacred songs, which elevated the soul, purifying it from every earth-born stain. They not only heard holy words of instruction, but found themselves at the same time fascinated by a contemplation of the divine in beatific visions, at the same time coming into actual relation with purely spiritual enjoyments, and experiencing blessedness not as a mere imagination, but as a reality. Thus received into the society of pure and holy men, they beheld the uninitiated and unsanctified multitude far beneath, involved in dense mists, tossed to and fro, and trampling each other ever further down into the morass of matter, racked and tormented by the dread of death, because they would not believe in the eternal Good.[1] Here there is a conception of blessedness, which is higher than earthly Eudaimony, but lower than Christian blessedness,—an intermediate degree of bliss, which is the highest attainable by heathen consciousness.[1]

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[1] From a fragment of Plutarch's treatise "On the Soul," in Schelling's *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, vol. ii. ch. 3, p. 449. Mynster, *Miscell. Writings*, iv. p. 135, and onwards.

But the idea of *happiness* may also be associated with that of religion as the union of the heavenly Good with the good things of this world, the combination of happiness and bliss. This combination, however, binds down the religious hope of the future to earth and the present life, and just on this account its ideal of happiness has so many adherents. No doubt the idea would be at once rejected if we should seek to exclude religion and virtue from happiness, and, imitating an assertion of Goethe, should maintain that God, virtue, and immortality might be dispensed with, if, instead of God, we could get gold; instead of virtue, we could get health, beauty, and geniality, instead of immortality in the world to come, we could get a long life upon earth. Such an ideal of happiness would be found inadmissible. But if we could procure for men God and God's grace along with this world's riches; give them virtue along with health, beauty, and intellectual endowment; secure to them the certain hope of a blessed immortality, and at the same time a long and happy life on earth,—then would most of those pious searchers after happiness hold this abundantly worthy of desire, and deem themselves supremely fortunate in its possession. Even although not a few of this class would be more modest in their earthly desires—for the ideal of happiness is infinitely diversified in different individuals—yet what the greater number aspire after, at least in the first stadium of their religious course, is just a painless and passionless union of the heavenly and the earthly, in which union there is no cross. Neither can it be said that this ideal is to be unconditionally rejected as that which is maintained by the pure ascetics, who in no sense of the term desire happiness, but only bliss, and regard mortification and suffering as the normal condition of earth. For, not to speak of the Old Testament, which to the fear of God and uprightness joins the promise of happiness, the New

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[1] It was, according to their description, a true heaven in which the initiated found themselves. The great, all-dominating law of the universe was so just, that it did not deny its heaven to upright pagans, although this heaven was not the actual one, but only such when subjectively perceived. Schelling onwards from 451.

Testament also declares that the fear of God is profitable to all things, both for the present life and also for that which is to come (1 Tim. iv. 8)—that the fear of God is also accompanied by blessings in the present time. And since the Lord Himself has said, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you," He implies that these other things have an inferior value, and are thus not entirely worthless. Unquestionably there is also another word in Scripture, which must be here emphasized, namely, "that we through much tribulation shall enter the kingdom of God" (Acts xiv. 22); by which we are led to the reflection, that the promise as regards the fear of God in the present life also is, that it shall work in us patience under tribulation, and that all things work together for good to them that love God. The experience of life will also teach every one, that the ideal of happiness is but very imperfectly realized. The opposite of happiness, suffering, whether external or internal, is shut out from the life of no man, in spite of all the precaution of prudence, as an evidence that not happiness, but bliss, as life in God under an entirely different form of existence from the present, is the proper final aim of our being. For a man may be really blessed on the ruins of his earthly happiness, even under pain and suffering, by which blessedness shows its heavenly nature, makes evident that it is not of this world; and blessedness or salvation, which as a heavenly grace has come down to man—for no one can himself procure it, or draw it forth from his own inner being, as he may stoical apathy—returns with him from earth to heaven, there to unfold itself in its true home. Happiness, even if it be preserved throughout a long life, must vanish at all events when death arrives. The earthly elements, the relativities, remain behind on earth; and only that portion of it which has been fashioned into blessedness, the treasure of faith and obedience, of love and wisdom, which has thus become the soul's possession, is taken up along with him into the heavenly kingdom.

§ 47.

The limited character of the ideal of earthly happiness is also shown when we contemplate it from the standpoint of society. From this standpoint the ideal of happiness appears specially in the representation of the *golden period,* the golden age, which as paradise lies far behind us, whilst it lies now before us as the goal of our effort and of our desire. The conception of the golden age is that of a condition of society on earth, in which universal religion and morality are combined with the harmonious development of all the powers of humanity, and with the greatest possible sum of enjoyment and prosperity both for the whole and for individuals,—a condition of outward and inward harmony. The visionary colouring of the golden age is present in the many Utopias which from time to time emerge and constantly recur in representations such as these: that in the golden times the spirit of love and wisdom shall cause war to cease for ever; that the progress of dominion over nature shall make malignant disease impossible, and teach men the art of prolonging life far beyond its present limits, etc. etc. But looked at apart from the visionary, it may be said that ethics itself, in so far as it unfolds the ideals of human society, the social advantages and the conditions of their attainment, is calculated to produce the golden period, or at least to conduce to it and prepare the way for it, which Plato, from the standpoint of Paganism, has already done in his *Republic,* his ideal state as the model of a morally harmonious condition of society. The highest religious representation of the golden period, as the perfect exhibition of the supreme Good within these earthly conditions, is the representation of *Messiah's kingdom upon earth,* which again has its strongest expression in Chiliasm, or in the doctrine of the *Millennium,* in which the power of evil is bound and cannot express itself as the power of society, and in which God's people, after the many protracted conflicts of the Church, celebrate their great historic Sabbath. The kernel of Chiliasm, stripped of its visionary colouring, is the idea of *the earthly sovereignty of Christianity,*—an idea which was especially vigorous and brilliant during the first three centuries, in the time of the Church's persecution and oppression, in the time of martyrdom, when the kingdom of God could only be possessed as the one pearl of great price, as blessedness in faith and hope, in the union of hearts with the Redeemer, in the communion of the word and of the sacraments—as blessedness, but not at all as happiness. In contrast to this state of oppression, Chiliasm arises with the thought of Christ's rule in this world, and along with this, universal peace on earth. And, strangely enough, when Christianity becomes the State religion, and thus attains worldly dominion, Chiliasm disappears for a considerable period. Christ's rule on earth, His kingly power, may undoubtedly be understood in very different senses, more or less truly or falsely, spiritually or carnally. But it is essentially this ideal which flits before us, when we demand that the kingdom of God shall develope itself as a total organization, including within it all the objects of human society. It is this which, from the time when Christianity became the State religion, has at least been present to the purpose of all Christian States. And in its perfect development it is the ideal of Christianity as a world-wide union of Christian nations and races in a condition of universal peace and uprightness, in which conflicting forces, in which opposed and naturally hostile national individualities, are combined in the higher unity of faith and love, in which in the universal peace of the world "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the cow and the bear shall feed together" (Isa. xii. 6). This earthly ideal has certainly its value, but still with the restriction, which belongs to all earthly ideals, that it can never be perfectly attained, but can only flit before our aspiration, can only be realized approximately. The golden period is coming, and shall come; but never under heaven will that point of time be reached, when it can be said absolutely that *it has come.* For sin, and death, and the powers of Antichrist, inseparable from this economy, make this an impossibility. Even if we imagine a moment in the history of the universe in which the age of gold bursts forth and the devil is bound, yet in a succeeding moment this will have disappeared: the devil will be once more let loose, and the Church again be suffering and militant. The perfect realization of the kingdom of God, and the complete sovereignty of Christ, shall first appear through a great crisis with the erection of the kingdom of heaven, which is not a realm of happiness, but of supreme blessedness and glory.

Happiness, whether it be considered from the standpoint of the individual or from that of society, whether characterized by religion or not—and originally it is not a religious but a worldly conception—can never be found perfect upon earth, whilst yet its home is exclusively there. Its antagonists—that is to say, suffering, adversity, want, and death—prevent the achievement of the ideal. Therefore this world can never be contemplated as an island of happiness; yet neither can it be contemplated as exclusively a vale of sorrow, since relative happiness may be found, though even this would be very precarious if the blessedness of salvation had not been revealed. But Christianity teaches us to view both happiness and suffering not as matters of infinite importance, not as that which is man's final destiny, but as interminable destinies which are consonant to this earthly state of existence, because through them, as means of education, we are to be fitted for the coming blessedness, for that heavenly life in which we are not merely redeemed from suffering, but also freed from the craving for enjoyment; because we have become partakers of God's own blessedness, in the liberty of God's children, in which we can dispense with the lower benefits on which we are here dependent. And the heavenly life, as the life in God and in the realms of creation, which God fills with His own presence, is an *indissoluble* life (Heb. vii. 16),—a life which is the indissoluble union of its moments, of the divine and the human, the uncreated and created, of energy and repose, of love and contemplation; whilst the present life is constantly exposed to the dissolution and breaking asunder of its moments, which is especially the case with happiness, it being fragile as glass. An optimism which puts happiness in the place of the final or chief end of man, and, closing its eyes to sin and the deficiencies of the present existence, concludes that in this "excellent world" there is no essential risk either to virtue or to happiness, is not less untrue, though far less profound, than a pessimism which puts suffering and death as the final purpose of life, as that for which it is lived. Such a pessimism has in our days found expression in Schopenhauer's theory of unhappiness, in consequence of which existence, nay, life itself, is the highest evil, from which individual evils are but offshoots. For, according to this theory, the conception of life is an egoistic will, which is incessantly renewing in itself pain and suffering, as is already exhibited in nature in the suffering animal kingdom, which shows us the spectacle of mutual destruction and torture, but in the highest degree repeats itself in the realm of humanity, where men mutually strive, torture and tread down one another, at the same time tormenting and plaguing themselves. Each of them certainly desires to be happy, yet chases after a soap-bubble, a *Fata Morgana* in the form of an ideal of happiness, which is never attained, and only leaves behind pains which not the less drive them on to new wishes, new cravings, new illusions. True wisdom, therefore, consists in acknowledging the emptiness of existence, and not allowing oneself to be dazzled by appearances. The ethical task then remains the same as with the Indian ascetics, to die to the wish to live and exist, to will "nothing," because the will is the source of all sufferings and illusions. The thing most desirable for man, the highest good, is union with "nothing," is liberation from the burden of life itself, is to become again what he was before his birth, namely, non-existent.[1] However false and monstrous this theory may be, it has still its relative correctness as opposed to a flat optimism, which has taken no account of the contradictions and the wants of life.

A more minute consideration of Optimism and Pessimism must, however, be given a little further on.

§ 48.

It is in the hope of the future kingdom of bliss and glory that we work for God's kingdom on earth, assured that we are not drawing water in the vessels of the Danaïdes. But the kingdom of God on earth can only be realized by a continued strife with Evil, and victory over it as the opposite of the Good. Just as the Good is both that after which man *should* strive, and that wherein, from the impulse of his being, he finds his peace, his blessedness, so is the Evil the corresponding opposite. In so far as the Good is considered from the view-point of God's holy law, the contrast between Good and Evil must be defined as that between the normal and the abnormal in conduct and disposition of mind. In so far, on the other hand, as the Good is considered as a state of realized perfection, as it is considered from the view-point of blessedness, happiness, and the harmony of the world, the contrast appears between the blessings and the evils of life. In general terms, an evil is that which man, in consequence of his nature, cannot otherwise than seek to escape, because it hinders and restrains life, produces a disharmony in existence. But both physical and mental evils are, like the corresponding goods or benefits, only æsthetic evils (æsthetic taken in the older, general signification, as that which awakens desire or distaste, pleasure or the reverse), so long as they are not placed in relation to the holy law of the will. What is relatively worthy to be desired, and what should conditionally be avoided, is measured by the highest good and the highest evil alone.

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[1] *Die Welt as Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Appearance).

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE KINGDOM OF SIN. THE HIGHEST EVIL.

§ 49.

As the Good, considered as the destiny of man, is love to God and His kingdom, the Evil can only be defined as the essential contrast to love, or as Egoism. The Evil is not a mere defect, a limitation, so that the contrast between Good and Evil should be only the contrast between the more or less perfect. Evil is moreover a positive, as certainly as the egoistic will takes up a position, sets itself against the Good. The Evil is not a necessary moment of development; it is that which should not be—that, the presence of which is absolutely unauthorized in the creation of God, and which should have rested eternally in the night of possibility. It does not consist merely in the sovereignty of the senses over reason, though this is one of the principal phenomena under which it appears; for the highest and most decided factors of the Good are not reason and sense, liberty and nature, but human will and divine will, human liberty and divine grace. The Evil is *sin*, a disturbance of the normal relation of the will, not merely to an impersonal law of reason, but to the Creator. And if the good will is that which, in union with God, wills the divine aim of creation, the evil will is the denial and opposition of this aim, and the prosecution of an opposite aim; since the egoistic will does not desire that God should reign supreme over all things, but that itself should hold the place of ruler, use and enjoy the world in independence of God. As the kingdom of God does not merely appear in separate individuals, but as a kingdom, so also does Evil, whose kingdom on earth is along with the former, as tares in the wheat. And as, according to the teaching of revelation, the kingdom of the Good has not merely its members on earth, but also embraces the glorified and sanctified souls and spirits departed, and those that were originally holy; so, too, the kingdom of Evil stretches beyond this earthly sphere, embracing demon souls and spirits, who have their central point in the devil; and the contest between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of sin on earth is bound up with the contest in the higher world of spirits. This idea of a kingdom of sin has indeed its special difficulty in this, that evil is not organizing, but only disorganizing, and would therefore seem to lack the unity which is necessary for a kingdom. But although Evil is disorganizing, and only has actual existence by disturbing the original Good; and though the kingdom of Evil must be antagonistic to itself, in so far as the egoistic wills mutually contest the supremacy; still, from another side, it is not antagonistic to itself, and possesses a comparative unity, in so far as the egoistic wills all conspire and co-operate against the kingdom of the Good and its realization. By the appearance of Christ, the opposition between Good and Evil amongst men was most fully manifested. For, as the aim of creation here has determined itself as the aim of redemption, the opposition between Good and Evil determines itself as the opposition between the will which submits to redemption and that which rejects and contests it.

§ 50.

If the highest Good may be defined as the unity of sanctified love and blessedness, the highest Evil must be defined as the unity of sin and misery. The highest Evil is sin itself, joined to consciousness of guilt and inward condemnation. It is this evil (*supremum malum*) which ought to be abhorred by men above every other evil, and which cannot be counterbalanced by the possession of all relative Good. "What shall it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" In truth, it may be said that all men share in this highest Evil, in so far as they are all by sin estranged from God; and they all bear within them the germ of that sickness which must unfold itself in death, if the remedy be not found. Even where consciousness of guilt and accusation of conscience have not been awakened, the absence of holy peace and tranquillity receives an indirect testimony, in the inexplicable sadness of which there is a store in every human heart; in the weariness, the feeling of emptiness and desolation in existence, which often assails man whilst in the possession of all external goods, and makes it necessary for him to discover means to pass away time, although never succeeding in his aim; in which respect Byron has called this tedium or *ennui* the mystery of the fashionable world. The mystery is, that men in this life feel miserable separated from eternal life; and therefore not merely when obliged to struggle with earthly want, but also when in possession of all earthly advantages, they must feel the pressure and emptiness of time; that the man who has not found the highest good can never obtain any actually present time, but predominantly lives either in the past or in the future, whilst by an illusion of the fancy he imagines that what he cannot attain now, he shall reach at some future period, though in reality it never can be his if Time and Eternity are not united for him. But, first, where the consciousness of guilt and the accusations of conscience appear in their terrors, we have the highest evil as such. The highest evil becomes the perfect evil (*malum consummatum*) when all possibilities of change and improvement are exhausted, when the future is lost, when every hope of deliverance is extinguished, and when, in addition to the inward misery, comes a corresponding outward state of woe. Unmitigated evil leads our contemplation away from this world of mixture, where the good and the evil exist together, and where the evil, therefore, cannot be found in its completeness, to the outer realm, to that cosmic region which we call Hell, to the abode of the damned, the entrance to which, according to Dante, has this inscription:

> "Through me you pass into the realms of woe;
> Through me to regions of eternal pain;
> Through me among a people lost for aye.
> Justice divine my strong foundation laid;
> And love, by wisdom led, the limits drew.
> My being was when things create were none,
> Save things eternal; and such thing am I.
> Abandon hope, all ye that enter here." [1]

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[1] Chambers' translation.

This passage is at the same time so remarkable, because the poet causes Hell to be built, not by mere justice, but also by love, since justice is an essential moment even in love, its self-vindication, the maintenance of the justice of love towards those who have rejected it; by which, in the great discord, he seeks to maintain the *harmony of the universe.* In a relative sense, as a foretaste of the future, unmitigated evil may also be found within these earthly conditions. If the ideal of the perfect good within these conditions is an ethical total organization which exhibits the union of universal religion, morality and bliss, then must perfect evil or Hell upon Earth be imagined as the opposite, as an approximately realized totality of evils. But a totality of evil can only be imagined as a condition of the world, a state of society which finds itself in a universal disorganization and dissolution, in which all bonds are loosened by the destroying power of Egoism, where ungodliness and arrogant denial of the truth, where vice in all forms, reigns in conjunction with the loss of happiness and bliss, inward and outward misery. We have an approximate image of the highest evil on earth—the Roman Empire during its decay—the picture of a vast carrion world, in which evil, impure, and demon spirits have taken up their abode. We may also picture the destruction of Jerusalem, — an exhibition not merely of the most fearful sin, crime, and vain strife against God, but also of a condition in which the community, though pressed by external foes, the instruments of retributive justice, completed its own downfall by furious party struggles within its own bosom. We may recall the period of the reign of terror in the French Revolution. But especially the word of Prophecy leads us to the contemplation of the last age of the world, when the Man of Sin shall be revealed, "who opposeth and exalteth himself against everything which is called God, and the worship of God; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God" (2 Thess. ii. 4). If the highest Good on earth, viewed from the standpoint of society, is the ideal of a world-wide alliance of Christian states and nationalities in a condition of universal uprightness and peace, the prophetic word would seem to indicate here the highest evil of society on earth to be a universal monarchy, an earthly sovereignty, in which Antichrist, in the form of an autocrat, armed with all external power, and supported by the false prophet, by all the means of culture and civilisation, seduces the nations of the earth, brings them to bear his mark, and exerts his disorganizing, all-perverting might against everything divine and human. The complete prophetic sketch of the highest Evil, both in the present and the future world, the torments of earth and hell, is given in the Apocalypse, where there is likewise a representation of the highest Good, of the progressive contest and victory of the kingdom of God.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE WORLD. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

§ 51.

But the kingdom of God is not only opposed to the kingdom of sin and of evil; it is also opposed to the world in the ethical signification of the term. This expression "the world" has in Bible language, besides its application to the content of inhabitants, a special reference to the condition of human society since the Fall, and thus bears a peculiar ethical meaning; and as material creation shared in the consequences of the spiritual fall, nature in its present condition is also of "this world," that is to say, abnormal in its state and development. Yet this world is still not one with the kingdom of sin and evil, although it certainly is a sinful world in so far as the kingdom of evil has won entrance within it, and by its influence has vitiated it. The nature of this world is twofold in its character, and can neither be absolutely condemned as evil, nor unconditionally applauded as good. It bears the mark of opposing principles (the good and the evil), containing within it antagonistic elements and qualities which can never be reconciled; thus giving evidence that it is doomed to destruction, in order that it may hereafter arise again in restored harmony of form. Viewed in relation to the other regions of creation, it is a middle sphere, neither Heaven nor Hell, but the vestibule of each. It is a world of sin, of death, of evanescence; but it is not the less God's world, in which the disturbing forces are still constantly opposed by creative and sustaining power, and where the mercy of God, outside redemption, has countless witnesses. It is a world destitute of the supreme good, and is so far unsatisfying; but it embraces every relative good, the relations of virtue and happiness, of ideal and actual excellences, which though indeed by no means absolute, are yet not worthless, but intermediate realities, which have their value. On account of its twofold nature, the world is unreliable and illusory, so that the thoughtless and inexperienced are constantly deceived and betrayed by it; but he who uses the world with sound judgment, and within its domain seeks for truth, will find, not indeed the truth as a whole, but precious fragments of it. In its separation from God, the world bears in its bosom an enmity towards Him which testifies to its relationship with the kingdom of Satan; but, on the other hand, it is susceptible of redemption, and is imbued with a deep longing after the supreme good, showing thereby its relationship with the kingdom of God. Therefore the kingdom of God stands in a double relation to this world, and regards it from a twofold point of view. On the one side, this world, on account of sin, is opposed to the kingdom of God, and is therefore to be avoided and combated as an evil. "Love not the world, neither the things which are in the world" (1 John ii. 15). "The friendship of the world is enmity with God" (Jas. iv. 14). But on the other side the world is appointed to redemption: "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son" (John iii. 16): it is capable of receiving the kingdom of God, is a plastic material (*Formabile*); it is fitted to be organized for the kingdom of God. The field is the world (Matt. xiii. 37), a field in which this kingdom of God may be set up; a household where the relative good is not altogether illusory, but fitted to occupy a right relation towards the supreme good. But without the kingdom of God, without the supreme good, this world remains a continual contradiction, a fragment which can never become a whole, a harmony which incessantly passes over into discord. From the twofold nature of this world as here pointed out, the opposite statements regarding it found in Scripture are explained. And from this we learn, at the same time, to appreciate the two views of life and of the world which ever and anon recur in the human race—Optimism and Pessimism.

§ 52.

Naturalistic Optimism, apart from Christianity, ignores sin and redemption, and is ignorant that the world, by the Fall, has become *this world;* it assumes that this world still maintains its original condition, when "God saw all that He had made, and, behold, it was very good." The supreme Good has never been lost, the world's harmony has never been disturbed; the world preserves a normal position, a normal development; and everything viewed from the standpoint of totality is good. The supreme Good is the free self-development of humanity in a world affording all the required conditions. The optimist view of life takes in only the creative and sustaining powers of existence, and shuts out the contemplation of death and disorder. Evil is considered as only a defect, a limitation, nay, as the condition for life movement and progress; the supreme Evil is only lack of wisdom, ignorance and barbarism, which are to be overcome by advancing culture. The view of life diametrically opposed to this, which we shall call Pessimism, assumes, on the other hand, either that the world originally, and from the beginning until now, has been and remains a vale of sorrow, that man was formed for suffering and for a disturbed development of life; or it admits a golden age in the beginning of history, which has disappeared and given place to a depravity ever on the increase. But its constant complaint is that the supreme Good cannot be found by man in this world, that the supreme Good is but a mere ideal, a thought, an image of the fancy, generated by human desire, and which unhappily man must ever pursue with eagerness; whilst the reality presents to him only the supreme Evil, namely life, and even existence, as an unsolved and unsolvable problem of dissonance,—a painful contrast to the pretensions of the ideal.

Christianity is the truth both of Optimism and Pessimism. It is pessimist, in that it teaches that the whole world lieth in wickedness, that man has a lost paradise behind him, that the supreme Good has disappeared, that human life with all its excellences only shows us the ruins of an empire which has been overthrown, since man by the abuse of his free-will has lost his royal dignity on earth. But it is optimist, in that it teaches that it is possible for man to be redeemed and to be reinstated in his sovereignty, that the supreme Good is restored in Christ, who has opened again the gates of paradise. If we compare Optimism and Pessimism as they appear in the natural life of man, the last of the two may be designated as the more elevated view, since it unveils the incongruity of the reality with the ideal, which Optimism conceals. Pessimism, in the midst of its errors, has yet a deeper perception than Optimism of the jar in existence; and just because of this more correct apprehension of the actual condition of the disturbed harmony, it is the constant corrector of the other, troubling the calm of its contemplation. Yet Optimism and Pessimism are near akin, bearing the relation of immediate perception and reflection. They are both found at all times in the human race. For man has an impulse to life, and finds satisfaction and enjoyment in existence, whilst, on the other hand, he bears sin and sorrow secretly in his heart. But with regard to the optimist view of things, history shows that the productive periods of our race are those in which it has predominated. Thus with the Greeks at the zenith of their greatness. For so long as man is conscious of his own creative power, and delights in its exercise, so long is his faith unshaken in the victory of the creative power of existence,—a faith which is well founded, but will only hold its ground when alongside of it stands faith in the *new* creation of Christianity. Pessimism appears especially in the unhappy epochs of history. It may then contemplate the world from the standpoint of virtue, and find that in place of this only vice is seen. We see this in Plautus and the Roman satirists, as Juvenal, whose painting of the morals of his times agrees essentially with the description given of paganism by the Apostle Paul in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and which is certainly not an optimist sketch. Or it may regard life specially from the standpoint of happiness, and discover that human existence is utterly miserable, as the poets have often declared. But all these complaints merge into one, that all is vanity, that the life of man is aimless and meaningless. It is indeed characteristic of pagan Pessimism, that the ethical is more or less dominated by the fatalistic, that the blame of the whole is cast on a mysterious destiny. But yet it approaches more closely to Christianity than does this self-satisfied Optimism; for "they that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick." It is therefore in a moral point of view more instructive to study the unfortunate periods in history than the fortunate, because the former exhibit to us the end of the natural life of man, the moral of the optimist history. And here, too, the saying holds good: *Respice finem.* Thus the contemplation of the condition of paganism at the time of Christ's birth is specially instructive, because it shows us the result to which this belief at last conducted through the long course of its history, the total absence of result, the pure nihilismus in which the whole terminates. Through sorrow the way is opened to the acknowledgment of sin, and the Pessimism of Christian ethics paves the way for true Optimism.

§ 53.

That the Optimism of unrenewed human nature never permits itself to be carried through to a conclusion, is testified not merely by the consideration of ancient writers, but by that of the more modern as well; and we may here take example not only from the Greeks, but also from the greatest poet of our own time, from Goethe, who is the interpreter of the bright, joyous life of the world. No one has with such force as Goethe fixed his eye on the creating and sustaining powers of existence, whilst at the same time he turned away his glance from the destroying powers, or acknowledged their presence only in so far as was inevitable, and ever asserted their impotence against the powers of life. "I adore," said he, "that God who has laid such a power of production in the world, that if even but a millionth part thereof come to perfection, the world so swarms with creatures, that war, pestilence, fire, or flood cannot overwhelm it. This God is my God!" By this he indicates his conception of God as the physical, not as the moral. And on this same productivity he fixes his attention in the contemplation of human life; for however many may meanwhile perish, "there still circulates fresh young blood." The same holds good with the spiritual. After every barren and unproductive period, genius stands forth anew, and pours out its fertilizing stream on the human race. Man is everywhere surrounded by the sources of life and of the renewal of youth, and the poet cries aloud to his contemporaries: "Open your eyes; ye are not required to search for the good in the far distant; it is here, if ye will but grasp it. Learn to find joy in existence, giving yourselves up to the glory of Nature, and that higher glory of Nature which is revealed through the productions of genius; live your life; extend education and civilisation beyond yourselves; draw from the wells, which flow at your feet, if ye will but look round you, instead of closing your eyes in sloth and vain dreaming: do this, and ye shall discover that it is good to be in this world." We certainly do not ignore the truth which is contained in this life-teaching. There is no one who does not require to listen to it, who does not require to open his eyes to the beauties of creation and of human life; no one who does not require this appeal to contemplate the grandeur of life, not merely in what is most elevated, but also in the minute and lowly, not merely in the far removed, but also in that which lies nearest to us, and which just on that account is so unnoticed, whether it be the sunbeam which shines in on us in our chamber, or the men who appear to us so commonplace, but in whom there is yet something original, some ray of eternity, if we have but eyes to perceive it; or it may be the circumstances or the occupation which we look upon as so trivial and unimportant, but of which we might make something useful and important, if we had but energy and love. The question is only, if Pessimism is really excluded by such life-teaching, without the intervention of Christianity. We maintain that all Optimism which is not Christian contains a Pessimism, hidden and repressed it may be, but not annihilated, and that this is the case with Goethe's Optimism. The point with Goethe from which Pessimism may be deduced, lies, in our opinion, in the want of result in his view of life. We will endeavour to show this more clearly.

It is acknowledged as an element in the greatness of Goethe, that the conditions of mind which he depicts are the portraiture of his own inner being, the different epochs in the development of his own life, and that he freed himself from the overwhelming influence of these by making them the subject of poetic representation. He is himself Werther, whose unhappy love he has painted in such glowing colours. He is himself Tasso, who lives exclusively in the world of imagination, in the poet's dreamland, and in his artist sensitiveness feels the cold breath of reality touch him painfully. We may add, that he is himself Antonio, the courtier, a contrast to the poet,—these two never really coming into harmonious unity. He is himself Wilhelm Meister, who yearns for intellectual progress and refinement, and passes through illusion after illusion in this respect, whilst yet his years of study and of travel never can show him this last: Whither? He is himself Faust, who turns away from the faith and craves the infinite, first in unlimited knowledge, and next in unlimited enjoyment of life, both alike unattainable by him. All these conditions and tendencies depict various epochs in his own life. But whilst these puny ideals, encumbered with illusions, have one by one disappeared from his view, and can but serve as material for poetic beauty of representation, the question yet arises: What ideal of life remains standing before him, as that wherein he himself and his readers shall rest at last? What aim in life remains standing before him, which shall not merely furnish subject for verses, but by which life itself shall be cultivated and refined? We can here only speak of cultivation, progress, human life. But just here appears, on a closer contemplation, what we have before called the want of result in his view of life, or the want of a final object, where, under the seriousness of life, we may find rest, because the human with Goethe is separated from the Christian, and must find rest and satisfaction for itself. We do not assert, by any means, that his view of life is destitute of ethical content. In refutation of this, might be pointed out to us his *Goetz*, or *Iphigenia*, or *Herman and Dorothea*, where the good, where fidelity and love, are placed before our eyes in such noble forms. These poems, however, appear like islands in a lonely sea. The suggestions of an ethical survey of life, which are to be found here, are not carried out elsewhere. On the other hand, there is an important moral moment, which becomes more and more predominant in his writings, namely, *resignation* and *self-denial.* It is resignation which is indirectly preached in Werther, who is mastered by the allurements of passion. It is resignation which is preached in Tasso, who, in immeasurable attachment to poetic imageries, makes demands upon reality which can never be fulfilled. It is resignation and self-denial which, under other forms, are enunciated through Wilhelm Meister, who devotes himself to tasks beyond his strength. And it is the same teaching which is set forth through Faust, who seeks to soar beyond the limits of earthly knowledge. But resignation and self-denial do not present a final result, in which we can find rest; when deprived of our illusory ideas, we must receive in return for them another ideal, and that the true one. But "refinement," "culture," and "human life," are only temporary subjects of interest, which cannot satisfy us as a last and highest aim of existence, a final refuge for the soul throughout its conflict. Here Goethe's view of life exhibits a great lack of teleology—its want of religion, the want of an ultimate and supreme object after which the life may strive, and according to which it may be ethically planned. The same thing appears in his autobiography (*Wahrheit und Dichtung*), in which we only find an extremely interesting, lively, and suggestive *development of talent.*

Goethe's theory of life, like that of the ancients, has its aims entirely in this lower world, concerns itself only about *happiness* and *resignation*, whilst salvation and the kingdom of God lie entirely outside. For if the idea of immortality and a future higher life are not excluded from his programme, they play a very unimportant part. According to Goethe, we should live without allowing such considerations strongly to influence us; we should, like the Greeks, who were his great types of human dignity, have sufficient to occupy us in the present time, and let the future come to us as it may; we ought, in genuine artistic self-restraint, to lead a healthy, virtuous life, in which we may preserve contentment with existence and with ourselves. There is unquestionably a season when this is possible, especially for the possessors of health, talent, and money. Thus the Greeks could rejoice in existence till overtaken by death under its manifold shapes. But such a scheme of life makes no provision for those among us who belong to the ungifted, the poor, those who toil and suffer hardship, those who are in the gripe of sickness or adversity. Here the ethics of Goethe, lacking faith, has nothing to offer us except the reiteration of resignation, or it points to Christianity as a *beautiful illusion* for amiable but weak minds. "For my sweet friend was ill," says he, in reference to Fraulein von Klettenberg, who furnished him with the groundwork of his *Confessions of a Pure Mind.* "And with regard to all that is unhealthy and unsatisfactory around us, with regard to the contrast which appears between ideal and reality, this view of life has nothing more to tell us, than that we must not make ideal requirements on realities, but take the world as we find it. Neither does it enlighten us as to how we are to preserve that self-satisfaction which Goethe's system of ethics demands, when in our moral efforts we feel ourselves hemmed in by our own nature, and are forced to lament: The good which I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." That Goethe, to whom none of these experiences were unknown, and who himself made the distressing discovery that "we constantly fall back again into error," becomes neither pessimist nor Christian, probably is due to the fact that, instead of descending into the sad and inexplicable contradictions of reality, he rather seeks to forget them, so as not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of existence, nay, even diminishes the demands of his ideal. This coming down from the ideal, this sinking to prosaic reality, shows itself also in his Faust. For the same Faust who, in the beginning, moves in the highest region of thought, who yearns after knowledge unlimited, and wishes to penetrate into the deep things of God, ends in the second part of the poem in a rational self-restraint, laying aside his speculative ideals, and at the court of the Emperor works for the public good, by executing dykes and dams to keep out the inroads of the sea, whereby agriculture, industry, and other matters which concern the general weal are promoted. In this direction the poet's own ever-increasing realism and resignation of the ideal are mirrored in Faust.

That, nevertheless, the want of result in such a view of life, that the inexplicable dissonance in existence has also come to his knowledge, and has made itself felt as a drawback, which forms a contrast to his Optimism, is clearly shown by several of his own admissions; as when he says, in conversation with Eckermann: "I have always been looked upon as a favourite of fortune; neither will I bemoan myself or accuse my course of life as unworthy But yet, after all, it has been nothing but labour and trouble, and I may well say that in my seventy-five years I have not had four weeks during which I could enjoy life. It has been the eternal rolling of a stone which must be constantly moved afresh." To such admissions may be added also expressions regarding the course of worldly events, which exhibit a very different view of life from those of the optimist, and in which he has expressed thoughts which every day became more confirmed, as when in his old age he says: "Matters go very ill with us, the inhabitants of so old a region as Europe. Our circumstances are too artificial and complicated, our food and mode of living are not in accordance with nature, and our social relations are destitute of real affection and cordiality. Every one is polite and courteous, but no one has the courage to be natural and hearty; so that an honest man, with nature in his soul, has a hard lot. One might often wish he had been born in the South Sea Islands, among the so-called savages, in order to enjoy for once human existence pure and without this false flavour."

And again: "When one ponders deeply on the misery of our times, it often seems as if the world were ripening more and more for the last day. Evil increases from generation to generation. For it is not enough that we suffer from the sins of our fathers; we transmit this heritage of woe to our descendants, increased by our own transgressions."

And again: "Our rural population is certainly in a healthy condition, and it is to be hoped will long continue so, in order to preserve us from total depravity and decay. But go into any of our large cities, and you will be shocked and horrified. Take a walk through the streets with a *diable boiteux* or a doctor of extensive practice by your side, and he will whisper in your ear stories which will make your hair stand on end at the thought of the wickedness and misery which pervade human nature and scourge society."

"Humanity will doubtless advance in knowledge and intelligence, but not in the love or the practice of virtue, and seeming progress in the latter direction will not be permanent. I see the time approaching when God will have no longer pleasure in the human race, and will break in pieces the whole creation in order totally to renew it."[1]

It must be admitted that such utterances only come forth from Goethe at rare intervals, momentary sparkles, but they furnish unexceptionable evidence that his Optimism has Pessimism in the background, that some other view of life is needed than that of Goethe.

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[1] From conversations with Eckermann. Gelzer, *German National Literature*, 2d vol. pp. 366–67.

§ 54.

The want of result in which Optimism terminates, and which it most commonly seeks to conceal from itself, is, from the first, prominently brought forward by Pessimism as the great, all-embracing, fundamental discovery. Pessimism fixes its glance on the disturbing and destroying powers, and beholds these as the conquering. In nature, it discerns everywhere death in life; in human affairs, the evil overpowering the good; in history, the incessant rolling of a Sisyphus stone; and thence arrives at the conclusion that the life of man is without aim, the last object and intention of existence—nothing. Not the less does it continue to demand an ideal of a world which must be real; and however otherwise it may be regulated, this world must always be such that the individual can find in it absolute satisfaction. This contradiction, at the same time denying the ideal and demanding it, often appears like scepticism, as doubt of the reality of life; but in the very demand for this reality there lurks a secret belief that it is to be found. Sceptic Pessimism must therefore clear gradually into belief or sink into fatalism.

A classical expression of the sceptic Pessimism which may be dissipated by faith, is given us from the standpoint of the Old Testament in the book of Ecclesiastes, the burden of which is: All is vanity! The Preacher, who is introduced speaking in the person of King Solomon, expresses in these words that life has no aim, no τέλος, that is to say, no settled aim, nothing in which man can find repose. He has sought wisdom, but it was only vanity and vexation of spirit; for the wisdom which he found merely exhibited to him the illusions of life, but could not show him one perfect object in which he might rest as a final aim of existence. Therefore he says, that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, since he only thus perceives more and more illusions, whilst nothing is the result, and nihilism is only sorrow of heart. Thereafter he turns to the practical: All here is within his power. He has tasted seeming enjoyment, has listened to male singers and female singers, but it ended in vanity. He has executed great projects, but this also was vanity; for in the course of the world he might expect that those who succeeded him would break down or suffer to fall into decay what he had begun. What, then, has a man of all his labour and trouble under the sun? And as the contemplation of human efforts brings him to exclaim, All is vanity! so also does the contemplation of human *destinies*. "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness," and he cannot find in the course of the world any real revelation of just retribution. And what specially strengthens him in his sceptical opinions is, that the life of the human race shows no *progress*. There is nothing new under the sun, but that which has been before shall be again. When Optimism perpetually glories in the progress of humanity, and perpetually proclaims the golden age, the Preacher reminds us by his earnest declaration, "There is nothing new under the sun," that these highly-vaunted improvements are but repetitions of the old, which is bad, and that the old vanity and the old misery yet continue to abide with the race; or, in other words, that the fundamental conditions of existence remain the same, and that therefore nothing *essentially* new can occur. When Optimism thus vaunts the progress which the human race has made in the control of nature, the Preacher refuses to admit this as new, so long as this progress cannot arrest decay and death. When Optimism praises the advance of human knowledge, the Preacher refuses to admit this as new, so long as knowledge in regard to the highest question remains imperfect, only a negative wisdom, which may indeed strip life of its illusions, but cannot discover to us a final aim for existence, by which we may take our stand. In order to arrive at anything really new here, *new conditions of existence* are requisite, both with regard to the spiritual and the natural. In other words, what the Preacher requires, though he does not express it, is the *new creation* of Christianity — a new heaven and a new earth. So long as the human race has not attained a share in the blessings of this new kingdom, so long as it has made no progress in essentials, so long does it continue to repeat, no matter how high and developed its forms of culture, still the same round of vanity which the Preacher describes, when he says: "The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose: All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full." How little the heart is filled by the manifold varieties of life, he expresses by saying: "The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing. That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is lost cannot be numbered."

We have, in this sketch, only repeated that which is the burden of one voice in the book of Ecclesiastes. But along with this sceptical and lamentable voice is heard another full of comfort, making known to us that a great and essential change shall have place in these matters, that God Himself will bring every work into judgment (Eccles. xii. 14, xi. 9); and herein is the germ of a higher Optimism, which in Christianity is made clear. The same voice says also to us in warning: Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep His commandments! Nay, the Preacher even counsels the man who fears God, seeing the transient nature of this life, to grasp the innocent enjoyments which may come within his reach: Go thy way, eat thy bread with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works. Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of thy vanity; for that is thy portion in this life, and in thy labour which thou takest under the sun (Eccles. ix. 7, 9).

§ 55.

Fatalistic Pessimism found exalted expression during the period of the Roman Empire. As Rome is the historical type of the kingdom of this world, it has likewise become typical of the self-decay and death in which the kingdom of this world must end. Just because with the Romans the State was the highest Good, just because the political sovereignty of the world was the absolute aim, Rome was overthrown on her attainment of these, because of their finite and purely material character; for when this material aim was accomplished, there was no further object for human effort. Life had lost its earnestness, and it might reiterate with perfect truth the maxim, "All is vanity." From thence arose the fearful depravity of morals which then became general, and spread over all classes of the community. Thence the immense diffusion of unbelief, which, commencing in the schools of philosophy, in process of time leavened the whole mass of the people with doubts concerning the divine government of the world, whilst nature, destiny, fortune, gold, became the divinities which dominated existence. Thence the increasing prevalence of the sentiment that existence is exhausted, that life has become old, the weariness and lassitude which then became common. And thence the melancholy views of life with all nobler spirits, which were penetrated by the secret dread, by the concealed despair of discovering, as it seemed to them, that the being of man, in all its earthly majesty and greatness, is without aim and without purpose; that there is no reality in human consciousness and in human enterprise; that with all the abundant means and powers of this world nothing can be done, no progress can be made. The superior minds sought refuge in Stoicism, whilst the multitude gave themselves up to Epicurism, which at bottom is a fleeing from death and annihilation, by drinking of forgetfulness in the enjoyment of the present moment. The fatalistic Pessimism, both secret and avowed, which pervades the consciousness of this entire period of history, could only be burst asunder by the religious-ethical Pessimism and Optimism of Christianity, in its proclamation of sin and redemption.

§ 56.

Fatalistic and sceptical Pessimism has also repeated itself in the most recent times; and how should it be otherwise, at a period which has undergone so many social revolutions, and in which faith has been undermined in so many fashions? The optimist view has indeed also powerfully prevailed in our times, supported by the marvellously productive powers of the age, with its widespread cultivation. The later philosophy is pre-eminently optimist, since it has sought to reconcile the contradictions of life, and blend them into unity and harmony. But not to mention that Kant's philosophy ended with "the radical evil," the philosophic Optimisim of Schopenhauer also broke out into Pessimism and the doctrine of this world's unhappiness, and the same has been repeated in its *poetry*.

We have already spoken of Goethe as the mouthpiece of Optimism. We may also reckon among its votaries the romantic school of poets of the nineteenth century, who, having triumphed over the prosaic tendency of the preceding age, intoxicated themselves in the poetic glories of existence, and abandoned themselves to an æsthetic enjoyment of the world

But from this romantic Optimism sprang the Pessimism of Byron. In him and his imitators, down to the present day (we refer here to several of the poems of Lenau, and also to those of Leopardi), the secret sadness of the race got utterance.

Though Byron belongs to the school of romance, we believe that we shall most clearly set forth his teaching by comparing him with Goethe. Both of these great poets admired the other; but their view of life is diametrically opposed. Goethe conceals the disturbing powers in existence; Byron freely discovers them. His poetry glows with the most exquisite colouring; all the glories of life are mirrored in its depths, but only to show that they bear within them the elements of evanescence and dissolution. All the ideals of human life shine here in dazzling brilliancy, but only to exhibit the reality in cutting contrast. There is scarcely any human pang which does not find utterance in this poetry, which has also been called the poetry of earthly suffering; and a Pessimism like it, though it be far from Christian, can only be found in the Christian world, where the infinite craving of personality has been awakened. It is a sceptical spirit, a broken heart, which expresses itself through these verses, a blending of pride and misery, a human heart full of Titanic defiance, and "a human heart in tears"—a heart which feels itself to be unspeakably wretched; and yet, in spite of all its sinfulness, it asserts its dignity, its readiness to endure self-sacrifice, to act magnanimously, and its title to arraign before its bar of judgment God and the world. All Byron's heroes are disguised representations of himself. He is himself Cain, who with Lucifer traverses infinite space, where the fallen spirit shows him the relics of extinct worlds, and the Earth as a scarcely distinguishable dot amidst the innumerable spheres of light; afterwards he descends with Lucifer into the realm of death, in order to contemplate departed generations that had preceded Adam, and his soul is filled with bitterness against the God who only forms in order to destroy. He is himself Manfred, Childe Harold, Lara, etc. However rich and varied are his delineations of the external world, there is but one and the same human personality, the same heart, the same melancholy and defiant man, though each time presented in different guise, who stands forth in this multiplicity of gorgeously pictured scenes,

—on the mountains of Switzerland; on the boundless ocean, with the starry heavens above it; in Rome, with the memorials of departed greatness; by Sestos and Abydos; in the palm groves of the East, or in the midst of the chequered bustle of modern life;—however glorious the external surroundings are, yet to declare that the lot of man is sorrow and suffering, deserved and undeserved; that the being who is most highly gifted and most susceptible of enjoyment is the unhappiest of all; that there is in his breast a wound which never is healed, a fire which is never extinguished, a hunger which is never satisfied, a depth which is never filled up; that he is doomed to seek and to long after a region of glory which he shall never attain. With sarcasm and contempt he turns away from society, where he sees only stupidity, meanness, and low selfishness bearing sway. In history, the scenes of which he frequently calls up in his journey through the world, he sees the vanished greatness, the faded beauty, which only leave behind the remembrance of their fleeting nature, ruins which awaken notes of lamentation. He does indeed sometimes dream of the golden times as yet to come; and his enthusiasm for the Greeks has been cited as an evidence that he was positivist in sentiment, that there was an historic aim in which he was eager to co-operate. But, taking him in the whole, it may certainly be said that his faith in his ideal of political freedom was far from being as strong as his contempt for the world, which is much too bad for any ideal of freedom to be realized, any actual progress to be made. The positive, the actual in him, is just his poetry; the exquisite music is a cry of anguish vibrating from the heart's core. For what he says about the poet applies *in fullest measure* to himself, that he had formed friendships with mountains and with stars, with night and the abyss, and their genii spoke to him and revealed to him their secrets. Not the less was the deepest of all these, that which is expressed in *Manfred*, that life had become to him

> "One desert,
> Barren and cold, on which the wild waves break,
> But nothing rests, save carcases and wrecks,
> Rocks, and the salt-surf weeds of bitterness."
> —Act ii. Scene 1, *Manfred.*

This, in connection with his insatiable longing, which embraced the whole world, the abyss which never can be filled, is the predominating theme, which is repeated in endless variation.[1]

Goethe and Byron bear relation to one another as the poets of harmony and discord. But human life experiences far higher harmony than Goethe's, just because it experiences far deeper discords than those he will acknowledge. And human life requires a very different interpretation of its discords from that of Byron. Both of these representations of human life have the same defect: in both the Christian idea is absent. They are therefore both far behind *Shakespeare.* In Shakespeare we find an *historic* view of the world, along with genuine Optimism and Pessimism, although it may also be said that the pessimist view is most abundantly developed. Although Shakespeare is by no means the poet of religion, and his writings have no religious tone, still there is with him this great advantage, that his pictures are founded on the *assumptions* of Christianity, the influences of which are to be indirectly traced in the whole busy and varied life of the world which he unfolds before us. The Christian idea of sin permeates all his productions. His men are no phantoms of the imagination, but real beings of flesh and blood, every one of them evincing that in the flesh dwelleth no good thing; even his noblest, purest characters, his Juliet and his Desdemona, having imperfections, which influence their fate. They are all included under sin. His poetry also is the poetry of suffering. But yet it is not a lament over the undeserved suffering of man; for the world of sin corresponds with the world of death and corruption, with human misery and the vanity of earth, as it is symbolically represented in Lear on the heath in the wild night-storm. Here it is not Titanic defiance and bitterness which the poet seeks to impart to us; but he imbues us with a sacred awe for the divine government of the world, and for the righteous retribution which overtakes the guilty, whilst the sin of the individual is at the same time involved in that of the race. Doubtless the prominent features in the picture are the lightning of judgment, the peal of its thunder, and the overthrow of human greatness, the divine mercy and long-suffering being meanwhile hidden behind heavy clouds. Yet these nevertheless frequently gleam forth, and in some of his individual dramas, as the *Merchant of Venice* and *Measure for Measure*, both of which turn on the contrast between justice and mercy, the law and the gospel play the principal parts. This view of the world is not destitute of aim or result. Although it tells us again and again that all is vanity, that all earthly grandeur,—

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[1] Compare his confessions in conversations with Medwin. (*Conversations with Lord Byron*, p. 73.)

> "The cloud-capt towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself;
> Yea, all that it inherits, shall dissolve,
> And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind!"

yet it tells us also that there are some things which are not in vain, and wherein we may after all find rest,—namely, God and His holy government, His righteous ordering of all events: it tells us that, moreover, in human life are some things not in vain, as faith and loyalty, affection and uprightness (Cordelia and Kent): in one word, it exhibits to us the morality of religion, which is the only thing that holds its ground amidst the fearful changes of human life, the immortal part of man, which is not of *this* world, and which forms the bond of union between him and the eternity beyond this world. "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God, and keep His commandment!"

§ 57.

We have dwelt somewhat more minutely on Pessimism, just because it is only through true Pessimism that we can arrive at true Optimism. We add still further, that as Christian Pessimism finds its corroboration in the actual experience of life, so also its truth is powerfully confirmed by the great phenomena of *the tragic and the comic*. We speak not here of the poetic art, but of the tragic and the comic, as cosmological appointments, as essential conditions of the present world over which we are moved both to laughter and to tears. They both preach the old text: "All is vanity!"

Let us then take first the tragic, and inquire what sort of world, what general condition of the world, does it exhibit to us? Does it not show us a world of liberty, which is at once a world of crime and a world of cruel destiny?—a world which just on the principal points of the moral life exhibits a painful contrast between the ideal and the reality? Does it not show us ideal men, who succumb to the complications of the life of free-will? Does it not show us the overthrow of the magnanimous, the beautiful, the noble, the good,—a contradiction which can only find its solution in the contrast which Christianity institutes between *this* world, the course of *this* world, *this* present world, and the world that is *to come*, which last contains the possibility of solution?

The tragic, as the painful contrast between ideal and reality, has in its lower forms a fatalistic impress; but in the highest forms the fatalistic is changed into the ethical, fate into guilt. The contrast between ideal and reality appears already in nature, and in the relation of nature to man. It oppresses our feelings as a painful contradiction that creation in all its beauty must submit to decay, that the animal world is subjected to such great sufferings, that the powers of nature so often encroach upon human life, that blooming manhood, just at the point where it should most gloriously unfold itself, is blighted by a gnawing worm; that an unfortunate accident—and the number of unhappy accidents is legion—suddenly annihilates the anticipations of a great future. This feeling still more oppresses us when we see the ideal life of free-will so often struggling, perishing under sickness and bodily suffering, in poverty and want; when we behold a poet, a Camoens, dying of hunger, and wrapped in an old shroud bestowed in alms, because he had not died possessed even of so much as would have purchased this. (We take this statement from Schach Staffeldt's noble poem on Camoens, where the poet's fate is at the same time denounced as the guilt of the community, the crime of Lisbon.) Yet not merely external fate oppresses us with the feeling above named, but also when we obtain a glimpse of the inner being of men, human individualities; when we see many noble and beautiful characters perish, not by external fate, but from an internal mental agony, which is deeply seated in their individuality, their will, their affection, since they are devoured by an inward contradiction, and cannot attain equilibrium as regards their surroundings, so that towards these they are like plants indigenous to a milder region, when transported to a bleak and ungenial climate. Is it not possible that Goethe meant to express this in his

Wilhelm Meister, when the specially poetic natures, those who love most deeply, as Marianne, Aurelie, Mignon the harpist, all quickly fade in death, whilst the more prosaic and practical individuals live, and pass successfully through all inward and outward changes? Has the poet consciously or unconsciously sought to make apparent that these poor, sensitive natures could not strike root in earth, and that in order not to succumb under the sufferings, passions, and errors incident to a poetic temperament, there must be a copious addition of the coarser earthly matter?—that for such minds, as Rahel, who held this theory, expresses it in one of his letters, there is no preparation (*Anstalt*) in this world? In whatever fashion, however, the poet may dispose of it, actual life shows us in many ways that there are such minds, for whom in this world there is no preparation (except that of redemption); whilst we cannot avoid the assertion that these mental sufferings are on account of sin, not merely personal sin, but also that of the race, the effects of which, like that of a benumbing prose, are death-bringing to those finer natures which are devoted to an ideal passion. The tragic, in the present course of the world, shows itself more clearly in its ethical significance, in the fact that those who stand high in the moral world, who, armed with mighty power of action, aspire to realize a great ideal, again and again perish through their own crime. It is this form of the tragic which dramatic poetry specially makes its subject (historic tragedy); and the history of the world shows us constantly the same phenomenon, shows us the destruction of heroes, because these either pursue a merely subjective ideal, or because they wish to carry a real ideal beyond its limits. It is essential to the representations of dramatic art, and enforced by Aristotle and Hegel, that the tragic hero must have a crime, and that in a tragedy no perfectly good and upright being should be represented as suffering entirely without blame, because this would be too distressing, too wounding to the moral feelings. We will not contest the merely æsthetic validity of this theory. But actual life does not restrain itself within these limits. It shows us in this world the good in itself, the absolutely just, perishing; shows us that there is a suffering on account of sin, which is not a suffering for personal guilt, but exclusively a suffering for the guilt of others, for the sin of the nation, for that of the race; shows us the rejection and crucifixion of Christ by men; shows us under different forms the verification of the Saviour's words: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not!" Under the cross of Christ, on the height of Golgotha, the real nature of the world displays itself. Here the Optimism of the natural man fades, though it is just here that a higher Optimism originates. But the utmost which here appears is this: So stands it in this world; this is the earthly fate of sacred truth and uprightness![1]

But the same world which shows us the tragic shows us also the comic. The comic is an *indirect* testimony to the validity of the pessimist theory. The comic contemplation of the world views it not as a world of sin, of guilt, of destiny, but as one of folly and fortuitous occurrences. Here is no painful contrast, but one entirely painless, which calls forth in the mind a feeling of pleasure of quite a peculiar kind. But in its inmost essence the world of folly is the world of sinfulness; only where there is sin, where freedom has declined from its ideal, can there be folly. Folly, or the intellectual contrast, the intellectual opposition to the ideal, has its presupposition and origin in the ethical contrast, in the contrast of the will to the ideal. We do not attempt here any exhaustive definition of the comic, a conception which belongs to the least clearly elucidated, but about which it may safely be asserted that no one will be able to explain it, any more than the tragic, without a thorough acquaintance with sin; and that lacking this, all that can be attained is mere preparatory and preliminary definition, which is the case with regard to Aristotle.[2] In so far as the comic presents itself in human affairs, perhaps no truer explanation of it can be given than that of Vinet in his *Studies of Pascal*,—namely, that the comic is the *naïveté* of sin: "Le comique est la naïveté du péché."[1] This definition seizes the comic in its *origin*, and it describes at the same time the *limits* within which the comic apprehension is valid. No one will designate a merely theoretic contradiction to the ideal as comic; for instance, failure in the solution of a mathematical or philosophical problem. Comic folly must be practical, or have its source in the will. On the other side, no one will call the depraved will comic when it is considered in its essence, when sin is considered as sin, and thus in its terrible seriousness. Only as long as sin is veiled in the evanescence of *naïveté* can it become the subject for comic apprehension. Its inmost essence, contradiction to the ethical, the religious, is still concealed or kept back under the æsthetic phenomenon of *naïveté*, and therefore the ethical perception of it may also be concealed or withheld. In whatever forms sin may then present itself, although it be sufficiently reflected, yet in so far as it appears with an addition of simplicity or *naïveté*, in which it unconsciously unfolds and betrays its practical *folly*, this addition will be capable of furnishing material for comic apprehension. It is this which Vinet has so well pointed out in Pascal, who in his *Lettres Provinciales*, in a sketch bordering on the dramatic, introduces the Jesuits expounding their own system of morality; but makes them comic, since he shows their craft and cunning, their hypocrisy and falsehood, combined with a *naïveté*, in which they betray themselves. The comic character is thus always encumbered with a certain directness, whilst the comic perception of a matter is the eye to this directness and its illusions. Enjoyment of the comic may therefore be designated an *intellectual* enjoyment, an enjoyment of a philosophic kind. As now, in the comic contemplation of the world, the ethical consideration is withheld, and as it were suspended, as the comic contrast to the ideal is without suffering,—a contrast which dissolves itself in laughter,—it may certainly be affirmed that the comic view of the world may, above all, be designated *optimist*. Tragedy brings Pessimism into view; comedy, on the other hand, exhibits Optimism: for in all dilemmas, difficulties, and dangers, it is apparent that these are only imaginary and to be overcome, that the perils of this life "have no necessity," and that all will come right in the end. But comic Optimism is only apparent—is only, in the strict significance of the term, a mere phenomenal *superficial* Optimism, under which the real character of existence is concealed; while, on the contrary, this is unveiled by the Pessimism of tragedy. Comic Optimism has moral earnestness, and thereby Pessimism, in the veiled background, as folly has sin in the background, as fortune and the easy play of chance have stern fate in the background; and it is a shrewd observation, that the comic writer acts wisely in letting the curtain fall at the exact instant when the game is at its height: for if he should carry on his narrative, and show us how it fared with these fortunate beings at a later period of their history, he would infallibly arrive at a time of misery, in which there opens a wide field for Pessimism.

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[1] Concerning the tragic in existence, compare Daumer, *My Conversion*; and from the standpoint of Nihilism, the whole of Schopenhauer.

[2] For those who wish to search into the nature of the comic, this problem may be specially enunciated: Why do we never find in our Gospel narratives that the Saviour of the world laughed, whilst we more than once find that He wept?

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[1] *Etudes sur Pascal*, p. 252.

The more the comic developes itself in its higher forms, the more does seriousness shine through it. If, with J. C. Heiberg, we hold sprightliness, irony, and humour as the three principal forms of the comic, we may then say that comic Optimism appears most unmixed in gaiety, as the directly comic. So, too, with Holberg.[1] The world of narrow-minded citizens which he represents in his comedies is most thoroughly a world of *naïveté*, and the great directness with which all these personages are encumbered prevent moral earnestness from exercising a disturbing effect. In irony the serious becomes more prominent. It also brings the *naïveté* of sin into view. But whilst gaiety and wit aimlessly let their light sparkle and glitter, irony has a determinate tendency. In irony there is therefore reflexion, and it has its special element in a world of reflexions, where the relations of life are complicated and intermixed. Just because irony has an object, and through the destruction of the manifold illusions desires to quicken the moral sense, will seriousness and the pessimist background often shine through. We named above Pascal in his irony concerning Jesuitism; we may also here mention Molière.[2] In common with Holberg, Molière possesses comic gaiety; but just because he possesses far finer and deeper powers of reflection, his pieces contain an irony far deeper than that of Holberg,—an irony which often causes one at the most ludicrous passages to be seized with a shuddering earnestness, as is also the case with Hogarth's paintings; so that one at once laughs and shudders in regarding these depths of social depravity; so that behind the comic mask one suddenly discovers an entirely different face, the poet's own, which contemplates this world of folly with pain and indignation, because it perceives it as a world of vice and misery. In humour we have a combination of sportive gaiety and mocking irony. As gaiety does not confine itself to individual matters, but lets its light play over the whole, so too with humour. But this last includes the whole reflexion of irony. In humour, the mind does not soar merely above this or that individual matter, but above the whole world of relativities, above the contrast between the great and the small, the high and the trivial, nay, even over tragic pathos, in so far as human earnestness, even when it embraces the great and the high, is encumbered with a limitation of *naïveté*, a narrowness of perception which causes it to confound the humanly great with the absolutely great,—a limitation by which the heroes of tragedy often show themselves to be encumbered. Thus they maintain the relatively great aim which they pursue, and for which they suffer shipwreck, to be the unconditionally great and important. Humour makes the diversity between great and small fluctuating; for it possesses a sharp eye for the fact that great and small, the high and the trivial, the deep and the superficial, the touching and the ridiculous, approach each other nearly, and often pass over into each other: wherefore it is also the union of weeping and laughter, of smiles and tears. Undoubtedly this humoristic contemplation, which soars above this whole world of relativities, must have its ultimate hold, its last refuge, in something which is not relative, in the absolutely great,—namely, in God. And there is therefore a twofold kind of humour. There is a humour which rests in religion, in faith, and which in religious reconciliation has overcome Pessimism. In a partial manner this humour often sparkles forth in Luther's letters, and in his *Tischreden* (Table-talk). But there is also a humour in which consciousness in this world of tragedy and comedy has not found its refuge in religion, but seeks a final refuge without finding one,—an unhappy, shattered consciousness, which vainly craves repose and satisfaction in this world of contrasts, and which now, by making everything fluctuating, seeks deliverance from the pressure which rests on the mind. An example of this melancholy humour is that of Hamlet, who endeavours to escape from the heavy burden of his soul by indulging in a philosophic humour,—a philosophy which, in spite of its brilliant and deep thought, is without result, and ends in unsubdued dissonance.

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[1] Danish dramatic writer, 1684–1754, whose comedies Oehlenschlager's masterly hand has introduced into German literature.

[2] 1622–1673.

Thus both the tragic and the comic—the former directly, the latter indirectly—bear testimony to the sin and misery of the world, a world needing redemption. Though it has not seldom been asserted that writers or actors of comedy pay homage to an optimist view of the world, yet experience most frequently shows the very opposite. Thus Holberg in his *Moralske Tanker*,—a meditation on the miseries of life, and on his own course of existence, which is entirely the reverse of Optimism (lib. iii. epig. 46, p. 369, Rode's ed.). He begins by saying that "the life of man is short in regard to years, but long in reference to the many miseries to which it is subjected. A child comes into the world weeping aloud, by which it would seem to anticipate the many sorrows of its inevitable fate. Among all creatures, indeed, nothing can be conceived more wretched than a new-born child, whose birth-day, without the help of others, would become the day of its death. For if other people did not stretch forth the hand, and with skill and effort seek to preserve its feeble throb of existence, it could not be regarded other than as a masque in an opera or play, that only presented itself on the stage to sing a lament, and thereafter disappeared. With all the care which is bestowed on the preservation of a child's life, it is threatened every day and every hour with death, so that the body in regard to its external delicacy is nothing but a water-bubble, which bursts and disappears on the smallest shock. Day and night it must be watched, and, like a fragile glass, be swathed in soft covering; and with difficulty can the nurse, by singing to it, keep it in good humour. Such is the condition at birth and during the tender years of infancy, and so the first act of the tragedy opens." He then goes through what he calls the other acts of the tragedy, until old age, or the last act, where all the ills of life gather together as in a haven of refuge, and the sum of the matter is this, that it has been all labour and trouble: "that the life of man is nothing else but pain, though the pain differs in its kind; that all the roads are uneven, narrow, and rough, but they all lead to the same goal, which is death. Lastly, as life begins with weeping, so it also ends with weeping." After which he concludes by saying: "If any one thinks this description too strong and too tragic, I account him fortunate in that he has accomplished his life with less labour, and got through the world with a whole skin. I for my part do not think that it is surcharged, for the good days I have had in the world are easily counted. The greater portion of my life has been spent in anxiety, sickness, and the want of all those things which the world calls good." Here we find our great comic writer speaking in accents which remind us of the book of Ecclesiastes. He can only console himself by a glance at the life to come: "For if there were no other world after this present one, one must conclude that God had formed man in His wrath, and made him the most wretched among creatures. For though dumb beasts are also subject to misery and death, they are yet free from anxieties of mind; and just that reason which man has received as his portion distinguishes him in misery from the lower creation, which are not troubled by any evils except those present, whereas their master has the past, the present, and the future evils at once before his view."

§ 58.

It appears from all that has been remarked in the foregoing pages concerning the condition of the world, from the ancient complaint on its vanity, from the tragic and the comic as its essential qualities, that the Optimism of the natural life of man cannot be carried through to the end, because that its Pessimism always bursts forth. But, on the other side, neither can the Pessimism of the natural life of man be carried through, just because the character of the world is a mixture of good and evil, and not exclusively the one or the other. Pessimism carried out to the end would be absolute despair. But while this may indeed affect certain individuals and particular periods, it is not true of mankind as a whole. Not merely do the creating and sustaining powers continue to react against those of destruction; not merely do life and the impulse to life and its enjoyments, merely for life's sake and without any wherefore, as with Goethe's shoemaker in Dresden,[1] attest constantly afresh its reality: there is, moreover, in the heart of man an ineffaceable feeling of certainty that suffering and death cannot be the ultimate object of life,—an imperturbable hope, which after each mortification arises anew, that in spite of all obstacles and restrictions, a highest Good *must* yet at last be possible as the portion of humanity, and that there must be possibility for a happy result as regards the whole. We may here refer to the myth of Pandora, from whose box all misfortunes and torments flew forth over the race of man, whilst *Hope*, which had been added as the gift of mercy, was preserved. Now, Christian Pessimism and Optimism are both merely relative ideas, which will not stand the test of practice and experience, for which reason also most men alternately follow both views entirely according to circumstances; which may also be expressed thus, that most men live in an unsolved contradiction, which is exactly the fundamental character of this world. Pessimists are to be found who live according to optimist maxims, who, whilst lamenting over this world as a vale of tears, contrive not the less in daily life to make themselves as comfortable as possible, which is notably the case with Schopenhauer, who has written a so-called lower eudaimonistic system of morality and prudence, to which he adheres in practice, in direct opposition to his ascetic "doctrine of unhappiness" (*Unglückseligkeitslehre*) which he developed in theory. Optimists are to be found who live in a pessimist frame of mind; for whilst, as regards the human race as a whole, they maintain that all is well, that everything in this world goes on exactly as it ought, yet in their own concerns, and in their daily circumstances and relations, they are vexed and irritated, complain incessantly over much which is wrong, and which must and ought to be entirely otherwise. Systems of philosophy endeavour to escape this contradiction, but life constantly exhibits it afresh under forms innumerable.

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[1] The Dresden shoemaker with whom Goethe amused himself in his student days.—MICHELSEN.

Doubtless, also, in the Christian life many inconsistencies appear; yet it is Christianity alone which makes it possible for man to attain, in the deepest sense, unity in his view of life and in his frame of mind—to combine without self-contradiction Optimism and Pessimism. As Christianity, by awakening consciousness of sin and of guilt, awakens the true fundamental pain of existence in regard to which all other sorrows and calamities are subordinate, so it awakens also the true exaltation over all misery which hallows every pure and innocent joy. In showing us existence in the light of redemption, it shows us the new creation as the completion of the first, gathering up the fragments of this world into a whole whenever the eye is fixed on that structure which is to be erected in the fulness of time, so that all things may be assembled under Christ as their head. And although Christian consciousness only sees the perfecting of the world and of individuals in *hope*,—and there will thus always be in the Christian mind a tinge of pain at the contrast between the ideal and the reality, a craving for the overthrow of the fragmentary and the substitution of the complete,—yet there is agreement in the inmost being, in faith and in love, which work for the coming of God's kingdom. Aristotle has said that great and noble minds have a disposition to melancholy; and the truth of this saying is confirmed by history, both in the pre-Christian and the Christian world, because such minds have a perception of the great dissonance, of which the multitude are unconscious. It may be added that it is not by any means to great minds alone that this is applicable, but to every real Christian. But this pain is constantly changed into joy, as it is thus expressed in an old Danish song:

"Aldrig er jeg uden Vaade,
Aldrig dog foruden Naade."[1]

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE KINGDOM OF HUMANITY. REDEMPTION AND EMANCIPATION.

§ 59.

A view of life and of the world does not receive its significance solely from the result it promises to man, nor from the optimist and pessimist prospects it exhibits to us in the present and the future world, but not less in the fundamental contrast which it presents to man for him practically to overcome, in order that the result may be attained, and the highest Good be realized through a progressive development of free-will. As this fundamental contrast, we may from the standpoint of Christianity undoubtedly designate the contrast between good and evil, between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of sin. Yet we cannot stop here, for the kingdom of God wages an unconditional war of annihilation against the kingdom of sin, whilst life rests upon normal contrasts, which may and ought to be brought into unity. As the normal contrast which also has its validity independently of sin, we cite God's kingdom and the world, in so far as the world, in the conception formed of it, has a relative independence of God the Lord, or more precisely, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of *humanity*, because the relative independence and dignity of the world as regards God first attains full expression in man. The relation of contrast and the relation of unity the progressive mutual relation between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of humanity, may be described as the history within history, the inmost kernel both of the history of the world and of the unmarked every-day history of the individual.

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[1] "Never am I without grief,
Never still without relief."
The commencement of a beautiful series of hymns by old Kingo, whose "Psalmebog," or collection of religious songs, was published in 1699.

Through the contrast between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of humanity, the ethical problem within the Christian world has become entirely different from what it was in the world prior to Christianity, and it is Christianity itself which developes both sides of the contrast. On its entrance into history, Christianity not merely discovers an independent kingdom of humanity, but awakens and calls it forth as certainly as it awakens the principle of personality. For although other conditions may be named for the awakening of this principle, yet Christianity is here unquestionably the essentially operative condition. But Christianity, in awakening the principle of personality, gives also an impulse to the development of all the consequences of personality which are not merely of a religious but also of a worldly nature, embracing man's entire position in the world, and all his relations in which free personality is the centre-point. Just because Christianity awakened the universal consciousness of God, it must, at the same time, awaken the universal consciousness of the world, and self-consciousness must burst the barriers within which consciousness of the world and self-consciousness were confined. By its teaching of the creation of man in the image of God, and of man's dignity and his appointment to be the sovereign of earth, Christianity has awakened at once the consciousness of the human race and the consciousness of the free individual. For in the ancient world the conception of the human *race*, so far as it was present, exerted no determinate influence. Human freedom was bound in national contrasts, the contrasts between Jews and Samaritans, Greeks and barbarians, bond and free, compatriots and friends whom one ought to love, and strangers and enemies whom it was befitting to abhor. The higher conception of a kingdom or realm of humanity in which these contrasts were reconciled was not known. Neither in the ancient world was there representation of the free individual; for the individual is only a member of the body politic, or body of the nation, but not free in himself, not independent of the people and the State. If we would understand history, we must pay attention to the fact that Christianity, on its first appearance, plants two commencements, two developments. It plants the germ of God's kingdom, sows the seed of the operations of grace and the gifts of grace, institutes the Church and the congregation. It speaks with divine authority, completes the law, and establishes the divine economy in human society, offering to men God's saving and sanctifying grace. But it desires to exercise a saving and educating influence on beings who are called to a universal liberty, and who, in a relative sense, have the centre-point of their life in themselves. Therefore at the same time it plants the germ, sows the seed of an independent kingdom of humanity with the whole affluence of man's natural endowments and natural powers, which develope themselves in his worldly relation in culture and civilisation. Whilst the gospel redeems man to the life of personality in God, it fits him, at the same time, for the life of personality in the world. It is this moment of the operations of Christianity, in which all within the bounds of Christendom partake, whether believers or unbelievers, whether for Christ or opposed to Him. In order to distinguish it from redemption, we designate this moment, which has so great a significance in the divine plan of education, as *Emancipation*, that is to say, deliverance from the natural and national bonds of the ancient times. Emancipation is only deliverance from cramping barriers, from powers of nature and powers of the world, from false traditions and false authorities, through which personal liberty is oppressed, but which are predominantly external to man. It is release to the rights of man, to sovereignty over earth, to the full and unrestricted use of the faculties with which he is equipped,—among others, the faculty of determining himself in relation to that which is unseen and imperceptible by the senses; nay, to determine for himself even for or against the gospel: freedom for what in our days is usually called "the purely human." Redemption, on the other hand, is not from barriers and particular powers, but from the principle hostile to liberty and to man, which not merely mutually separates men from each other, but also separates them *from God*, and which is not merely external to man, but within him — even sin in the heart of man. Redemption makes free to inward communion with God, freedom founded on grace. When Christ says, "If the Son make you not free, then are ye not free" (John viii. 38), it must certainly not be overlooked that emancipation, in the good significance given here, is the work of Christ; for in that redemption enters history, and stands forth to liberate man's consciousness of God, it bursts at the same time the bonds and fetters by which consciousness of the world is enchained. But those who are emancipated by Christ, though not at the same time redeemed, are not made free by the Son as the *Son*, since they are not related to Him as the Being through whom they come unto the Father (John xiv. 6). Those who are merely emancipated by Christianity are doubtless elevated to a higher grade of humanity, to human dignity and human privilege; but they are still in their sins, even though in their life there may be a reflection of redemption, for as yet they have only the *possibility* of redemption. The same holds good in regard to society. Enlightened government, marriage and household decency, refinement and science, every commendable form of life, participate as the times advance in the emancipation, in so far as the principle of personality, together with the rights of man contained in this, come into development. But in redemption he only becomes a partaker, who, according to the direction of Christianity, places himself under the will and government of God, and allows himself to be penetrated by their sanctifying influences. And therefore Christianity emancipates man to freedom, makes him sovereign over a relatively independent kingdom of the world, in order that he may in truth be fit to serve. If, in our days, there are many who think that progressive emancipation is the special object of history, and that it is the essential importance of Christianity to have given a world-wide impulse to the free development of humanity, and to have introduced great social reforms, there is here egregious error. For all this is not the object, is not the matter itself, but a means, a condition in order that the matter itself may obtain fit success. Emancipation is not for its own sake, but is a condition necessary in order that men may attain the just relation of subordination, and along with this the just relation of unity with the kingdom of God. For the just relation of service, and the just, the noble relation of love, can only be exhibited by him who himself is a *master*, by him who possesses a dignity of his own, which he may either devote in offering to God, to receive it back from Him ennobled and illumined, or in which he may egoistically settle himself as one who will not *serve*. By the revelation of Christ, therefore, man becomes anew installed in the privilege of the first Adam to make the earth subject to himself, and to be the lord of creation, in order that thus he may be anew installed in the relation of service to God, anew to be enabled to take the earthly kingdom as God's vassal. The sovereignty of earth, which was lost by the Fall, is now, in so far as this is possible under the conditions of sin, restored to man, in order that he may again be proved by the test of the first Adam.

§ 60.

The contrast here described was unknown to the human race before Christ's advent. In Israel the kingdom of God appears in the national limitation and liberty, is bound under the discipline of the law (Gal. iv. 1, 2.) It is, as the apostle says, the state of childhood, in which "the heir differeth nothing from a servant, but is under tutors and governors." Human freedom has certainly this independence towards God, that it may obey or disobey His command; but human freedom under the theocratic constitution of Israel did not possess its own kingdom in contrast to the kingdom of God. If we turn to paganism, we certainly find with the Greeks a beautiful form of the kingdom of humanity. But the kingdom of God was lacking, and this beautiful kingdom of humanity is fettered in the national limitation. Not until Christianity appeared was there exhibited a universal kingdom of God destined to embrace all kindreds of the earth, and a universal kingdom of humanity, destined to subject even earth itself. History subsequent to Christ's advent shows us not merely the combination of these kingdoms, but also their conflict, since the soul of man repeats the circumstances of the Fall, and like a new Prometheus, desires to found a kingdom of his own, desires to establish himself in his own self-dignity in opposition to the kingdom of God, desires to emancipate himself not merely from the restraining powers of nature and of the world, but even from the relation of dependence on God and His revelation.

§ 61.

But although the contrast described above was essentially planted on the advent of Christ; although liberated humanity and the emancipation produced, already bore witness to itself during the first ages of the Church, in the expression of man's brotherhood and the equality of all before God, as descending from one blood, in the cosmopolitan in opposition to the mere national, in the elevation of woman's personal dignity, and her release from unworthy thraldom, in the first germs of the idea of slave emancipation, in the demand of religious liberty and the protest against constraint of conscience (it is the right of man, says Tertullian, and comes to every one by nature, to determine what manner of divine worship of God he considers the best[1]); yet time was required before it could attain to develope itself in its consequences as an all-embracing power of society. It holds good with everything that is destined to grow in time, that the beginning should appear most clearly at the end, that the nature and quality of the seed should first be rightly perceived when the plant is in flower. And thus it is true in the fullest measure of Christianity, that what it is in its principle and beginning, is developed more and more clearly through the course of time, and becomes most evident towards the close of time. By reason of the world's pagan and depraved condition, the relation of the first Church towards it was predominantly negative, ascetic, denying. Man did not, so to speak, venture as yet to take the world into possession, which by Christianity had been essentially given over to him. In the middle ages the gospel appeared even as a law which held the people under its discipline, and the times of the Old Testament repeated themselves. The kingdom of God, in an outward form resembling the theocracy of Israel, appeared as the visible Church, which all-prevailing stretches out its educating authority over the barbarians. The middle ages seem rather to show us the picture of a kingdom of great authority than one of liberty. But liberty terminates under the discipline of the Church; and these influences of emancipation show themselves throughout the whole period of the middle ages in this principle of personality, which also in the worldly relation appears in a variety of forms, in chivalry with bravery, fidelity, and honour, in earthly love, in the romantic ideal of happiness which is eagerly sought in the undetermined distance, behind the blue mountains and the golden clouds, and which, although very different from the ideal of bliss itself, yet shows that the ancient barriers are fallen, that human personality has discovered itself in its freedom and its self-appreciation, and advances in a world which has infinitude for its horizon. Through the Reformation and the circle of its accompanying circumstances, a revolution was brought about. As the kingdom of grace and of the gospel again appears in its purity, so too the kingdom of humanity and of liberty appears in its independence. The Church, which had assumed sovereignty over the worldly side of life, was brought back to its right destination, to the stewardship of the means of grace, to preach the word and dispense the sacraments. The State, with culture and civilisation, now appears in its independence of the Church, developing itself according to its own laws. The mind of man takes itself and its world into possession and knows itself as the world's master. The old world, Greece and Rome, is anew taken into possession. The new world, America, is discovered. The art of printing is invented. Copernicus announces an entirely new theory of the structure of the universe. This development of humanity, by which man both theoretically and practically makes himself master of the world, continues through manifold crises and struggles until our days, when it is repeated in the demands of Revolution regarding the rights of man, in recent literature, in the immense progress of natural science and sovereignty over nature, which appears more and more as the fulfilment of the command—Subdue the earth. Railways, steam vessels, and the electric telegraph, annihilate the distance of space, and contribute to bring men nearer to each other, so that the same intellectual kingdom may be spread over the whole world. Humanity and freedom are the watchwords of the age; and *rightly understood*, these demands are sanctioned by Christianity itself. The development of human liberty and culture is founded on man's destiny, and on the divine scheme for his education; only this is not the ultimate object, but the condition and means for a higher. And in face of emancipation, with its immense development of man's natural powers, the gospel continues to testify: Except the Son shall make you free, ye cannot be freed (John viii. 36). In face of this colossal accumulation of intellectual wealth, amassed from generation to generation, the gospel continues to testify: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." For it is the true essence of humanity to thirst after God, to be poor in the midst of its earthly riches, ignorant in the midst of its worldly knowledge. It is the essence of humanity to be an incomplete, fragmentary existence, which can only become complete by being gathered together under Christ.

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[1] Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putaverit, colere.—TERTULL. *ad Scapulam*, I.

And here we assert the deepest contrast in history. For whilst men are more and more emancipated to liberty and independence, more and more establish and extend their own kingdom, and whilst the gospel constantly accompanies them with the same demand with which it entered history, there are laid before men two great alternatives, either—or: either in ministering adoration to allow the kingdom of humanity to be glorified in God's kingdom, or in arrogance to endeavour to found the kingdom of humanity without God's kingdom. These two kingdoms do not rest calmly alongside each other; but the contrast mounts to opposition and conflict. In so far as the kingdom of humanity is directly and consciously placed in hostile relation to the kingdom of God, in hatred opposing Christ and His gospel, we are led back to the opposition between God's kingdom and that of the devil and his angels. No attentive observer will deny that in history there occur phenomena which point to demoniac powers and demoniac inspirations. In recent times examples may be drawn from the French Revolution, where in the name of humanity the gospel was trodden under foot, and Reason was worshipped in the form of a prostitute. Examples may also be found in the currents of thought and inspirations which in the year 1848 prevailed in after-dinner speeches and toasts, where men invoked the free spirit, which still belonged only to the future, but which should make free (emancipate) itself from all powers, both from the actual on earth, and from the imaginary which mocked in heaven.

§ 62.

Divine mercy and human free-will, God's kingdom and the kingdom of the devil,—these are the contrasts which make up the content of history. And if we turn to the great question of this historic *progress*, we must then declare that it is these contrasts which progress in history to the end of time. That which advances in history is the kingdom of God in its relation to the kingdom of humanity; it is the kingdom of humanity in its double relation to the kingdom of God. The prayer, "Thy kingdom come," therefore contains the true idea of historic progress; for in this prayer we also petition that the true kingdom of humanity may come in its unity with God's kingdom. But by the side of the labour to accomplish the object of this petition is found permeating humanity an opposing force, an opposing will, labouring for the establishment of an entirely different kingdom, the kingdom of humanity, as the false kingdom of the universe. Every philosophy of history which does not fix its glance on this opposition is but one-eyed, is only a mere humanist apprehension. When Hegel thus in his *Philosophy of History* says, "The history of the world is progress in the consciousness of liberty"—die Weltgeschichte ist der Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit—and goes on to explain this assertion thus, that the Orientals knew that *one man* was free, namely the despot, that the Greeks knew that *some men* were free, namely the Greeks, whilst the rest were slaves and barbarians, but that we know that *all* are free, that man as man is free, and that it is the aim of history to develope this universal consciousness of freedom which in principle is given along with Christianity, and to cause it to permeate every circle of society; this is certainly both true and striking, but quite insufficient for a just comprehension of history. For he has here only described one side of the contrast,—namely, the development of mere humanity: he has only described emancipation. But emancipation with culture and civilisation, which last in our day is set forth as the proper aim of history, and with which it is hoped that the golden age shall dawn at last, is not the perfection of progress. The perfection of progress is the progressive mutual relation between the kingdom of God and humanity emancipated to liberty, to culture and civilisation. And the all-embracing aim of history which should be ever present to our efforts, is the unity of the kingdom of humanity and the kingdom of God,—a unity including the completion of the work of redemption and the work of emancipation, since by emancipation we only refer to that true emancipation from the powers of nature and the unjust powers of the world which is sanctioned by Christianity itself.

If we consider historic progress more closely, we find that from ancient times there has been a twofold mode of viewing it: one optimist, which asserts that the times are growing better; the other pessimist, affirming that they grow worse. Christianity is the truth of both. The times grow better, not in the signification that the succeeding generation will be more virtuous than that which preceded it, for in every generation virtue must originate as personal virtue in individuals; neither can it be affirmed in the signification that the succeeding generation will be happier than its predecessors, for happiness is insecure and unreliable; but they grow better, in so far as the good, even under partial relapses, always comes to more abundant development and *consciousness*, and by the progressive development of culture, refinement, and experience, which is a certain and indubitable progress, obtains a larger variety of means and possibilities for its manifestation. The times grow worse, inasmuch as evil also, under partial defeats and overthrows, yet attains greater development, and assumes more and more an intellectual character, acquiring by culture and refinement new weapons. Historic progress, contemplated as a whole, may be defined as progressive assimilation of the content of existence, both of nature and the intellectual world, progressive production and progressive criticism, although there are periods in history which pre-eminently pursue one or other of these individual directions. But as assimilation, production, and criticism, by the opposite directions of the will, are divided into the service of opposite spirits (in the last instance the good and the evil, Christ and Antichrist), by which the one will have assimilated what the other will have excreted and discarded, and *vice versa*, both the true and the false kingdom of humanity advance through time under an increasing intensifying of their principles, which more and more seek to organize themselves; and more and more the strife of univeral history becomes a great war of principle. As the idea of time, or temporary duration, is inseparable from the idea of the immature, the incomplete, the still imperfectly manifested and awakened consciousness, the absolute separation of the kingdoms only occurs at the conclusion of history. During the development *intermixture* prevails. History must therefore be considered from the standpoint of the parable of the tares in the wheat, which both grew together until the harvest, and the close of history is the day of judgment, or the catastrophe, through which the true kingdom of humanity, combined with the kingdom of God, humanity not merely emancipated but redeemed, is set free from the condition of admixture; and the false kingdom of humanity, which by a progress in the unreal emancipation has become more and more amalgamated with the kingdom of the devil, is thrust out from connection with the good, and is given over to its own egoistic isolation. The end of all things on earth is not therefore eternal peace, as philosophy has dreamed, but the fiercest war between the two camps into which the human race will then be divided. The golden age, which is promised before the last times, can only be conceived as relatively the nearest perfection, as relatively the happiest period which under earthly conditions is possible. But its imperfection is shown in this, that it is evanescent, and bears in its train the last strife of earth.

The prayer, Thy kingdom come! may therefore first be accomplished by a series of historical crises, which all attain their completion in the last decisive crisis. And here a parallel is exhibited between the coming of God's kingdom in regard to the race and in regard to the individual man. The more a man understands himself and his own life, the more will he come to the perception that, if the kingdom of God is to make progress within him, if true humanity is to be developed in him, it must be on the condition of a continued separation of the good and the evil principle, the influences of which on his inner being are mingled,—a continued process of purification, in which the sinful essence is separated and eliminated. He will understand the period of his own life as a season of grace which has been given to him, not merely for labour and progress, but also for cleansing and purification. He will perceive that the longer the years run on, the more pressing and urgent becomes this inward crisis, and the more it assumes a spiritual character. Only he who has this view in regard to his own life will be able also to understand that of the race; and in the many outworks and secondary questions of history, and their complicated motion, will not permit himself to be hindered from perceiving the real point at issue. He will be convinced that what chiefly concerns him is not to become partaker in emancipation (as this is not the real matter),but in redemption.

GOD'S KINGDOM IN REGARD TO INDIVIDUALS. SOCIALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM.

§ 63.

Whilst emancipation (both in a good and bad sense) progresses, and redemption diffuses itself, and thus personality comes into fuller development, an increasing contrast appears between the individual and the community, since the individual demands to be acknowledged according to its absolute worth, and the community on its side requires the same. This contrast between the community and the individual, between socialism and individualism,—this contrast, which is conditional to Christianity itself, is by Christianity brought back again to its unity. By socialism we understand that view and tendency which places society in the position of the highest and ultimate aim of ethical development; by individualism the same thing, but ascribed to the individual. Christianity is the unity of both aims. It is the absolutely socializing power, since it seeks to transform all the individual differences of humanity into one great society of love. But, at the same time, Christianity is the absolutely individualizing power, since it will not efface individual differences,—which would be the same as to abrogate society,—but developes and transfigures them in the unity of love. It desires the totality, "the kingdom," as the ultimate aim of development, and the individual as the ministering means, tool, instrument for the whole; but just because it desires a kingdom of *personality*, desires a total organization of sanctified *individuals*, the individual is accounted as the absolute aim in itself, and the whole as ministering to the individual. It is this idea which the apostle expresses in the figure of the body with many members, which are so incorporated that when one member suffers, all suffer, and when one member is held in honour, all the members rejoice in sympathy. The individual is there for the sake of the whole; but, on the other side, it must be admitted that the whole is there for the sake of the individual. This social aim during earthly existence, in which the tares are mingled with the wheat, in which all organization must incessantly combat with the disorganizing powers, can only be realized under great relativity; it can only be perfectly accomplished in the fulness of God's kingdom. But an earthly copy of the ideal of God's kingdom may be approximately attained during this temporal development, and should be striven after in all human relations of society, and specially in those fundamental forms which have been appointed by God for earthly development, in the Church, the State, the Family, in harmony with the nature of every sphere of society. With the advancing development of the community, the individual must arrive at a fuller life of liberty, and obtain a larger domain for its self-government. But in the same measure must the community be developed to a higher, more complicated organization and division or articulation. The deeper the principle of personality takes root, the more will the community become dependent on the individual, the more and more will it be constrained to take account of the individual; but, at the same time, the individual, the freer and more independent it becomes, becomes more and more dependent on the whole. It is to this relation of reciprocity between society and individuals that both nations and persons should be educated, and should educate themselves, through historic guidance. But this can only really be attained in the same degree as both the community and the individual subject themselves to that power which is the absolutely socializing and the absolutely individualizing, namely the gospel.

§ 64.

The one-sided socialism is found everywhere, in which society in that sense is made the ultimate aim, so that the individual becomes only the means and instrument for society, without at the same time being an object in itself. It appears in the States of ancient times, and we may describe Plato's *Republic* as socialistic in this sense of the term. It is thus genuinely socialistic, when he desires that children should be taken from their parents and brought up in a State institution, in order that they may not be spoiled by parental indulgence; or when he proposes that the choice of a partner in marriage should not be free, but determined by the representatives of the State, so that only those men and women should marry each other from whom may be expected the procreation of the healthiest and most virtuous children for the State. But not only in the pagan world does socialism appear, but also in Christianity. Catholicism is socialistic; for though in theory it acknowledges the eternal dignity of the individual, and its destiny to eternal bliss, yet the community takes on itself, through the hierarchy, to care for the blessedness of individuals, and holds the individual in a constant state of pupilage and subjection, under a yoke of human precepts and decrees. The Inquisition, the stake, and censure are moments in this socialism, the first aim of which is the maintenance of the existing society *à tout prix*. The confessional state, which binds all citizens to the same profession, and does not tolerate any deviation of doctrine, is socialistic, as it asserts the claim of itself and its decrees to be absolute, and denies the right of personal conviction. But also from the standpoint of liberalism and emancipation, in which liberty so often passes over into thraldom, socialism appears. Thus in the French Revolution, in the Reign of Terror, in which the mere suspicion of cherishing a political sentiment different from those of the men in power brought death, because "the common weal" was endangered by such suspected individuals. Thus also in that system which calls itself Socialism and Communism, and which, however fantastic and impracticable, is yet very worthy of attention as a *tendency*. It starts from the idea of the human *race* as the highest, to which the individuals are subordinate, and also from the idea of the perfect equality of men's rights, and thus the equality of those of individuals, as the temporary representatives of the *race*. On this basis Socialism desires to organize a great universal economy, a vast community, with organization of labour, with equality in property and enjoyment, equality in information and refinement, which, if it could be accomplished, must annihilate all individuality; and though it promises the individual happiness, would subject him to the most frightful tyranny, stretching him on the Procrustes-bed of the system.

If, however, we look away from the peculiar forms in which the principle appears, and if we inquire what metaphysic forms the basis of this theory, which degrades the individual into the subjected means for society, we arrive at Pantheism, which only regards the universal as the essential, and the individual as the temporary accident. Pantheism, in its application to human society and history, contemplates the individuals of the race only as disappearing drops in the ocean, whilst the ocean itself, in the unbroken motion of its waves, is the actually existing and real. In opposition to this, it is right to bring forward the principle of individuality; and they who have done so in the spirit of Christianity, and laid down a protest against the social Pantheism of our day, deserve all thanks and acknowledgment.

But there is also a one-sided individualism, an isolation of the individual, which only seeks to be its own aim, without at the same time being a *ministering member*. Where this individualism becomes practical and obtains diffusion, it may really have an influence hostile to society. The ideal of individualism achieved would be a world of personal atoms, which are mutually attracted and repulsed by each other, but even when they associate themselves, never can attain further unity than a mere contract of combination, which may be again dissolved at pleasure, because unity and totality, which are presupposed by parts (*totum est partibus prius*), and which form the mystery of life and organization, are perfectly alien to it.

§ 65.

Individualism may, like socialism, appear in different circles of life, and we may thus speak of a political, an ecclesiastical, and a religious individualism. This religious individualism has in our century unquestionably found its most important and its noblest expression in Alexander Vinet. In opposition to the social Pantheism which would annul everything individual and concrete, would dethrone personality and make the universal one and all, he with great eloquence exalts the individual as the actually existing, sets this forth as the object of the work of creation.[1] Individuality is the stamp which God has impressed on every human being, his own possession entrusted to him by his Maker, and which he should maintain and protect against the dangers which threaten him on the side of society. For though society (*la société*) in one respect is the condition for the development of the individual, and no one can escape from society, yet society has a natural tendency to efface and obliterate individuality. We are all originals at birth; for in every individual that comes into the world, even in the least gifted and most insignificant, we can perceive an intention of Providence to form a being which is different from all others, and which thus has never existed before. But although we are all born originals, yet most of us die as imitations; for society (*la société*) has a tendency to rub off peculiarities and produce similarity amongst individuals. The weaker members of the community are brought, by the force of example, by prejudice and convenience, by the entire legion of social influences, gradually to lose their individuality. They make themselves mere instruments for the whole, and offer, so to speak, their individuality as a contribution to the great general fund of society, where it disappears as in an abyss. And yet the individual, as Vinet again and again urges, is higher than society, because it is destined to relation with God, to a living and direct union with God, to which society is not destined, as it is only indirectly related to God. It is the privilege of the individual, even the lowliest and most insignificant, to exist for God, to have the capacity of eternal happiness or eternal perdition. Not society, but the individual, anticipates a future life, an immortality beyond the grave. And it is only the individual that believes, hopes, obeys, suffers, and loves. It is only the individual who in his conscience is bound and responsible, the individual that is the real object of God's attention and of His judgment, the individual who ought to be presented, and is daily presented, before the judgment-seat of the Eternal. It is not to humanity *in abstracto*, not to society, but to the individual, that the gospel addresses itself with its requirements and its promises. It is to the individual that God says in His word, "Come now, and let us reason together" (Isa. i. 13). Society (*la société*) is not a being (*un être*), but only an "arrangement" between personal beings. Or, seen from another point of view, society is an ocean on which the individual soul is cast forth in a little bark to seek the way through the rough billows to the shores of a new world, where it may land. Both the ocean and the bark are worthy of admiration. The bark, which each one of us is called to steer, and in which we are to reach the land in yon new world, is our own individuality. Another, not myself, guides the waves, and appoints their way over the great abyss; but the bark is *my own*, and the ocean is on account of the bark, not the bark on account of the ocean. For the principal concern, purpose, object, is that the bark should land; that the human individual, which alone stands in immediate relation to God, and is the special object of the work of creation, should fulfil its destiny. All depends, therefore, on the right steering of the bark; for as the sea, the fluid element, which is less fluid than air and less solid than earth, has the twofold capacity to bear up the bark or to engulf it, so also with regard to the fluid social element on which individuality is launched. One may founder in the ocean of society as well as on that of the material world, and it would be of little avail to examine on which of the two oceans the most frequent shipwrecks occur.

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[1] See, for instance, "Sur l'individualité et l'individualisme," "Du rôle de l'individualité dans une réforme sociale," two dissertations contained in his *Essais de philosophie morale et de morale religieuse.*

This exaltation of individuality expresses certainly a sacred and precious truth, but not the whole truth. No one will thus be able to deny the deep practical truth in the last figure employed, of the individual cast forth on the ocean in his little bark, which is to reach the shore at length. But if we are to speak in figures, we are acquainted with another emblem of the voyage of man's life. We are reminded of the gospel picture of Christ with His disciples on the Lake of Gennesareth, where the Lord stilled the tempest and the boisterous waves, and guided the disciples unharmed to the shore. In this we have an emblem of the Church, as a ship which sails across the stormy sea of society. In this picture the voyage is made in company with others, who are all united under the same Master. And we are reminded that we, if we hope to land at last, must be in the right ship, and with the right companions, and have the Master on board. This emblem is certainly not less just than the first, and expresses a side of the matter which in Vinet's theory of individuality does not appear. Certainly it too may be taken in a one-sided manner. For if any one should suppose that, because he was outwardly within the vessel of the Church, because he outwardly belonged to the community of the true Church, that therefore he must infallibly land on the shores of bliss, he has fallen into dreadful error. And as a fitting corrective the first emblem may be employed, that each one must embark in the vessel of his own individuality, and pay good heed that he be not swamped by the waves, or, as S. Kierkegaard[1] has expressed the idea, that every man must navigate the sea of this world in his own little kajak.

Without figure, with Vinet society does not receive justice; and for this very reason, neither does the individual attain its full measure of what is due to it. However strongly Vinet urges the claims to supremacy of individualism and of personality, still he lacks the idea of a kingdom of personality, the idea of a total organization of personalities. Society (*Samfund*), the ethical organism, is to him synonymous with the community (*Selskabet*). The French word *la société* has this double meaning, so that it can be employed in either sense, whilst a closer consideration must discover here diversity of conceptions. The community (*Selskabet*) designates only the external, accidental unity of human individuals; society (*Samfundet*), when it is contrasted with the community (*Selskabet*), the inner organic unity. In the community (*Selskabet*) individuals appear as independent, without at the same time being *members* of a greater moral whole; in society (*Samfund*) they are only independent in so far as they are at the same time organic members.

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[1] Sören Kierkegaard, a Danish theological writer of the present time.

The community (*Selskabet*) is a product of the individuals, to be moulded and brought forth by their mutual relation to each other; society (*Samfundet*) is not merely the product, but the *postulate* of individuals. As now Vinet only views the moral world from the standpoint of the community (*Selskabet*), it is quite explicable that he sometimes depicts *la société* as a mere "arrangement" among individuals, sometimes as an "ocean," under which figure he imagines the whole indeterminate infinitude of the relations of human life, which in their uninterrupted motion sometimes bear up the individual, sometimes engulf him. And it must be acknowledged, that the more emancipation and the development of freedom, bearing along with them the independence of the human individual, advance with rapid steps, the more also will the community (*Selskabet*) increase in power and significance. But the human individual stands not merely in relation to the community (*Selskabet*), but also to society (*Samfundet*), to ethical organisms, in which the firm decrees of God bearing sway over man make their appearance, and in which the individual must find not a mere limiting, but moreover a supporting and sustaining power for his inner life. But the conception of ethical organisms lies outside of Vinet's horizon, at most obtains but a passing glance, and remains without results. On this account also the highest idea of Christian ethics, the idea of God's kingdom, has no determining influence. The highest Good is with him only the eternal blessedness of the individual, but not one totality, not one perfection, in the world's condition, although this idea pervades the Scriptures, shadowed forth in the Old Testament and fully revealed in the New. The future kingdom of glory can, in the light of this theory of individuality, be only regarded as a community of holy and blessed spirits, who individually come together without forming a really incorporated society (*Samfunds legeme*). But the Scriptures represent the society of the blessed as a body having many members, of which Christ is the head; as a temple of living stones, of which Christ is the foundation stone. And if we inquire what is here in truth the principal, the individual limb of the body, the individual stone of the temple, then, without contradiction, it must be answered that not the individual limb, not the single stone is the most important, but the body and the entire temple.

The whole is before the parts, which is just the essence of organization. For Vinet, the Church is only a community, which from time to time sporadically moulds itself in this manner: several individuals resolve on fellowship in the worship of God on the gospel basis. But the historical continuity of the Church throughout all the changes of time, the Church as the postulate for individuals, not merely with the word, but also with the sacraments as divine mysteries, by which communion with the Redeemer and the mutual communion between believers are preserved, is not a determining power in his ethical theory.

§ 66.

To Vinet's theory of God's Church and kingdom corresponds his theory regarding "humanity" (*l'humanité*), which he only partly considers as the mass of the human individuals which inhabit our planet, partly as the sum-total of those peculiarities which constitute human nature.[1] But humanity is not merely the "mass" of human individuals, it is an organism of individuals, a tree with many branches which all grow on the same trunk. And not merely does humanity embrace the present living individuals inhabiting our planet, but also the past and the future, since these are all members of the same body of humanity; so that we have not only duties to perform towards the living, but, moreover, towards the dead and towards the yet unborn. And humanity is not merely an *ensemble* or sum-total of the qualities abstracted from us to form a general conception. It is an idea, a thought of unity, which is realized in a totality of human individuals. In no single individual (with the exception of the central individual, Christ) can human nature be perfectly realized: no single individual can be perfect man. Only the totality of human individuals can actually be so, because in their special qualities they mutually complete each other.

By the consideration of humanity as an abstract, we are led back to the contests of the scholastics regarding realism and nominalism. Mere realism acknowledges only the universal as the truly existing. Nominalism, on the other hand, acknowledges only the individual as the truly existing, whilst the universal is but an abstraction from the individual. The universal has not any existence in itself, but only in our reflection, which forms to itself a common concept. Both are right and both are wrong, for the truth is only the living unity of the universal and the individual. Humanity and the human race exist only in individuals, and individuals are only real in their connection with the race, and in their own place in the kingdom of humanity. Applied to the contrast here contemplated between socialism and individualism, between society and the individual, we may say that all one-sided socialism is exclusively realistic, since it considers individuals as temporary, and makes the universal one and all: individualism, on the other hand, is exclusively nominalistic, since it places the isolated individuals in the position of the only true existences, and degrades society into a mere arrangement between the individuals, but does not acknowledge it as a being (*un être*) in itself. It is well known what exceeding importance the contrast between realism and nominalism had to dogmatics in the middle ages. But it deserves to be borne in mind that this same contrast also in the middle ages received its ethical importance principally in the question of the relation of the Church to the individual. Here nominalism maintained the right of individuality in opposition to the one-sided socialism of the Church, and especially towards the close of the middle ages exerted an unfavourable influence on the stability of the Church, for which reason the nominalists have been often applauded as the precursors of Protestantism. The credit thus accorded them is not, however, entirely their due. In reality they were only the precursors of sects in religion, but not of the formation of the Protestant Church. The Reformation itself went back to the unity of nominalism and realism, as this is given in the Holy Scriptures, the teaching of which on this point we shall hereafter discuss. In modern times the contrast of which we have been speaking continues to repeat itself under higher, more developed forms. And although the name does not appear, the present age is predominantly rich in religious, ecclesiastical, and political nominalists, that is to say, of persons who desire to make religion exclusively the concern of the individual, who would convert the Church into a conventicle, and the State into a joint-stock company. The Christian view, on the other hand, is the higher unity of both opposing theories. It is realistic, or, as we may also express it by a term which lies nearer to modern consciousness, it is *universalistic;* for the kingdom, the totality, is before the individual, which must be regarded as a link in the series, as a member of the vast body. It is nominalistic or *individualistic;* for the individual is not merely a ministering member, but at the same time an infinite object in itself, of infinite value to itself. But what holds good with regard to the kingdom of God as the final destiny of the developments of society, holds good also with regard to the lower organizations of society, which typically refer to the kingdom of God. It holds good with regard to every organization of society, a race, a family, that unity and totality only come into actual existence in and with individuals, as, on the other hand, each of these members only exists in and with this unity; that society and the individual, as Baader expresses it, mutually *guarantee each other's* existence. The body does not exist without or by the side of its members; and just as little have the members any real existence without the body.

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[1] *Essais de phil. moral.* 193: On peut entendre par humanité deux choses, la masse des hommes qui peuplent notre planète et l'ensemble des attributs qui constituent la qualité d'homme. Two different things may be understood by "humanité,"—the mass of men who people our planet, and the sum of attributes which constitute the quality of man.

§ 67.

The maxim which recurs again and again in Vinet, that the individual is higher than society, is misleading, if it is to be understood as unconditional. For from this it would follow that society is only to be the means for the individual. It is undeniable that the individual, considered in its eternal destination, does not cease or lose its character of individuality in any of the earthly forms of society; but that it does not cease in the forms of earthly society proceeds exactly from the fact that it is a member in a society of a higher order, that it is called to citizenship in a higher realm. It does not cease in the family, because it is appointed to be a member of the State. It does not cease in the State, because it is appointed to be a member of the kingdom of humanity, which shall be transformed into the kingdom of God. It does not cease in the visible Church, because it is destined for the society of the saints. The truth is, that at every step of the development of the moral world, it is decreed that there shall be a relation of reciprocity between society and the individual, so that they both shall be means and end for one another. That the individual is higher than society, Vinet grounds on the assumption that only the individual, not society, is the ethical subject. And if the matter really stands thus, that society is without religious and moral subjectivity, then it must certainly be set down as exclusively the means for the individual. Only the individual is immortal, says he: only the individual has a real relation to God. But although it is undeniable that not every form of society has promise of the life which is to come, yet there is one society which has this promise,—the Church of Christ,—that the powers of death shall not prevail against it. It is the view of Scripture, that the congregation is the religious ethical subject, and through time shall grow up to the "perfect man," unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ (Eph. iv. 13). And as the Scripture represents the congregation as a man, so it also represents the congregation as a woman, as the Bride, whilst Christ is the Bridegroom (Rev. xxii. 17). This idea is repeated when the apostle says to the Galatians, iii. 28, Ye are all one (εἷς) in Christ; and Eph. ii. 15, that Christ hath made Jews and Greeks to be one, and hath made in Himself of twain *one new man*. No one can reasonably interpret this and corresponding passages, as if the apostle only spoke here of a summary of qualities, from which he had constructed a personification which had no deeper significance. He speaks about a common personality, not as a mere collective, but as an organic unity. The Church, as the new man, certainly does not now exist without or by the side of the individual believing members, who have each their individual relation towards God. But since they are all united in the same Lord and the same Spirit, are all united in the same faith, the same hope, the same love, all are partakers of the same general benefits, all are not merely of one (ἕν), but to one (εἷς), although this one as yet is only in its development, and has not attained maturity. They are all one, because only in their totality are they the *new man*. That is to say, that the new man is not perfectly realized in any single one of them, and without unity each of them is merely a fragment reflecting only a single ray of Christ's image; for only the entire Church can mirror Christ's kingdom. The relation of the individual to God expresses only in a limited, circumscribed manner the relation of love towards God of the new man, which can only be realized in a relation of the whole Church, where all in the diversity of the gifts of grace think and desire one thing, where a common consciousness and a common will inspire all, where a feeling of the wants and necessities of the whole body pervades each member. Wherever there is a community of real believers, then not merely the individuals, but also the community, have an actual relation towards God, which is especially evident in that true prayer of the Church, the Lord's Prayer, which is to be used by the congregation to the end of time, and in which each one prays not for himself alone, in his own individual circumstances, but where at the same time one prays as all, and all as one in *separate and conjoint* association.

Vinet says, that not society, but the individual, awaits the coming judgment. But we would inquire if there is not a common guilt, a crime of society; if there are not sins of the Church apart from individual transgressions; if, for instance, the missives in the book of Revelation to the seven churches do not pass judgment over the congregations as common personalities, as communities bearing a common responsibility? And we would further inquire if there are not national sins; if even in the present time God's righteous judgments do not go forth upon the *nations?* The prophets of Israel, from first to last, utter both promises and threatenings to the people. And when Christ wept over Jerusalem, because it knew not the things which should serve to its peace, did He then weep only over the separate individuals, and not over the people as a people? The divine word tells us expressly, that at the Lord's second coming all "nations" shall be assembled before Him (Matt. xxv. 32); that the men of Nineveh, who had repented at the preaching of Jonah, should rise up in the judgment and condemn this "generation," who repented not at the preaching of Christ (Matt. xii. 41); that generation shall witness against generation. The contemplation of history, and the contemplation of the circumstances which pass before our own eyes, lead us to the inevitable conviction, that in a nation all the individuals, though in very different degrees, are responsible for the general tone which predominates in the community. The study of history compels us to acknowledge the law of *solidarity* (all for one, and one for all), or that all have a common responsibility in relation to the duties of life, which have constituted society as such, that all the members are responsible for the body, and thence also sharers in its weal and woe, honour and dishonour. And not merely does this solidarity embrace the present generation, but also the preceding, of whom we are the heirs, and the succeeding, who must inherit from us both good and evil things. How thus, under the mere postulates of individualism, can the joy be explained which we feel in the hope that a better future is in store for mankind, or that a better future is in store for our own country, although we ourselves shall not live to see it? or the enthusiasm with which a nation fights in a righteous cause, and in which thousands devote themselves on a field of battle for the sake of a future they are not to behold, and looking back to a former period, which they have only beheld in spirit, to the deeds and the glory of their forefathers? What especially does the historic past, in which we had no earthly existence, become to us, and the historic future in which this existence shall have ceased, without this solidaric connection, this inward association among personalities, which in time are far separated from each other, but which form with each other a living unity? The great law of solidarity is perfectly ignored in a theory of individualism, in which society is only an arrangement between personal atoms, and which consequently must deny the conceptions of history and tradition in the intellectual significance of these conceptions.

§ 68.

But just because Vinet does not give society its due, so neither can he do justice to the individual, which he desires to protect from society. It is his great merit that he maintains the inherent dignity of the individual; but since he overlooks the fact that the individual is ministering *member* in an organic whole, he at the same time deprives the individual of an important part of the support which it should have in society. He has a sharp eye for the dangers which threaten the individual from the side of society; views society, with all its infinitude of prejudices and illusions, of seductions and derelictions, as a power which, like a vast ocean, will engulf the individual. But the sustaining and supporting power, the educative influence, which proceed from the institutions, traditions, and customs of society, are put by him into the shade. Thus he makes war on State Churches, whilst he ignores their educational importance,—ignores the fact that the true Church of individuality, the communion of saints, must be developed from the bosom of the National Church, overlooks the necessity of the individual being *educated* to liberty, and thereby injures especially the rights of the unlearned, by allowing them to be cast out on the "Ocean," by requiring mature conviction and self-determination from those who are not yet educated. But also in other respects he deprives the individual of its due, since he separates it from an essential portion of the intellectual riches to which it is destined. Consequently the theory of individuality must repress the sympathetic element in human nature, and lead every individual to labour autopathically for his own perfection. It is indeed acknowledged that love towards God and man must be the fundamental virtue of the individual. But the theory of individuality only demands individual philanthropy, love towards human individuals, since these are the only actual existences, but not universal philanthropy, love towards the nation, fatherland and church, love towards humanity and its ideal aim, and above all, devotion to the kingdom of God which is coming, and is to be perfected through history. We say that the *theory* which in this age has found its principal religious exponent in Vinet, has no room for all this. With regard to himself, we are very far from saying so. There are few writers whose individuality is so *sympathetic* as his, rich in sympathy for all mankind; and numerous portions of his writings, in spite of his theory, breathe forth a deep universal love. Nay, we may say that it is his love to humanity which has made him so concerned about individuals, and has brought him to combat a universalism in which they stood in danger of being lost. But read his own books, and no one will regret having done so.[1]

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[1] For example, the already mentioned *Essais de philosophie morale*, as well as his *Etudes evangeliques* and his *Discours*.

§ 69.

What has been here charged against Vinet is true in a greater degree in regard to S. Kierkegaard, who, with great talent and powerful one-sidedness, has been with us the advocate of individualism. As his support of individualism forms a remarkable episode in Danish literature, we shall dwell at somewhat greater length on the matter, although the principal consideration has been already discussed in reference to Vinet, so that what follows on it may be regarded as an episode in the present work. As with Vinet, the contrast between individualism and socialism also with Kierkegaard goes back to a higher,—namely, the contrast between individualism and universalism. It thus becomes necessary for the clearer understanding of the point to return to the consideration of this last.

By universalism, then, we understand that tendency of mind which places the universal highest. As now the most universal of all things are pure ideas and categories, so philosophic idealism, as panlogism, must be the purest universalism. This theory found, as is notorious, its representation in our day in the philosophy of Hegel. For this philosophy, in which it is carried out in its purity, must change the whole of existence into an ideal realm, a world of ideas. Every form of reality, nature and history, is contemplated only as a form or phase of thought, and religion itself is only valid as a lower form of knowledge, a possession of the absolute in the form of representation, whilst philosophy had the truth in the form of conception. Human personality, human individualities, were only temporary representatives of ideas, or mutes in the drama, which the ideal from eternity performs for itself. For history is in reality not the history of man, but the history of ideas. In combination with this philosophic element there prevailed at that time a poetic, artistic idealism, which, indifferent to the individual value or content of art, puts forward the universal, the beautiful form as the essential, and therefore dwells with equal interest on every work of art, collecting its material now from antiquity, now from modern times, from heaven or from earth, from the great or the small, if only the universal or form of beauty be present. The speculative and the æsthetic were for this tendency of mind the highest. Where this is consistently carried out,—which, however, is not the case with Hegel himself, for in his idealistic representations there is to be found a not inconsiderable woof of reality, by which means an ambiguity appears, and after a time mystification is inevitable,—consistently carried out, I say, this must also become the highest aim for the individual in the repose of contemplation, to linger in the aerial hall of universalism, with its broad prospects, its logical columns and pillars, its æsthetic pictures from all times and all regions of the earth,—those pictures which, as the ideal transfiguration of reality, are far superior to the immediate reality itself.

In those days there was also much discussion about the logical, the speculative, and the æsthetic bath, which was sometimes represented as a water-bath in the Heraclitic streams of infinity, sometimes as an air-bath in the eternal and changeless ether of pure idea, just as it was also regarded as the true art of life through the finite to inhale the breath of infinity. In this speculative and æsthetic intoxication about ideas, it had only been forgotten that there was one idea, which had entirely disappeared, namely the religious-ethical idea, which does not rest satisfied with a mere ideal being, a being in thought, but demands *existence*. Against this universalism must therefore come forth a reaction both from the side of philosophy and theology, a protest in the name of ethics and religion, of personality and individuality, the individual both in men and things; for even the mere knowledge of experience, especially the natural sciences, must make protest against a merely idealistic treatment. Both in the worlds of nature and of mind, the microscopic contemplation is now placed in contrast to the telescopic as applied to infinity, and the sense is developed for the small matters lying close to man, yet often unperceived by him. All depends, however, on the more intimate condition of this reaction, whether the child is to be cast out with the bath, whether universalism in every sense is to be rejected, or whether a higher union of universalism and individualism, of ideal and reality, is to be attempted. We find ourselves here again in the midst of the problem of the middle ages concerning realism and nominalism, but in modern form. The terms in use are certainly quite different; for what the middle ages called realism we call idealism, and what was then designated nominalism we style empiricism. But the matter itself is entirely the same, which may also be seen by the predicates which were employed in the middle ages with regard to the realists, who were called *formalizantes*, *metaphysicantes*, which answers exactly to the idealists of our day.

In the nominalistic reaction here referred to, proceeding from the essential interest, in so far as this moves in the spheres of ethics and religion, Kierkegaard takes up a peculiar position. He considers it as the misfortune of the age to know too much, and with all this knowledge to have forgotten what it is to exist, and the significance of the term subjectiveness; that in view of the æsthetic, the speculative, the history of the world, it has forgotten that the main point is to be an individual man; that the age, by becoming objective, has forgotten that it is the business of every human being to remain subjective. He has therefore made it the aim of his life to promote and carry through the category, "the individual." Should he ask for an inscription on his grave, he desires no other than this: "The individual man." If this category of S. Kierkegaard is not understood by the present generation, he is yet persuaded that it will be understood in time coming.[1]

In so far as S. Kierkegaard claims this category as a sort of discovery, and admits no other predecessor to himself in it except Socrates, this is only quite correct in reference to the highly individual manner in which he has maintained this category, and which doubtless may be described as a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*. Already before him Alexander Vinet had introduced the same category, and by his noble eloquence had procured for it a distinguished position in literature. At the time when S. Kierkegaard appeared, individualism was already in full activity by the side of universalism. But in general it may be said that this category, "the individual," is common to all those who, certainly in a far more comprehensive sense than either Vinet or Kierkegaard, desire to uphold the *principle of personality*, to maintain the personality of God and of man in opposition to Pantheism. "The individual" is the category of nominalism; and rightly understood, and when all has been heard,—that is to say, when nominalism does not exclude but includes realism,—nominalism is the higher. The individual is higher than the abstract, the personal than the impersonal. Only the individual *exists*, has actual being (*existentia est singulorum*, as the scholastics expressed it), whilst the universal has only ideal existence, and only in its union with the individual attains to actual being. "The individual" is the category of Christianity and of Theism. For God also, not indeed in a worldly sense, but in a super-mundane, is the individual, not the indeterminate universal, not the abstract, but the perfect threefold One, which, though comprehending and embracing all the possible and actual, yet in the most decided manner is distinct from the universe. From a former period we may here refer to the antagonism between Leibnitz and Spinosa, because the former, in opposition to the all-absorbing ocean of substance set forth by Spinosa, determines both God and Creation as monads, as individual beings, and causes the universal to be received into the individual. In our times we may refer to Schelling, according to his more recent system, which he has now brought into connected order. Whilst Hegel sets forth the universal as the actually existing, and lets this determine its own destinies and itself move to its concretions, the later Schelling, in this agreeing with Aristotle, sets forth the individual as the actually existing. Not as though he denied the value of ideas of universal concepts. But the ideal only arrives at participation in actual being, in existence, by becoming the attribute of the individual; and God is to him the absolute individual Being, who invests Himself with the universal. Whilst Hegel says that it is the universal which individualizes itself, Schelling says that, on the contrary, it is the individual which universalizes itself.[1] He inquires whence the universal should obtain the power to individualize itself and put itself into existence, which may also be expressed thus: that not thought as the universal and ideal, but the *will* as the essence of existence, is the supreme principle, which has the power to determine itself and others. Reason is to him only the sum-total, the complete number of the divine *possibilities*, the circle of the *predicates*, through which the absolute individual being makes itself intelligible. Reason, the mere realm of ideas, *is*, but cannot attain existence except by the will. Besides Schelling, we may also mention Fr. Baader and his determinate Christian Theism; the younger Fichte, too, who by his theory of personality (which had reference to the teaching of Leibnitz) upholds the individual and monadic as the really actual.

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[1] *Synspunctet for min Forfattervirksomhed. En ligefrem Meddelse Rapport til Historien af S. Kierkegaard, Udgivet af P. C. Kierkegaard*, 1859, p. 105. (View-point for the Criticism of my Authorship. A frank Communication regarding the History of S. Kierkegaard, edited by his Brother, P. C. Kierkegaard.)

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[1] *Von der Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten*, Werke 2, Abth. 1, S. 587.

But that which philosophy seeks for, theology possesses,—namely, in revelation. It is indubitably the metaphysic of revelation, that not the impersonal ideal, but the personal existence—not thought, but will—not wisdom, but love, is the first principle in God; as, on the other side, it tells us that the almighty love only exists and reveals itself in the form of wisdom. And when the Scriptures present to us the kingdom of God as the highest in existence, it undoubtedly tells us that not the impersonal universal, not impersonal ideals, operations, and powers, but the individual personal existences, are first in value; but tells us likewise that these personal existences can only develope themselves through an *organization*, which includes a system of ideas and powers.

It is not meant that all this about existence and idea, about the individual and the universal, is empty and barren metaphysics, which would have no bearing on ethics. On the contrary, it has the most important bearing on the ethical relation of man, and specially imposes on the individual the problem, in the solution of which redeeming grace will assist,—namely, in the effort to express the unity of existence and ideal, of will (love) and apprehension, of individual life and social life, because every dualism here is of evil. Although metaphysical problems like that concerning nominalism and realism may seem to be alien, and far apart from ethics, yet they are still intimately associated with it, because all metaphysical problems gravitate, as it were, towards the ethical, centre therein, and therein find their ultimate determination. And just those ethical categories which show themselves daily, always lying near us, are, when rightly understood, the highest metaphysics, the deepest grounds for speculation.

Kierkegaard's assertion is therefore perfectly justifiable, that with the category of "the individual" the cause of Christianity must stand and fall; that, without this category, Pantheism had conquered unconditionally.[1] From this, at a glance, it may be seen that Kierkegaard ought to make common cause with those philosophic and theological writers who specially desire to promote the principle of Personality as opposed to Pantheism. This is, however, very far from being the case. For those views which upheld the category of existence and personality, in opposition to this abstract idealism, did not do this in the sense of an *either—or*, but in that of a *both—and.* They strove after unity of existence and idea, which may be specially seen from the fact that they desired system, totality. With Kierkegaard, on the other hand, during this progressive development, existence comes into more and more negative relation towards the ideal, for which reason he first and last combats speculation and system. It was not his aim to dislodge one speculation by another, one system by another; he desired a metabasis of an entirely different *genus.* *Directly*, no doubt, he only turns his polemics against the system of Hegel. He finds, as has been already said, that the age, in its great knowledge, large æsthetics, and extensive universal history, has forgotten the real significance of existence and subjectivity. The category of the "individual" interests him, therefore, only in the sense of the individual existing man. He has arrived at the perception that "subjectivity is the truth,"—a doubtful proposition, in regard to which it may be observed that there is but one human subjectivity concerning whom it can be expressed, namely, that One who, in the highest sense, may be called "the individual" in human history, and who alone can say, *I am* the truth; that great individual, who came into the world to make Himself universal, to impart Himself to *all* by instituting the holy *catholic* Church, whilst every other human subjectivity can only through Him become *participant* in the truth, but can never *be* the truth. Kierkegaard has discovered that what the age, from its great knowledge and its decline into the objective, specially requires is a Socrates, who, in his apprehension, must be a sort of trainer or guide to Christ. "Socrates! Socrates! Socrates! yea, we may well call thrice upon thy name; it would not be too much to call upon it ten times, if that could avail aught. Some people are of opinion that the world requires a republic, that it requires a fresh organization of society and a new religion; but no one perceives that it is just a Socrates of which this world, perplexed by its great knowledge, stands in need."[1] But whilst he now, Socratic-like, turns against speculation, in order "to make difficulties," and to disperse like vapour this imaginary knowledge, evoking soberness and circumspection, he turns at the same time *indirectly*—for directly he has never entered on the subject—to combat those philosophical and theological speculations which seek precisely to work out his own category, though in a far more universal sense than he has done. All these views he classes together under the names of "speculation" and "mediation," without in any way permitting himself to institute a closer examination into their internal diversities, especially the diversity in the position they assume towards revelation,—a mode of proceeding which does not evince Socratic caution.

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[1] *Synspunctet for min Forfattervirksomhed*, S. 110.

This reckless polemic against speculation, which in so many respects is entirely uncritical, and merely an attack in flank, finds, however, a mitigating explanation in his individual pathos.[2] For as there are exhibited to us from different periods of the history of science many examples of persons whose enthusiasm was entirely logical, whose passion was the ideal and the purely scientific, so that in this passion of theirs they insulted the material, and closed their eyes to the actual and its most evident facts (of this the elder Fichte is an instance); so, on the other hand, existence and the actual constitute the passion of Kierkegaard, making him regardless of the ideal, which could not but be avenged on existence itself, causing this last to be finally clipped of its fair proportions.

"Existence," "the individual," "will," "subjectivity," "unmitigated selfishness," "the paradox," "faith," "scandal," "happy and unhappy love,"—by these and kindred categories of existence Kierkegaard appears intoxicated, nay, thrown as it were into a state of ecstasy. Therefore he declares war against all speculation, and also against such persons as seek to speculate on faith and strive after an insight into the truths of revelation: for all speculation is loss of time, leads away from the subjective into the objective, from the actual to the ideal, is a dangerous distraction; and all mediation betrays existence, leads treacherously away from the decided in actual life, is a falsifying of faith by the help of idea. Although he himself is amply endowed with imagination, yet the course of his individuality, throughout the various stages of its development, may be described as a continued dying to the ideal in order to reach the actual, which to him is the true, and which just receives its value from the ideal glories, which must be cast aside in order to attain it. Kierkegaard's deepest passion is not merely the ethical, not merely the ethical-religious, but the ethical-religious paradox; it is Christianity itself,—such as this exhibits itself to his apprehension.[1] Christianity is to him the divinely absurd (*credo quia absurdum*), not merely the relative paradox,—namely, in relation to the natural man, ensnared in sin and worldliness, which has been the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church from the beginning,—but the absolute paradox, which must be believed in defiance of all reason, because every ideal, every thought of wisdom, is excluded therefrom, and in every case is absolutely inaccessible to man. Faith is to him the highest actual *passion*, which, thrilled by the consciousness of sin and guilt, appropriates to itself the paradox in defiance of the understanding, and from which all comprehension, all contemplation are excluded, as it is of a purely practical nature, a mere act of the will. Not the less is everything for him dialectic. But his dialectic is a disuniting dialectic of existence, which developes the relation of the individual to the various spheres of existence, developes specially the internal contradictions in the problem of faith, and why it must be believed "in virtue of the absurd;" just as, on the other side, it unfolds the incongruity between speculation and existence, in which it is only to be regretted that speculation obtains such an imperfect hearing, and must submit to refutation in forms under which it cannot recognise itself. It may also be complained that existence, particularly the fact of revelation, is so imperfectly exhibited, as that God's becoming man in Christ, or, as he terms it, playing on the word, "God's coming into existence" (*Gudens Tilblivelse*), which is to him the paradox, is represented as an entirely isolated fact,—a *deus ex machina*,—without any connection with the *economy* of revelation and its universal principles, on which he does not venture, doubtless because he would thus be brought too deeply into the ideal and the objective, and that thus too much wisdom and intellect would be brought into the whole. Only the individual in his personal relation to God is the subject of his interest; and this existential pathos, which predominates the dialectic, is the guiding view-point for the voluminous authorship of Kierkegaard.

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[1] *Sygdommen til Döden*, S. 93. (The Sickness unto Death.)

[2] The succeeding paragraph is taken from the author's own treatise on Faith and Knowledge (*Om Tro og Viden*).

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[1] With regard to his very defective non-ethical conception of God, see the author's work quoted above.

His great idea is, that "Christianity is a vast deception; that all these thousands, without anything further, call themselves Christians; those many, many men, whose far, far greatest number, from all that can be discerned, have their lives in entirely different categories."[1] His chief problem is, "how to become a Christian:"—"The Individual. This category has only been employed once before, the first time in a decidedly dialectic manner by Socrates in order to overthrow paganism. In Christianity, on the other hand, it is to be employed this second time to make men (nominal Christians) real followers of Christ. It is not the category of the missionary in regard to the heathen, which he announces to the Christian world; but it is the missionary's category within Christendom itself to re-introduce Christianity into Christendom."[2] This mission he now desires to execute, not after the apostolic example, but after the *manner of Socrates*, by *indirect* communications, since he first by a number of pseudonymous productions, which he describes as æsthetic productivity, prepares the way for special religious authorship. It must certainly be acknowledged, that by means of this "diffuse literature" he has contributed in many respects to exercise a preparing and awakening influence,—in frequent instances, has aroused anxiety after the reality of religious impressions. And when on a brilliant *worldly* background, a background glittering with worldly refinement, there arises a partially ascetic, world-denying prospect, it must certainly be regarded as a very remarkable event. It may be very instructive to accompany him in his solitary wandering throughout its different stages, through the speculative, æsthetic, and ethical regions, which he has traversed along with the borderlands of irony and humour, until he, the individual, after having successively resigned all these earthly joys, at last, along with that individual reader, which he wished for himself, and for whose sake he has undertaken the pilgrimage, arrives at the Religious, at the relation to God and to Christ. It is extremely interesting to see him cast aside one worldly disguise after another, that of Æsthetics, Ethics, Irony, Humour, until at last he appears before us in the form which directly expresses the inmost thought, the special aim of his life, the Christian-æsthetic, and tells us frankly that all throughout he has been a religious author, and that the whole æsthetic productivity was only a device, though of a peculiar sort, not to deceive men regarding truth, but, Socrates-like, to deceive them into the truth, to betray them into the Christian. Certainly it is interesting to behold him devoutly separate himself from one worldly circle of life after another, and from the threshold looking back on all these circles as stages he has passed, and which have ceased to exist for him, and after having broken down the bridge between himself and the world, retire into religious isolation, into the fold of communion with God, alone, entirely alone with God and his life's model. It may be acknowledged that a vast amount of *reflection* has been here employed in order to attain at last to this invisible height of hermit life, amidst the bustle and turmoil of a capital city, and under daily contact with a multitude of men. One could admire it more if it were less sportive and desultory, less disposed to please itself in sophistical sallies and dazzling half-truths, and more combined with directness and natural truth in sentiment and fancy. In every case we cannot but admire the rich psychological observation, the keen insight, the dexterity in psychological experiment, by which means he has become acquainted with the mysteries of existence both actual and possible, which but few ever know, and fewer still are in a condition to express; which he has not only discovered in others, but has also detected in his own mind by a self-observation, which *thus* only can be accomplished in a hermit life, with the sufferings and temptations with which he has also been very familiar. For, as he himself says in his frank communication, he was literally alone in the wide world: wherever he was, before the eyes of all, or in the privacy of a *tête-à-tête* with his bosom friend, he always wore a mask, so that solitude did not become more solitary in the dead of the night; he was alone not in the forests of America, amidst their terrors and dangers, but in that which caused even the most terrible *reality* to appear as a relief and mitigation—alone in the company of dreadful *possibilities;* alone, with almost human speech against him; alone in agonies which have taught him more than one new note on the text of the thorn in the flesh; alone in decisions in which he would have required friends—nay, if possible, the whole race—as a stay and support; alone in dialectic uncertainties, contests, mortal anguish, etc. It must be owned that his works contain a rich store of material for reflection on deep psychological, ethical, and religious problems. But with all this, it must also be acknowledged that the real significance of this diffuse literature does not equal its pretensions; that though its teaching concerning the individual has been in many respects a corrective to a one-sided universalism, yet the corrective itself on all important points requires to be corrected; that this betraying into the truth harmonizes but little with the essence of Christianity, so that in the contemplation of Kierkegaard's image of Christ we are constantly disturbed by an image of Socrates, which incessantly and obtrusively blends with the first; that this betrayal into truth forms a striking contrast to the noble simplicity of Vinet in his communications concerning it; for Vinet has nothing in common with "a spy in the service of truth," but more with a Christian witness to the truth. It must be owned,—and this acknowledgment has already been expressed on various sides,—that though the path he has chalked out is rich in intellectual wonders, yet the whole of this hermit pilgrimage is misleading, and ends in a distorted view of truth. For Kierkegaard, in his strife with universalism, with increasing vehemence puts existence in a negative and opposing relation to the ideal, faith to knowledge, the Christian to the human, the individual to the social; because to him God is only the God of the individual, not of the Church—Christ is only the Saviour of the individual, not of the world; because the more our author denied the true ideal or the true universal, the more he came under the dominion of a false and merely subjective ideal, established for individual existence an abstract ideal, to the demands of which submission was imperative, whilst he separated that which God has joined together, free-will and mercy, law and gospel, pattern and Saviour, which shall be shown in its own place. In connection with the present subject of consideration, we must, after having pointed out his position towards universalism, confine ourselves to a closer contemplation of his position towards socialism, or, if the term is preferred, towards sociality. If we have said of Vinet that neither society nor the individual got justice from him, this is true in a far higher sense with regard to Kierkegaard. For with him all the one-sidedness and the defects of individualism may be read, so to speak, in large characters, and as through a natural magnifying-glass.

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[1] *Synspunctet for min Forfattervirksomhed*, p. 15.

[2] The same, p. 111.

§ 70.

That Christianity is a vast delusion or misapplication of a name may be readily granted to him, with this proviso, that it is so to all those who lack the mind of the Spirit to discriminate between the apparent and the unseen—between those who outwardly profess Christianity, and those who inwardly belong to Christ. But the question is, What does he think of the Church of Christ, visible and invisible, and of the relation of the individual thereto? Throughout the whole diffuse literature we look in vain for the idea of the Church. The Church seems for him to appear first in heaven, in the future life, when the individuals, after their personal contests and sufferings, at last come together as a society. Ethical organizations of society on earth lie quite beyond his contemplation, at all events receive no positive determinate significance, and are merely sometimes mentioned as "concretions of individuality." Of a *solidaric* union between individuals and races of mankind, of history and tradition in the intellectual and organic signification, there is here not the most distant idea. He has only set himself to the task of "resisting an immoral confusion, which will demoralize the individual by means of universal *humanity* or whimsical social appointments" (p. 103). He deals himself most frequently with the lowest and worst forms of society,—namely, "the multitude" and "the public." "There is one view of life," says he, "which entertains the idea, that where the multitude is, there also is truth,—that there dwells in truth an inherent necessity to have the multitude on its side; there is another view of life which holds, that wherever the multitude is, there is untruth" (p. 90). Again and again he repeats that the multitude, as an ethical and religious Instanz, is a falsehood; and on this subject he has said much that is both true and forcible. But the question is, whether behind the multitude and the public there do not lie other social appointments which a teacher of ethics ought to take into consideration. Into this question he does not enter, but only wishes to resist this immoral confusion by, if possible, getting men to be individual by isolating them from each other. "Every human being of earnest mind, who knows what edification means,—every one, whatever else they may be, high or low, wise or simple, man or woman,—every one who has felt the power of edification or God present with them, will grant me unconditionally, that it is impossible to edify or to be edified *en masse;* edification yet more than love can only bear relation to the individual,—the individual, not in the sense of the distinguished and specially endowed, but the individual in the sense in which every one ought and can be such, in which he must place his honour, nay, his salvation, on attaining." This remarkable passage in his *Berichte an die Geschichte* (Relations to History) deserves special attention, because in it the anti-social tendency of the man comes clearly to light. Because one admits to him the impossibility of edifying or being edified *en masse*, it by no means follows that one admits that edification has reference *only* to the individual. For to be edified in the assembly of the Church, and along with it, is not at all the same thing as to be edified *en masse.* What constitutes the Church as such is not the number. The Church may consist of a larger or smaller number of individuals. But what constitutes the Church as such is, that these individuals know themselves to be united, called and associated not by man, not by their own perfection of power, but by the Lord of spirits, who calls and associates them by His word and His sacraments; and since He unites them to Himself, He unites them mutually to one another. This last fact, that believers know themselves to be mutually joined to each other, because they are united in the same Lord, is inseparable from the true conception of edification. It belongs to edification to be edified by the truth, which is determined for *all* (the universal, catholic truth), in order that I may be confirmed in the faith, which from the beginning was committed to the saints, as is testified throughout all times, under all changes, and professed throughout the different regions of the world. It belongs to edification, that in the faith I am solidarically associated, not merely with contemporary believers, but with all the faithful, who throughout far distant ages have been called away from the Church on earth to live in the Church in heaven; and not merely with these, but also with the yet unborn, who shall be saved through the same faith. It supports and strengthens my faith, that others believe and profess the same; not as though numbers could be the last instance for that which is truth, but because I am not formed to stand alone, either in things temporal or eternal; because whilst I am formed for independence, I am at the same time fitted to be a *member* in one great whole. This moment in edification, the mutual association of believers, is excluded from Kierkegaard's conception of edification, which is only defined as a relation between the individual and God. Following out Kierkegaard's conception of edification, it would be best that the Lord's Supper should be observed separately by each individual. And yet it was instituted by the Lord as a social feast, and it must only be considered as an exceptional case when it is administered to a single individual. Along with the true conception of edification, the social conception of the Church is denied at the same time. He overlooks that the truth, which Christ desires should be spread throughout the world, was not from the first confided to an individual, but to a circle of apostles; that the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost did not descend on one single person, but on those who were with one consent in one place; and that no individual has received Christ's promise, "Lo, I am with you always," but only in so far as he remains in that association which has received the promise.

There may, however, develope itself in life a conception of edification which is the opposite extreme to that of Kierkegaard, and by which his polemic receives a relative validity. That is to say, if only the moment in edification is realized, that it is a mutual relation between believers and professors, but excludes the relation to the Lord; if one only apprehends individuals as "members" of the society of the Church, but does not take into consideration that each one has his independent personal significance in regard to the Lord; there appears a false socialism in Christianity, in which the individual, the subjective moment, is excluded. There may exist a merely traditional Christianity, in which the individual comforts himself with the consideration that he believes what the Church believes, but without himself having any personal relation to the Lord: nominal Christianity, and a worship of God, which may well be compared to an edification *en masse*; that is to say, when many are associated without any individual of them having a real relation towards God, and where each one soothes himself with the thought that he shares the faith of the others, and that "we are all Christians," and they mutually guarantee each other to be good Christians, whilst not one of them is so in reality, or at any rate is only so very imperfectly. In such a case it is very justifiable to present this problem in the midst of Christianity, "how to become a Christian," to divide the multitude, to separate the individual from the mass, to cause the soul as unclothed and in its nakedness to be presented before God's face for self-examination, according to the requirements of the gospel. What Kierkegaard as a religious writer has endeavoured to accomplish is, however, neither unheard of nor even very unusual, though not, therefore, the less important and valuable. It is what the Church calls "awakening" or revival. Every Christian revival preacher sets forth the problem "how to become a Christian," and seeks thereby to introduce Christianity among professing Christians, to combat the false sociality of a merely nominal Christianity, and the false security that one is in a state of salvation because belonging to the Church, or to the professors of Christianity. Every revival preacher desires to separate the multitude, in order to obtain a hearing from the individual, and bring this last into relation with God. Considered in a purely religious manner, the matter is the same. The difference lies only in the means which are here set in motion, and in the long or circuitous route which is here pursued, in order at last, through successive masking and unmasking, to reach the individual in a religious and Christian manner. There is moreover this difference, that the true, the real revival preacher, through awakening and isolation, seeks to lead the individual to the congregation, to the associated means of grace, to baptism and the Lord's Supper, whilst with Kierkegaard the Church and congregation are denied.

The difference lies, finally, in the peculiar view which Kierkegaard entertains of his own generation, and which exerts the greatest influence on the whole manner in which he regards what may be termed his home mission (missionary work in the midst of Christianity). From the very first his activity strikes a pessimist key-note, which on our part, according to what has before been said about pessimism, is not to be unconditionally censured. In a very peculiar sense, he applies the pessimist view to his own times. He not merely tells us that he has never employed the smallest portion of the ability he possesses to express this: that the world is good, loves truth, desires the good, and that the problem is therefore (in the sense of Goethe and Hegel) to satisfy the existing age. On the contrary, he has sought to express that the world, if it is not evil, is indifferent; "that the demand of the age is always folly and absurdity; that truth, in the eyes of the world, is ridiculous exaggeration or an entire superfluity; that the good must suffer" (p. 68). But as regards his own times, he views them as peculiar, as altogether evil, because this age is the age of *breakings up*, the age of "levelling," in which all authority is undermined by insidious reflection, and becomes daily more so. With this view, he considers it only absurd to speak of the sustaining and supporting power of the State and of the Church for the individual. But however comfortless and desolate he finds this age to be, he yet perceives in it a deeper significance,—that, namely, the whole of this great levelling must serve for the development of "the principle of individuality." For, since all concretions of individuals are in process of dissolution and destruction by the firebrand of abstraction, and the only entire one, which remains standing to the last, is that monstrous abstract the "public," the individual must be left entirely to its own resources, and must either perish or seek safety in a religious return to God. "For it will not be as formerly, that individuals, when matters became somewhat perplexing to their own dizzied vision, looked to the nearest man of distinction from whom to discover their bearings. The time for that is gone by. They must either be lost in the abstract dizziness of infiniteness, or attain infinite salvation in the reality of personal piety. Many, many will perhaps cry out in their despair, but that will not help; it is now too late."[1] The significance of the levelling principle is as follows: "It is not from God, and every good man will have moments when he could weep over its forlorn results; but yet God permits it, and by this means brings out what is highest in the individual, that is, in each person separately. So far is the idea of sociality of the community from being the salvation of the age, that, on the contrary, it is the *Skepsis* which must give way, in order that the development of individuality may have free course; since every individual must either be lost, or, prepared by the discipline of abstraction, come to itself in communion with God." In these views of society we must undoubtedly acknowledge a fundamental Pessimism, for which Kierkegaard considered that strong confirmation was to be found in the events of 1848. And his last appearance in "The Present Moment," in order to be correctly estimated, must be looked at on this background. The question is only if this Pessimism is Christian or unchristian Pessimism. We, for our part, are very far from denying that the age was and is the age of *dissolutions;* yet we cannot give up the thought and the hope that it is also the age of *remodellings*, even in the relations of society. We cannot also but admit that the sustaining, supporting, and elevating power of society in our days is far inferior to what it was in the foregoing; that the Church and the State no longer exert the same authority over the individual as they did at an earlier period; that individuals, as a consequence of the progressive emancipation, now stand in far more danger of making shipwreck of their tiny bark on the vexed ocean of society. The danger is so much the greater, because not merely has the authority of institutions suffered, but also those *persons* and those authorities, who by their prominence exert a moral influence in wide circles, have more and more drawn back. In all this, every "serious person" who has thought on the subject must sympathize with Kierkegaard. But from this it certainly does not follow that a Pessimism which is one with absolute desperation as regards the relations of society should be justified. Even if it be admitted that dissolution is the view-point from which society should be exclusively regarded, and that there cannot be here any grounds for expecting a remodelling, still even under the universal dissolution there must be an organization of society concerning which no Christian can or ought to doubt,—namely, the holy Catholic Church, which has the promise that the powers of death shall not prevail, and which is not at all dependent on the continuance of a State Church, but can very well maintain its existence independently of connection with State or people. Kierkegaard's view of the situation in which the individual is placed reminds one of the position of the Stoics during the Roman decline and dissolution, in so far as the individual was here obliged to seek to help himself by taking refuge in the ethical. In the same manner, the individual under the dissolution of Christianity must seek refuge in the isolated relation to God. But the position of a Christian cannot, under any breaking up of society, become that of an isolated individual: he will always know himself to be a member of Christ's Church; and even if the presently existing forms of a State Church sink in ruins, the socializing power of Christianity will produce a new form of Church life. *Never in any case will Christianity appear in individuals, without at the same time appearing in the form of a society.* That the separation of individuals into isolated relation to God cannot be the last and final destiny of man, Kierkegaard himself seems to have had a misgiving, if only temporarily. For, after having in the strongest terms denounced the principle of association, to which he will only accord validity in relation to material interests, but in all mental relations considers to be an illusion, because it is only strengthened by the numerical, by coherence, which ethically is enervation and weakness, he goes on: "*First when the separate individual in himself has attained ethical stedfastness in spite of the whole world, first then can there be room for speaking of association.*"[1] Here, then, he would seem to make admission of the principle of sociality. But in what manner he has imagined that this association of individuals in the Christian sense shall be brought about after the Christian Church has been broken up, and the continuity of the historical thread has been severed, he has not told us. It is only evident that the association shall go forth from these powerful individuals, who have helped themselves in spite of the world,—that the association must therefore be a *product* of these strong minds; but in what manner these shall themselves be strengthened is not evident, when the Church as the *postulate* for individuals has entirely disappeared under the firebrands of levelling and abstraction.

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[1] *En litterair Anmeldelse*, S. 109 (A Literary Notice, p. 109).

We do not therefore express ourselves too strongly, when we say that society does not here receive justice. And now the individual? Into what relation to God is the individual introduced who follows this guidance? Isolated relation to God may be one of two things. It may be the mystic-pantheistic relation to God, in which the individual absorbs himself in God, and gives up his individuality. This is not Kierkegaard's theory. And though, in his religious writings, one certainly misses in a high degree the true mystic, yet he is correct as regards the false, in maintaining that the consciousness of duty and the consciousness of guilt testify to man's dignity and independence before God, and make it impossible for the individual to escape from himself, or pantheistically to relinquish himself. The isolated relation to God must therefore be defined as the ascetic-practical, as a continual exercise of faith, a continued struggle with reason under obedience to the paradox, a continued exercise of the absurd, and of a practical love to God, which shows itself in obedience and "acts of love" towards separate individuals. But as the individual is cut off from the Church, he is thus also deprived of "the Church's God," deprived of the fulness of the revelation of God. The revelation of God becomes only a revelation to the individual for the purpose of his own salvation, not a revelation to the Church; for the love of Christ is then only separating, not combining. And from this standpoint there can be no hearty prayer: Thy kingdom come! If Kierkegaard could have got sight of the idea of "the kingdom," his horizon would also have widened, and he would have perceived a higher and nobler universalism than that which he at first combated. Then would he also, in the history of the world, in the struggles of nations for the ideals of society, have seen more than mere external circumstances and personalities, in which we ask only after the great and remarkable in the human sense, but are led away from the ethical. Then would he also, in the æsthetic, have been able to find more than the merely dissipating and distracting; would have been able in Shakespeare, whom he so much admires, to perceive more than the psychological,—namely, a teaching of universal history, which is nearly allied to that of the highest religion. And before everything else, he would have learnt from the history of revelation, and from the prophetic and apocalyptic inspiration of Scripture, that Christianity has not only an individual, but also a cosmical significance; that

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[1] *En litterair Anmeldelse*, p. 108.

Christ is not merely the model of believers, but the Saviour of the world,—the Head, under whom the whole system of creation must be combined, and that only under this postulate can there be any serious consideration of the relation of the individual to Christ. But in regard to this point, in regard to the relation of the individual to the love of Christ, to the mercy of God in Christ, and in what manner the individual, by allowing himself, according to Kierkegaard, to be betrayed into the truth, is at the same time—certainly much against this writer's original view—betrayed into the objective mercy of God, we must defer discussion to a later chapter.

In reply to all that has been urged above, Kierkegaard, however, continues to repeat: "The individual is the category through which, in regard to religion, time, history, the entire race must pass. And he who stood by Thermopylæ was not so secure as I, who, in order at least to draw attention to the matter, have stood beside this pass—'the individual.' His aim was to hinder the troops from pressing through the pass; if they succeeded in forcing their way, he was lost. My object is, to move the many to press through this pass—the individual; through which, however, it is to be remarked that no one presses, without thereby becoming the individual."[1] This is very good, and exceedingly well put. But, on our side, we continue to repeat, that all depends on what is *the region to which* we penetrate through this narrow pass—whether to dry and barren places or to a fruitful land. Therefore we continue to repeat: The individual and the kingdom of God; or rather: the kingdom of God and the individual. For it is from the kingdom of God that the initiative proceeds, and the connecting link between the kingdom of God and the individual is the Church and the means of grace. And he whose ear is closed to the voices of the present age, will hear this resound throughout the moral world, in harmony with the nature of each sphere: Society and the individual. And in all social sufferings of this age traces of this problem may be seen. Ethics can only draw attention to this problem. For, as Kierkegaard very justly observes with regard to ethical problems, "the actual solution is itself an art, a gift which cannot be taught."

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[1] *Synspunctet for min Forfattervirksomhed*, p. 105. (Standpoint for my Authorship.)

II.

VIRTUE.

THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY. CHRIST OUR PATTERN.

§ 71.

THE special perfection of the individual, his personal capacity to promote the advent of God's kingdom, the realization of the highest Good, is virtue. But Christian virtue is not the virtue of the old man, but that of the new, and has for its postulate that personality which Christ has not merely emancipated, but which He has also redeemed and regenerated. In so far as virtue only developes itself on the basis of emancipation, it is essentially limited to the same factors as pagan virtue, to mind and nature, reason and the perceptions of sense, whether the higher of these is defined as combating the lower, or as harmonizing them, and bringing them into unison and accordance with itself. On the basis of redemption, on the other hand, the factors are, free-will and grace. Therefore the difference between Christian and non-Christian virtue goes back to a diversity in the personal existence itself, and in its essential conditions.

When contrasted with the personality of antiquity, modern personality, emancipated to free humanity, has a universality and intensity which from the ancient standpoint was impossible. Modern personality in our own day has not merely Christianity, but also the Reformation and Revolution, with all their emancipating effects, for its postulate. It is freed from the national barriers and caste-divisions of ancient times, from the false authority of the Hierarchy, from the oppression of political absolutism.

It has come into possession of its human rights, has liberty of thought and of research, liberty of conscience and belief, political and civil liberty; nay, even many more than these. Thus, on the basis of emancipation, a morality may be developed which is higher than that of ancient times. But what, again, places it in a more precarious position than that of the ancients, is the want of a fixed and definite ideal of humanity,—not merely the want of a fixed ideal of the kingdom of humanity which is to be striven after, but moreover the want of a fixed ideal of personality. Both Greece and Rome have their fixed ideal of personality, which certainly is circumscribed by the limitations of nationality, but just from this derives its plastic impress, its individual type, until it is dissolved by philosophy,—a dissolution in which Sophists and Socrates also had an important part; this last by awakening consciousness of the universal, but at the same time indeterminate human. Christianity has its determinate ideal of personality in Christ, in the example which the Redeemer has left us. But the man of the present day, who does not receive Christ, has no determinate ideal of humanity and personality, although he is in constant search of one. It is characteristic of the refinement of our day, that it extols the human and seeks it out under all forms, in times past and present, in the east and the west, in every climate under heaven and among all nations, appropriates it, asserts it, but assumes a critical relation towards its totality. Our contemporaries admit the validity of all to a certain extent, but allow *unconditional* validity to nothing; and were one of these critical individuals called upon to answer the question, What, then, is his own ideal, on which he himself unconditionally relies, what it is that he unconditionally loves, and wherein he puts his last dependence? he would be puzzled how to reply, or could only give an empty and formal answer. For progress (*le progrès*), which is the indeterminate thought, in which the greater portion work, is only a very misty ideal. The merely emancipated, unredeemed personality, is therefore doomed to perpetual anxiety and disquietude; for with all its rich appropriation—what treasures of discovery and experience have come into the possession of the present generation?—with all this production, and with all its criticism, it bears within it an enormous vacuum, which can only be filled up by faith on God in Christ.

And just on this account, this personality is not at all happy. Even if it theoretically professes an optimist ideal of the future which shall come through "progress," still its faith in the future is not strong, and it has no living hope. For this it is too critical, knows too many illusions, and has too often been deceived in its calculations. In the individual life of personality, the unhappiness of emancipation shows itself in many deeper natures as a painful condition of the inner being. If we could look into the souls of our contemporaries, we should see, under many a calm exterior, torment and suffering, doubt and secret passion, which do not burst forth into bright flame,—modern personality is too reflective for that,—but burn with a slow consuming fire. If these agonies could find words, they would express craving to be delivered from liberty,—a desire for an authority to which they might entirely and unconditionally subject themselves,—a love to which they might unconditionally devote themselves,—an anxiety to attain a position in which, in words somewhat similar to those of the apostle, "That I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God" (Gal. ii. 19), they could say, "By freedom I am dead to freedom, that I might live in the dependence of obedience and love to God." Poets have often depicted the torture and degradation of thraldom, the indignity of the condition of slavery, in the oppression of the people by despotism. They have glorified emancipation by painting the struggle for liberty, through which nations and their heroes have shaken off an unworthy yoke, and with their swords won for themselves freedom and its blessings. And the social romance of our own day has exalted emancipation by assailing, sometimes with justice, sometimes without it, obsolete institutions, laws, and customs, which have tyrannized over the individual. But however right this attempt is in itself, a far higher aim for the poet is to descend into the depths of the soul, and depict the miseries of freedom, the sufferings of emancipation. Byron has, indeed, contributed richly to this end. But he is too subjective, paints predominantly only his own personality, his own genially aristocratic nature. The poet who would do this in a comprehensive manner must have Goethe's objective vision, but must see by the light of Christianity. A tendency towards this kind of poetry seems to show itself in the immature and awkward attempt made in our day to introduce the Religious and Christian into poetry, which at any rate gives evidence of the perception of the malady, for which Christianity is the cure. The misfortune of emancipation shows itself in our day in another form, namely that already mentioned, that a great multitude of individuals, in the midst of the world of liberty, and under a constant reference to the principle of individuality and individual right, under a restless labour in the service of emancipation, lose their individuality, drowned in society, in the social and political whirlpools which pantheistically overwhelm them, wash away and obliterate their originality. "Born as originals, they die as copies."

The effaced and obliterated being of a large proportion of individuals, the flightiness of others, the restless toil and anxiety at work, joined to disquietude and haste in enjoyment, the never-ceasing criticism,—these peculiarities, which our age exhibits more conspicuously than any other, are evidences that human freedom cannot suffice to itself, but requires to find rest in the just relation of dependence. Only one power in society can free the individual, namely, the Gospel. Here is the unconditional that is sought, and to which the individual can devote itself, ministering and loving. Here is that in which the emancipated, inconstantly tossed personality, with its fluttering thoughts and wishes, may find rest, where it may find foundation, secure footing, support, and maintenance, —the *basis* of existence. Here is the true personal ideal of humanity in the example which the Redeemer has left us. In opposition to the engulfing power of society, the gospel is an asylum for individuality, where it may constantly receive initiation and renewal for the toil and strife of life, for self-elevation, self-sacrifice, and self-devotion, for the true life in and for society; as, on the other side, it is the same gospel which, through the Church, constitutes the salt which must preserve the whole life of the people from destruction and decay.

§ 72.

Whether or not we require an example or pattern of morality, that is to say, the spectacle of an individual man who in himself includes all personal perfection, and demands imitation in the life of every other man on earth, is a question inseparable from this, Do we need a Saviour? Those who are of opinion that man can save himself, will reply that we do not require a pattern outside of us, because we carry within our own inner being an image of humanity (but what?), which it is the duty of every one to work out specially by his own self-determination. But it is just this postulate which we cannot admit, in the signification in which it is set forth, since we find our view confirmed by the experience alluded to above, and the many contradictory conceptions of the aim and purpose of man's life which are enunciated by philosophic ethics. On the other hand, it is the common experience of all those who have entered into the relation of discipleship with Christ, and have resolved on following Him, that only in Christ do we find the essence of humanity—man as he is in God; and first in Him do we find the comprehension of our own individuality, its distance and separation from God, and its appointment for God. But inseparable from the acknowledgment that Christ is the pattern is also this, that He is the Saviour; that no one can imitate the example of Christ but he who by faith has found Christ as the Saviour, and by His saving grace is armed with the power to set forth on pilgrimage after His example: so that faith in the gospel is the mother of virtue. If Christ were *but* the pattern, and not the Saviour, then His revelation would only be to our condemnation—only be against us, but not for us. It would undoubtedly afford us the spectacle of the perfectly good, of the human embodiment of the moral law in a world of sin. But to the man who in this model sees not also a Saviour, compassionate and ready to forgive, it stands merely as an accusing witness against mankind and against himself. Only when in the model we see the Saviour, can we receive encouragement, because the more we feel our infinite distance, the more closely do we feel ourselves drawn into fellowship with Him. Whilst we designate Christ the Saviour and Example, we can also designate Him the Highest Good, in so far as the fulness of God's kingdom, the futurity of bliss, is included in Him.

THE UNPARALLELED IN HISTORY. CHRIST AND GREAT MEN.

§ 73.

The individual who, as Saviour and example, is to be all things to all men, must be the isolated or unparalleled in history, in the human race. He must be like us, must be a true man, subject to a human development of life and human conditions; for otherwise he could not be our pattern, our Saviour. He must be unlike us; for otherwise he could not be that One whom we should *all* imitate, and of whose fulness we must all partake. There are modern "Pictures of the Character of Jesus," which, in the supposed interest of the ethical, lay stress on Christ's true humanity, so as to lower Him, to represent Him as like us, without acknowledging the essential dissimilarity. But if Christ is to be our Saviour and our example, *He must even as a man be unlike us.* And the perception of this human dissimilarity between Him and us is the first step in the knowledge of Christ, the way to perceive Him as the only-begotten of the Father.

That Christ, even as a man, is unlike us, that He as a man is the isolated in history, is a perception which must force itself on every serious contemplation, whether we fix our view on the work He has accomplished, and the influences which have proceeded from Him, or fix our view upon His person. A naturalistic system of contemplation has desired to assign to Christ a place among "the great men" in the history of the world. But every comparison between Christ and "great men" must lead to the conviction that His greatness is of a totally different nature from theirs, and cannot be explained by the principles of ordinary human nature.

We may, whilst fixing our glance on the work of Christ, take our starting-point from Schleiermacher's treatise on the concept of "the great man," whose characteristic he asserts to be, that he exerts a moulding influence on society. By this definition Schleiermacher has the merit of bringing back to its rightful owners the predicate of "great man," which most writers are disposed to distribute with too great liberality. If we inquire concerning the scale of historic greatness which must be adjudged to individual personalities, then the great and the small can only be measured and determined by the relation between the individual and society,—by the intellectual *power* belonging to the individual, and the *influences* he thereby exerts on the whole. Whilst the category of the small, the insignificant, finds its application in those persons who are lost in the mass, in those from whom no special influence on society proceeds, but who rather in their whole mode of existence show themselves as a product of society, since they only mirror back the spirit of the times and of their own surroundings; we apply, on the other hand, the category of *great* to the men whose individuality has so much original force, independence, and power, that it stamps society with its impress; nay, that society even appears as the product of such, as the work of their individuality. Between these extreme points are found such persons as develope themselves in a mutual relation between society and their individuality, a reciprocity of productivity and receptivity, of giving and receiving, an interchange of intellectual endowments. In this great middle class, which embraces an infinitude of diversities, we find not merely the commonplace, but also the excellent, the distinguished, the prominent, but not the great *par excellence*. The great men in the highest sense of the term, the heroes, are those who predominantly relate themselves to society, not as receiving, but as bestowing, and are therefore entitled the benefactors of the people. Though they may receive influences from society, these have no independent significance, becoming only means and material for their own unfettered creative activity. The great man is not merely the genius; for although this is inseparable from him, yet the genius is by no means always a great *man*. Shakespeare is a great poet, Raphael and Mozart are great artists; but on that account alone to call them great men would be a misapplication of terms. It necessarily belongs to the great man that the influence of genius should be inseparable from the *influence* of the great *personality*, and that he not merely applies himself to one side of human receptivity, not merely works on individual circles of society, but affects society as a *totality*, by his creative activity calls forth an organization of society, with the whole multitude of circles, powers, and objects.

If this view brings along with it the admission that the great man cannot be found in the domain of art and science, because these agencies are too narrow and one-sided for him, then doubtless sceptical objections may be brought against it. Thus, to take an example *instar omnium*, it may be asked if Socrates, the founder of ethics, who, just on account of his personality, exercised so great an influence, ought not to be reckoned among the great? We reply, there are great men who distinguish themselves by an inward greatness, which is not measured by the relation to the historic development of society, but in relation to the ideal of personality, even if, like Socrates, their relation towards it is only one of inquiry; and by the relation of the individual to the majority of those, never at any time a numerous class, who aspire after personal perfection; and this internal greatness may be found with men who have no place at all in the history of the world or of the nation, but live an unmarked every-day life. However high we then would place Socrates as a thinker and as a man, however high we may rate the intensive in his greatness, still the extensive, the historic influences on society, which have proceeded from him are proportionately small, because his influence has only produced philosophic schools, only addresses itself to the philosophic, and thus to men of a special stamp of mind, and at a determined stage of progress, but has not been able to penetrate a community in all its circles, far less to mould it or create it anew. And even if we should make the boundaries which Schleiermacher in his treatise has drawn indefinite, still we are always brought back to the fact that the *highest* historic greatness, if it is to be at once intensive and extensive, can only show itself in the domain of the *State*, the *Church*, or of *religious society;* that great men, in the highest sense of the term, are those who have founded states, or restored those which were decayed, who have caused a new social life to bloom forth amidst ruins; as also those who have been founders of religion, or religious reformers, and have produced new organizations in the domain of religion. Only on these territories can there be exercised those all-embracing influences which penetrate all classes and circles of society.

If we then retain the idea of the founding and moulding of society as the characteristic mark of great men, there is here certainly a formal resemblance to Christ. But if we go into a

cal circles. Christ influenced any circle because he makes new life.

real comparison, the essential dissimilarity appears. The great men of history are, for instance, under this limitation, that their influence is confined to a single nation, or at most to a single portion of humanity, to one individual *generation*, which is essentially their work. No founder of religion, with the exception of Christ, has established a world-wide religion. In Christ, on the other hand, we behold an individual man, who in His personality has a power, whose influences extend over all races of people, under every clime of heaven, throughout all ages. He does not enter into relation with a single portion of humanity, but with the entire race, as not in a merely relative sense, but absolutely as the *Giver*,—as He who by His religion has bestowed, not on a single generation, but on the whole world, a new form, has established a new development of the world, a new course of the world, a new humanity extending throughout the range of centuries. On Him we cannot bestow the appellation, "the great man." To Him we can only apply the words of the angel spoken to Mary: "He shall be great, and shall be called the *Son of the Most High*."

But the dissimilarity is still more apparent when we contemplate Christ's work according to its principle, aim, and means. Every one who acknowledges the principle of causality must, from the vast world-determining influences which have issued, and still continue to issue, from Christ, and with which no other historic influences can be compared, infer a power which infinitely exceeds that of all others. But if we inquire concerning the essence of this power, of the principle of Christ's all-powerful influence, we can only name the world-emancipating and world-redeeming *liberty* and *love*. Christ's historic greatness indicates an inward holy greatness in His personality, through which He is infinitely distinguished, not merely from all who have exerted influences on the history of the world, but also from all who have aspired after personal perfection. The aim which Christ proposed to Himself and carried through, was to redeem not merely His own nation, but the *world*, from the dominion of sin, and by His life to leave behind to latest generations an example for imitation—in fine, to found God's kingdom upon earth,—an aim which none of the great men have ever proposed to themselves, the necessity of which few among them have felt, and which not one individual of their number has been able to accomplish. Not one of them has assumed the task of becoming the Redeemer of the world, not one has grasped the idea of setting forth his own life as an example, which should remain universally valid even to the last generation which shall inhabit the earth. The dissimilarity in aim corresponds with the dissimilarity in the means. For the means by which Christ executes His work lie not in anything external to Him, but only and alone in His personality. Doubtless from every truly great man there proceeds a great personal influence. But, on the one hand, the ethical is here not seldom restrained by an impure intermingling with the natural intellectual power of genius; on the other hand, this personal influence only appears at the outset of their work, which in course of time developes itself, or comes to an end, *independently of their person*. But Christ's work is carried on throughout the lapse of ages only in this manner, that not merely His teaching, but His personality, continues to exert its influences on the human soul. As with no other, there is in Christ an indissoluble connection between His personality and His work, and this connection has from the very first stood before Him in the full clearness of consciousness. He desires to redeem the human race to a kingdom of sanctified personalities; He desires to destroy the old abnormal development of the world, in order to introduce a new development; He will remove the world's centre of gravity, which has been displaced by sin, and bring it back to its original position in God. But He can only execute this by Himself, by His own personal self-participation in it, or by transplanting His own personal life into the race. No one can here help Him, or be His counsellor. His work stands exclusively in His person; and the smallest abnormality in His personal condition and development would destroy His work entirely. This connection between the highest aim on earth conceivable—the founding of God's kingdom—and His own human individuality, in which He stands as the isolated One in the human race, who must Himself create the new community, embracing all races and all ages, the ideal which His thought has framed, gives Him a greatness which surpasses all human measure.

§ 74.

It also belongs to Christ's greatness that He stands forth as the *turning-point of the times*, which does not hold good of any of the heroes of the human race, who are only born for a single generation, and merely in a relative sense can be described as a turning-point in time. Christ was born in the fulness of time, at the time fixed in the counsel of God, when the universal condition of the world was such that the Redeemer and example could be revealed in it,—a condition in which the principles which had hitherto governed the reality were exhausted, in which there had entered a universal decay of religion and morality, and there was need felt for the regeneration not merely of a single people, but of the race, of the *world*. Only in such a condition of the world can the religious moral example be revealed, because only in such a state of the world the need was urgent for the highest undertaking, which altogether was possible in human nature, to found the kingdom of redemption and of regeneration.

And as Christ's work rests on His person, He must also develope Himself under relations and surroundings, in which it became possible for Him to exhibit His personal perfection in every respect. What is true of each one of the great in the human race, that there is a predestined relation between the personality and the circumstances under which it developes itself, discovering in their lives traces of providential dealing, is true in an absolute sense of Christ. He discloses Himself under circumstances which embrace the whole fulness of contradictions and contrasts requisite for the complete revelation of the world-subduing and world-redeeming ideal of love and free-will. He found in His nation the combined results of Jewish, Greek, and Roman culture. The great religious opposition between Jew and Gentile met Him in the face. He encountered an over-ripe state of civilisation, which included the whole range of contrasts in human life, contrasts in education, contrasts in external circumstances, wealth and poverty, despotism and slavery; and the whole of this great civilisation resting on a foundation, the political, which was in an advanced state of decay, and threatened to sink beneath its own weight. His surroundings showed Him the highest world-historic powers, political sovereignty and ecclesiastical (theocratic), fallen away from God, sunk in the service of egoism. It showed Him the religious life of the Jews petrified into a literal and meaningless ceremonial worship, in combination with empty political ideals and national self-idolatry (Pharisees, Caiaphas). And by the side of superstition and formality appeared Gentile incredulity, the reflective wisdom of the world with all its atheism: with the naturalism which has resolved all religious conceptions into ideas of the natural man, into the course of nature, the usual order of things; with indifferentism and scepticism, whose adherents, weary of the change in human systems and opinions, mockingly inquired, What is truth? with Epicurism, which addicts itself to no other worship than that of the flesh (Sadducees, Pilate, Herod and his court). He found His nation as sheep without a shepherd, the prey alternately of false prophets and of blind leaders. But in the midst of the general depravity, which may well be designated a world-wide process of corruption, He found also in the souls of men new germs of life, announcements of a new time, holy expectation and desire. By the side of extreme corruption and obduracy He found the deepest susceptibility for the kingdom of God—poverty of spirit, hunger and thirst after righteousness, not merely in the people of Israel, but also among heathens and Samaritans. And in the midst of the miserable and precarious condition of His nation, He found, especially among the younger generation, a circle of men fitted to become His disciples, the stay and support of the time to come, instruments for the extension of God's kingdom in the world.

Into this world of contrasts Christ entered, disclosed Himself, and fulfilled the mission of His life. The greatness He displayed during His pilgrimage on earth was quiet greatness. For in deepest tranquillity, in a remote corner of the world, He completed His work of redemption and atonement, and left behind to the race His example. Only after He, ignored, betrayed, rejected, had died a felon's death upon the cross, and had become invisible to the world, did it become manifest to the world what He had been, and not merely had been, but constantly continues to be for it.

THE EXAMPLE OF FREE-WILL. SON OF MAN AND SON OF GOD.

§ 75.

If we turn more narrowly to the contemplation of this calm greatness, and give ourselves up to the impression of His personality, whilst in spirit we wander forth with Him, like the disciples of old, we cannot but receive the conviction that the ideal of free-will in Him was realized. The first thing to which we turn attention is, that His relation to the law of morality is one wholly different from that of other men. In all other men there appears, namely, a struggle, an opposition between God's holy law and their own will,—a discord which, the more conscience is awakened, the more seriously we consider the demands of the law, makes us feel the law as a yoke, a burden, and which awakens in us a longing desire, a necessity for atonement and redemption. There are, indeed, now many who think that there is no other relation to the law, that all men must find themselves at this standpoint, even if there be a question of a relative reconciliation and smoothing over of this disharmony in man's inner being, because they assume that all men, even the noblest and the best, are sinners. And undeniably, experience shows us the universality of sin in the human race. The longer we live, the more seriously we ourselves strive after moral perfection, and the more our eyes become sharpened to the requirements of the law, the more frequently do we experience that those men, whether belonging to a former age or to the present, to whom in our first enthusiasm we had looked up as patterns, because they charmed and attracted us by an appearance of moral perfection, lose their glory, and are degraded to relative greatness, one after the other. It is an experience, which is again and again corroborated, that those whom we call great, noble, and distinguished, in so far as they are to be considered from the view-point of the moral ideal, cannot stand close inspection, but must be seen from a distance. The more opportunity we have closely to contemplate the life of a conspicuous man, who strives after the ideal, the more will we perceive that throughout this life, though probably it may be admired by the beholders, there vibrates a secret pain, a jarring dissonance, a sigh for peace, a complaint like that of the apostle: "The good which I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do" (Rom. vii. 19); or we hear a confession, which one of these distinguished characters has expressed in these words: "To do anything good is always delightful, to execute anything great is the joy of the gifted; but to remain sinless, umblemished by guilt—alas, how hard, how difficult!" But he who from all these sin-stained patterns will turn to Christ, will find that here is the great Being who needs not to make confession of sin. Here is He who knows not remorse, but only holy sorrow for the sin and misery of mankind, whilst His own personal life breathes freedom and heavenly peace. He does not know from His own experience what it is to remain at the standpoint of the law, to be under the yoke and curse of the law, to feel the struggle between the demands of conscience and the actual condition; and neither does He know from His own experience, what it is to be a man reconciled to God, to have received the forgiveness of sins, and to be admitted to the adoption of sons. He testifies concerning Himself, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" He summons all to come to Him and learn of Him, calls Himself meek and humble of heart, without thereby wounding humility. His life is described by those who saw Him close at hand, not merely in single important moments, but who daily followed Him, and were with Him in the most diverse circumstances of life. But no critic has been able to point out in His life any sin or inconsistency, to exhibit anything in His word or deed, which He required to alter. Therefore have those who have so accustomed themselves to the impure atmosphere of this world, that they do not believe in the possibility of a sinless human life, declared the life of Christ to be a myth. But they have not been able to explain the miracle of such a myth. Neither have they been able to indicate the author or show the possibility of a sinless and holy myth originating in this world of sin. But he who believes in Christ's freedom from sin, has in this belief the commencement of real self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. To believe that Christ is without sin, is certainly the least which can be believed concerning Christ, is the minimum of Christian faith; for without this boundary lies unbelief and atheism. But however imperfect a man's knowledge of Christ may be, yet if he receives this smallest article of faith, he has in it a fruitful mustard-seed, which may develope itself into faith in the Lord of glory. If he believes that in this world of sin and death there appeared One who was without sin, a man who did not come under the law, because His life was the fulfilling of the law; a man in whose development there was indeed growth, progress from the incomplete to the complete, but no contradiction, no variance between ideal and reality, because at every step of His progress He was what He ought to be; in His life prior to consciousness, in His childhood, which was thus no sinful natural condition, the disturbing influence of which must infallibly have produced its effects throughout the whole subsequent development,—if he believes this, then he believes the *miracle*, believes that these laws of nature have been broken through by a higher order of things. To deny this ethical miracle is to deny from the very foundation what is *new* in Christianity. If Christ, though possessing relative moral perfection and dignity, took no higher position than that of the law, was in any degree under the yoke and condemnation of the law, then all has continued old. Then we have no Redeemer, and no pattern; then the ideal of liberty has not been revealed in reality. We cannot press on any one the acknowledgment of Christ's freedom from sin. For Christ's inward greatness reveals itself only to the recipients. But we can urge on every one a great alternative for their decisive choice. For either He, who testified concerning Himself that He was without sin, and who in connection with this matter brought forward a host of witnesses, in which He claimed for Himself the position of the Highest, must have been an arrogant visionary, wanting in all self-knowledge, and therefore the chief priests and the Jews have pronounced a righteous sentence on Him; or in this and in everything else the relations must be as He has said.

§ 76.

But the ethical miracle ascends and becomes greater, when we not merely yield to the impression of the isolated in Christ's position to the law, but also to the isolation of His position in regard to the copiousness and harmony of His being. We discriminate in the life of man between one-sided and harmonious characters. Yet in the ordinary life of man there is, in the absolute sense of the term, no such thing as harmonious character. In every human being there is not merely a want of harmony on account of sin, but also a one-sidedness on account of the limitation in his endowments, which prevents him from moving freely on all sides. The character has not perfect equilibrium, so long as it has not by association with others, in the fullest signification, by association with the kingdom of God, been received into a higher harmony. Only in Christ do we behold that perfectly harmonious character which affords inexhaustible fulness to our contemplation. Human life, with the exception of that of Christ, shows us only moral characters, which are *disjecta membra*, shattered moments of personal perfection, because the moment which is signally present lacks its harmonizing contrast; whilst Christ stands alone in the abundance of harmonious contrasts, which in His personality have their unity. There are thus moral characters, whose energetic virtue is love to society, enthusiasm for the aims and pursuits of public life, but who are far from entertaining in the same measure an interest in the relations of individual life, who prefer the ideals of humanity to the actual human individuals. And, *vice versa*, there are characters whose predominant affection is individual, and who have their special sphere in relation to individuals. In Christ we see the harmonious unity of the universal and the individual love of man. He whose work was to embrace peoples and tongues and races, receives with cordiality every human being who comes in contact with Him and opens his mind to Him. The good shepherd leaves the ninety-nine sheep in the wilderness, in order to search after the one that was lost. We discriminate between masculine and feminine characters. But though in Christ we must acknowledge the highest pre-eminence of manly character, the world-contesting, world-subduing heroism, which at the same time has here this peculiarity, that it bears the consciousness that it must give way for a time, but accepts sufferings and death as moments in its work, certain of victory at last; yet we cannot call Him a masculine character, as in contradistinction to the feminine. For the highest characteristics of womanly virtue are found also in Him—infinite devotion and singleness of purpose, the unruffled serenity of a calm and gentle spirit, pure and modest feeling in the maintenance of the finest moral distinctions; and the power peculiar to women of passive obedience, power to bear, to suffer, to forego, in unspeakable loyalty. He is at once the lion and the lamb. There are individualities and characters which have their life predominantly in quiet contemplation, as the philosopher who in thought looks out over existence, in the tranquillity of speculation seeks to discover its laws, but does not actively entangle himself in the finite aims, in the strife and turmoil of life, which for him are only a subject for consideration; or as predominantly an inwardly religious life, as we see with ascetics and mystics, who desire to fall asleep to the world that they may awake in God,—whilst surrounded by the things of time, desire to anticipate eternity. In contrast to these contemplative and mystic natures, we see practical natures, which are exclusively devoted to action, have no time for contemplation, because reality is everything to them. But in Christ we behold the marvellous unity of the contemplative and the practical,—the repose of contemplation, the deepest earnestness and abstraction of prayer, combined with the most energetic activity; because He, not merely by contemplation, but in deed, nay, by aggression, entered into relation with the actual powers of the world, and in strife with these provoked the catastrophe of His life. Finally, we can discriminate between such characters whose development predominantly bears the impress of an intellectual nature, a quiet growth, the so-called beautiful minds, which we most frequently meet in naive, poetic, and artist natures, and in women, whose being makes the impression of a natural harmony (because the dissonance of sin has not as yet come to an outbreak), and such whose life presents the picture of a struggle for liberty, but thus also lacks the beautiful immediateness of the first. In Christ, on the other hand, all is nature: His actions come forth with the impress of a higher natural necessity from His inner being; and yet all is freedom, clear, self-conscious action.

It has been said that nothing great is achieved in the world without *passion;* and from this it would follow that we must also ascribe passions to Christ. We, however, deny the truth of the maxim cited, in so far as it demands absolute universal validity; on the other hand, we maintain that nothing great has been achieved without enthusiasm. Passion always implies a one-sided, enthralled, and unharmonious condition. In passion, a man has sacrificed the moral totality of his being, and only exerts an individual portion—one side of his nature; he is spell-bound under the despotic sway of a single interest, which usurps the place of the whole. In all passion there is idolatry, and ruthlessly is set aside, sacrificed, slain, everything—not merely the unauthorized, but also the important and deserving, —all for the one idol. We therefore do not ascribe passion to Christ, though just as little do we ascribe to Him stoical indifference, coldness, and want of feeling. On the contrary, we know and bear witness that Christ lived a life of the deepest feeling, that there moved in Him the most powerful desire after that which was the object of His life ("I am come to send fire on earth; and what will I if it be already kindled?" Luke xii. 49); and we ascribe to Him, therefore, a holy pathos, holy emotion, but exclude everything unbecoming and one-sided. Although every moment of life was lived by Him in its whole depth, yet He never thus enters into any individual emotion, whether of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, in such a manner as to lose thereby the moral totality of His being. The sympathetic and the autopathic with Him are in perfect harmony. In His devotion to men, both in the universal and individual sense, He preserves the deepest self-possession. He devotes Himself to all, to each; according to his susceptibility, is accessible to all; but never, either among friends or foes, neither when the world greeted Him with hosannahs, nor in the season of His humiliation, under the scorn of men, and with the cross before His eyes, did He forget His royal dignity, or was false to Himself. In no condition of His life of emotion do we see the absence of harmony. The Gospels show us, that when one pathos, one emotion, one chord of feeling vibrates, its opposite is always present too, though unperceived, keeping the first within just limitations; and this contrast generally comes into view before the first chord has fairly died away.[1] In the denunciations of woe against the Pharisees, we hear not merely the voice of law and justice, but also the complaint of love unappreciated; and in His parting lament over the Temple, we hear at the conclusion these words, in which a future comfort for the unhappy people yet gleams forth: "Ye shall not see me from this time forth, until ye shall say, Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord!" (Matt. xxiii. 39.) He weeps over Jerusalem; but the note of sympathy, the note of lamentation, in this contemplation passes over into action, whilst He immediately thereafter goes into the Temple to drive out thence the buyers and sellers (Luke xix. 45). In the highest moments of exaltation, when the disciples or the people yield Him praise and acknowledgment, the deepest seriousness breaks forth, the consciousness that the hosannahs of the people shall be changed into the cry, "Crucify him!" consciousness of coming suffering and death, in which even the disciples shall be offended in Him. And, *vice versa:* from the notes of sorrow and pain break forth gladness, gratitude to the Father for the progress of God's kingdom, and blissful consciousness of victory. When Mary at Bethany anoints Him, He says in holy sadness, "She has anointed me for my burial." But the sadness is changed into glad certainty that the future belongs to Him, and He says: "Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall this which this woman hath done be told for a memorial of her" (John xii. 7; Mark xiv. 9).

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[1] See Ullmann, *On Christ's Sinless Perfection.*

And as His being is harmonious in itself, so is He also in harmony with everything outside of Him,—except with sin, and the confusion which through sin has entered into the world. For Him there was no *original*, no discordant contrast between the world of matter, or corporeity, and the world of mind, between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of humanity. The material creation, with the lilies of the field and the fowls of the air, with the ear of wheat which falls into the earth and dies, with the vine and the fig-tree; human life, with its manifold relations and occupations, with the sower and the shepherd, the bridegroom and the bride, the master and the steward, the merchant and the usurer, the physician and the judge, the captain and the king,—all become to Him types, emblems of that kingdom of God into which He desires to bring men. Everywhere He sees the divine unity of thought which permeates, embraces, and binds all things together, both the spiritual and the natural, the visible and the invisible, the earthly and the heavenly, in one vast economy. He has manifested His dignity in domestic life, in Nazareth, in Cana, in Bethany. He submitted Himself to the orders of the State, and exhorted to render unto Cæsar the things which were Cæsar's (Matt. xxii. 21). Neither the State with its regulations, nor the family with mother and children, are for Him in themselves unholy; only sin has in Him its inexorable enemy. But for this cause has He come to redeem the world from sin, and in order that the dissonance produced by sin—which, to the disturbance of their tranquillity, permeates all circles of human life, and every individual soul within them—might be received into His pure and holy heart, in its harmony with itself, that, passing through this dissonance and suffering, through it He might re-establish the kingdom of peace. His view of the world is therefore wholly different from this world's Optimism or Pessimism. For that which completes His liberty, the animating principle in every one of His free actions, is His world-redeeming and soul-redeeming *love.*

§ 77.

And if, then, contemplation further inquires: Who, then, is He, who so resembles us in our condition as men, who has watched and slept, laboured and been weary, has been tried in all things like as we, and yet is so essentially unlike us in relation to the law of God, so unlike the highly gifted amongst us, by the boundlessness of His endowments, and by that which it is His purpose to achieve in the world, that He stands before us with the impress of the superhuman?—to such an inquiry we know no other satisfactory reply than that which is given us in His own testimony, and in the testimony of His apostles, and which refers us to a peculiar relation of nature and being, both to the human race and to God. He designates Himself the Son of man, that is to say, as man himself, as He who represents human nature not merely in its purity, but also in its perfection and fulness. If the whole human race is a kingdom of eternal individualities, of immortal souls, then Christ is the central individuality in this organism. One of His apostles calls Him the second Adam, the new man, as the first of a new spiritualized race, under whom the mass or body of mankind shall collect as under the Head, because the numerous human individuals and nationalities, first through

Him come into right organic relation towards each other mutually, and towards God. Just because He came to draw all men unto Himself, to redeem all human talents, and all human wills, to make every one perfect, to help him to achieve the essential aim of life, which is for each to become a *man*; just on this account must He come to us not as an individual man, in this or that special endowment, this or that special vocation, but as the *man*, as the point of union of all human talents and all human wills; just on this account, although He appears in a particular century, and among a single people, His whole revelation bears the stamp of eternity, and is fitted to impress on all times and all races the universal-human and the closest brotherhood, and must find an echo in every human breast, be it man or woman, which is not closed by sin against Him who cometh to His own. The words of Pilate: Ecce homo! Behold the man! receive here their just and true significance. And this is the marvel, that He, as the universal man, does not make the impression of the abstract, uniform, and colourless, the indefinite and misty, but in the Gospels stands before us in all the freshness of the most distinct, most strongly marked individuality, that this human form of brightness shows itself before us in an infinite number of individual refractions, an inexhaustible variety of the finest individual traits.

§ 78.

But He who is to be the Mediator between God and man, must not merely be in unity with the human race, but also with God. And He who is to be the example of free-will, must not merely show us freedom in its inner harmony and consistency with itself, but also in its unity with God, with the divine love; must not be merely the son of man, but also the Son of God. It is a great though very widespread one-sidedness, to regard the destiny of man, as a free moral being, as consisting only in productivity, whilst first of all it must be regarded as *receptivity* of God. On the power of human nature to receive God, rests the possibility of God becoming man, which already shines forth from the idea of God's kingdom, a kingdom of individuals, which God fills with His real presence. But if this idea is only relatively and imperfectly realized in those human individuals who are members of God's kingdom, it is realized in an absolute and unique manner in Christ as the Head of this kingdom. In the new Adam, as the Head of the human race, is the *central receptivity of God* of man's nature. Therefore Christ is not merely, like the prophets, a man favoured of God; but the divine favour, the divine *Charis*, in human form, manifesting itself in the form of human liberty. As a true man, Christ is the unity of mind, soul, and body. But whilst every human soul is fitted to become a temple of God, a dwelling for God, formed in a relative sense to be united with God, the soul of Christ is that, among all other souls, in which not only dwells the fulness of humanity, but also the fulness of God, not merely as an inhabitation, which, as with the prophets, had commenced at a fixed period of the soul's self-conscious life (which would presuppose a former condition of sin, or at least a partially developed human existence, which, just on account of its partial or one-sided character, would be incapable of receiving fulness), but as an incarnation, a union of the divine and human, which must be assigned to the preconscious condition, in which the soul itself forms its body, and in which the whole mental resources must already be potentially present. And if we, in our anthropological postulate, have said that in every human soul there is something new, which has not been before, and thus cannot be attributed to earthly parentage, something beyond the natural, which cannot be explained by descent from it, but in which we recognise the divine creative power (the creative moment), this holds good in an absolute sense of the soul of Christ. It is absolutely impossible to imagine this soul as an offshoot of the sinful race. In the birth of Christ itself we stand face to face with the supernatural in the most eminent sense, even though we can say that human nature from the first was planned to furnish the conditions for this birth (Mary). But when we consider the soul of Christ as a new creation, the idea of creation here converges into the idea of God's becoming man, of the incarnation of the Eternal Word, just because this soul had not, like the rest of human souls, a worldly independence and special character outside the holy centre of Divinity, but was destined to be the *self-manifestation of the holy centre of Divinity*, in the form of human nature.

If we, therefore, in the contemplation of Christ's life, which unfolds itself before us in a progressive human development (Jesus increased in wisdom and favour, Luke ii. 52), are constrained to exclaim: Ecce homo! Behold the man! yet we can only say it with truth, when we say also: Ecce Deus! Behold God in human form! He who hath seen Him, hath seen the Father! Here is the reflexion of His glory, and the express image of His person. Here is not merely man's love to God, but God's own love to the race of man in human form. The same who designates Himself the Son of man (John iii. 11), and speaks that which He knows, because every one of His assertions is the assertion of His own self-consciousness, originating in inner knowledge and experience, says also that He is *one* with the Father (John x. 30); and He regards His coming to this world, and the whole of His life on earth, as the *continuation of His heavenly, superhuman life,* in which He had glory with the Father before the foundation of the world (John xvii. 5); where He was thus from eternity, and whence He descended to seek and to save that which was lost, to become the Bread and the Fountain of Life for men (John vi. 51). He was in the world in the universal manner as the Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John i. 9), before He appeared as that human individuality, in whom dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily (Col. ii. 9). But although in His individuality He manifests a glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father, still His descent to earth, and His life on earth, were acts of self-derogation, self-humiliation. For He had come to bear the sin of the world, to win back through obedience that which had been lost by the disobedience of the first man; and He was therefore obliged to submit Himself to poverty and temptation, suffering and death. It is this, His free self-humiliation, which the Apostle Paul describes in Phil. ii. 6–8: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man: and being found in fashion as a man, He *humbled* Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

THE EXAMPLE OF LOVE AND OBEDIENCE. THE LORD IN THE FORM OF A SERVANT.

§ 79.

In whatever mode, then, we seek metaphysically to interpret the words of the apostle concerning Him who humbled Himself and took on Him the form of a servant, which can only be unfolded in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, the ethical significance is undoubtedly this: that He brought an unspeakably vast offering of love, and by His entrance into the world of time renounced a glory, a majesty, an equality with God, which belonged to Him in His life of eternity. And although, during His life on earth, the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily in Him, yet self-abasement, dignity in humiliation, continue to be the characteristics of His life on earth, which was indeed a *veiling* of glory, which caused the worldly mind to misunderstand and ignore Him. He who is in being one with the Father, has by becoming man entered into an absolute relation of subordination to the Father; and words such as, "The Father is greater than I" (John xiv. 28), are not at all, as a narrow orthodoxy has suggested, to be taken as regarding only the human nature of Christ, but as regarding the whole Christ in humiliation. This subordinate relation is shown especially in this, that His divine and human life of love developes itself under the form of *obedience*, without which it could not be said that He has left us a pattern. And the progressive development of His obedience must not be regarded as though Christ had only had one will, namely the divine (not monotheletically, but *dyotheletically*). In the development of His *divine* and *human* will, the divine and the human moment separate and become distinct, so that the lower can be freely subjected to the higher, and perfect obedience is manifested. (Not my will, but Thine be done!) To Christ, also, a choice was offered. His temptation and contest were no mere seeming. He not only strove against the world, but against the princes of this world, against the demoniac powers, and the devil. The worldly impulse stirred in His nature, and He perceived in Himself the possibility of defection, the possibility of making Himself an earthly, a worldly Messiah, and of winning the riches and glory of this lower sphere,—a Messianic kingdom which was desired by many, who sought the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life; a possibility which, however, could not be realized in the Only-begotten of the Father, who herein, in contrast to Prometheus, would not take the glory of divinity by theft or fraud, but chose to become the Redeemer of the world through obedience and the cross. He, indeed, showed signs and wonders, since the fulness of the powers dwelt in Him, and He could pray the Father to send Him legions of angels (Matt. xxvi. 53), but always only in pursuance of His mission as Redeemer; and the miracle was always ethically conditioned by the aim of God's kingdom, by the will of the Father: every manifestation of power was subordinate to holy love. The highest summit of obedience was shown in the narrative of the agony in the garden, and on the cross, where, in order to complete the work of redemption, He entirely relinquishes the use of this miraculous power, nay, where the suffering reaches the point of feeling God-forsaken, that the Scripture might be fulfilled. But this obedience of His would lose its highest significance as a pattern and a prototype, if it were not the obedience of Him who was originally and essentially the Lord of glory. If it was only a man who had tragically become involved in pain and suffering, and had endured the inevitable with moral dignity, we should here undoubtedly have an edifying example. But we should miss that perfect ideal of love which we now have in Christ, when we, in the suffering and dying Redeemer, see the Only-begotten of the Father, who has relinquished the glory of divinity, and submitted Himself to a humiliation which is in direct contrast to His essential dignity.[1] They who make Christ a mere man, in order, as they say, to do honour to the ethical, the human, weaken and injure the ethical, because they deny to Christ the means and the possibility of the highest manifestation of love. The truly ethical, truly human example which Christ has left us, rests on the mysterious basis of the divine in His being, and loses its power, becomes empty and flat, when it is detached from this.

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[1] St. Martin and Fr. Baader: He divested Himself of His divine glory, and *there remained to Him only the unquenchable focus of love.*

§ 80.

The ideal of obedience, which is manifested in Christ, is prophetically set forth in the Old Testament, without, however, being comprehended in perfect union with that of love. We refer here to the representation of the Lord's righteous *Servant* upon earth. This representation implies that the Lord desires to have a work on earth executed by another than Himself, by His servant. The work is the founding of God's kingdom, the kingdom of righteousness, by which redemption is re-established. By the servant we are first led to think of the people of Israel; for it was appointed to them, in the midst of the unrighteousness of the heathen, to work out a preparatory restoration of the true relation towards God. But as Israel itself again and again falls away from the true God, and falls back to the old unrighteousness, the conception of the Lord's servant is limited to the pious and believing in Israel, and amongst these in particular to the prophets, who, as the ambassadors of God, through suffering, adversity, and persecution, labour for His righteous cause on earth. But neither can the prophets realize the ideal of God's servant, because none of them lives in undisturbed communion with God, their intercourse being often interrupted by sin and self-will. Therefore the representation of God's righteous servant can only be referred to a single individual, the Messiah, who in the fulness of time should be manifested to carry forward God's cause to victory. It is this personality of whom the prophet Isaiah speaks, when he says: Behold my Servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have put my Spirit upon Him; He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles. He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause His voice to be heard in the street. A bruised reed shall He not break, and the smoking flax shall He not quench, till He have set judgment in the earth (Isa. xlii.). It is the same of whom it is said, that He shall grow up as a root out of a dry ground, without form or comeliness; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief. He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed. But when Thou shalt make His soul an offering for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days. My righteous Servant shall justify many; and He shall divide the spoil with the strong (Isa. liii.).

But the representation of the servant of the Lord is inseparable from another representation—that of the *Son of God.* The relation of servant is the relation of obedience to God; but the filial relation is the relation of love, the relation of union with God. The same beings who in the prophecies are described as servants of God, are described also as the sons of God. Not only is Israel as an entire people called in the Old Testament the son of God ("Out of Egypt I have called my son"), but the chosen in Israel, the supporters and instruments of God's kingdom, are called the sons of God, the children of God. As the Lord says, "Behold my servant, whom I have chosen" (Isa. xlii. 1); so He says also (Ps. ii.), "Thou art my son; this day I have begotten thee." But in Christ this prophecy first finds its true fulfilment. For as Christ is the only-begotten among the servants of God, the only one who uninterruptedly preserves obedience, so, too, is He also the only-begotten Son, the Son of God not merely in an ethical, but moreover in a physical sense. Only on the ground of His original being in the Father, only because in essence He is the Son, can He be truly the servant of God on earth, can He fulfil what prophecy can only demand and predict. This fulfilment of prophecy we may express in the words of the apostle quoted above in Phil. ii. 6–8: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; yet He humbled Himself." As the Lord in the form of a servant, He executes God's work on earth in perfect unity of obedience and love, and leaves us thereby a pattern of love.

§ 81.

In examining the essential moments in Christ's example of love whilst in the form of a servant, we direct our attention partly towards His inward relation of love to the Father, partly towards His relation of love to the world. As all development of human personality assumes the psychological essential forms, Assimilation and Production, the unfolding of Christ's personality took also these forms. In His relation to the Father He appears as assimilating—in unconditional devotion receiving and appropriating to Himself the divine fulness of life. For though from His birth He was one with the Father, yet this did not prevent what the Gospels show to us, that He constantly stood in a relation of reciprocity — interchange of influence with the Father. In His relation to the world He is active, creating anew, whilst He imparts to it that fulness which the Father has given Him, bestowing on the world the bread of life. And through this activity He not merely continues His appropriation of the Father ("It is my meat to do His will that sent me, and to finish His work," John iv. 34), whilst He draws therefrom the heavenly, the nourishing powers to Himself; but through His working He appropriates also to Himself the world, makes souls His possession, His own kingdom (I know my own, and am known of mine; neither shall any pluck them out of my hand, John x. 14, 28). Of cleansing and purification with regard to Him, the pure and sinless One, there can be no mention, as there might with us. On the contrary, His life was a constant *sacrifice,* a free-will offering and voluntary suffering, since, in spite of the world's continued and increasing opposition, He desires to redeem men, to abolish sin, and as Redeemer to take away guilt by bearing it Himself. Because He had come to cleanse the world, He had to bring about a crisis, a separation, a division between the susceptible and the unsusceptible, between the children of light and the children of darkness ("I am come for the judgment of the world, that they that see not should receive sight, and that the seeing should become blind," John ix. 39); He had to bring about a crisis in the individual heart, which He desired to awaken to contrition and repentance. He Himself required no cleansing, but in His whole relation to the world He had to keep Himself from its pollutions, to resist all impure influences of this world's spirit and this world's mental-atmosphere, and only appropriate to Himself from it that which might become an element in His normal development. As the chief moments of the example of love given us by the Redeemer in His state of humiliation, we therefore set forth this appropriating love in the inward communion with the Father, which has its expression in meditation and prayer; that active and passive affection, which has its expression in the whole of His redeeming work on earth. As His love both in regard to the Father and to the world is the love of the Redeemer, His voluntary sacrifice and suffering is everywhere present, though in various ways, whilst it appears in a very peculiar manner in that part of his life which we specially call the story of His passion.

As His love and obedience are the manifestations of free love to the Father and to men, He thus attains thereby His own personal perfection. The ideal of freedom is realized only through that of love. Through the completion of the Father's work He becomes Himself perfected; and through the continued development of the love, appropriating and devoting, active and passive, in which He becomes the bread of life and the fountain of life for men, He builds to Himself His body in the ethical sense of the term. His outward body, with all its members, He spiritualizes to be the instrument of His holy personality, and He Himself designates His body a dwelling, a temple of God. "Destroy this temple," said He to the Jews, "and in three days I will raise it again. But He spake of the temple of His body," adds the apostle (John ii. 21). He prepares to Himself His inner body, His intellectual, spiritual property, in which all the fulness of His gifts is spiritually glorified and hallowed; on which account He is not merely in a physical but in an ethical sense God's beloved Son, in whom the Father is well pleased; on which account God can again raise Him from the state of humiliation, and which is the condition of the miracle of almighty power in His resurrection from the dead, because it was not possible that death could hold Him, whose organism was thus united to God, not possible that God could suffer His Holy One to see corruption (Acts ii. 24–27). And after His resurrection from the dead He continues to construct to Himself His body in the widest sense of the term, since He, through His continued world and soul redeeming activity, goes on appropriating to Himself human souls, in order thereby to prepare for Himself His organism, or His Church, in which each individual soul is His tool, Christ's instrument, and He Himself by His Spirit the animating principle both in the individual and in the whole,—an agency in the formation of bodies, which shall continue in force till the end of the world, when in the whole extent of the word it shall be manifested that Christ is the head of His *body* the Church (Eph. i. 22).

But here we pause, still to consider the love of the Redeemer in His state of humiliation.

CONTEMPLATIVE AND SUPPLICATIVE LOVE. ACTIVE LOVE.

§ 82.

The inner life of the Lord must be to us a mystery, and we can only speak about it according to what the Lord has Himself revealed to us. But all the declarations of the Lord lead us to conceive His relation to the Father to be one of reception and appropriation. The first which here presents itself before us, is His divine-human view of the Father, who has sent Him into the world. When the Apostle John says, "No one hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" (John i. 18), we understand that He who is to make known to men that God whom no one hath seen, must Himself have beheld God, and not merely have beheld, but lived in a constantly renewing contemplation of God, and of all things in God. He testifies only concerning those things which He has *seen* with the Father (John iii. 11); and the Father shows Himself to Him not merely in the mirror of nature, human life, and the Scriptures, but directly, in the inward communion of life, in which He is in the Father, and the Father in Him. If we think of the long time which preceded His public appearance, His quiet youth in Nazareth, in the city on the mountain-top with the broad outlook,—this life concerning which we only know that He grew and increased in years and in wisdom, and in favour with God and men,—we may well imagine that it was preponderatingly full of holy meditation and contemplation, in which nature and human life changed before Him into pictures and emblems of the kingdom of God which He bears within Him, and the Scriptures have opened to Him as types and prophecies, which are to find their fulfilment in Himself. Specially conspicuous do we find the contemplative life in the Gospels, where it is related that Christ withdrew into solitude, and spent whole nights in meditation and prayer (Luke vi. 12). It recurs frequently in the sacred narrative that God's revelations come to the solitary, and that only those who have been alone with God have attained the power to influence society as instruments and ambassadors of God, because receptivity of God can only be developed in solitude. In solitude the Lord spoke to the prophets, to Moses, to Elias, to John the Baptist; and thus also the Son in solitude listened to the Father's voice. But this is the difference between the Son and the prophets, that Christ's knowledge of the Father is not associated with a single moment of revelation, an individual vision or ecstasy of mind, a single word of God, which has come to Him, but that it developes itself from His original relation of union with the Father, from uninterrupted and undisturbed progressive intercourse with Him. Under this presupposition He who is *one* with the Father says: I speak to the world that which I have *heard* from the Father (John viii. 26); and, The Son can do nothing but that which He seeth the Father do (John v. 19). And this His relation of only Son, this His inner solitariness, in which the Father is with Him in the deepest stillness of His soul—like an uninterrupted Sabbath stillness—continues throughout His life amongst men. In the midst of the most exciting social life, in the most earnest devotion of love to men, He is still the solitary One in the human race, who, surrounded by the deafening voices and the shifting scenes of this world, incessantly *listens* to the Father, and *contemplates* what the Father shows Him.

But this filial relation to the Father must be developed and glorified through the relation of service and obedience. The sacrificing, and at the same time critical, discriminating, and limiting relation to the world, begins already in quiet contemplation. For, in contrast to that which the Father shows Him, the world displays to Him quite other images, and in obedience He must reject and strive against the false and alluring visions with which the spirit of the world seeks to entice Him. This appears plainly in the story of the temptation in the wilderness, where in solitude He fights the great fight, in which He rejects the false worldly ideals of a Messiah, and subjects Himself to the written word, repulsing each assault of the tempter with an "It is written!"—thereby testifying that He placed Himself under the entire control of the Father, which in Him should find the fulfilment of His word. In this, His obedience in contemplation, there is an analogy to the belief without which He could not be the founder and the finisher of our faith (Heb. vii. 2). For though He beholds the Father and heavenly things, still He finds Himself in a world which meets Him with a multitude of signs and experiences, which seem to tell Him that His inner visions are fancies, illusions, and that this visible world is the only true reality. His unity with the Father, thus even His view, is not from the beginning what it shall first become, when His personal perfection is complete. It therefore becomes an ethical task for Him, in His state of humiliation, not to regard things visible, but the invisible; in spite of worldly experience, to hold fast the certainty of His communion with the Father, certainty of what He sees and hears regarding Him, in contradiction to all that He sees and hears in the world; certainty concerning Himself as the Only-begotten (*ἐγώ εἰμι*),—a task which receives a special significance in the story of the Passion, where He has the whole world opposed to Him, where it seems that His whole work is overthrown, and has been founded only on illusion and self-deception.

But our Lord's inner life shows us not only the progressive unity of faith and sight, but is at the same time a life of prayer. It is the essence of prayer to be the real and living appropriation (assimilation) of God and the divine fulness of life. For he who prays in truth, prays first and foremost for God Himself, for the Spirit of God, for spiritual influences from above. But the prayer of Christ is the prayer of the Mediator, the prayer of the Redeemer, in which He appropriates the Father's love to Himself, and to those who are to be redeemed by Him; and when it is declared concerning Him, that God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost and with power (Acts x. 38), we cannot, in so far as we conceive of His self-conscious life, avoid the inference that He received this anointing in the attitude of prayer. For, that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, that He was the Word of God become man (John i. 1), and that the fulness of God dwells bodily in Him, does not preclude His progressive development, does not preclude the continued communication of power and Spirit from the Father, which also appeared as a special consecration at His baptism, when the Spirit of God came upon Him (Matt. iii. 16). The filial relation in prayer must also be interpreted through the relation of service and obedience. For prayer is only appropriation of God, union with God, contains only its own fulfilment, in so far as it is at the same time the *yielding up* of the individual will to the divine. All prayer is sacrifice; but the idea of sacrifice is devotion of our possessions in the highest sense,—devotion of our own will, our self; and if we could only in prayer accomplish this sacrifice in a higher degree, we should also receive more. Because Christ in prayer sacrifices His individual will, sacrifices it as an independent will, draws His Father's will to Himself, it becomes possible for the Father to glorify the Son. Thus, it is related in the narrative of Christ's baptism, by which He consecrated Himself to bear the sins of the world, that as He came up out of the water, and *prayed* (Luke iii. 21), behold, the heavens were opened unto Him, and the Holy Ghost came upon Him; and there came a voice, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. The same is said concerning the transfiguration on the mountain, that as He *prayed* (Luke ix. 29) He was transfigured before them; and His face did shine as the sun, and His raiment was white and glittering. And the same is shown after the sacrificial prayer in Gethsemane. For after that He had said in prayer, Not my will, but Thine be done! the story of His passion, contemplated by the eye of the spirit, is a progressive transfiguration.

§ 83.

But what the Lord in His inner life sees and hears from the Father, what He there appropriates, He does not reserve for His own exclusive property, but imparts to the world. From Christ's inner life of love to the Father, from contemplation and prayer, are developed His *active*, His redeeming and regenerating love to men. If Christ's life had been exclusively a life of meditation and prayer, a resting on the breast of the Father, then He would only have been the ideal of the Mystics and Theosophers. But the God who is revealed in Christ is not merely the God of contemplation, but of determination and action, who desires the establishment of His kingdom in the world. "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God" (Ps. xl.; Heb. x. 7): this word of prophecy, which refers to the Servant of the Lord, finds its fulfilment not merely in the sacrifice which Christ brings in prayer, but also in the sacrifice which He brings in His work. "I must work the work of Him that sent me whilst it is day; the night cometh, when no man can work"

(John ix. 4). This consciousness pervades Him, and urges Him to that ceaseless, indefatigable labour for the kingdom of God. He knows that He has only a short time, that the light shall shine before men but for a brief period (John vii. 35). Therefore He must redeem the fleeting time. And what a vast amount of labour has He not accomplished during the short period when it was day for Him to work—a period of two or three years! What an amount has not been gone through in a single day of our Lord's life! When thus it is related (Mark i. 32; Matt. viii. 16), that in the evening at sunset they brought unto Him many that were possessed with devils, and He drove out the spirits by His word, and healed all those that were sick, this evening hour was the close of a day which had been spent in uninterrupted activity in teaching the people, and in going about among them, healing them and doing them good. And this day was followed by another, about the beginning of which we are told, that whilst it was yet dark He arose and went thence into a desert place apart to pray. And Simon and they that were with Him followed after Him, and said, All men seek Thee. And He said unto them, Let us go into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for therefore came I forth (Mark i. 35–38). We are here reminded of the prophecy regarding the Servant of the Lord: "He shall not fail nor be discouraged" (Isa. xlii. 4). The great, the colossal in Christ's labour of love, the enthusiastic devotion, in which He does not spare Himself, in order to be able to achieve the work of redemption, exceeds all ordinary conceptions. Not the less is the burden of the work light to Him; and the ideal stands before our eyes, when we look beyond to the peace of eternity shed abroad upon this work, the tranquillity which mirrors itself in emotion,—the deep *circumspection* which characterizes His every word, His every deed, during all the conflicts and collisions of public life,—in regard to the masses of the people and popular feeling,—in regard to the disciples, to the adversaries, in contrast to whose deceit and rancour He manifests the simplicity of the dove and the prudence of the serpent,—in regard to men of the most dissimilar grades of education, the most varied conditions of mind.

In this His work, His self-sacrificing obedience, His patience was proved in a special manner, not merely by the resistance of men or by their indifference, but also by their senseless and worldly demands on Him. For the multitude desire of Him a sign of His mission entirely different from that which He shows them,—desire a sign from heaven, such a sign as shall make faith superfluous. Even a John the Baptist, no doubt in a moment of temptation, craves that He will lay aside the form of a servant, and in a more conspicuous manner stand forth as the promised Messiah, and usher in the kingdom of God. (Art thou He that should come, or do we look for another?) But in unconditional obedience, He continues to perform His work in the form of a servant; and in contrast to the impatient wishes and requirements of men, He listens to the Father alone. And just because He listens to the Father, and places His life entirely under the divine guidance, He understands the times in their relation to the decisions of eternity, which are to be realized in time. His works are always in harmony with the actual relation and the actual circumstances; for at every moment he knows what is the time in the kingdom of God. He is not surprised, as is so often the case with the great men of history, by any situation. For in reality it is He Himself who produces the situation, and is its Master, which specially holds good in the narrative of the Passion, where His adversaries imagine themselves masters of the situation, whilst He fulfils the eternal decree. In no section of His life does He do anything too early or too late; He knows when His hour is come, and when it is not yet come. He says once to His brethren, who request Him to go up to a feast at Jerusalem in order to make Himself known to the people: "My time is not yet come; but your time is always ready" (John vii. 6). And by this He means to say, that for them, whose life in time was not placed in relation to the Eternal, who had no work of the Father's to accomplish, the various moments, the various periods of time were indifferent, because their works were non-essential, without intrinsic significance. For such, one point of time is as good as another, and therefore the time is always ready for what they wish to undertake. They could appear openly whenever it should be, because they allowed themselves to be guided by the stream of time, but have nothing to reveal which will arouse the opposition of the world. For Him, on the other hand, who has a testimony to bear *against* the world, the precise *moment* has a great significance, because it is determined by its relation to eternity, by its relation to the work of the Father which He has to accomplish. He perceives and employs the moment in its special significance for the kingdom of God, and therefore forestalls nothing in impatience, and neglects nothing in procrastination.

§ 84.

And thus Christ's example presents to us the solution of a contradiction, which recurs again and again in human life, and which we have already touched upon in the foregoing, but must now more closely elucidate,—the contradiction between the contemplative and the practical life. There is a view of life, set forth by deep and earnest natures, which seeks to maintain that the perfect life is in contemplation alone. For, say they, when man acts, he goes out of himself and of the harmony of his inner being, betakes himself to the diversities and separated interests of life, and subjects himself to the conditions and intricacies of this temporary state. He who *has* acted is bound to the consequences of his actions, and thus becomes bound to the world, instead of being free from the world. Therefore it is best and happiest for a man not to act, but to remain on the mount of contemplation, to absorb his soul in the Eternal, to live in view of God and divine things: for thus he remains in the unity, in the tranquillity, in which there is the greatest likeness to God; whilst the active man is without the immediate circle of God's felt presence, cannot avoid being entangled in what is worldly, and being soiled by the contact, and thus bringing division into his own being. In opposition to this view of life, there has been repeated from the oldest mystics of the East, down to the latest in the West, this assertion: The happiest condition, that which has intrinsic worth, is to act, to work: for only in action does freedom show itself as freedom; and the greatest likeness to God is in overcoming the world, and in creating, producing life around about one's self. Each of these views expresses but half the truth. For he who endeavours to live his life exclusively in contemplation, and regards action only as a necessary evil, from which no one can absolutely free himself, will only bear towards God the relation of receiving, appropriating, enjoying. But receptivity, *appro-*

priation, is only the one side of relation to God; the other side is the working out of that which has been appropriated, not selfishly to reserve it as our own property, but to impart it, to engage in active service, to do God's will, to introduce into the world of time that which God has not held Himself too highly exalted to create. But, again, it may be said that he who desires only to act, and denies the independent value of contemplation, will soon show a lack of spirituality in this his acting. For as, on the one side, the love which actuates meditation and prayer has a worth of its own, so, too, it is only through receptivity, through appropriation, that men can become partakers of divine power, and only he who is God-filled can act in harmony with God. The union of this opposition between contemplation and action has been frequently *demanded* both by systems and by practical life. But this demand is only really fulfilled in the love of Christ, which is at once inward, appropriating love towards the Father, and outward, ministering and imparting love towards men. In his contemplation there is working; for in contemplation is prayer, and in this is the fruitful germ of action. And in his acting there is contemplation. Just because Christ is the Sinless, the Holy One, He is not torn away from contemplation by action, He does not become by His acting entangled with the world, sullied by the world. That view of life which maintains that he who acts is thereby withdrawn from union with God, would only be true if the acts could not, as the Scriptures express it, be wrought in God (John iii. 21). He only becomes fettered to the world, and entangled with it by his acting, who seeks to carry out *his own will*, and who has bound his soul to this or to that *earthly* aim. We see this with the most of so-called practical men, who fix their minds on some individual object which they desire to attain, or which they desire to *establish*. We see it with many of those who are called the heroes of history, whose first and last aim lies in the kingdom of this world, in the State, in the condition of outward things, which they seek to create by a revolution of the world, or in the condition of things which they desire to preserve (Alexander—Cæsar—Napoleon). However admirable these actions are, yet they are still, even if they are impressed with an *idea*, only wrought in the world, but not in God; and all these heroes have this in common, that by their acting they have become world-enslaved and world-entangled. Thus, on the other hand, the mystic view of life has so far validity, that it is better not to act, not to yield oneself up to this distraction of interest, but to remain in harmony on the mount of contemplation. But he whose acts are wrought in God, desires in all of them not to accomplish his own will, but only God's, and nothing else. He places all on the kingdom which is not of this world; and though he cannot be without finite and relative aims, yet he holds these as though he held them not,—that is to say, that he does not bind his heart to such as his great desire, but is prepared to sacrifice them for the kingdom of God's sake. Traces of such a mode of action are undoubtedly to be found outside the Christian community, and a shade of it is to be found in that mode of acting which fulfils duty exclusively for duty's sake, without craving the earthly *fruits* of working, whilst the actor lays down his acts and their consequences in the lap of Providence, and just in this way preserves repose of mind, inward harmony. But of Christ alone is it true in the absolute sense, that His deeds are wrought in God. Not one of His acts is done as His own, but all as the acts of the Father, and therefore under all worldly commotion He remains in unity with the Father. During conflicts He is in the "Father's bosom," He is in heaven, as He during His earthly sojourn describes Himself as the Son of man, who is in heaven (John iii. 13). Therefore also in the discourses of Christ, the expression "to do God's will," which He declares concerning Himself, alternates with the expressions, "to see the Father," "to hear" from the Father. Even in the narrative of the Passion, He is in uninterrupted contemplation, since He comprehends all that befalls Him as the fulfilment of Scripture; and until His death on the cross, as is evident from the words He uttered there, He remains in unison with the Scriptures, and in consciousness of the eternal decree.

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE LOVE.

§ 85.

He went about doing good. He preached the gospel of the kingdom, and healed every sickness and disease among the people. We can thus describe the work of Christ. Yet words and deeds alone did not afford Him admission with men. How little has He still effected, when He stands at the close of His earthly career of activity, as He weeps over Jerusalem, predicting its destruction! To human eyes, and according to human modes of judging, it must seem that His whole mission has been essentially in vain. Yet there is one impression which He has reserved for men, to awaken them to contrition and repentance, to faith and love; one means by which He will triumphantly establish the kingdom of God, which cannot be established by prophetic working alone: His own death in unappreciated, in crucified love. His suffering and death proceed from a natural catastrophe, but contain the deepest mystery of the divine decree. The crucifixion is the characteristic sign that it is the true pattern and the true Redeemer who is here manifested. For when the true pattern is made manifest in a world of sin, when the ideal from which we have fallen, and to which we must be redeemed, shines in living brightness before us, the revelation will exert not only an attractive, but also a repulsive, influence on the hearts of men. No one has been so much beloved as Christ, and none has been so hated; and not only the love, but also the hatred, is a mark by which He may be recognised as the Truth. The world, as the world, loves only its own; but its own is a mixture, the mixture of light and darkness. Therefore the world cannot love pure, holy perfection,—can at the utmost only love it at an infinite distance, but not when it approaches. Therefore Christ has become a sign of contradiction; for both the multitude and the leaders of the multitude desire a redeemer and a pattern quite different from Him,—desire a redeemer with an accompaniment of worldliness, a pattern with an accompaniment of sin. The world desires neither unmixed truth nor unmixed falsehood, neither pure holiness nor entire unholiness, but the blending of both, by which all may come into relativity, which is the element of the world. But Christ was destined to produce the crisis, to call forth the final separation—to cleanse, purify, remove sin. Since Christ, therefore, is revealed as the Light of the world, worldly natures, which do not desire to renounce this mixture, are seized by terror of the Light (*terror lucis*), and their antagonistic dispositions develope more and more into conscious opposition—to hostility, hatred, nay, to a life-and-death struggle. Not only Christ's word, by which He testifies incessantly against the sin of the world, not merely His works, but even His person, calls forth this hatred; because His mere personal entrance into the world, His purity and holiness, His love, the majesty and repose which shine forth from His person, have a critical, judging, and depreciating effect on the self-righteous, who are unwilling to submit to Him. This hatred is the human cause of the crown of thorns and the cross.

§ 86.

But again it is said: *Ought* not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory? (Luke xxiv. 26.) The suffering and death have not merely a human cause in the hatred of men, but a divine cause in the decree of eternal love. Without suffering and death, Christ could neither have been the Redeemer nor the perfect example; He could not be the Redeemer and Mediator; could not be the servant of the Lord, in whom is fulfilled: "He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed;" could not be our High Priest, who brought the true sacrifice for the sin of the world. For what Christ offers on the cross is the Ego, the will, the principle of the world, from which proceeds the whole of this world's dominion with all its glory, —that principle which also stirred in Him, though it never in Him became actual sin. It was that sacrifice which the human race itself could not bring, which He brings in man's stead. But as He without this could not be the Redeemer, so neither could He be the pattern: "He learned obedience through the things which He suffered," says the Scripture (Heb. v. 8). Undoubtedly the whole life of Christ was a life of obedience;

His will was in every moment in full harmony with the will of the Father. But as He learnt obedience in His temptations, when the prince of this world showed Him the allurements of the world, so too must He also be proved in suffering, in order that His love and obedience might unfold themselves in their innermost depths, might manifest themselves in the greatest sacrifice, the greatest conquest over self. An instance of the manner in which He learnt obedience is given us in the narrative of the agony in Gethsemane: when He prays that this cup may pass from Him, but the conclusion of the prayer is, Not my will, but Thine be done! the will which He calls *His* will, and distinguishes from that of the Father, is His natural individual will, but it is not sinful. For it is not in itself sinful, that He, who has exhibited only love and faithfulness, should ask that the cup of hatred, treachery, and defection may be removed from Him; it is not in itself sinful, that He who alone is inwardly free among the race of Adam, desires also external liberty as the element of His life; it is not in itself sinful, that He whom the Father honours, and who is come into the world that all should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, asks that the cup of misconstruction and dishonour may be taken from Him; or that He, who stands in the full vigour of life, the sole offspring of humanity untainted by disease, should feel a natural repugnance to bodily anguish, a natural repugnance to death. But this is the obedience He must learn — freely to give up these many possessions, the love and gratitude of men, the loyalty of disciples and friends, liberty, honour, life, for the *one* end for which the Father sent Him — the reconciliation of the world to God, the establishment of God's kingdom. The will which He calls *His* will, as distinct from the Father's, and the natural impulses of which move in His being, therefore obtain no dominion in Him, reach no act of the will. By the sacrifice of this will, His position in the period of His suffering becomes a continued intensifying of the relation of obedience to the Father and of love towards men; and this unappreciated, scorned, abused, crucified love, which voluntarily offers itself for those who misconstrue and reject Him, unfolds depths which surpass the power of language to express.

§ 87.

As the contrast between contemplation and action has found its solution in the example of Christ, so also the contrast between action and suffering. Regarded outwardly, the story of Christ's Passion is the interruption, the disturbance of His activity; regarded inwardly, it is just the completion of His work. Heathenism, the idea of the natural man regarding life, affords no place to suffering. Healthy life expresses itself here only in activity or in enjoyment, in appropriation of the good things of this world: when suffering enters and disturbs this, it is regarded as only a blind and inexplicable fate. To avoid suffering, to escape from it, is the great object striven after; and where it is inevitable, then to bear it with resignation, and as far as possible to be case-hardened against it in insensibility. The natural man thus regards suffering as that which *ought not to exist*,—a hostile power, which disturbs the beauty and the aim of life. In Christ we behold suffering as that which must be. For there is another thing which ought not to be, but which man has brought into existence,—namely, sin and guilt. This, which ought not to exist, must not exist, has nevertheless come into the world, and therefore there must be suffering in order that sin may be removed. When, in the life of Christ, we contrast His sufferings and His working, this contrast can only be received relatively. His whole life may be called a narrative of suffering, and His whole life may be called a narrative of activity. The distinction is only, that in the portion of Christ's history which we in a limited acceptation call the story of His working, His activity is manifest, whilst the suffering is veiled; whilst, on the other hand, in that portion of His story which in a limited sense we call the story of His Passion, the suffering is manifest, whilst the activity is veiled. In Christ, therefore, activity and suffering are combined. There is a concealed suffering, which even from the commencement permeates His activity,—not merely pain on account of the sin of the world, but pain that His redeeming love, which has come to seek and to save the lost, should be misconstrued and unappreciated by men, even by those nearest to Him—by the disciples. There is a hidden suffering in that continual loveliness in the midst of human society, where even those nearest Him only so imperfectly comprehend Him. This His suffering becomes more and more apparent in the same measure, as His struggle against the world and the great catastrophe developes itself, until that is literally fulfilled which He spake to the disciples: "Ye shall be scattered, every one to his own, and shall leave me alone; and yet I am not alone, for the Father is with me" (John xvi. 32). There He stands alone, forsaken by the disciples, with all the powers of the world against Him. As He is now delivered over into the hands of men, and deprived of external liberty, His *outward* activity is also interrupted. Thus it seems that only suffering remains behind, but in this suffering is concealed inward activity. For from the external world He retires to the internal, the invisible kingdom, to secret communion with the Father, to the deepest concentration of His will in the will of the Father, preparing *Himself* as the perfect sacrifice of love and obedience. His soul has travailed (Isa. liii.), it is said in the prophecy concerning the Lord's righteous Servant, who was to be delivered for our transgressions; and this travail of the soul continues to the last moment on the cross.

But when, in the narrative of Christ's sufferings, we fix our eyes on this inward travail of the soul, this inward action in suffering, we must beware of supposing that His abandonment of the outer world was absolute, as though He had only mystically introverted His moral vision, and even before death had fallen asleep to the actual world. On the contrary, the Gospels show us that to the last He preserved a lively interest in the surrounding world. And when, in Christ's sufferings, we perceive the fulfilment of the prophetic word: "He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter; and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so He openeth not His mouth" (Isa. liii.); we must undoubtedly behold herein a delineation of gentleness and forbearance unspeakable. But we must not apprehend this as a mere passivity in regard to the world from which He suffers. The Gospels show us that the Lord, though His outward action was interrupted and brought to a stand, though He became more and more silent in His sufferings, never ceased such action so long as there existed *possibility* for it. He shows this by the final witness for truth which He utters before the high priest, before Pilate,—that magnanimous "I am He," which from His sufferings continues to resound throughout the history of the world. For He will not suffer wrong in the sense of giving up His testimony concerning His own right. He shows this by the testimony which on the *via dolorosa* He utters to the daughters of Jerusalem: Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and your children! (Luke xxiii. 28.) He shows it by the individual acts of love, which He to the last undertakes in the one great act of love. He had said: "I must work the work of Him that sent me, whilst it is day." And the night begins already to close in; yet He toils on amidst the lengthening shadows. For even on the cross He carries out His work of love towards the repenting thief, and to His mother, whom He commends to the care of the disciple at the foot of the cross. Thus He manifests His example of the indissoluble union of working and suffering.

§ 88.

In Christ's perfect freedom, in His perfect love and obedience, which manifests itself in the harmonious union of the moral fundamental principles of life (appropriation, productive action, and suffering), we perceive at the same time the ideal of personal *righteousness*. For righteous is a designation which we bestow on that personal existence which is in perfect harmony with all divine requirements and norms or rules, in which the contrasts of personal life are in harmonious accordance, because every moment is in its place, and is kept within its proper limits; that existence from which all disorder is excluded, and where no single thing is made valid at the expense of the whole. But Christ's personal righteousness manifests itself most perfectly in His suffering; for only under misconstruction can righteousness as well as love sustain its highest proofs. We may here refer to Plato, who prophetically maintained that when the righteous man should actually be manifested, this would only take place through the greatest sufferings. For as the greatest wrong consists in *seeming* righteous without being so, on the other hand, the righteous, in order to be really perfect, is deprived of all except righteousness, and is placed in the opposite position. Without having done wrong, he must take on himself the greatest seeming of wrong, in order that his righteousness may sustain its test, since he does not allow himself to be moved by evil report and its consequences, but remains unchanged till death, although throughout his whole life he is considered as unrighteous in spite of his integrity. But he will then also be persecuted, scourged, bound to the rack, deprived of eyesight by heated iron, and at last nailed to a stake (2d vol. of the *Republic*).

Although Plato's conception of righteousness is chiefly confined to citizen and political uprightness, yet this picture which he has drawn of the righteous man may be regarded as a type, which has found exact fulfilment in the history of Christ. For from the beginning of His work Christ was surrounded by the appearance of unrighteousness, was accused of being an enemy to the law, a foe to the temple, and ends by being reckoned among the transgressors. And in contrast to this, perfect injustice appears in the semblance of righteousness. For it is the high priests and the rulers of the people, the representatives of justice on earth, who doom Him to death. All is done according to the forms of justice, and in its name. The Just Man is enveloped in the deepest misconstruction, and even the sincere are in doubt concerning Him. But to the eye of faith there beams forth from the unappreciated, crucified righteous One a light over all His surroundings, which shows them as future types of the relation of the world to Him. Caiaphas and Pilate, the people, the disciples, the ignorant daughters of Jerusalem, who wept over Christ instead of weeping for themselves, are found at all times; and the more we contemplate the course of this world in the light of this history, the more are we persuaded that it repeats itself in every age. But at all times, moreover, there are also to be found repentant thieves, with John and Mary at the foot of the cross.

THE EXAMPLE OF DIGNITY. CHRIST IN EXALTATION.

§ 89.

Therefore hath God also highly exalted Him, and given Him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that

Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Phil. ii. 9–11). In these words the apostle points from the ideal of obedience and self-abasing love to that of triumph and dominion,—to the resurrection of Christ and His ascension to heaven, His seat at the Father's right hand,—to the glorified Redeemer's manifestation at the last day, when it shall be made apparent in an unmistakeable manner that to Him is given all power in heaven and on earth. It is an ancient belief of the human race, that the Good shall at last triumph; and even among the heathen there is found the expectation of a great personality, a mighty ruler of the world, who must come to introduce into it the times of peace and happiness. But in sacred vision, the ideal of the Conqueror and Ruler, the Hope of Israel, appeared under the image of the Prince of Peace, the King whose dominion shall have no end, and who must reign until He hath put all His enemies under His footstool (Ps. cx. 1). The prophecy is fulfilled in Christ, in His humiliation and His exaltation. Even in His humiliation Christ is a King. "Thou sayest that I am a king," says He to Pilate (John xviii. 37). He knows that the kingdom and the power are His, though He stands before Pilate as the mocked and thorn-crowned; He knows that the future belongs to Him, that the influences which shall proceed from Him shall never cease, but extend to all ages and all races of men; knows that the nations shall be redeemed and shall be judged by Him. From the commencement of His earthly sojourn, every moment of His life has been illuminated by His kingly power and dignity: even in suffering He manifests His royal power in judging and ransoming the world. But He can only be fully revealed as King when He has completed His work as the Lord's righteous Servant on earth. "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?" (Luke xxiv. 26.) By His ascension to heaven, and His seat at the right hand of the Father, He has become the prototype not only of the kingdom of bliss, but of glory. They who deny the marvel of His exaltation, are the same as they who also deny the marvel of His humiliation, and who, if they are consistent, deny further that He was without sin.

Just as it has often been maintained as an inevitable demand of reason, that unless existence is to contain an eternally unreconciled contradiction, that virtue, that the moral kingdom, or more strictly the kingdom of holiness, must finally obtain victory and dominion, after all hostile powers have been thrust out; so, too, it has been asserted as a necessary demand, that the present separation between virtue and *happiness* should be reconciled (Kant). Happiness is undoubtedly, as has been before explained, a conception which is only of an earthly and temporal nature. The ideal of earthly happiness was condemned by the cross of Christ, where the disciples were obliged to abandon all hope of an earthly Messiah, and the earthly dominion of the Messiah. But the deep thought, which lies at the foundation of this demand, is the idea of a condition in which life may be lived and *enjoyed* in its unrestrained fulness, in which all the original cravings of human nature find satisfaction, where the external order of things is in harmony with the moral kingdom, where mind and matter are reconciled, where thus the Good is manifested as the all-determining power. In the resurrection of Christ from the dead is the foundation given for the Christian *hope*, the hope of a life of eternal fulness after the anxiety, struggle, and pain of the present,—a state of *glory*, which the risen Saviour shall prepare for His people, where God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, nor any pain, where it shall be fulfilled: "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men; and they shall be His people, and He shall be their God" (Rev. xxi. 3–5). But when we behold the prototype of future glory and bliss in the risen Saviour, we do not forget that already the Saviour, in His state of humiliation, possesses the essentials of bliss,—namely, that *peace* and *gladness* which are inseparable from the consciousness of undisturbed communion with the Father, and the approaching victory.

If we now cast a glance back on the general outline of teaching as regards Christ's example, we shall discriminate therein three moments,—namely, that of nature, that of ethics, and that of glory. To the last we assign all that belongs to the ideal of triumph and dominion, and thus also the miracles of Christ, which are foretokens of the coming glory and greatness of the world. The example of glory is developed from moral example, as the exaltation from the humiliation; for which reason also, they only will become sharers in the image of His glory, who have followed Him in the humiliation of His form of a servant. The basis of the ethical example is the innate perfection which belongs to Him in consequence of the natural and essential relation in which He stands to God and the human race.

DISCIPLESHIP.

§ 90.

"I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. . . . Abide in me, and I in you" (John xv. 1–4). In these words the Lord indicates what is peculiar in the relation of the disciples towards Him. No human teacher can require from his disciples, that their relation to him shall be constant and permanent. On the contrary, the human teacher must by his instruction be constantly rendering the disciple more and more independent of his authority. Neither can a human teacher demand that his disciple shall remain in personal association with him, in order constantly to draw from thence the support of his life; for the human teacher must always point away from himself to the truth, which stands high above him and his own personal life. When Christ, on the other hand, describes Himself as the vine, and the disciples as the branches, He indicates the discipleship not merely as a permanent relation to Him as the divine teacher, who has the words of eternal life, but as the Redeemer, from whose fulness they shall uninterruptedly receive. And when He designates His Father as the husbandman, who purges the branches that they may bear fruit, He points to divine providence with its manifold leadings, through which the disciples were trained and moulded for future companionship with the Saviour. The difference between discipleship to Christ and to a merely human teacher has often been illustrated by the contrast between Christ and Socrates. Socrates, the great human teacher, started from the maxim that the Good and the True are developed from man's own inner being,—that all perception is therefore a *reminiscence*, because man descends into himself, and recalls to mind the contents of his own consciousness. In this respect Socrates desired to assist his disciples; and his system of education showed itself as an intellectual midwifery, by which he would assist the disciples to bring forth real perceptions, real ideas from their own minds, in order that they may thus become independently wise. This is also the normal position on the heathen standpoint, where only the universal truths of reason find consideration, but not divine revelation and redemption. Christ, on the other hand, seeks to impart to His disciples a system of truth which cannot be drawn from their own inner being, a revelation of that which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man to conceive (1 Cor. ii. 9). And not merely will He impart to them a new understanding, but also a new life, will enable them to live their lives in a manner which cannot be accomplished except in communion with Him. Discipleship to Him becomes therefore, in the deepest sense, one of incessant reception and appropriation.

§ 91.

That now the disciples could *abide* in Christ, after He was taken away from them, and that we, although centuries have elapsed since Christ sojourned on earth, can enter into discipleship towards Him, and have fellowship with Him,—this rests on His resurrection and exaltation, or on the fact of His being the *living Christ*, who, as Lord and Head of His Church, through the means of grace and the Holy Spirit, carries on and perfects the communion between Himself and His people. We must here call to mind the words which He spoke to His disciples (John xiv. 7): "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you." So long as in the outward and material sense they could be His followers, so long were discipleship and imitation only imperfect. True discipleship and true imitation only began when His actual presence was taken from them, first began with the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. Then the *inner* communion with Christ first became realized; then His history was *understood* by them, and He began to win form *within* them. Then they began, under the influence of the Spirit, to tread independently the path which their Lord and Master had trodden, reflecting the example which He had left to them. And however peculiar the position of those disciples is, who have also outwardly followed the Lord, yet essentially the position of succeeding generations is the same. For it is the constant work of the exalted Saviour, by means of the Spirit, to collect His disciples, and in the Spirit bring the life He led on earth into the presence of men, and within them.

§ 92.

The central sphere for the working of the exalted Redeemer is the Church, and admission to discipleship takes place by *baptism.* Baptism is initiation into the hidden and yet revealed life with Christ in God, initiation into all the mysteries of Christianity. Here also we may illustrate the peculiarity of Christianity by glancing back at paganism. Paganism also had its mysteries, which aimed not merely at communicating to the initiated a higher teaching, but moreover raising them to a more elevated grade of life. Especially do the Eleusinian mysteries, of which we have already had occasion to speak, deserve attention here. They formed a contrast to the public religion, to the religion of the mass, although they did not at all set forth to undermine this, but rather to impart to the initiated an insight into its deeper significance. At the same time, they desired to bestow on him who had passed through all the steps of initiation a higher experience of the Divine, desired to bring him into a closer communion with divinity, to elevate him to a higher grade of existence; for which reason those who wished to be admitted must first be prepared through exercises of abstinence and purification, for only with clean hands and pure heart durst any one approach. These mysteries appear like a shadow of that into which Christ desires to initiate us. But the peculiarity of the Christian faith does not consist merely in the fact that Christ has revealed the *true* mysteries of sin and free grace, of natural birth and regeneration, of death and of resurrection,—the mysteries of *the grain of corn,* which is sown in corruption, but is raised in incorruption,—the mysteries of suffering and of glory. The peculiarity of the Christian faith appears also in this, that God's saving grace in Christ was manifested for *all* men, not merely for a single people or a single section of a people. Therefore the mysteries of Christianity stand in no opposition to the religion of the people, are not limited to a secret society; but Christianity sets itself in the place of the religion of the masses, desires to make itself the *public* religion, the religion of the world, according to Christ's own words: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19). Just because Christ's Church is the *universal* Church, fitted for all, it becomes the national Church; and in the national Church baptism remains the baptism of infants, because the child who is brought up under Christian surroundings and influences, even from the commencement of its natural life, ought to be initiated into discipleship. Whilst now the Christian Church, both in doctrine and worship, observes the most perfect publicity, preaches the gospel in open day, baptizes the great national masses, imparts the highest truths to the poor and the young, it may seem that the mysteries are profaned. Yet this publicity and universality of the Church is a consequence of the universality of grace and the gospel invitation. It is the condescension of divine love that it thus makes its gifts universal, orders it so that much seed falls by the wayside to be trodden under foot of men or devoured by the fowls of the air, that none may be able to say that grace, that the true secret of life, has not been offered to them. And the mystery of grace is also secured through the mystery of free-will: for no one comes to the experience of the secret of Christianity except by the devotion of his own free-will; or, in other words, the grace bestowed in baptism comes first into exercise through *faith*, and first by a personal life of faith begins the true discipleship. When Christ says to His disciples, "To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but unto them which are without all these things are done in parables" (Luke viii. 10), this has the same application. To all those who have not yet come to living personal belief, Christianity, Christian doctrine, and Christian worship can only be an uncomprehended, unexplained parable. They stop at the husk without having found the kernel. Though, therefore, the light of Christianity shines before the national masses, who by baptism are admitted into membership with the Church, yet its true essence is hidden from all those who believe not. Though the deepest secret of life lies open before all, yet it is like the treasure hid in a field, which must be found; it is the pearl which must be sought, and for which a man must give all that he hath. These masses have their prototypes in the Gospels, in the multitudes which sometimes gather around Christ, sometimes forsake Him, and, so to speak, wander to and fro. They have indeed received a general influence, but without having formed a personal relation towards the Saviour. But within these multitudes appears again a smaller, a narrower circle of those who have entered into personal relation with the Saviour, have bound their lives to His. These are the prototypes of the future disciples, who by sanctification have become the real followers of Christ.

Only in this sense can there be any question of an exoteric and an esoteric Christianity—a Christianity for the many, and a Christianity for the really initiated. *Faith* alone makes this difference. The diversities of understanding, of knowledge, have disappeared; for the means of salvation are the same for the wise and the simple. And just because these individuals, or the regenerate, are only separated from others by faith, are only separated from others because they hold the common religion, not merely as tradition, as something handed down to them by the community, but as their own personal religion, they do not separate themselves from the visible Church, or say that they should form a secret society which occupies a standpoint *above* the national religion. Secret societies and lodges with a religious aim are, whatever may otherwise be said about them, from the standpoint of Christianity, in which the real mysteries are revealed to all, to be regarded as anachronisms in the spiritual world. Christ's disciples and followers are acquainted with no other mysteries, no other means of grace, than those which are accessible to the many: they are only separated from the many by *appropriation*. And they who are initiated into appropriation understand each other, and receive with meekness this mystery, which, however frequently and clearly it may be explained, "the natural man receiveth not, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned" (1 Cor. ii. 14).

§ 93.

Although faith rests on man's free-will, yet in its first cause it is a work of divine grace; and we designate this influence of divine grace, which is a necessary condition to entering into personal relation to the Redeemer, as *awakening*, because the man is awakened as from a state of sleep, as from a dream. Even he who from childhood has kept faith in the doctrines of Christianity, requires that for him there should be a period of time when he became awakened, so that he can perceive seriously and personally in what his Christianity consists, what it bestows on him, and what it demands of him; and in a time of revolution, defection, and decay, the greater portion of mankind wander their own way, and can only be brought back to what they have forsaken by a work of grace. Awakening to the kingdom of God must always be effected by means of God's word concerning Christ; but in combination with the word, divine grace works also by the outward and inward *guidings of providence.* If we go back to the first disciples, we find that they were awakened by the preaching of John the Baptist in combination with the signs of the times, emphatically a time of spiritual poverty and impotence, when the existing state of things was worn out and effete, which, with the better minds of the period, especially the better minds among the young, who felt within themselves the powers of the future, must awaken a craving after the hope of Israel, after a new creation of the times. And it has frequently recurred, that the spiritual destitution of an age has, with deeper natures, been a means of awakening which led them to Christ. Thus, at the time of the Reformation, and thus also at the present, which, both by its outward occurrences, its great revolutions, the sudden overthrow of what in the eyes of man is great, and by its inward strain of thought and sentiment, has awakened in many a craving for a more stable dominion, which should be at the same time a dominion of renewal and rejuvenescence for the nations and for individuals. But if thus the historic dispensations of Providence, which are often administered by the angels of war and pestilence, become means of awakening for the kingdom of God, so, too, do the *individual* leadings of every-day life assume importance in this respect. Among these we may specially name sufferings, adversity, everything which in the life of the individual awakens consciousness of the vanity of this world; for which reason they who felt weary and heavy laden were the first to seek Christ. We may think on wearisome sufferings, or on sudden misfortunes, which like lightning strike the life of the individual, as in the case of Luther, when literally a flash of lightning at his side brought before him the thought of death and judgment in all its horror. But not only occurrences, sin itself may become a means of awakening. A great lapse into which a man unthinkingly falls, may open his eyes to the weakness of his nature, and allow him to look into its abyss; as also the sight of another's fall may awaken the same dread. The prodigal son, Mary Magdalene, Paul in his blind zeal, are lasting examples. And as suffering and self-caused misery may be the means of awakening, so may also prosperous circumstances produce the same effect. But His richest blessings are bestowed on us by God through men, who become His instruments and messengers to us. Philip, who comes to the Ethiopian eunuch and opens to him the Scriptures (Acts viii.), is here a type. And how many have there not been awakened by the personal relations of life, by a meeting, by contact with such as were already disciples, and whose personality bore testimony concerning the Master! And only to name one of such relations, how many more have been won by their wives,—won, as the apostle says, without the word, merely by their holy conversation!

With the outward leadings of Providence are combined the inward leadings of the mind; and there are many individuals who are pre-eminently awakened from within. A spiritual phenomenon of frequent occurrence is an inward disquietude, an inexplicable heaviness of heart, which does not allow the man to find rest or satisfaction in anything created; as it, on the whole, may be said that there is a fund of melancholy in the inmost being of every man, if it does not come forth alike with all. From this disquietude, this melancholy, there is frequently developed a craving for Christ, and a search after Him, from which awakening proceeds, although this craving assumes different tints or shades of colour in different people. There are those with whom it predominantly appears as a craving for revelation, the desire to receive an answer to this great question, What is truth? under the many disappointments of life, under the self-deceiving of men. There are those with whom it specially appears as a desire after salvation, after reconciliation, to which deepest desire that for revelation must *at last* conduct,—desire for the forgiveness of sins; for what does all truth profit me, if I am not myself received of God? They have felt themselves oppressed by sin, by the burden of guilt; they have striven after a moral ideal, but have constantly experienced anew the power of sin. They have bent beneath the rigour of the law, under its stern demands, but have also perceived that the law has no power to bestow a new heart, to give new power and new desire, and therefore they cannot attain to any enjoyment of existence. It is this which we see with Luther in the cloister, where he was at last comforted by the old monk, who pointed out to him the article of the Creed on the forgiveness of sins. There are those with whom this desire of salvation specially appears as a deep craving for love, combined with the feeling of loneliness and desertion in the world, craving for a love to which the heart may unreservedly devote itself, and which, when it becomes conscious of itself, is the desire, under the disquietude and perplexing cares of this world, to sit under the shadow of the Most High, and to dwell in His tabernacles. Those persons with whom no trace of such a craving is to be found can dispense with Christ. Their hour is not yet come.

Christian memoirs and autobiographies, which relate in what manner a man, through the inward and outward dealings of Providence, has become a disciple of Christ, has been found by Christ and has found Him, have, if truthfully executed, the highest interest, because they show us the multifarious paths, both as regards God and men, which are yet one and the same path, which all must tread in order to come to Christ. Among Christian autobiographies, the *Confessions* of Augustine will always rank as the most remarkable. They form the most complete contrast to the famous *Confessions* of Rousseau, which were given forth from the standpoint of emancipation, and in a brilliant, dazzling, and alluring representation, show us only a tangled web of high ideal effort, and of Egoism in all forms, down to the lowest debauchery,—a mixture of lights and shadows, of half-truths and colossal errors, in which this emancipated man had ensnared himself, and in the description of which he took pleasure, while yet there seemed no outlet from this labyrinth. In the *Confessions* of Augustine, on the other hand, we see likewise the labyrinth; but we see, at the same time, the path of the soul to God, so that he may dart through it,—we see the redeemed sinner casting a backward glance upon his sinful life. In the narrative of Augustine's awakening, the inward and outward means co-operate; the craving for revelation and the craving for salvation appear almost equally strong. His unquenchable thirst after truth, which brought him to sift one dogma of human learning after another, without being able to find satisfaction; his unbridled licentiousness, which he in vain sought to master by his own power, and which brought him to feel his own helplessness and misery, his own condemnation; the exhortations of his pious mother Monica, the preaching of Ambrosius, the reading of the Holy Scriptures, the examples of perdition around him, a great worldly life sinking into ruins,—all these things worked together, so that at last he could come to Christ, to be plucked as a brand from the burning, and become the great interpreter of sin and free grace to Christendom. But however different the process may appear in different individuals, it is common to all who have been awakened to Christ to experience a feeling of helplessness, a helplessness for which the whole world offers no remedy. It is this helplessness which is described to us by the first Christians, and it is also depicted to us by the last who have communicated to us their condition. It is this which Hamann has represented in his course of life, in which he speaks of the forlorn condition of his existence, in inward and outward poverty, as he was tossed about by passion, which so overpowered him that he often could not draw breath; and he prayed God for a friend who might give him a key to his own heart, a clue in his labyrinth, because all human books of learning were to him miserable comforters; and at last, whilst perusing the Holy Scripture, a veil fell from his understanding and his heart. And to name a more recent example from our own literature: it is this helplessness which Mynster has depicted in that noted passage of his literary remains, in which he speaks of the sudden dawning of the light which took place within him. Therefore, in every narrative of conversion, it is not the pattern, but the *Saviour*, which is the first object of the sinner's search.

§ 94.

But awakening must, through conversion, through contrition as fruitful penitence (I will arise, and go to my Father, Luke xv. 18), which is not contrition for this or that individual transgression, but a return from the whole preceding sinful existence, from the whole state of enmity to God, a breach with the entire preceding course of development, pass over into regeneration, which is the institution of a new personality. Where regeneration has entered, there has grace so taken root in free-will, that it has become the principle of a progressive development of character; whilst the mere awakening, which is still an unsettled condition of craving, cannot induce a moral life, which may be perceived in many of the "awakened," whose lives are not regulated by the requirements of ethics, but who only move in pathological moods and conditions, without attaining consistency and steadiness. We may also express this by saying that regeneration has entered wherever justifying faith, the appropriating reception of God's grace, has become the principle of a progressive development of character. Regeneration is to the disciples what the inherent ideal was for Christ. With the sinlessness of Christ corresponds the forgiveness of sins. With Christ's filial relation to the Father, which naturally belongs to Him, corresponds the adoption of children, which is given us by grace, through justifying faith. From this point is developed the imitation of Christ.

THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. IMITATION AND JUSTIFYING FAITH.

§ 95.

The usual and closest representation of the following of Christ is the representation of a copying, a moulding of the life after that of Christ (*imitatio Christi*). Following after presupposes a path which must be trodden in company with Christ, and thus a starting-point to be left, a goal which is to be reached, and even motion from the starting-point to the goal. The starting-point is faith in Christ; the goal is eternal bliss in the kingdom of God; the motion is Christian life, in which Christ's example goes before us. As preliminary explanation, we say, therefore, that the imitation of Christ is a life after His *example*, and in His *power*. For no one can follow Christ's example, except he who by faith has found Christ as Mediator and Redeemer, and by His saving grace is armed with power to set forth on the pilgrimage after His example (John xiii.; 1 Pet. ii. 21; 1 John ii. 6).

The imitation of Christ is not a direct copying of Him. For it cannot be the duty of any of His disciples to make himself a Christ, or to achieve the task which He has accomplished. There is but one Saviour and Mediator. Not the work of Christ, but each one his own work, which is appointed to each according to his position in Christ's kingdom and the individuality and special endowments he possesses, is to be accomplished in the service of his spirit. That which is imitable in Christ, and which we should copy, is therefore that in Him which must continue in all, and take form according to special character and circumstances. We may and ought to discover this, not merely from His life and actions, but also from His *word* and *commandments* to us, because as Saviour and example He is at the same time *teacher*. Thus Luther so strikingly observes (Walch, xx. p. 253): "It is not necessary to do and to suffer all that Christ has done and borne; otherwise we too would have to walk on the sea, and work all the miracles which He has wrought; then, too, we must abjure matrimony, renounce worldly rule, forsake the field and the plough, and all else that He has given up. For whatever He desired that we should do or suffer, He not merely did and suffered Himself, but also *declared by His word* that we should imitate. Therefore we hold no example as binding, not even the example of Christ, unless it agrees with the word of God, which expounds to us what we should follow and what we should not follow." So far Luther. But the sum of Christ's commands to us is contained in that love which in Christ has become a new commandment, partly because it was expounded by Him, partly because He gives us power to perform it. We say then, with the apostle, "Let the same mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus" (Phil. ii. 5); since by the mind we understand the fundamental bent of the will, in combination with all the inner being, which has influence upon this, and thus the thought and feeling, in so far as they form a union with the will. But as the mind, at the same time, must be the power to imprint itself in action, thus the representative in Christ, more closely considered, becomes determined as Christ's *mode of action;* since, though each of His actions bears the impress of the Only-begotten and unparalleled of the human race, and so far cannot be imitated, yet in His actions He must have expressed those universal norms, that universal type, according to which the affairs of God's kingdom are to be regulated. Christian virtue, as the union of the mind and mode of action, in imitation of Christ's example, is at once imitative and original, derived and yet in each individual a new thing, because it is born of the Spirit and of the inmost portion of individuality, because it is the believer's eternal genius, the individual image of God, which by means of redemption, in fellowship with Christ, attains self-development. Every man shall be presented perfect in Christ Jesus (Col. i. 28).

§ 96.

The direct copying of Christ limits its imitation to the *religious* sphere, to a life in which religion must not merely be the animating sentiment, but also the immediate *aim* of human action, its immediate content and material. As Christ lived for the religious ideal, unembarrassed by worldly concerns, His followers—thus it is concluded—should also be in the world as He was, and live exclusively for the religious ideal. If we look to the history of Christianity, we must undoubtedly admit that at its foundation the imitation of Christ *necessarily* appeared predominantly in the directly religious form, as with the apostles and disciples, who forsook everything in order to follow Him, and spread abroad the gospel of the kingdom. But the vocation of missionary cannot be common to all: it is the object of mission work that Christ's Church shall be planted, that God's kingdom shall grow and wax a great tree, spreading its shade over all good human achievement. The highest grade of external likeness to Christ we discover in the martyrs, who witnessed for the truth before the world, were scorned and contemned, suffered and died, for the sake of their testimony. But whilst true martyrdom is founded in the historic condition of the world and the historic situation, we see already in these early times that false imitation with many who, in fanatic arrogance and vanity, pressed forward to martyrdom, in order thus to attain to perfect likeness to the Lord.

Another form of this false imitation is monastic life. Certainly those who forsake the world, in order in the stillness of the cloister to follow the example of the Lord, do not aim at martyrdom, which would be the highest material resemblance; but in contrast with Christians living in the world, they subject themselves to an extraordinary self-denial and renunciation of earthly objects, in order to make their lives in conformity with that of the Lord. They take on them three monastic vows—obedience, poverty, and chastity. Just as the Lord lived His life in obedience, so they desire to imitate Him by expressing outwardly obedience in their daily walk, pledging themselves to submit implicitly to monastic rules and the commands of their superiors. Just as the Lord had not where to lay His head, they desire to imitate Him by the endurance of poverty throughout the whole circumstances of their lives; and as the Lord lived in celibacy, they desire to imitate Him by abjuring marriage and family life, and cutting asunder all the ties which through these bind a man to the world. The whole of this aspiration after material likeness to Christ, which has its seat in the Roman Catholic Church, is founded on a false conception of Christ, and the significance of His coming, and on a false conception of the relation of Christianity towards the human. Christ does not desire only denial of the world, and renunciation of it, but also the ennobling of the world, and its enlightenment. Nothing human is alien to Him, and His kingdom is compatible with everything except with sin. Real likeness to Christ is therefore not likeness in the external circumstances and employments of life, but likeness to Him in the disposition of the mind—likeness to Christ's *will*. This likeness may be found as easily in the lay condition as in the ecclesiastical, as easily with those who bear their cross in secret, as with those who become historic martyrs. For the principal matter is to comply with the will of the Lord, wherever we are placed, and to be what He would have us to be.

And just here it shows itself, that the ascetic life, in its effort to resemble Christ, comes into great dissimilarity to Him, and turns aside from His example. Christ only developed His own personal perfection, whilst He executed the work which His Father had given Him to do for human *society*; and in this every Christian should imitate Him, should, in his special calling appointed by society, carry out the mission given him by God, and after the example of Christ, must be able to say: "Must I not be about my Father's business?" But asceticism as such is only an exercise of virtue, in which the virtue has no other substance than the mere exercise itself. Asceticism allows society to lie entirely beyond it, undertakes no duty for its benefit, but is only occupied with its own blessedness, and with purely formal actions, which are merely preparatory, and which have found graphic expression in the task which is often imposed on young monks: to spend the day in planting sticks in the sand, in order that by this useless, aimless labour, they may be exercised in self-denial, in obedience, and in patience, but from which they can never succeed in producing any result. In this indifference to society, in this merely formal, unprofitable acting, there is great dissimilarity to Christ. In those conspicuous among ascetic characters, of which Catholicism exhibits to us a great profusion, we must certainly acknowledge a deep sentiment of the nothingness and vanity of worldly life, a frequently visionary love to God, and an admirable energy of will, bordering on the supernatural, in renunciation of the world, and subjection to mortification. This is what—to take an example from the time of the Reformation—we admire in the Abbé Rancé (1626–1700), who, remarkably enough, just in France, in the midst of the people who are so often spoken of as frivolous and fond of enjoyment, exhibits to us the highest point of asceticism. After a life of worldliness (in his thirteenth year he published *Anacreon*) and dissipation, he suddenly perceived the illusory nature of these things, and became penetrated with the sentiment of this world's nothingness and the terrors of eternity, exchanged his thoughtless, optimist view of life for a melancholy pessimism, and founded the order of La Trappe. It is this formal energy of will we admire, when the brethren forsake their miserable pallets at two o'clock in the morning, spend a number of hours in prayers and masses, the remaining hours in strenuous hard work, without daring to utter one single word, with the exception of this, *Memento mori*; when their daily food is the smallest amount of meagre fare, and the day closes by each of the brethren spending a short time in digging his own future grave; and this monotonous circuit is repeated in patience and constancy to the last hour of life. It is the energy of will in mortification which we admire in Madame Guyon (1648–1717), when, still in youth and distinguished for beauty, in order to exercise herself in self-denial, in order "to hate herself," she scourges herself till the blood comes, voluntarily licks the matter from a sore, mixes her food with wormwood and other similar ingredients, has sound teeth extracted, and drops melted sealing-wax on her hands. But just as we must wish this will a better content, so we cannot acknowledge this frame of mind as evangelical, and must determine that the likeness to Christ is very distant. By this abuse of nature sin is not expelled; for pride remains, and a false confidence in ascetic practices, in the merit of such exercises. Christ desires that the gifts of nature should be consecrated to God's glory. But in a life devoted to merely ascetic, merely formal exercises, a great many of the inherent endowments of individuality remain unused, because these faculties can only find their employment in the duties of civilised and moral society. It belongs to the shady side of asceticism, that a great multitude of the noblest gifts of nature lie unused, and thus rot away in cloisters.

§ 97.

But whilst we say that what is essential in the imitation of Christ is resemblance in disposition, in will, and not material resemblance; whilst we reject that external copying which is found in false martyrdom, and in monastic life; and whilst we with the Reformers maintain, that the imitation of Christ may be accomplished in every condition of human life which is founded on the rules of society appointed by God (*ordinationes Dei;* Conf. Aug. 16), we must at the same time guard against another error, namely, that of supposing that we can resemble Christ in disposition of mind, can have Him as our pattern without uniting ourselves to Him as the *Saviour*. In opposition to monkish morality, with its denial of the human, there is a false humanism, which will only see in Christ what it calls the purely human, regards Him as the first who manifested that disposition of mind which is really well-pleasing to God, the first in whom the highest ideal of man has been realized. Christ's imitators are then they who, after His example, and through the impulse which He has given, express in their own lives the same disposition, live their lives in the same spirit in which Christ lived, toil and suffer in the same cause for which He toiled and suffered, without therefore standing in any relation of dependence to Christ's person, since they believe that they can draw the water of life from the same fountain whence He drew it. Nay, the elder Fichte even says, that if Christ were now to return to earth, it would concern Him but little though His name and person were forgotten, if He only found men enthusiastic in His cause, and labouring for it. This so-called "purely human" view also maintains, that man by his own power can work for the kingdom of God, by his own power can produce the disposition pleasing to God, and at most only requires an example which may awaken the slumbering power. But in this manner the adherents of this tenet clearly discover, that they understand nothing of the real nature of Christ's cause, atonement and redemption; that they know nothing about sin and grace. We by no means deny that in our day there are forms of the religious ethics of rationalism which possess elements of the Christian, by which they may be advantageously distinguished from ancient Paganism; as, for instance, in contrast to Stoicism, they speak of man's need of the grace of God, of humility and love, of freedom in dependence on God. But as all this is without organic connection with the person of Christ, as the positive in Christianity for them belongs to what shall pass away as unsuited to the culture of modern times, as they will not "eat His flesh and drink His blood," have no desire to be assimilated to Him, these elements become only reflections and shadows, scattered leaves and flowers, which, no longer adhering to the root, have no life-giving power. For "without me ye can do nothing," says the Lord (John xv. 5). There are thus in our days preachers of rationalistic humanity, who have received something of the leaven of Christianity. But the pearl is wanting.

§ 98.

But even in higher and deeper systems of doctrine than those here indicated, in systems which in Christ behold the Only-begotten of the Father, the God-man, there appears the one-sided setting forth of the example, whilst the Saviour and Mediator, though not expressly denied, are yet placed in the shade, and remain inactive. We are brought back again to monastic life, namely to the mystics, who, in a higher form than the ordinary ascetics, seek by means of contemplation to attain likeness to Christ. However high we then rank the mysticism of the middle ages, and however much it may by its deep earnestness have contributed in preparing for the Reformation, yet this is a pervading defect with the greatest mystics, Eckardt, Tauler, Suso, Ruysbroock. Christ, though the God-man, is to them not the Redeemer, but is predominantly only the example of the mystic union with God, the example of contemplation and prayer, the example of love to men, of patience in sufferings, of dying to sin. It is undoubtedly their merit that they set forth the human side of Christ's being. But they forget that the example only receives its due significance to us when it is viewed on the ground of atonement. They place themselves beneath the cross of Christ, and feel the deepest sympathy with Him; they mourn over the sin and misery of the world, and aspire after fellowship in Christ's sufferings; but they understand by this, that they learn from Christ love and patience in suffering, learn to forgive men and preserve union with God. But although the consciousness of sin is not absent in these mystics, yet the consciousness of *guilt* is so—consciousness of the responsibility, the reprobation, the debt we have by sin incurred: they do not think of their own necessity, and that of the world, to be reconciled with God; they do not see in the cross and sufferings of Christ that great *sacrifice* for the forgiveness of sin, which we must first have appropriated to ourselves in faith before we can think of becoming like Christ. And where the earnestness of conscience, where the feeling of responsibility and duty, of the inviolable demands of God's holiness, makes itself valid, the adherents of this system believe that their acknowledgment of sin and their repentance have atoning power. We are here specially reminded of Franciscus of Assisi, about whom it is related that he constantly poured forth a flood of holy tears, so that at last his sight became weakened by it. The gift of tears is a substitute for the atonement wrought out by Christ. In one word: the mystics lack the great principle of the Reformation,—justification by faith, the appropriation of Christ as our righteousness before God, the Rock of our salvation. However deep a view, then, the mystics have obtained of the significance of assimilation, of *appropriation ;* however much they may set forth the passive, receptive side of the inner life, still their chief error consists in the neglect of the principal point of appropriation, since they do not in faith appropriate to themselves Christ as the *propitiation,* and therefore do not rightly appropriate Him, and use the *means of grace,* which the Redeemer has instituted in His Church for the development of the life of faith. The sacraments and the fellowship of the Church, as an agency of educative grace, which will come to the help of man during his work of sanctification, are regarded by them only with indifference, as belonging to the lower grade, to which the multitude belong.

But since the mystics thus attach themselves to Christ as the example, but set Him aside as Redeemer and Mediator, they must also forego what the Redeemer alone can give, *peace with God,* as the foundation of all genuine moral effort. Their inner life is an incessant alternation between the moments of ecstatic gladness and felicity, and feelings of utter desertion by God, the condition which is "without hope." They lack that peace, that holy equanimity of man's inmost being which springs from being received of God, independent of his feelings, the vicissitude of his inner experiences; sorrow and joy constantly succeed each other in their minds, but never to the final destruction of either. They know not that evangelical frame of mind, which, for instance, appears so glorious in Luther, in whom sorrow on account of the consciousness of sin is transformed into the joy of free grace and appropriation. The mystics are agitated either by a gladness exalted above all anxiety, or by a joyless sorrow, either melted into the highest raptures, or in the most desolate and disconsolate circumstances, instead of which the essentially Christian frame of mind is the *combination* of true gladness and true sorrow.[1] The mystic one-sidedness in the contemplation of the example, which also in the middle ages was found with others than the genuine mystics, has been graphically described by Luther, who says: "Under Papacy the sufferings of the Lord were so preached as to show how His example must be followed. All the time was spent in bewailing Christ and His mother, and all that was sought to be accomplished was to give an affecting picture, and move the people to sympathy and tears; and he who could do this best was looked upon as the best preacher on the Passion. But we preach the sufferings of the Lord as the Holy Scriptures teach us." He then goes on to show that the sufferings of Christ doubtless are also "an example of obedience, and, like the sufferings of the martyrs, a glorification of God. But besides this, there is also a special reason why Christ suffered, namely, because by His suffering He was to redeem the whole world, to open heaven to us, to bar the gates of hell, and win for us eternal life." In this Luther expresses what through the struggles of His own inner life had become to him irresistible certainty, that we must first in faith have appropriated the Saviour to ourselves before we can imitate His example.

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[1] The author's *Mester Eckart;* Dorner, *The History of the Development of the Doctrine of Christ's Person,* Div. ii. p. 9 (For. Theol. Library); Ullmann's *Reformers before the Reformation,* 2 vols. (For. Theol. Library).

§ 99.

In another form, the setting aside of the Redeemer and of justification by faith as here described is to be found in recent times in the religious writings of S. Kierkegaard. Here the Example is set forth not with a contemplative nor with a mystic bearing, but in relation to practical asceticism, in relation to the works of Christianity, and more especially to the sufferings connected with these. Union to Christ's human and divine personality is here represented as a demand to *believe* the divine paradox, that God became man—to believe against reason by virtue of the absurd. But the significance of this divine miracle is to Kierkegaard entirely merged in Christ's manifestation as the *Example.* To follow Christ is with him all in all, when first through a miracle we have attained the perception of the fact, imperceptible to the multitude, in His form of a servant. Kierkegaard desires, as we have explained in the foregoing part of this work, to break down the monstrous illusion of nominal Christianity, that all without further conditions are Christians; he desires, in opposition to the cheap Christianity of the multitude, to set it at a higher price, to make its *demands* valid, because men have too long contented themselves with Christ's *benefits.* His fundamental idea is, that what concerns a man is to live his life as the individual, and that the individual who is to become a Christian must find himself alone, alone in the whole world, alone face to face with God. Whilst the mystic at times allows the individual pantheistically to be swallowed up in the depth of divinity, and thereby denies the principle of personality and the ethical, which he in other moments acknowledges, but from the barb of which he escapes by plunging for a time into the pantheistic ocean, Kierkegaard's ethical tendency shows itself in this, that in full earnestness he maintains the individual in his validity face to face with the personal God. He discovers this principally by not, like the mystics, fixing his contemplation merely on man's finiteness and misery, but also seeking in the most earnest manner to awaken not only consciousness of sin, but moreover consciousness of *guilt*. Religious consciousness of guilt is the strongest practical evidence of the infinite value of human personality. For although man, in the consciousness of his guilt, feels himself to be absolutely unworthy, he is at the same time aware that his guilt has infinite significance to God Himself, who appointed him to everlasting bliss. And this combination of the consciousness of guilt with the anticipation of eternal salvation is just the infinite pain of this consciousness. But the more Kierkegaard thus exalts the importance of the individual; the more earnestly he sets forth the principle of personality and personal relation to God; the more determinedly he aims at leading the *individual* to Christ, in order that the individual, by the imitation of Christ, may attain the eternal bliss which by sin and guilt is lost; the more he urges the consciousness of guilt and the demands of the law: the more must it be felt as a misguiding error, that he only leads the individual with the oppressive consciousness of his sin and his guilt to the example, but not to the Redeemer. The example is torn apart from the ground of reconciliation, and *appropriation* is therefore entirely set aside by Kierkegaard; whilst he impatiently hastens on to ascetic exercises and deeds of love, and in indignation over the many, who call themselves Christians without being really so, does not give himself time for the due consideration of Christ's work of love. Of atonement by Christ, of justification by faith, of the sacraments as the means of divine grace for the sinner's forgiveness, nourishment, and spiritual growth, of the influences of the Holy Ghost through the Church, of the sustaining and supporting power of church fellowship for the individual, there is little or nothing to be heard in this system of Christian instruction. Where some glimpses of this do appear, as it were, in passing, they are not wrought out or digested, the results are not brought forward, so that thus they receive no *determining*, no *absorbing* significance. With power the example only is brought forth, and the *demands* springing from this, especially the demand to follow Christ in His sufferings. With power is only brought forth what he calls the paradox of faith,—namely, that God became man in the midst of time, and that eternal bliss is joined to the imitation of this marvellous Example, who by His revelation awakes the *offence* of the world and of our own hearts. But of Christ's work a very imperfect explanation is given. Christ's work, according to Kierkegaard, is essentially merged in His prophetic office, in the revelation of the absolute witness of truth, who, though He addresses Himself to all, will have nothing to do with the multitude, who only desires to be what He is, the truth to the individual, and who is therefore rejected by the multitude, mocked, and crucified. But of Christ's sufferings as High Priest, of the great *sacrifice* which He offered for the sin of the world, in order to satisfy divine justice, which we cannot do, whilst the consciousness of guilt craves a satisfaction, an expiation of transgression, scarcely any mention is made. Again and again we are told of the sacrifice we ourselves should bring, of the sufferings we ourselves must endure, because in our sufferings we imitate the sufferings of Christ. But in this manner we are led back more and more to the ascetic errors of the middle ages, from which the Reformation has delivered us. Although Kierkegaard is opposed to the cloister life and self-imposed penances of the middle ages, yet it is not manifest that his own system, which unquestionably sharpens the consciousness of guilt, yet without admitting the propitiation of Christ as a determining factor in the work of salvation, is aught else but a repetition of the same, in the midst of the Protestant world of the nineteenth century. A life carried out on the views of Kierkegaard, in which consciousness of sin and consciousness of guilt are essential ingredients, in which the believer exists, without this believer having found *justifying* faith, can only become a life of penitence; and as consciousness of sin craves propitiation, but the propitiation of Christ is absent, we return to the self-accomplished propitiation, because eternal salvation must be attained by a continued exercise of suffering and self-denial. Undoubtedly we also hear that eternal salvation is the gift of God's free grace and compassionate love. But this grace only comes afterwards in the future life in heaven, when the man first on earth by his own exertion has achieved all necessary preparations. Christianity, on the other hand, teaches us not a grace which only comes afterwards, but a grace which is far in advance for man,—an anticipating grace which comes to meet him, which from his birth receives man in its arms in baptism (which Kierkegaard ended by rejecting),—a grace which step by step accompanies him to the grave, and which, to him who in faith devotes himself to it, becomes *sustaining* grace, which alone makes it possible for the man to strive after likeness to Christ. Doubtless Kierkegaard also speaks of a "guidance" in the life of the individual, by which in his own concerns he is brought to admire the goodness of God, and what the impotence of man can accomplish by Divine assistance. But this guidance is without any connection with the appointments of God's grace in His Church; and it must certainly appear paradoxical to us, that this same guidance which, according to Kierkegaard's own expression, must have so great a share in his authorship, should through more than eighteen centuries have been completely inactive and indifferent in regard to the greatest phenomenon in history, to Christ's Church on earth, which throughout these centuries must have appeared as an institution which had failed in essentials, which had admitted the multitude. For us the question can only be, if even this authorship has pointed out to us God's saving grace, which is revealed to *all* men, has revealed to us the way of salvation, by which God will lead *all* men, whilst He at the same time in His word warns us against all self-elected and self-discovered ways. It is this which we must deny. We do not deny that his religious teaching may exert a preparing and awakening influence, in many respects may serve to arouse anxiety and earnestness. But in so far as this hermit-sentiment is intended to give us a right view of what it is to become a Christian, and right views of the imitation of Christ, we consider its tenets as containing a deep and perilous mistake.

It belongs to the experiences of Church history, that if on the one side the infinite *demands* of Christianity are maintained, as these proceed from Christ's word and example, and on the other side the Redeemer is ignored, and the aids which God has granted to us weak men in the fellowship of the Church and the means of grace are dispensed with, then there is no one who can satisfy these demands. He who earnestly endeavours to order his life in this manner, and as the individual torn apart from the appointments and ordinances which are God's own gifts, will press himself into relation with God, will live his life in this solitary and isolated relation to God, must be crushed by the weight of these demands. It was a belief in the infancy of mankind, that he who had a theophany, he to whom God had shown Himself in direct revelation, must die immediately after the vision, because that the sin-stained could not endure the sight of the holy God, and that the frail earthly form must be rent asunder when touched by the glory of God's holiness. With some modification, we may say that the old proverb, that no one can see God and live, has often been fulfilled in the midst of Christendom in the history of false asceticism. It has often been fulfilled in hermits and monks, who in solitude, face to face with the example of Christ, the glory of whose holiness had burst upon them, have fought the fight of self-denial and renunciation of the world. They have been, as it were, struck by the ideal of holiness in Christ,—so to speak, God-stricken, as when we say that one has been terror-stricken or lightning-struck; but whilst they have felt themselves annihilated and crushed by the glory of this image, they have also felt themselves attracted towards it in love ineffable, in an infinite aspiration to attain likeness to Him, and thus to reach eternal salvation. The misfortune in this love, the abnormal and dangerous part of this condition, is, that those concerned have *only* seen the image, without at the same time seeing the Redeemer and His ordinances and means of grace. Their condition has thus been one of passion, a condition in which there is no peace. Hovering between a possibility of eternal bliss and eternal woe, in ecstatic raptures, in transports of unutterable misery, they have been destitute of that steady fulcrum of the mind, that in which Paul found aid under all difficulties and dangers, and Luther also amid the struggles of his convent life,—justifying faith,—faith which has appropriated to itself Christ as our righteousness, and which, in spite of all sin and weakness, still knows itself to be accepted by atoning and sin-pardoning grace, knows itself to be placed under the fatherly providential guidance of God, who, whilst He desires that we work out our salvation with fear and trembling, gives at the same time the assurance that nothing except unbelief can separate us from the love of God in Christ. Destitute of this foundation for peace of mind, they have in solitude struggled under incessant self-examination, and efforts to die to the world in order to root out and annihilate sin, which, however, in this earthly existence is never absolutely annihilated; and in trying to overleap the earthly barrier, and encumbered with a burden which they could not bear, they have often ended in derangement of mind, in despair and horror of themselves. With regard to such it has been fulfilled, that no one can see the example of Christ and live, if he does not see the example in the Redeemer, does not contemplate the holiness through the veil of pitying and forgiving grace. And this will confirm itself in the same degree, as the eye is sharpened to the ideal of holiness which in Christ was exhibited as an indispensable requirement of human nature. Exclusively to gaze at Christ as the example, is to look at Him askance, is not to see Him as He is. Nay, he who only sees Christ as the example, just on this account does not see Him accurately as the example, does not see the whole depth of Christ's love,—sees Him only as the witness for truth, but not in His pitying office of High Priest towards the lost, from which human love, in imitation of Christ, receives its deepest motives, and through which Christ's command to men, Be ye merciful! first finds its full significance. Christ says: "He who hath seen me, hath seen the Father!" But the Father is not merely the holy Lawgiver; the Father is redeeming love, saving and educating grace, who does not demand that the children shall reach the goal at once, but in infinite patience and long-suffering guides them thither step by step through a comprehensive system of education.

In harmony with the leading doctrines of the evangelical Church, we therefore maintain that, without justifying faith in the Redeemer, His example cannot be really followed; without the postulate of grace, there can be no mention of Christian virtue.

THE CARDINAL VIRTUE OF CHRISTIANITY. IMITATION AS SANCTIFICATION.

§ 100.

As Christ is revealed as the Righteous Servant of the Lord, who through the ministering relation works out the relation of love, the filial relation to the Father, this must be repeated by way of invitation in the life of the Christian. It becomes the task of every Christian, in his special position in life, to live as the servant of the Lord, and through this relation of obedience to develope the relation of God's child. Holy obedience and holy love are essential features in the physiognomy of Christian life; and the further a Christian makes spiritual progress, the clearer will these features appear. They constitute, so to speak, the family likeness which is to be found between all true Christians, at all times and in different creeds. They are to be found in Fénélon as in Luther. Whether we contemplate apostles and reformers, or Christians who have led a quiet life, unmarked by the world, we always find the relation of servant in unison with the relation of love. This ministering love, which is the living manifestation of the power of free-will, since through it free-will attains true independence, we designate as the Christian cardinal virtue. It is essentially love to God, and as union with God, likeness to God. Already Plato, the greatest sage of Paganism, in anticipation of Christianity, declared likeness to God to be the highest summit of virtue. But as God can only be perceived and comprehended by us in Christ, and as we can only love God through Christ, can only attain likeness to God by attaining likeness to Christ, we determine the Christian cardinal virtue more closely as *love to God in Christ Jesus.*

It may here be inquired why we do not set forth *faith* as the Christian cardinal virtue? We reply, Faith is not so much itself a virtue as the mother of all virtues, the root from which they spring. Faith and love are *at bottom one.* Faith is love itself, in its fruitful beginning, with all the germs of life; for in faith the soul opens to divine grace as the flower which opens its cup to the sunbeam, and the soul yields itself to these influences. Whether we determine faith as the conviction of that which is not seen, or as trust and confidence, it is essentially love to God, which humbly receives and confidently apprehends the divine love, offered and imparted to man. Faith is only justifying faith because it is reception and *appropriation* of God's mercy in Christ, appropriation of the gospel, that in Christ we are loved of God, that God in Christ forgives our sins, and receives us as His children. But by faith, as the *ground of appropriation*, by which the relation of love between God and man comes into existence, independent progressive love is developed in its manifold modes of expression, the love of gratitude and of adoration, sanctifying love, sacrificial love, in which man brings himself and his life as a sacrifice to God; with regard to which, however, it is to be remarked that all human yielding, working, suffering, is conditional on a *continued* reception and appropriation of divine grace, so that reception and appropriation are constantly the first, and man's act the second.

§ 101.

Since we have determined the cardinal virtue of Christianity as love to God in Christ, we may also, rightly understood, determine it as love to Christ. As Christ confirms the first and great commandment,—Thou shalt love the Lord thy God above all things,—He also requires that we should love Himself (Christ) above all things, should forsake all and follow Him,—a demand which Christ could not make if love to Him did not include the perfection of all love. We love Christ only because, in becoming partakers of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we become at the same time partakers in the love of the Father and the communion of the Holy Ghost. Love to Christ is therefore one with love to the triune God in His revelation in the world, but finds in Christ its centre and resting-point. And as it is love to God, so it is also love to men; for love to Christ is inseparable from love to Christ's work and Christ's kingdom, which embraces the whole human race; since the whole human race was created and fore-ordained to Christ as the first-born of every creature, fitted to be gathered together under Christ as under the head, and is therefore only rightly acknowledged and loved in Him. And as love to Christ includes love to men, both to individuals and to the race, so it includes also true self-love, right self-preservation, and care for the soul's salvation. Love to Christ thus includes, as in an ample storehouse, love to the true ideals of all humanity. It includes love to God as the ideal, since God Himself, union and likeness with God, is the ultimate object for the moral effort of man. It includes love to the ideal of individuality, since every man is fitted to become perfect in Christ. Each of these ideals can only really be loved through Christ as the Mediator, and in Christ as their uniting centre.

But, on the other side, it may be said that only when love to Christ embraces these ideals is it perfect love to Him. In the opposite case it becomes particularistic (*particularistik*). To love Christ without loving Him as the *Son*, as the manifestation of the *Father*, would be man-worship and idolatry, nay, a kind of Fetishism. Something of such a one-sidedness is seen in several of the hymns of the United Brethren, in which the relation of the soul to Christ, of the bride to the bridegroom, becomes a relation bordering on the sensual, because God the Father is left out of this relation of love, or because it is forgotten, or not seriously considered, that Christ can only be loved as the image of the invisible God, who guides us to the Father. 2 Another form of this circumscribed love to Christ is to love Him as the Redeemer of the individual, without at the same time loving Him as the Redeemer of the world, as the head of that kingdom in which all the aims of humanity must find their final result. This particularism appears with hermits and ascetics, in monastic life and pietism. A third form, finally, is to love Christ as the founder of a kingdom, from which has issued an infinite number of influences for the training and ennobling of the race; to extol Christ's historic greatness, nay, to labour for the spread of His Church among the masses, but to set aside the personal, the individual relation to the Redeemer. This tendency, which appears in various tints, sometimes as humanism, sometimes as ecclesiasticism, has unquestionably the appearance of universality, but is nevertheless partial or particularistic, since it overlooks the principal fact,—namely, that Christ's kingdom is the kingdom of individuals, or the community of *saints*. True love to Christ's kingdom is at once individual and universal, embraces regard to society and the individual. But unquestionably it may there be said, that the individual relation—however many one-sided considerations may be combined with it—is still the central relation of discipleship, and that it holds good here that every one is nearest to himself. What is said in Acts xx. 28 to teachers, that they should take heed to *themselves* and to the entire flock, thus that they should consider their own relation to the Master before that of any other person, applies to every Christian. No one can be able to work for the spread of God's kingdom in society who has not himself received God's kingdom; and the measure of each individual's activity in religious and ethical significance, is the depth, sincerity, and power of his own personal relation to the Redeemer.

§ 102.

The love of the disciple contains the same moments as those which we have discovered above in the love of the Lord. As Christ's love, in His inward relation to the Father, is receptive and appropriating, contemplative and adoring love, in His relation to the world it is active and passive love; so, too, is the love of the disciple, in an imitative manner, and by means of Christ as Mediator. It determines itself as a *contemplative* love, rooted and grounded in faith, which in contemplation appropriates to itself the Lord, and those things which belong to the kingdom of God, absorbing itself in the divine word which the Lord has given us, hereby at the same time teaching the true contemplation of the world and of self,—a love which has its type in Mary sitting at the feet of the Master, hearing His word, and pondering it in her heart, and in which all theology and theosophy have their origin. It determines itself, further, as *mystic* love, or as the love of prayer, which in the most intimate personal fellowship unites itself to the Redeemer, and redeeming love in Christ, in accordance with the Lord's own instructions, praying for the good and perfect gifts from above, praying before all else to receive Christ Himself and the Holy Ghost, unconditionally submitting his will to that of his Master. We designate prayer—by which we mean not merely prayer as an individual act, but as a constant frame of mind ("Pray without ceasing," 1 Thess. v. 17)—as mystic love; for there is not only a false pantheistic, but also a true ethical mysticism, without which the religious relation to God is impossible. The true conception of mysticism is the conception of inward communion with God,—a communion in which man not merely seeks God in the outer sanctuary, the visible temple, but in which man himself is the sanctuary and temple: and the principal form of this inward communion is prayer. But neither contemplative nor mystic love is exclusively mere contemplation and prayer in solitude. Neither is it merely in the depths of the Christian soul, in the midst of the occupations and distractions of external life; but it finds—and thereby discriminates itself from false mysticism—special power and strengthening in the mutual edification of the Church, in Christian social worship, in which the Lord, in a special significance, fulfils His word, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there will I be in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii. 20); where the life of our Lord is repeated before the congregation in the Gospel lessons of the ecclesiastical year, which are read aloud by the servant of the word; where the prayer and thanksgiving of all find expression in psalms and hymns; and where union with the Lord reaches its summit in the holy ordinance of the Supper, since we have received His body and blood—assimilate Himself, who gives Himself to us as food for the new man, to an eternal life. Christian love further determines itself as *practical*, active love, in which love to men and devotion to the special worldly calling and to the worldly aims of society are hallowed by devotion to the aim of God's kingdom, to the coming of God's kingdom on earth, and in which a Christian unites as in marriage his earthly calling and his heavenly. Practical love determines itself at the same time as suffering and forbearing love, which through much tribulation enters the kingdom of God, and by sacrifice learns obedience under the cross.

§ 103.

In the same measure as the love rooted and grounded in faith increases in a disciple of Christ, in the same measure is he led back to the divinely appointed destiny of man, and triumphs over the two false tendencies of human nature: the one, which in a false spiritualism—that of Prometheus and Faust—desires to fly beyond the destiny appointed him by God, as God's servant on earth; the other, which by the weight of law will draw him down *below* the destiny appointed him by God, and materialize him in the thraldom of the senses. He is more and more guided into the centre pointed out to him as the personal union of spirit and matter, of the heavenly and the earthly; he becomes more and more, in the religious-ethical signification, not merely mind, but soul, since Christ, by means of His Holy Spirit, is the animating principle in him, the centre of his life. Christian love thus forms the direct opposite to Egoism, with lust of the flesh and lust of the eye and the pride of life as a middle form between the two other principal forms, which have the deepest roots.

To the pride of life, or arrogance, Christian love opposes *humility*, which is not merely the deeply felt consciousness of the infinite need of God in which created nature stands (*indigentia Dei*), but also the consciousness of sin, and the infinite distance between man and Christ, who has redeemed him, and by the path of humiliation and humility leads him to an exceeding height, to union with God. "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Luke xviii. 14). To the lust of the flesh Christian love opposes chastity or *purity* (*ἁγνεία*) in the widest sense of the word, which does not show itself in rooting out the employment of the senses, as with the false ascetics, but in watching the *boundaries* between mind and matter, places the material in the proper relation of subordination to the spiritual, prevents the false independence of the material. To the lust of the eye, Christian love opposes inward independence of *earthly possessions and worldly honour*, by means of which the senses, enlightened by Christ to the perception of heavenly treasures, and thus valuing not things visible but invisible, do not permit themselves to be dazzled by earthly phenomena. In regard to outward wealth, earthly possessions, the Christian knows himself to be the steward of goods entrusted to him, for the use and employment of which he must render account. And in regard to earthly, mere apparent honour, it is a small thing to him to be judged of man's judgment (1 Cor. iv. 3), as the highest matter with him is to have honour with God. At the entrance of Christianity into the pagan world, Christian humility and purity appeared to the heathen as something new and striking, and they became aware that a life of personality unknown before had now its advent on the earth.

That monastic life soon changed this humility to a false self-abasement and external obedience; purity to a spirituality hostile to nature, and contemptuous of the married condition and family ties; independence on worldly possession, and honour to an external poverty, which, together with dishonour and misconstruction from men, should be aspired after as an aim, and thus become changed into vanity,—such considerations do not lessen the real evangelical significance of these virtues, their importance for the development of holiness and bliss. They will, if rightly understood, continue to be the ascetic cardinal virtues, which—not without, but with, and under guidance of, our actual earthly vocation—may be specially useful in the conquest of sin, to clear away obstacles to the progress of God's kingdom within us, and to promote the reign of love. If we acknowledge this, then we shall also be able, losing sight of the errors of monastic life and of Catholicism, to acknowledge Christian universality in the great emphasis which, in the Romish Church, is laid on confession, fasting, and on the symbols of death—the death's head, the hour-glass, the scythe, and other figures, which cry aloud to man, "*Memento mori!*" For the specific remedy for curing pride and developing humility is still self-examination and *confession of sin*. We may add: the confession of sin not merely to God, but to some one of our *fellow-men*. It is a deep observation of Pascal's, that in the mere confession of sin to God there is not the energy, not the real humiliation, which there must be in the confession of sin to a fellow-man, who perhaps had before far better thoughts of us, and now beholds us in our native deformity; to a man who, according to evangelical ideas, does not need to be a priest, but may be a friend ("Confess your faults one to another," Jas. v. 16). The specific means to deaden the lusts of the flesh, and to promote chastity, not merely in the direction of the sixth commandment, but as guardians of the frontier in the whole relation between mind and matter, to maintain thorough purity, is fasting, if this idea be extended to a scheme of dietetics, not merely bodily, but also mental, in which one sometimes denies himself permissible enjoyment in order to set a barrier to the impermissible, and when one in all things exercises a thorough self-control, so as to have all his faculties, his intellectual and bodily instruments, in his own power. ("I keep under my body, lest that, after having preached to others, I myself should be a castaway," 1 Cor. ix. 27.) The specific means against covetousness, against the lust of possession in all its varied forms, is, *Memento mori!*—the thought of death ("Thou fool! this night thy soul shall be required of thee? Then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?" Luke xii. 20), the thought of how relative and evanescent are all the honours and possessions of this world, if man makes himself dependent upon these, *vanitas vanitatum;* all of which considerations will be further developed in the discussion of special ethics.

§ 104.

In its development in time, Christian love exhibits itself as *fidelity*. If love may be described as the essence and content of virtue, fidelity may be termed its shape and form, since fidelity, under the temptations and dangers of time, not merely preserves and guards communion with the Lord, the blessing God has vouchsafed us, but also moulds and fashions it (the talents entrusted). Fidelity includes vigilance, that eye of fidelity which beholds at once that which is nearest and most distant, watches the situation and the special requirements, the restraining and the furthering. Fidelity likewise includes courage and constancy (*perseverantia*), which endure in season and out of season, in good times and in bad, until the end; and in which appears not only courage for the fight, but courage in suffering, God's foster-daughter, as Tertullian calls Patience, which, along with meekness and long-suffering, always accompany God's Spirit when this descends to earth (Whoso endureth to the end shall be saved, Matt. x. 22). In the same measure as love exhibits itself as fidelity and constancy, in the same measure is also realized Christian liberty, with peace and joy in God and our Saviour, which is a reflection of the ideal of liberty and peace, of the calm glory which was already manifested in the Lord in the humiliation. (See Luther's treatise, *On the Liberty of a Christian Man.*) But Christian liberty is grounded in humility,—in the feeling, By the grace of God I am what I am,—in the feeling of the infinite distance from the perfection of God ("Not that I have already attained, neither am already perfect," Phil. iii. 12); and under the contrast between ideal and reality, which continues throughout this present time, Christian liberty is a struggle in the *hope* of the ultimate perfection of God's kingdom.

The four cardinal virtues of heathen morality—wisdom, uprightness, sobriety, and constancy—are contained and regenerated in Christian virtue. Wisdom is born anew in contemplative love. For it is the true conception of wisdom to be the intelligence of love, perceiving love, which comprehends its path and its goal. Uprightness is renewed in practical love. For as love is one with obedience and the fulfilment of the law, it does no evil, and in every circle of life performs what is right, complies both actively and passively with the rules and demands appointed by God. Sobriety and constancy are renewed in Christian fidelity, which possesses real sobriety and real constancy, because, a thing unknown to heathen virtue, it watches and prays, and because it works in humility and hope.

§ 105.

The development of virtue in the imitation of Christ, from the first imperfect commencement to the various stages of perfection, we designate with the Scriptures as *sanctification*, which is at once a work of divine grace, which causes man to progress in holy growth, and a work of toil and strife effected by Christian liberty. Sanctification is the process by which human personality must be liberated from its *profanity*, from the thraldom of worldliness, in which it finds itself without redemption, even in the highest stage of civilisation and culture; by which the life shall be transformed to its true destiny, to be a life in God *free from the world*, a life in the world appointed of God. In the same measure as sanctification progresses, all the natural faculties and gifts are brought into subjection to the new principle of personality implanted by Christ: the material is placed in normal relation to the mental, the human to the divine, the development of talent to the development of character, the world to the kingdom of God, time and the present moment to eternity; and the various moments of life are brought into harmony. Sanctification progresses through the often-named moments, continued appropriation of Christ, productive activity in the spirit of Christ, and separation, cleansing, and mastery of sin, and that which sin originates.

This cleansing, which till the close of life continues to have such great significance, must be carried out through the entire domain of personal life; and there is no circle of this which forms any exception. It must be carried out in contemplation and prayer, in activity and in suffering, in appropriation and use of the world and the things of the world: for everywhere there is still impurity and abnormality proceeding from the old man; and so far, there must be everywhere in Christian life an ascetic moment as an exercise in virtue, which results in the removal of obstacles, and the employment of means to its advancement. The double character here indicated of the cleansing, breaking down, and the positive developing, forming, and edifying, has also its type in Christ's mode of action in regard to the disciples. For, on the one hand, He frees them from their prejudices and illusions, corrects and purifies them, which He symbolically indicates by the washing of feet (John xiii.); on the other hand, He forms them and quickens them, promising them a new and higher productivity ("He that believeth on me, out of his belly shall flow living water," John vii. 38). So also Christ's work in the human race contemplates at once the *redemption* of the human race, its deliverance from sin, and its *new creation* and elevation to a higher grade of life. Therefore we may also express the task of life in imitation of Christ thus, that we must die with Christ, and live with Him. Like as Christ died for sin, so must we die to sin and to the world; and like as Christ has risen from the dead, so should we walk in newness of life. Where one of these appointments is maintained without the other, a one-sided direction of life ensues, of which Church history affords many examples. Ascetic life, monastic life, and pietism afford examples of the one-sidedness first mentioned. The Christian duty of life is here placed exclusively in cleansing from sin, in the mortification of the flesh, in dying to the world; but concerning the development of human talents and powers by Christ's Spirit, of creative, life-giving effects, there is no mention. There is only the suggestion of a blessed death; but of a blessed life already in the present time there is no hint. It is only preached that he who believes on Christ shall not be lost; but not that whoso believeth on Him, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living waters. It is only preached that Christ gives us the forgiveness of sins, but not that He is the *bread of life.* Opposed to this one-sided ascetic theory of life is that which we may designate as the Hellenistic, because it seeks to combine Greek paganism with Christianity. In the early ages of Christianity it appeared specially in the Greek Church, whilst in more recent times it has been exhibited in the various forms in which a heathen scheme of humanity is blended with Christianity. It places sin and redemption in the shade, and regards Christ predominantly as the completion of human nature, as the summit of attainment in the development of the race, from which a new and more perfect development of life shall proceed. The imitation of Christ is there made to consist in a harmoniously progressive unfolding of human nature after His example. The opposition between the old and the new man, between the old development disturbed by sin, the consequences of which continue in the life of every Christian, and the new development established by Christ, and which must fight its way forward through the old obstacles, is entirely overlooked. Only where sin is not taken into serious account can we dream the optimist dream of a harmoniously progressive development, although this ought to stand before us as the ideal. It is not by any means the case that our Christian life can run on in rhythmical alternation of appropriation and producing activity, of assimilation and production: there is further required a constant *excretion*, the separation of the unwholesome and injurious matter which we bear within us—a continual purging away of the old leaven (1 Cor. v. 7). Although sin, with the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, with its optimist levity and its pessimist melancholy, with its uneasy, violent, and hasty temper, and its indolent repose, sluggishness, and indifference, with its daring and its desponding heart, *is broken* in the truly regenerate, still there are many remnants left behind of this leaven, in accordance with the sinful peculiarities of each.

During our education for the kingdom of God, the Great Ruler of all things assists us specially in this purging away of the old leaven by sending us sufferings. It also forms part of His vast system of education in this world, that we are so often obliged to work with earthly materials, which resist our efforts; so often must do coarse work, or insignificant, trivial, unspeakably prosaic work; are so often compelled to sacrifice time and industry and care to things which are so petty and evanescent, that they seem at variance with our high and eternal destiny. These trivialities, this coarse material, has, however, a great ascetic and pedagogic significance, and is designed to break our egoism, especially our spiritual pride, and that we may learn obedience. Bodily sufferings, and the depression that accompanies them, frequently heavy care regarding the necessities of the body, serve with spiritual natures to separate and evaporate injurious spiritual essences. But assuredly this education which God bestows on us will not complete its work if human self-education is not combined with it. In this must the proving, cleansing, contesting method, like a continual exorcism, go hand in hand with the moulding, positively progressive, forming an eternal individuality or genius. Only thus can the soul gradually be made perfect in the imitation of Christ, forming for itself its inward body whilst in conflict with the disturbing, destroying powers, forming for itself that external perishing body as an instrument for the spirit, toiling painfully on its invisible wedding garment, through much tribulation gathering together the treasure which it is to bring along with it into the kingdom beyond.

THE HIGHEST MOTIVE. BLESSEDNESS AND DISINTERESTED LOVE TO GOD. THE DEEPEST QUIETIVE.

§ 106.

A question of pre-eminent importance for every ethical system is the motive or ground of moral actions. In Christian life, *grateful* love to the redeeming God, who in mercy bestowed on us the beginning of felicity, and who will finish what He has begun in us, is the deepest ground of virtue, to which all other motives may be referred. When unmixed, disinterested *reverence* for the law, for the majesty of duty, is mentioned as the motive of duty (Kant), though we certainly cannot refuse our esteem to this motive, yet neither can we acknowledge it as the highest. For not the relation to an impersonal law, but only the personal relation to God Himself, can produce the most sincere motive to action in the kingdom of personality. Our whole Christianity rests on this, that we are beloved of God, that we have received from Him the forgiveness of sins, and are adopted as children of God; that He Himself in baptism has established His covenant of mercy with us,—a relation of reciprocy, in which He, loving us, desires to be beloved by us. From this springs gratitude towards God and the Saviour, which obliges us to new obedience, and which is inseparable from filial confidence and submission to God's will. But the love produced by *gratitude* does not exclude, but includes, *adoring* love, which loves God for His own sake. For in what manner should I love God, if I did not also sink in adoring contemplation of His perfection, of Christ's glory,—if the kingdom of God did not stand before me as in itself the perfectly good, the intrinsically precious, quite independently of the benefits which God has bestowed on me individually? Gratitude and admiration in union with unlimited trust are the great motives which have incited to all truly Christian actions, as well to the great self-sacrificing achievements on the stage of history, as to the quiet unmarked acts of love. "This I have done for thee, what doest thou for me?" was the inscription beneath a picture of Christ (Ecce Homo), which made so deep an impression on Zinzendorf. It is the same thought, the same motive ground, in all Christian action. And inseparable from this are adoring love and worship of the depths of God's love in Christ. But in the imitation of Christ, adoring love unfolds itself on the ground of thankfulness. The deepest, most earnest motive, continues to be gratitude towards God in Christ for what He has done for the human race and for me—for the *benefits* He has bestowed on us. Where this is not maintained, there appears that error which with Fénélon has found its expression in the tenet of disinterested love to God. We are here again reminded of the old mystic path of error, and of more recent pantheistic errors.

Disinterested love, according to Fénélon, only loves God for the sake of His perfection: thus it is the pure love of adoration, but not for the sake of the benefits He has bestowed on us, in which last case there is always some self-interest (*intérêt propre*), and thus some egoism. No regard to our own felicity should here be the motive, if our love is to be pure and perfect. Not our own felicity, but the honour of God, must be our chief aim.

Fénélon does not find fault, if there are men who require the motive of blessedness and benefit, just as no fault can be found with the fact that there are sick people who can only walk by the help of a crutch. But he desires that it should be acknowledged that this is an imperfection, a lower position, to require this crutch, this motive to love God, who ought to be loved exclusively on account of His own perfection.[1] Even if God would not make me happy, even if God would slip me at death and let me sink into the night of annihilation, still I ought to love Him; for only then do I walk in the way of God, for which not my felicity, but *God's glory*, is the ultimate aim. It is notorious what a shock this teaching of Fénélon caused, and what vexations it drew down upon this noble mind in his controversy with Bossuet. But his doctrine, although he sought by various amendments to soften it, will continue to be a shock to the Christian mind desiring to be built up on the foundation of the gospel. For, however sublime it may sound that we should love God with a pure and unmixed love, the conclusion from his teaching is still, as Bossuet also showed, that gratitude towards God, who in Christ has given us the commencement of blessedness, with the promise of its future perfection, is a lower step, which we must leave behind when we go forward to perfection; and to this the Christian disposition never can attain, because it never through eternity will be able to forget that it has a Redeemer from sin and death. When Fénélon says that we undoubtedly should thank God, because this is His *will*, but that God's goodness towards us must not be the *motive* for our love to Him, because love ought to be a pure devotion irrespective of our own good, he has the Apostle John against him, since this last says: Let us love Him, for He first loved us (1 John iv. 19). The truth in Fénélon's teaching is, that there is unquestionably a narrow-minded gratitude, in which the individual is egoistically shut up in himself, without being moved to sympathy by the communication of God's love to the whole creation, and which only rejoices in the gifts, but not in the Giver. The truth is, that love to God ought not to be viewed as a *means* to procure my blessedness, as if blessedness was something which could be enjoyed without God, instead of which, blessedness, which is inseparable from holiness, only exists *in relation with God.* The truth is, that in the inner life there are moments in which gratitude and regard to our own felicity do not appear as such, but as though melted and absorbed in the universal element of adoration, like an ointment which is dissolved into perfume. And bliss would certainly not be bliss, if it did not include adoring love, and all the ecstasies of devotion. But it is an illusion, that there can be a real love to God, in which human personality does not also seek and find its own satisfaction, in which man will indeed *give* his love to God, but will not *accept* love from God, or at least will only accept of God's love for the sake of the glory of God, but not at all on account of *his own blessedness.* The teaching of Fénélon relative to disinterested love towards God contains a partial denial of the eternal validity of human personality in the sight of God Himself. For God has not appointed human personality merely as a means to promote His honour, but at the same time as an independent aim, by appointing it to the fellowship of His love. And what is it that we pre-eminently adore in God, and through which God's glory is revealed in the highest degree, except by the free voluntary communication of His love to His creatures, which He impressed with His image, and which He desired to redeem from perdition? But if my salvation is an object to God Himself, then it ought also to be an object to myself,—namely, in the way of His appointment, as His plan of salvation requires.

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[1] L'amour sans aucun motif de l'intérêt propre pour la béatitude est manifestement plus parfait que celui, qui est mélangé de ce motif d'intérêt propre.—*Sur le pur Amour.*

We reject, therefore, the tentative assumption that God might let us perish, and that not the less it would be our duty to love Him, because all things are for His *glory.* For this assumption denies the ethical conception of God, or love as God's essential nature, and sets forth an arbitrary omnipotence as the determining power in God, to whose glory everything shall be done. A wider contemplation, for which there is here no room, would lead us to perceive that the ethical conception of God which Fénélon held is in several points of his system overshadowed by the physical and abstract metaphysical. Here we shall only observe, that this disinterested love to God which Fénélon commends, in which we find ourselves in perfect self-forgetfulness, in which I am no more to myself than to every one else (*tout est alors égal, parceque le moi est perdu et anéanti, le moi n'est pas plus moi qu'autrui*), by which I am alike with all the saved in whom God's glory is manifested; in which the highest condition is that all thank God, but none thank Him specially on their own account, since all only are grateful because God has done all things to His own glory (*ce n'est plus pour nous, que nous demandons, ce n'est plus pour nous, que nous remercions. On le remercie d'avoir fait sa volonté et de s'être glorifié lui même*); that this disinterested love is nearly allied to what in the speculative systems is called the unity of human thought with God and the universe, in which the thinker only regards himself as the mere eye from which every individual and personal interest is excluded. It is in reality only pure, which here means abstract *contemplation*, but in *mystic* form; and just on this account it exhibits itself with Fénélon, as well as with the great mystics of the middle ages, where we have seen it before,[1] with that superhuman, heavenly expression, which exerts such a fascinating and enticing power, deceiving even thinkers with the appearance of the religious and ethical,—an angel's head with wings, but without body, hovering about in the clouds and disjoined from actual individuality, separated from real, complete personality, and thus also from the beating heart. But man's relation to God cannot be without heart.

That in Fénélon there was a great heart, which beat both for his own salvation and that of others, we acknowledge as fully as any one. But however high we may place him as a Christian personality, however willingly we may concede that this theoretical error of his did not exert any disturbing practical influence on himself, but was rendered innocuous by his upright faith in God's sanctifying grace, his great practical love to God and men, yet, on the whole, Bossuet must be held as in the right, when he maintains the motive of gratitude and salvation against that of so-called disinterested affection. Our evangelical teachers, who know what we have in the forgiveness of sin, and what is given along with it by God, have likewise determined gratitude towards God as the all-embracing motive of the whole personality, which springs from the relation to God produced by justification, and moves the will to deeds and sacrifices of love (eucharistic sacrifices; see Melanchthon's *loci: de sacrificio*). They have thus acknowledged the rightly understood motive of bliss: "Let us love Him, for He first loved us" (1 John iv. 19).

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[1] See the author's *Meister Eckardt*, Hamburg 1842.

§ 107.

The same thing which in the Christian life is the deepest ground or motive for the will, is, considered from another point of view, also the deepest ground of tranquillity, the deepest quietive. In the imitation of Christ, in which we learn to know what are the real necessities and the true calamities of life, we find, under all external and internal tribulations, the surest ground for comfort and serenity in the consciousness that we are beloved of God in Christ, that in Christ He has bestowed on us the forgiveness of sins and the adoption of children, and that nothing can separate us from the love of God in Christ (Rom. viii. 39). The same gratitude for God's undeserved mercy, which moves us to labour and sacrifice for Christ's sake, brings with it also tranquillity and peace, because it rests on faith and hope as its foundation. There is no deeper source of inward calm and serenity than justifying faith, with gratitude to God for His undeserved mercy. And there is no deeper source of unrest and disquietude to the soul, than the feeling of not being beloved of God, not being the object of God's grace, but of being under His wrath, doubting and distrusting the reality of salvation,—a condition which in the Christian life plays such an important part in the narrative of *temptations*. Where a man can thank God for His unmerited grace, this gratitude is inseparable from unbounded confidence and devotion. The lively consciousness of the unspeakably great gift, which is bestowed on us in Christ, constrains us to *be content with the grace of God, take up our cross, and follow Jesus*, and thus to exercise a subduing power over the impatience and restless craving of the will, cast down lofty imaginations, and cause the heart to become still in God. From gratitude springs prayer, in which the suppliant yields himself entirely to the will of Him, without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground, with whom the very hairs of our heads are all numbered, and who will make all things work together for good to them that love God. And in gratitude the hope is strengthened, that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. It is this which is expressed with such great earnestness in many of our Lutheran hymns, as, for example, "Befal Du dine Veie, Hvo ikkun lader Herren raade" (Commit thou thy ways, who art guided by God alone), or Brorson's beautiful "Her vil ties, her vil bies!"[1] (Here we will be silent, here we will wait!)

And as grateful love does not exclude, but includes and developes, adoring love, which grows deeper in the knowledge of Christ, and loves God and the Saviour on account of their own perfection, so contemplative, adoring love also exercises its tranquillizing power over the mind. For if we really adore God and Christ, and Christ's work and kingdom, as that which is worthy of adoration in an absolute sense, we learn thereby not to admire as the highest object of admiration what the world admires, not to be astonished at what astonishes the world; in short, we learn the true *nil admirari.* If we adore and worship Christ, we have a defence against all man-worship, all deifying of human persons and human works; not merely against saint-worship, but also against genius-worship, which in every age repeats itself in the world,—that idolatry which is offered to human genius; for we know how it will really fare with earthly genius if it shall be measured with absolute greatness. If we admire the kingdom of God, then we shall only have a very limited admiration for the kingdoms of this world, and the glories of them; and it does not surprise us at all in the course of this world, during the optimist illusions and pessimist lamentations of men, to see again and again the most beautiful and glorious of things, when only of earthly origin, follow the law of decay. "For all flesh is as grass, and the glory of men as the flower of the field; but the word of God endureth for ever" (1 Pet. i. 24). Not as if we could be freed, or desired to be freed, from pain and sorrow over the perishable condition under which creation sighs, or could fail to observe in the ruin and decay of the individual the universal pain of the world; but over it all Christ raises and comforts us, in the consciousness of the veiled kingdom of glory, which is coming through these tribulations.

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[1] "Her vil ties, her vil bies." S. A. Brorson, who died as Bishop of Ribe about the middle of last century, and is now considered one of the best hymn writers of the Danish Church, occupies a very similar position in this branch of literature to that held in Germany by Gellert, his contemporary, who, however, surpasses him in spirituality and poetic fancy.—MICHELSEN.

§ 108.

The great religious phenomenon which is known under the name of *Quietism*, may be described as that partial view of life which sets it forth as the highest aim for personality to be freed from all motives, and only to be regulated by quietives. The soul here desires no longer to be set in motion, but exclusively to be brought to rest, to sink into peace, to cease to will. This system of thought appeared in a very peculiar form in the seventeenth century, in connection with the tenet of disinterested love to God, which we have already explained. Its representatives are *Molinos* (1642–97), *Franciscus von Sales* (1567–1622), *Francisca von Chantal*, and *Jeanne de la Motte-Guyon* (1648–1717). Fénélon felt himself drawn in sympathy to this school of sentiment, became its apologist, and subjected himself to a degree of martyrdom for it, without however on his own account drawing conclusions from its doctrines. For persons who set forth worldly concerns as the highest aim, and through these aspire after happiness, this, like all mysticism, can only appear as a curiosity of Church history. For those who have any experience in the inner life and inner ways of men, it will, on the other hand, remain to all times coming as an error rich in instruction, and constantly recurring under different forms. This error cannot be investigated from the view-point of happiness, but only from that of blessedness. For it rests just upon this, that quietism, in order to bring the will to rest, resigns salvation or blessedness itself.

According to the quietist doctrine of perfection, disinterested love to God, when it attains fully to penetrate the soul, detaches us from ourselves, brings every wish, every desire into silence, nay, places the soul in a complete passivity, in which it can no more will anything, and is thus liberated from the restlessness of the will. Those who have reached this stage, are every moment of their lives in a worshipping frame of mind ; but in their prayer there is no will of their own, for they pray but one prayer : Thy will be done ! Under all external and every-day circumstances, nay, even under the temptations which concern their outward man, under the trespasses which they commit, and which cannot be avoided, they continue to be in the contemplative, mystic condition. In their inmost being there reigns a dead calm, a reflection of eternity. They are like the Alps, whose summits beam with sunshine under a cloudless sky, whilst storm and tempest roar around their feet. They desire nothing, will nothing, but remain only in humble *expectation* (*attente*) of what God will bring forth, whether internal or external, and they praise God in all. "To desire our soul's salvation," says Franciscus von Sales, "is doubtless good, but it is better to desire nothing at all. But one thing ought we to seek: the glory of God." "Often have I said to the Lord," says Madame Chantal, "that if it should please Him to assign me my place in hell, I should be content with my lot, if it could serve to His glory." She also says, that in the various perils in which she has frequently found herself in her travels, she never prayed or hoped that He would deliver her, but only that He would on all occasions do that which would serve most to His glory. This pure and unmixed waiting includes *holy indifference* (*l'indifférence*), in which everything, whether of internal or external circumstances, joy or sorrow, success or adversity, remain matter of indifference to the soul, because that in all it seeks but one thing, the glory of God. Neither does it more require consolation, for it asks nothing for itself. The uneasiness of desires or wishes is quite stilled and silenced. In this holy indifference Madame Guyon exclaims: "I can no longer will anything. Nay, I know not even whether I am here or not." But in this condition there developes the soul's *transformation*—a dissolving, a melting and absorption into God; and in this absorption is holy rest (*sainte quiétude*). Here is prayer without words, and in this prayer even consciousness and will eventually vanish. Here there is no longer any Ego, for the suppliant has fallen asleep entirely to himself and to the world, and is now asleep in God. Therefore Franciscus von Sales depicts this highest condition or perfect rest in God under the figure of a sucking child slumbering on its mother's breast, or under the figure of a statue fixed in its niche—an immoveable existence in God.

The great one-sidedness of this school of thought may be elucidated by the false application which is made of the prayer: Thy will be done! For well may we universally agree with Fénélon when he says: "The sole thing which really belongs to us is our will; everything else does not belong to us. Sickness deprives us of health, wealth is dependent on external circumstances, and even intellectual endowments are dependent on the body. The only thing which is really our own is the will. It is in reference to this that God is jealous (*jaloux*). He has given it to us, not in order that we should retain it for our own gratification, but in order that we may entirely and altogether restore it to Him again. He who retains the smallest portion of his will for himself, commits a robbery on God. Therefore all our aspirations should centre in this one: Thy will be done![1] But according to the teaching of the gospel, this prayer does not imply that we should yield ourselves to God as instruments of His glory, destitute of will, but that first of all we should in faith *accept* His grace. But of acceptance, of appropriation of God, there can here be no question, as the appropriating believer himself disappears in God, and in no sense of the term will seek his own. The partiality of the system further appears in this, that the prayer "Thy will be done!" is only taken as a quietive, and not at the same time as a motive. Christ's example shows us, that to Him it was not merely for tranquillity and consolation (as at Gethsemane, where His soul was troubled even unto death), but that the will of the Father was also a motive to Him to accomplish His work, the moving cause of His mighty deeds, His energetic working; as, in general, in Christ adoring and contemplative love was in harmonious unity with that of action. But especially does it show itself false in this, that those who are perfect have got beyond the Lord's prayer, which yet, according to the command of the Lord Himself, is to be employed by His Church to the end of time. He who does not require to offer up the other petitions, does not need to pray for daily bread, for the forgiveness of our sins; does not need to pray: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. He has in this present life got beyond not merely the *want* and necessity of misery, but moreover beyond the opposition between *sin* and *grace*. It would be impossible that quietism should imagine itself capable of self-elevation to the degree of perfection depicted, if it did not depreciate human depravity. Although it begins with the opposition between sin and grace, this opposition

[1] *Sur l'existence de Dieu.* (On the Existence of God.)

changes unobserved into the opposition between the finite and the infinite; and as it desires to soar to a higher point than salvation, it sinks down to the elements of this world, to pantheism. This "getting beyond" sin and grace shows itself specially in Madame Guyon, when she says that she can no longer pray: Forgive us our sins! because she loves God in a perfect self-forgetfulness. But the gospel does not teach that guilt should be forgotten, but that it should be remembered. Just in this the defect of holy indifference appears, that in indifference to salvation it also becomes indifference to guilt and transgression. Just this prayer: Forgive us our trespasses! which ought to be offered daily by every Christian, bears damning testimony not merely against quietism, but against all false mysticism. False mysticism begins with the following of Christ, but on the way it in reality forsakes His footsteps to ascend false heights, where Christ more and more disappears from observation, and there only remains consideration of pure divinity.

In the acknowledgment by our Evangelical Church of justification by faith, to which we will not again refer lest we weary our readers, we have the right point of junction so as to avoid the mystic path of error. Accepting, appropriating, and grateful love to God in Christ, is at once quietive and motive. Or, if we express the matter from the objective side, *God's mercy in Christ* is at once the deepest ground of tranquillity and the deepest ground of action. This evangelical grasp of the subject is powerfully brought out in all our Lutheran hymns, as, for instance, in these lines of Brorson, which contain a brief summary of the whole doctrine concerning the imitation of Christ:

"Know that thou hast need of all,
And before Him humbly fall,
Seeking in thy Saviour's face
To behold His saving grace.
Try incessantly to find
How to have the Saviour's mind:
What He did, do thou also;
He shall give thee strength thereto."[1]

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[1] "Kiender Eders store Vaade
I en grundig Ydmighed,
I vor Herres Jesu Naade
Saenker Eder ganske ned.

§ 109.

Allied to quietism is the moral system of Spinoza, which, independently of Christianity, recommends disinterested love to God, not merely as a motive, but also as a quietive, by which we are entirely liberated from ourselves and from the disquietudes of time, and attain an imperturbable tranquillity of mind, since we in comprehension devote ourselves entirely to the eternal reason, and become one with it. This unselfish love forms from the very beginning the direct contrast to the love of gratitude in the imitation of Christ. God is here only the impersonal necessity of reason, is only the eternal order of things, the necessary and unchangeable order of nature, in which there beats no loving heart. Man desires no love in return from this divinity, which cannot love, and is quite disinterested and indifferent to the human personality. As little can there be here mention of gratitude towards God, for this divinity has not first loved us, has *given* us *nothing*. Both what is beneficial and what is adverse to man come forth of necessity from its unconscious bosom. We do not accept its gifts or its dispensations; we only *take* the good things which we can obtain, use the portion of them which falls to us by chance, and suffer only the evils which we cannot avoid. Intellectual love, in which we entirely devote ourselves to eternal reason and its immutable laws, seems capable of being depicted as adoring love. Yet we inquire if mere mathematical necessity can be admired, if liberty and personality are not in truth alone admirable? if we do not admire the exquisite order and regularity of nature, just because we perceive or have a foreboding in this of an intelligent power, that is higher than the blind powers of nature—a personal spiritual existence? In reality, the intellectual love of Spinoza is only the *confirmation* of the human acknowledgment of the eternal order of reason, and its immutable regularity. The elevated character of the ethical teaching of Spinoza rests essentially on this, that this clear perception of reason not merely becomes to him a motive, but also a quietive: his whole

Laegger uophorlig Vind
Paa at have Jesu sind,
Hvad han giorde giörer efter:
Han skal give Mod og Kræfter"

system has a tinge of quietism—bringing with it universal *resignation* and renunciation of the world, and with this the undisturbed peace and serenity of mind so often vaunted by Spinoza. The great proportion of mankind have only partial resignation. They are resigned on this or that individual point, but continue otherwise to hold fast their demands on life, their illusions about a happiness, a temporal good, in which they shall be able to find a true and lasting satisfaction, until they are struck by a new reverse, a fresh stroke of destiny, which again obliges them to be resigned on a new point, and so forth, because they are each time surprised by the unexpected. In Spinoza we find universal resignation, which attracted to him in such a high degree the admiration of Goethe (in the autobiography of this last), because at the beginning, and once for all, he renounces the expectation of finding satisfaction in the inconstant and eternally changing, does not desire to retain its finite Ego with its miserable desires, its fears and hopes in opposition to the eternal order of reason, but assumes a relation quite disinterested and *without demands* towards life,—a relation of contemplative indifference towards worldly goods and ills, which he has discovered to be only apparent goods and ills. That this standpoint has its elevated, its negative truth, must certainly be acknowledged. The same elevated and negative truth we find again in the Indian (Buddhist) ethical system, so highly lauded by Schopenhauer, which places "nothing" as the final determination and real content of life, and teaches that the greater part of mankind are deceived by Maja (appearance, phenomenon), which veils their sight, whilst the sage has rent asunder the veil of Maja, and sees through the illusion, and thus attains exalted contemplative indifference.[1]

But although this quietive may appear very profound, yet it lacks a very essential element, because the highest good, which is here offered in recompense, is also nothing, because human personality must also regard itself as nothing. The same is the case with Spinoza. The highest good to which he invites us —namely, the clear perception of God, which frees us from all illusions—is, *ethically* considered, nothing, in so far as the principle in his eternal order of reason is not an ethical, but only a logical and physical principle. Pantheism may teach us the negative truth, may teach us renunciation of the world and contempt for the world; but it can only tranquillize those in whom the most sacred demands and deepest cravings of personality have been extinguished, or in whom these are not yet awakened, who hitherto have not found themselves in their eternal individuality and eternal relation to a higher world than this. For ethical personality requires not mere resignation, but *comfort*, —a compensation of a higher nature, and in a higher order of things, for that which it lost in this lower. It cannot give up the demand for salvation. And the more by riper experience we learn not to admire the things of this world, or only to yield to the best of them a very limited and conditional admiration. the more we feel the need of something which we can admire unconditionally,—a wisdom which does not, like the wisdom of this world, become distasteful when fully sifted, but which unveils to our sight an eternal kingdom, which is absolutely unfathomable and worthy of admiration. And the more the world bereaves us of one after another of its good things,—youth, health, energy, friends,—the more we feel our need of Him to whom we can devote ourselves with unbounded gratitude, the more we yearn to hear a song of praise which shall rise above all the lamentation of the world, over sin and sorrow and death.

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[1] See the passage quoted by Schopenhauer (*Parerga and Paralipomena*, book i. p. 435):

"Ist einer Welt Besitz für dich zerronnen
Sei nicht in Leid darüber, es ist nichts,
Und hast Du einer Welt Besitz gewonnen,
Sei nicht erfreut darüber, es ist nichts,
Vorüber gehn die Schmerzen und die Wonnen,
Geh' an der Welt vorüber, es ist nichts."

In the same measure as the disciples of Christ grow in the peace of God's kingdom, and in adoration of it, in the same measure do they grow also in just indifference for the goods and the ills of this world, nay, learn to sleep amid storms and dangers, after the example of the Lord, who slept during the storm on the sea of Gennesareth; that type of true quietism, holy rest in the bosom of the heavenly Father, whilst the billows beat over the ship. In the same measure as they grow in peace they grow also in Christian joy, which is not a joy over this or that individual earthly good, and in so far may be described as a joy over nothing, but only because it is joy over the one thing, in comparison with which not only is everything belonging to this world nothing, but which at the same time makes all things new, bringing along with it a new universe, joy in the Lord and in His kingdom, joy over eternal life itself. Peace is the indispensably necessary foundation of joy, for which reason joy can never be found without peace, although the converse is not so certain. There are, indeed, those who have spoken of a bitter peace, a peace which casts a slight flavour of acerbity, in which there is still a painful want or a painful memory. And we know the declaration of one who, after having passed through much trouble, deserved and undeserved, turned at last to Christ, and who, being once questioned about the state of his mind, answered, "I have peace, but not joy,"—a reply which might be given by many. Yet it may be said that a peace in which there is no joy betokens an imperfect condition in the Christian life, although this condition is to be found with many earnest Christians, who only experience glimpses of joy, moments of gladness; whereas the apostle says, "Rejoice in the Lord always" (Phil. iv. 4),—thus demanding a constant frame of joyfulness. This last is the normal Christian condition, though towards too many of us it stands more as a goal to which we should approach, than as that which we have already reached, and many find a great obstacle to their attainment of it in their natural temperament. Where Christian life is destitute of joy, neither peace nor adoring love has sufficient depth; or if it has this, then it lacks the right *diffusion* in the mind. For joy, as the animating sentiment of the presence in the soul of the Highest Good, of the beginning of eternal bliss, is peace itself in its fruit-bearing stage, which diffuses itself more and more over every region of the inner life, sends forth its enlivening and cheering beams also to the dark and cold places, dissipates care and sorrow, and will allow no corner of the soul to remain in shadow. Peace, as the assurance of reconciliation with God and the forgiveness of sins, is unquestionably the first, the only thing absolutely necessary; and all mention of Christian joy is only vain and idle talk, confounding Christian with worldly joy, where this one thing is absent. But to those who possess the peace of reconciliation, and lament that they cannot feel joyous, it may be said, "Absorb yourselves more deeply in peace, have more gratitude and more adoring love, and you shall have joy!"

A noble instance of Christian peace of soul is seen in Luther, who so painfully toiled to obtain it. He is a man of war and strife, yet in the midst of the combat the elevation above the world which peace bestows is in his inmost being; and if it sometimes be disturbed by the great temptations which storm around him, he always recovers it by means of his firm faith. And in him peace appears so frequently united with joy. In him we find also the true evangelical indifference towards the good things of this world, even if they are precious to him; and this sentiment has found great and memorable expression in his hymn:

> "Take they our life,
> Goods, honour, child, and wife,
> *Let go in Jesus' name!*
> They have no gain:
> Vaunt they the same,
> *God's kingdom we shall yet retain.*"[1]

In this "Let go!" is expressed that Christian indifference, which does not by any means deny that the sacrifice is painful, but is an elevation above this. And in this "God's kingdom we shall yet retain!" is expressed the possession and security of a blessing, a peace and a joy in comparison with which all other goods may be viewed with indifference.

In Fénélon also we see an elevating instance of Christian peace of mind, united with a quiet gladness. For his theoretic error before mentioned, and the narrowness of his creed, is in him practically counterbalanced by the evangelical element in his disposition, and by the true mysticism, to which he is in reality led back, and concerning which the apostle speaks when he says: "He that is joined unto the Lord, is one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. vi. 17). Fénélon is certainly not a giant of supernatural size, is not a great man like Luther. Yet he is a great man, a Christian sage, whose whole personality bears the impress of love, resignation, and peace, which also mirrored itself in his physical appearance, which, as the portraits of him show, has entirely the expression of the transmaterial, of intellect which has become soul, and in which the light from within beams forth on us. He is not merely magnanimous in bearing great trials and reverses, but also in bearing small ones. It was, indeed, owing to this admirable characteristic that he became acceptable as pastor to so many, his ability to deal with little matters. Christian peace, unattainable by the world, does not merely exhibit itself under extraordinary destinies, in great achievements and in world-renowned contests (as at the Diet of Worms: "Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise!" which unquestionably forms a striking contrast to Fénélon, who, in humility, reads the Papal condemnation of his teaching from the pulpit), but must also exhibit itself under the daily course of temptations and trials, where withevery-day life—its petty concerns and trivialities—environs us. In this particular, the writings of Fénélon, which reflect his personality, beyond question soothing in its influence, will always retain a great importance, even if we sometimes, from our evangelical standpoint, must apply a corrective. As in all our actions he recommends to us faithfulness in small matters, in order that we may not waste our spiritual possessions by trifling infidelities and neglects, like those who waste their material possessions in trifling expenses, which they do not observe; so, too, he recommends that we should not allow our peace to be disturbed by small vexations and annoyances, by the paltry cares of every-day life, by the senseless fashions of the world, by the folly and malice of men, by which so many allow themselves to be ruined, instead of which all this should be received in part ascetically as stuff and material for our own education, in part as a subject for Christian indifference. Many of his letters on this point are true quietives; as, for example, when he writes to one who had become impatient over the world, and over the malice of men: "Let water flow beneath the bridges; let men be men, that is to say, vain, fickle, unjust, false, conceited, and arrogant. Let the world continue to be the world; thou wilt not be able to hinder this. Let every one follow his disposition and his habits; thou wilt not be able to subvert them. The shortest way is to let them alone, and bear with them. Accustom thyself to unreasonableness and injustice. But *rest in peace in the bosom of God, who sees better than thou canst all these evils, and*

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[1] "Tage de end vort Liv,
Gods, Aere, Barn og Viv,
Lad fare i Jesu Navn!
Dem er det ei til Gavn;
Guds Rige vi dog beholde."

who permits them. Let it be sufficient for thee without heat (*sans ardeur*) *to do the little which rests on thee*, and let all the rest be to thee as though it were not."[1] This passage, which undoubtedly is not suited to all or for every situation, may appear to have a tinge of Stoicism, but it contains the truth in Stoicism on a Christian foundation. For it must not be misunderstood as recommending a Christian egoism, an indifference excluding love to men, which lies far beyond Fénélon's train of ideas. If we remain tranquilly in the bosom of God, and really perform the small amount of work which rests on us, this will mean, in the Christian understanding of the statement, that in the position in which we were placed, and with the faculties bestowed on us, we labour for the kingdom of God as our ultimate and highest aim, and thus labour for humanity and the concerns of men, moved thereto by sympathy. But, at the same time, it implies that the folly and baseness of men ought not to be able to disturb our own communion with the Lord; and that we must not think by our impatience and heat to be able to alter that which it is not put in our power to alter,—that which the Lord, in His long-suffering, permits and tolerates. It implies that we should have a region in our inner being, where earthly cares and annoyances, earthly disquietude, can find no entrance; that all that which daily presses on us should come no further than into the outer chambers of the soul, but be refused admittance to the inmost sanctuary, where undisturbed serenity must reign.

§ 110.

The sum of what has been brought out is this: the deepest quietive, the deepest peace and serenity, and at the same time the deepest joy, is to be found only in fellowship with Christ. We know, indeed, that the consolation of the gospel is often abused, that even justification by faith has been used as a sleeping draught, an opiate for the conscience. But this proves nothing against the thing itself. *Abusus optimi pessimus.* All earthly quietives,—as: not to be too scrupulous in regard to our failings, since God is too exalted or too good to call us so strictly to account; under reverses, to submit to necessity in what cannot be altered; to rely on the all-effacing power of time, and seek forgetfulness in amusement or in work; to take the world as it is (namely, in stupid indifference), since we do not know and do not live in another; to let the world go on its crooked path (whilst we follow in the same track), etc.,—are more or less unworthy, or more or less *insufficient* palliatives, amongst which occupation and steady activity certainly belong to the best. But even the best earthly quietives have no cure for the deepest ache of the human heart.

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[1] Fénélon, *Lettres Spirituelles:* Ne point prendre feu sur les dérèglements des hommes, mais remettre tout à Dieu en paix dans l'accomplissement de nois devoirs.

Men who cannot yield themselves to the cold and comfortless principle of resignation, and who know not the peace of Christ, especially such as have remained standing by a system of ethics destitute of religion, and who cannot find satisfaction in its emptiness and dryness, often seek, under external and internal adversity, a quietive in the fine arts. In these, certainly, in a high degree, lie a soothing and restoring power, because they bring us to forget ourselves and our actual existence with all its torments, by charming us thence into a higher world, over which is spread forth a spirit of peace, where all that moves seems surrounded by the repose of Eternity. And undoubtedly art will continue to be a solace to man, although it never can yield him the eternal solace, for which it was never designed. In particular, we may here name music, "die edle Frau Musica," as Luther calls it, and which he himself cultivated and held in high honour, "because it drives out the devil and makes men joyous." No other art has such an immediate power as this, not merely in moving and animating, but also in soothing the mind. Even when it expresses the deepest melancholy, the most earnest and most painful longing, or the storms of passion, still all moods melt in harmony and rhythm and melody, in which every earthly pain has lost its sting, every burden of real life is removed. We feel that a land of delight has come near us, the ideals of which, and not least those of our own hearts,—for every one who listens with imagination, can hear in music his own most hidden desires, his inmost pains and joys, his sorrow and his triumph,—come forth to meet us in unseen resurrection. And although the most of these ideals are unattainable to us in reality, still they sound here in immediate presence in which they can be appropriated by us: in which even sorrow and pain, and unsatisfied craving,—as in the symphonies of Beethoven, and in the similar enchanting productions of Mozart,—are assimilated as happiness. Thence the contentment and repose of temper, the yielding to the frame of mind induced, the desire to remain in it (Da Capo), which music calls forth. No other art suffers such repetition, and no other so craves repetition, since music just desires it in order that the soul may remain in tune. Even in ancient times it had been perceived that music may not merely be employed as motive, but that it also contains a powerful quietive. This is already apparent in the playing of David on the harp before Saul. For when David played on the harp, Saul was refreshed, and the evil spirit that afflicted him departed from him (1 Sam. x. 23). It was the softening influence of music which the Greeks had in view, when in a figurative manner they spoke of melodies and magic songs, by which even the fear of death can be exorcised, by which the child in the convulsive throes of death can suddenly be stilled and quieted. This soothing, care-dispelling power of music repeats itself from the earliest ages down to the most recent times. No education, no reflection, has been able to weaken its impression. And religious music, where it is not the ideal of happiness, but of bliss, which meets us, has power to raise us on angel wings above earthly want, care, and anxiety.

The end of the matter, when all has been heard, is however this, that art, in none of its forms, can give us real peace of mind, or true serenity. All art only receives its real significance in the moral connection of life, in pointing to something higher and better than itself, in being a "shadow of good things to come." Its ultimate and deepest import is of a prophetic and eschatological nature, since, by the deliverance it bestows on us in appearance, it becomes to us an evidence of a higher deliverance in reality, which is prepared for us in the coming harmony of the world. But art, merely as art, and without the ethical connection, is only a syren, whose songs transport us to an enchanting dreamland, a Maja, a treacherous sorceress, who deludes us with an appearance of the Eternal. Æsthetic tranquillity is only a temporary peace and reconciliation; and when we wake from its illusions, and have nothing higher and better than art, we find ourselves again in the old misery, on the bare sand-banks of this passing world, from which we had been spirited away. Only Christ can give us that peace which cannot be taken away from us, since He does not begin by entrancing us into æsthetic illusions, but by showing us the reality in all its seriousness and necessity, and that the necessity is far greater and more dangerous than we imagined, because its source is in our own hearts; but He also says, not in an æsthetic but an ethical sense: "Come unto me, all ye who labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest!"

THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

§ 111.

Through the progress of sanctification is formed the Christian character, the personality which more and more receives the impress of the Lord's servant after the example of Christ. The character grows and unfolds itself in the school of reality, of life, and of trial, in the exercise of a calling, in mutual intercourse with others, with society, in contest with the world. Whether the circle be large or small, that which the poet says of character in general, holds good of the Christian character, that whilst talent, especially artistic talent, is formed in stillness and repose, character is formed in the commotion of the world, in conflicts and dispeace. As the character is the unity of the mind and energy to set the mind in action, the perfection of the Christian character rests partly on its purity and power, partly on its fulness and harmony with the example of the Lord. The pure character is the *unmixed* character (*ἀκέροιος*): no alien powers, but love to God and God's kingdom is the one heart-controlling and will-determining power; for which reason the progressive purification of the heart is an essential condition, if we would *approach* purity of character. But to Christian purity of character belongs also purity of *motives* and *principles*. As science shows us mixed forms of ethics, in which Christian and Pagan views are associated together,—as, for instance, the ethics of the middle ages often exhibit a mixture of the ethics of Christianity and that of Aristotle,—so, too, life often shows us such blended characters, in which Christian and Pagan motives are united without examination. The history of the Church shows us characters with an unconscious tinge of Greek, Roman, or Scandinavian Paganism; and thus who can deny that the great Popes of the middle ages, a Gregory the Seventh, an Innocent the Third, these mighty and admired characters, are blendings of Christianity and Roman Paganism? For whilst they do battle for the kingdom of God, this last changes in their hands into a kingdom of this world, and they fight for "the Eternal City," which in a new sense they seek to make the mistress of the world. In contrast to these, we see in Luther the purely Christian character, which does not strive after any earthly aim whatever as the highest, but only for God's kingdom alone. Down to the most recent times, life shows us blended characters. There are Christian characters with unconscious tinges of Stoicism; and it will thus scarcely be denied, that not only in the personality of Calvin, but also in that of Schleiermacher, there was an element of Stoicism, which entered into their view of life, and which is consistent with their dogmatic opinions (the doctrine of predestination). There are others who have a tinge of Eudaimonism, or of Pagan Optimism and Pessimism; and the more mixed the relations of the world become, the more the Christian is placed in relation to the human in its various forms, the more easily may such a blending occur. This is an important chapter, if we are in earnest about putting off the old man; for most people will discover that they have been guilty of adopting principles of action springing from an entirely different source from that of Christianity,—principles of Stoicism, Eudaimonism, and mere worldly prudence. Without this purity of temper and motive, neither can the energy and stedfastness of the character be of the right kind. For the energy of the Christian character is by no means that energy which at all hazards will carry through any mere earthly aim, but that which fulfils the command, Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness. Therefore it belongs specially to the stedfastness of the Christian character not recklessly to employ every means, but only such as are in conformity with a good end. That which in worldly characters is often described as energy is this recklessness in carrying out an earthly aim, or firmness in not yielding to any obstacle whatever till the object be attained. But this firmness rests on the fact that the will is enslaved by a particular earthly aim, whilst the Christian character has only fixed its will on the one attainment, that of God's kingdom; and though it energetically pursues every earthly aim consistent with duty, yet with regard to all such it is prepared to say, with Luther: "Lass fahren dahin!" (Let it go). Therefore there is a mutual relation between purity of character and its energy. Only the pure will can be really energetic; for true energy shows itself in carrying out the demands of God's kingdom, not merely striving, but also suffering; whilst the worldly character only overcomes the world by permitting itself in another and a deeper sense to be overcome by it, by offering up conscience as a sacrifice, and strewing incense before the false divinities. But, on the other side, it may be said that only the really energetic will is truly pure. For a will which is feeble, and in actual working yields to the flesh and to the world, disclaims and renounces its good intentions before the cock crows thrice, can only in a very limited sense be accounted pure.

But the perfection of Christian character does not rest merely on its purity and energy, but also on its internal copiousness and harmony, as these in an absolute sense appear in Christ's example. The harmonious is the unity of various, nay, of opposing Moments, and the harmony is therefore determined by the copiousness and manifold character of that which is harmonized. The more varied the individuality is, the more interests not merely individual but also universal it is able to embrace, the more abundant the fulness of the mind, the greater also may the harmony become. There are firm and powerful characters which are but slightly harmonious, because their firmness is mere obstinacy, since they are inflexibly fixed to one interest, at least only move in a narrow circle. But there is no perfectly harmonious character except the Lord Himself. No human character is without dissonances, because not one is without sin. And no Christian character is without dissonances, nay, these only become very apparent in Christian character, although redemption aids their overthrow, and advancing maturity brings with it harmony. The want of harmony in the Christian character rests essentially on this, that the will lacks power to effect the union of its different Moments, and that there ensues a contradiction between knowledge and action (The good which I would, I do not), which indicates a struggle between the will and its organism, the spiritual as well as the bodily,—a struggle between the higher spiritual life and the natural life of temperament, which the mind is not able to control.

The frontispiece of the biography of the Princess of Gallitzin[1] is a vignette which represents a butterfly laboriously freeing itself from the caterpillar condition, stretching out the only half unfolded wings to tear itself loose from the imprisoning chrysalis, and disencumbered to soar into higher regions. This object, half worm, half winged insect, with partially unfolded wings, is a type of Christian life. Further down we bring it not. We shall all be changed (1 Cor. xv. 52).

§ 112.

The great variety of Christian character rests on the manifold nature of human individuality; and though the essential Christian type is in all ages the same, still there is the possibility of as many diversities of Christian character as there are different human individualities. On this rests also the diversity of the gifts of grace, or Charismen. Age, creed, nationality, are determining factors. The Christian character presents peculiar phases in the early Church, in the middle ages, at the period of the Reformation, and in modern times; it appears different in Catholicism and Protestantism, different in the races of the north and the south. But the natural temperament of the individual, the psychological organization, is specially influential in determining the peculiarity of the character. There are characters which are predominantly organized in the contemplative, mystic tendency, like the Apostle John and many of the great teachers of the Church, whose energetic productions of thought and whose prayers are their deeds, whilst in a less conspicuous degree they are called to outward action. There are others who are pre-eminently constituted for external activity, as Peter and the other organizers of the Church; others, again, like Paul and Augustine, who are constituted for a union of the contemplative and practical. We find in the domain of the practical a contrast between heroic characters, as martyrs, missionaries, and reformers, and the characters of quiet suffering and resignation, amongst which we have already noted the noble form of Fénélon; or the contrast between the heroic and those which unfold themselves in silent deeds of love, as Spener, Franke, and many others, both men and women, who in our own day have laboured in the service of Home Missions. According to the psychological diversity of nature, we also find contrasts between the resolute and bold in action, and the far-seeing, cautious, and reflecting. The general contrasts here suggested, with their infinite varieties of shade, are found in women as in men, although the feminine character chiefly finds its circle of activity in home life, where Mary and Martha —the Lord loved both of them—are permanent examples.

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[1] *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben der Fürstinn A. v. Gallitzin* (Memoirs of the Life of Princess A. von Gallitzin).

As it is often lamented that our age is so deficient in Christian characters, we maintain, on the contrary, what would not be difficult to prove, that in our century great Christian characters have appeared both in the literary profession and in the Churches. But that Christian characters amongst the laity are less conspicuous now than in those early times, proceeds from the fact that Christian life in our day has not that exclusively ecclesiastic and *directly* religious impress which it had then—that the Christian in our day is often hidden under the guise of common humanity. Where no special circumstances make the Christian principle evident, two individuals may perform the same outward action in the same forms of humanity, whilst the inward principle (the motive and quietive) is widely different in each case.

III.

THE LAW.

DUTY AND LAW. THE LAW OF MORALITY AND THE LAW OF NATURE. AUTHORITY.

§ 113.

What virtue is as fulfilment, *duty* is as demand; therefore the whole doctrine of virtue may be treated as the doctrine of duty. A virtue, a love which is not required by duty, is not a matter of conscience, does not include obedience and the ministering relation, is unethical; for which reason we have also seen that Christ's love is one with His perfect obedience. Duty points back to the *law* as the norm of the good, the eternal rule and criterion for the will, for our acting as well as for our being. When the usages of language teach us to say, It is my duty, but do not permit us to say, It is my law, and only to speak of the law as the whole matter, these call our attention to the fact that duty is the relation of the law to the *individual subject.* As now the relation of law and duty to the human consciousness and will is an entirely different matter within Christianity and without it, and as Christianity has for its postulate not merely the law as revealed to Israel, but also the law which from the beginning was written in men's hearts, it is impossible to represent the Christian apprehension of law without a retrospective glance at those forms of law which by Christ have received their fulfilment. We go then, first, back to the law as a general fact in human consciousness, a fact without the acknowledgment of which Christianity itself cannot be acknowledged.

§ 114.

Universality and necessity are provisions which are inseparable from the law of the Good in our inner being, and without which it would not have the character of law. It manifests itself as *universally* binding; for whilst it addresses itself with its demands to the individual, it embraces at the same time the whole world of personality, as binding upon all. The same law which we perceive in our inner being, when in solitude we descend into our conscience, meets us also outside of ourselves as an objective historic power; for its norms are determining for the regulations of society in the Family and the State, for morals and the relations of justice, for all social relations. However different these are in different ages and amongst the different races of men, there is still that connection with this law, which gives them a higher value than the merely temporary, which is determined by apparent good result; it is, moreover, the relation to this law which procures them respect and acknowledgment, or the contrary. It manifests itself with unerring *necessity*; for it is as independent of men as the law which determines the course of the stars, the growth of plants, and the mode of life of beasts, and its requirement is no less perceptible to our conscience than the law of gravity to our bodies. Yet it is essentially different from the law of nature. When this difference is defined by the assertion that the law of morality expresses a demand—a "must,"—whilst the law of nature works by necessity, which executes its own designs without the intervention of a medium, this assertion requires closer scrutiny. For nature also expresses on many points a demand which is by no means directly satisfied. We do not merely refer to the natural bents and inclinations which are the expression of an unsatisfied craving of nature, and thus express a demand; but we refer principally to the fact that nature itself in many ways shows us a contrast between the normal and the abnormal, shows us monsters and malformations, from which we receive the impression of an unsatisfied demand of nature,—a "must" to which the individual objects of nature respond but imperfectly, or to which they even stand opposed. The contemplation of nature constrains us, then, to speak of what *should* be, but is not. But—however we may explain this abnormality in nature—the difference between the law of nature and the law of morality is this, that only the latter expresses a "must" which at the same time is an "ought." It is not merely a power which manifests itself through the law of morality, but a power which at the same time is *authority;* a power which demands acknowledgment, demands obedience and voluntary submission, whilst it compels respect and esteem, and brings with it obligation and responsibility. Only on this account can the law of morality express its "must" as an "ought," because it is the *law of free-will.*

We therefore protest against that ethical naturalism which denies the essential difference here described, and which, for example, has found expression in Schleiermacher's famous treatise on the relation between the law of nature and the law of morality. In the view of this ethical naturalism, which is also determinism, the law of morality is only the highest law of nature, the law of nature itself, in so far as it enters into action on the highest grade of life known to us—namely, self-conscious life. As the highest potency of life, nature as self-conscious reason, cannot from the first attain perfect control in human individuals, in which the lower potencies, sensual, animal life, are still predominant, it must begin its activity as a demand, a "must," which by degrees disappears, in proportion as reasoning life progressively developes itself, and receives the impress of a higher law of necessity. The fundamental error in this theory rests on the misconstruction which forgets that the *transition* from the law of nature to the law of morality, from the realm of unconsciousness to that of self-consciousness, from the mute and instinct-bound world to that of speech and freedom, is not such as that which finds place within nature's own sphere, is not a transition from the laws of inorganic nature to the organic, or as from vegetable life to animal life, which are all only transitions within the same system; but the transition from the law of nature to the law of morality is the transition to a new, another world, which forms a contrast, not to any single step in natural life, but to the whole physical Kosmos.[1] The explanation of the manner in which this new principle, containing self-consciousness and liberty, speech and action, makes its appearance in the midst of nature, will always continue to be incumbent on naturalism. Nay, although the naturalistic thinker may explain everything else by the law of nature, one thing he cannot explain, — namely, himself, the thinking and willing mind, the free responsible personality. For by the representation of a self-determining law of nature nothing is explained, as it is just this which requires to be made clear to us, in what manner the blindly existing nature, bound by the law of necessity, can by its own power determine itself so as to become seeing and consciously willing. The ethical "ought" must remain to all eternity inexplicable by nature. It comes not from beneath, but from above. The contrast between good and evil will in all ages make a quite different impression on human consciousness, from the contrast between health and sickness, between a successful and an unsuccessful development of nature, repressed and constrained by circumstances. And the highest phenomena of evil which history and experience show us, will always mock an explanation which seeks to derive them from flesh and blood, from the preponderance of the influence of the senses, or from impotence of reason, "not yet" come to predominance in them.

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[1] See Humboldt's *Kosmos*, i. 386: "A physical picture indicates the limits where the sphere of *intelligence* begins, and the furthest glimpse sinks in another world. it indicates the limits, and does not overstep them."

But whilst we maintain the essential difference between the law of nature and the law of morality, we by no means teach an indissoluble dualism, and cannot, with Kant, whose theory forms a contrast with that of Schleiermacher, acknowledge an irreconcilable antagonism between the law of morality and the law of nature,—a dualism in consequence of which there must be in man an incessant struggle between reason and natural impulse, virtue and the exercise of the senses, duty and inclination. Such an irreconcilable dualism between the law of morality and the law of nature would not merely place an unsolved dualism in the being of God, since it is the same God who reveals Himself in both worlds, but would also destroy the unity of human nature; whereas it is the same man, whose brain, nervous system, circulation of the blood, and instinctive desires, are determined by the law of nature, but whose will must determine itself according to the law of morality, and under the postulate of an absolute dualism would be doomed to an incessant and resultless contest. Not the less Kant's theory contains a higher truth than that of Schleiermacher, because it rests on a deep view of the *actual* condition of human nature, the practical enigma of human nature, which only finds solution in redemption, in the Saviour, in whose sinless example we see the harmonious unity of the law of nature and the law of morality.

§ 115.

The law of morality frees man so far from the law of necessity, as it imprints on him the mark of freedom, stamps him as a citizen in a kingdom which is higher than the necessity of nature, and where everything is weighed and measured by a different standard from that of nature. But it also impresses on him a higher mark of dependence. In virtue of this law, which embraces the whole world of humanity, this is determined as at once the world of *liberty* and of *authority*, whilst nature is only that of necessity and of power. Authority and liberty, or free-will—around these two poles revolves the whole moral world; and if we have formerly designated grace and free-will as these poles, we have only named two sides of the same thing. The power which binds human liberty with an absolute authority, cannot be in any way conditional and finite, but only the absolute power, or God. Unconditional demand can only originate in absolute *being;* and human freedom is not therefore, as Kant believed, autonomic, or self-legislating, but theonomic, or bound by the law of God. When Kant exclaims, "*Duty!* thou exalted and great name, which contains nothing, which has universal favour, or seeks to ingratiate itself with us, but desirest subjection; yet dost thou not move the will by force or threatening, which call forth aversion, but thou dost only set up a law, which of itself finds entrance to the mind, and even against our will compels esteem and reverence (if it does not always procure for itself obedience); before whom inclinations are mute, though they may secretly rebel against it,—what origin is worthy of thee, and where shall we find the root of thy high descent?"—and when he then answers himself: "It cannot be anything less than that which exalts man above himself (as a portion of the world of sense), and knits him to an order of things which only the understanding can conceive. It can only be *personality*, that is, liberty, and independence of the whole mechanism of nature, yet at the same time considered as a faculty of a being, that belongs at once to the sensible and the supersensible world, and therefore, as belonging to both worlds, is subjected to purely practical laws, which it *prescribes to itself* (that is to say, as a rational being that has itself as a subject of the world of sense under *subordination*), and cannot do otherwise than regard its own being, its highest destiny, and its laws with the deepest respect;"[1]—in all this discussion he remains standing half way from the reply to this great question. For human personality, which is not of itself, and in so many ways is notoriously limited, under condition of time and space, which is born in time and developes itself from unconscious night, gradually wakening up to self-consciousness and self-government, cannot prescribe, and has not prescribed, for itself the eternal law of its being. It only *finds* it in itself as *given*. The root of the noble descent of *duty* concerning which he inquires, must lie deeper than in man himself. And when Kant above all else admires two things,—the starry heavens, which are above him, and the moral law, which he finds in his inner being: the first because its inconceivable vastness leads him from worlds to worlds, from systems to systems, by which he as a being of sense feels himself as it were annihilated, a thing of nothing, a speck in the great universe; the second because it raises him above the whole sphere of sense, and knits him to an unseen world, in which he has an infinite and eternal dignity as a free intelligence;—again his admiration remains standing half way. For he admires only the marvel of free-will which raises him above the world of sense, admires only the marvel of a moral world, whilst he regards it exclusively from the view-point of freedom as an autonomic republic, which forms the higher contrast to nature as blind automaty. On the other hand, he overlooks the *marvel of authority*, which bears witness that the government of God must be founded on *free* humanity. He believes that he can explain authority by liberty, believes that man's rational liberty is his own authority. But just as little as human liberty can be derived from nature, as little can authority, if it is questioned concerning its eternal foundation and essence, be derived from human liberty. Its source is *above* freedom. An impersonal law, an impersonal idea, which has not itself the will for its principle, cannot be an authority for my will, cannot bind me, cannot call me to account, or summon me before its judgment-seat. This can only be done by the personal Sovereign of the universe, the Lawgiver, the Judge. However superior in rank this impersonal law or idea with its normative perfection may be to me, the individual, finite, and limited human being, one infinite advantage is mine in comparison with the idea,—namely, that I have self-consciousness and will, which the idea has not. It is I who know the law, whereas the law knows neither itself nor me. Must I then be called to account and be judged at the tribunal of the impersonal idea in matters of conscience, in which men cannot judge me? Then it is in reality myself who must conduct my cause before myself; myself who in the last instance must doom myself, though in relation to the eternal law. That at this tribunal, where rational liberty must be its own authority, there can be no strength of authority, must be apparent; as it must also be quite obvious that the result at this tribunal, especially when the judgments are to be valid for eternity, where *Omniscience* is an essential condition to justice, can only be *taliter qualiter.* If duty and responsibility are to be treated with seriousness, then authority must be *above* liberty, then must the authority which engages me in my conscience be the *will of God,* that will which is at once holy and omnipotent, the same which is lord over the laws of nature, and which has created the starry heavens above me, the same which guides the history of the world, and decides the destinies of kingdoms and of races. *This unity of the ethical and the physical,* which in God is the unity of holiness and omnipotence, and in which the last is the ministering organ for the first, is essential to the conception of authority. For an ethical will, which is not at the same time a power, and which in the execution of its aim must bend to the physical and to the course of the world, expresses only an impotent demand, is only an abstract shadow, and might rather be designated a wish than a will. Therefore our inmost consciousness of duty, immediate or mediate, is also accompanied by the assurance that the legislating authority which speaks in our inner being is not merely the judging, but also the executive authority, which can give *effect* to its laws and sentences, because it is the law of the Almighty Sovereign of the universe. If man's rational liberty be its own authority, then it must also possess power to carry forward moral ascendency to a triumphant issue, and subdue the law of nature and the course of the world, so that in the final instance they direct themselves by the law of morality,—a theory which also in a side-way pressed upon Kant, and brought him to the acknowledgment that he could not do without God. In the unity here described of holiness and power, which by a further development is acknowledged as the unity of love and power, is the marvel of authority in the world of human liberty, the marvel of *moral creation ;* that is to say, this marvel that the Almighty has Himself limited His own omnipotence, though not therefore given it away, in order that He might rule over a state of free subjects, a *civitas Dei.* The opposite error is a denial of the Creator (*Autor*), and seeks to found a *civitas hominum,* a kingdom of humanity, in which one again and again (theoretically and practically) upheaves the Sisyphus stone, of attempting to deduce authority from free-will, and again and again comes to the result of only having one thing where two are required. Authority proceeds neither from beneath nor quite from within : it comes from above, and desires to be acknowledged in this its descent.

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[1] *Kritik der practischen Vernunft*, p. 214, Rosenkrantz' edition.

§ 116.

The divine authority, which manifests itself in the law, which is not merely the law of the individual, but embraces the whole community, is postulate and background for all earthly human authority, just as all human laws, as has already been asserted by an ancient heathen sage (Heraclitus), draw their nourishment from the one divine. All human authority rests in imitated form on the same Moments, which are present originally in the divine authority,—namely, on a unity of the ethical and the physical, or, as we may also express it, of right and might. Whilst by right we understand the ethically regulating, swaying, and engaging, by might (the physical) we not merely understand material power, but also higher agencies, as genius and talent, which are appointed to be *instruments* for the ethical. That authority is this unity of the ethical and the physical, may be read in giant characters in the State, which is appointed to be the earthly copy of the divine government. A magistracy, a government, which has not power to carry out its edicts, is without authority. But, on the other side, power alone cannot establish authority. A despot, such as Machiavelli sketches him in his book about the prince who, setting aside all principles of justice, only rules by force and fraud, or a revolutionary assembly that acknowledges no other right than that of the strongest, may certainly carry out a reign of terror, but can exercise no real authority, because they cannot bind men by any moral obligation, cannot engage them by means of conscience. If might alone establishes authority, as Baader remarks, one might say with the same reason, that a wild beast rushing forth and terrifying a herd of cattle or a crowd of men, exercises authority over them.[1] True sovereign authority is only such in the same measure as that can be applied to it, which Kant says about duty, that it will not ingratiate itself with us, but that its laws find entrance of themselves into the mind, and even against our will, and in spite of the secret resistance of our inclination, win our respect and assent. The same which holds good in regard to the State is valid also with the necessary alteration in regard to the Family, in regard to the authority of parents over their children, of the school over the pupils, that the authority must be able to commend itself to the moral sense of the children and pupils, if it is to call forth obedience, filial piety, and love. Despotic use of power in the family or the school is not authority, for which reason Scripture admonishes parents not to provoke their children to wrath (Eph. vi. 4). But, on the other side, it must be evident that commands, prescriptions, and rules, which are imperatively expressed, but where transgression or neglect remain without consequences, testify to the absence of authority.

In an entirely different form appears the unity of the ethical and the physical, when from the regulations of society, and the authorities associated therewith, we turn to free personal authorities. We refer here specially to the highly gifted, who at individual periods of time of historic development, in consequence of a higher vocation, appear as teachers of the people or as reformers of the state of society, and who, in contradistinction to the first, who are associated with the regulations which must be carried on from generation to generation, may be called extraordinary authorities. No individual personality will become an extraordinary authority in the historical life of man without the power of genius, without an eminently intellectual *potency*. And yet mere ability, mere endowment alone, is insufficient to stamp any one as an authority. Only that man becomes an authority, who to the power of genius or conspicuous talent unites a force of personality which enables him to exercise a moral sovereignty over men. Who thus, mediately or immediately, directly or indirectly, is enabled to commend himself and his cause to the consciences of men, to their sense of truth and justice, is enabled thus to represent his cause as that which *ought* to be; so that men thereby find themselves obliged voluntarily to submit and place themselves under his educating, guiding, and directing authority, which holds good both with regard to the true and the false authorities, which perplex consciences, and make men into slaves and blind adherents. When we here, as throughout the whole of this treatise, have placed the conception of authority in intimate and indissoluble connection with the conscience and the idea of duty, we by no means overlook the fact that this connection cannot in every circle of life appear with the same centrality. But though the idea of authority appears in a sufficiently vague application (as when we speak of authorities in this or that special science, this or that art), yet in none of these applications does it deny this connection. For we shall always find that authority is understood not merely as that which in the circle in question, on the basis of a power or ability, presents before us that which *ought* to be (whether this is expressed imperatively, or is placed before our eyes in actual accomplishment), but at the same time as that which in this circle has a *legitimate* demand on *acknowledgment*, *respect*, and voluntary *submission* on our side, by which the connection between duty and conscience is admitted, although not always in that conception of the term embracing the whole man.

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[1] *Ueber den Begriff der Autorität. Phil. Schriften*, 2 Bd. S. 419. (On the Conception of Authority. Phil. Writings, vol. ii. p. 419.)

But whilst we place the conception of authority in intimate connection with the conceptions of duty and conscience, it ought not to be overlooked that authority not only demands but bestows, or that authority as well as the law has its ultimate principle in love. The right of authority is grounded on the ethical, to which the power is subordinated; but the basis of ethics, the fundamental Good, is love, personal imparting of self. This holds good of every form of authority, though it is differently determined in the different circles of life. Every authority is only so in the full signification of the term, in the same degree as its right is not the mere abstract right in its unity with power, but when we can look up to it not merely with reverence, not merely with admiration, but also with piety and gratitude, with faith and confidence; because it not merely pledges us, but also bears towards us the relation of bestowing and imparting,—not merely restricts us, but at the same time supports, sustains, and exalts us,—not merely represses, but developes our liberty. Therefore authority is not only closely bound up with obedience, but moreover authority is associated with filial piety, with admiration, with faith. That these Moments are not always associated, experience shows. Yet even that authority which merely requires and demands has nevertheless its validity, when its abstract right is real right, and it must be obeyed, although this obedience lacks the true heartiness. But the more complete the authority is, the more are admiration and confidence present. Therefore Christ is the perfect personal authority; for whilst He binds us absolutely in our consciences, He stands at the same time before us as the object of faith, of unlimited gratitude and admiration. Whilst false authority only employs human personalities as means for an earthly object, makes men stupid and servile, true authority, especially that of Christ, not merely works in the direction of demand, but in those of bestowal and liberation, on their intelligence and their will.

Is it asked: In what manner shall the origin of authority in human society be explained? we reply: All authority is from God (Rom. xiii. 1). Though this passage refers most particularly to political authorities, yet it has an application to the whole of human society. This does not imply that society should be understood theocratically, as if its regulations had an immediately divine character, or as if all human laws were divine. In opposition to such an understanding of Scripture, another passage exhorts us thus: "Submit yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake" (1 Pet. ii. 13), in which the same ordinances which were mentioned as divine are also regarded as human. They have one side from which they are a work of men, have undergone a historic development, are imperfect, changing, inconstant, and from time to time require to be reformed; and it is for this reason that the extraordinary authorities are sent. That all authority is from God, does not imply that this or that form of State government—the monarchical or the republican—is from divine right the absolutely universally binding. But it does imply that this relation of superiority and subordination which permeates the whole of human society, and excludes all abstract liberty and equality,—this pervading relation of contrast, tending nevertheless to unity between authority and liberty, authority and obedience, authority and filial piety,—in its original source, in its inmost foundation and in its actual essence, is not of men, cannot be deduced from the right of the stronger or the more able, nor from common consent (*contrat social*), but rests on *God's will* and *appointment*, and is subject to His *guidance*. This implies, that in honouring his parents and obeying the law, one obeys not only men, but also God. It implies, that whilst superiors and subordinates are mutually bound to each other, both are engaged to a higher third party, whose servants they both are, whose laws they must both obey, and to whom both must render an account. It implies, in one word, that the whole order of human society in its ultimate resort rests on the divine will as its foundation, that society must be built on the basis of religion. The opposite theory, which in our time has found much entrance, is this: All authority is from men, or liberty is its own authority. Where thus the whole relation of superiority and inferiority only becomes a relation between men and men, in which the higher third can only be impersonal reason or idea, which on account of its impersonality cannot call them to account, or pronounce upon them any sentence, as they themselves must execute this *partes*, it leads only to an apparent authority, denying the power, because the inmost nerve of *obligation*, which knits us to responsibility, is severed along with the bond of religion. God alone can bind the conscience, since He is the eternal cause and source of all obligation and all right, just as it is He from whom all power and all endowment issue. Without common free subjection, common ministering relation under Him, society will soon show us a condition destitute of authority. We shall see despotism alternate with impotence in the governing power, who will seek to compensate the want of authority by ingratiating themselves with those over whom they ought to exercise authority. We shall see servility alternate with taking the law into their own hands on the part of those who ought to obey, and who by self-will and revolt discover that liberty desires to be its own authority. We shall see man-worship (the worship of genius) alternate with materialistic contempt for intellect and for more elevated humanity. It is unnecessary to observe here, that much false authority has also obtained entrance under the name of religion, and contributed powerfully to further the evils above mentioned. It is not the less certain that a community where religion is absent is destitute also of authority, and all is vacillating and insecure, because the supporting, sustaining basis is wanting. And it will to all times continue to be wisdom which was expressed by one of the ancients, when he said: "Far more easily wilt thou be able to build a city in the air, than on earth to found a city without the gods."

CONSCIENCE.

§ 117.

God alone can bind the conscience. But if we would understand the conscience, we cannot rest satisfied with its many imperfect phenomena, but must seek to examine its essence. Conscience is not mere impulse, the impulse of obedience and subordination, the aim of which is God and God's kingdom; it is not mere instinct which makes known to man what in an ethical respect is serviceable to him, and what he must avoid for the preservation of his soul, just as the instinct of animals makes known to them what is serviceable to their self-preservation, and incites them to avoid the opposite. It is also consciousness, knowledge, information, man's joint acquaintance with himself and with God, the consciousness direct, essential, differing from all consciousness of reflection and idea of our dependence not merely on the law, but on the binding and determining *authority*, which speaks to us through the law. The system of ethics which is merely autonomic can only apprehend the conscience as man's knowledge of himself, which certainly is the one essential side of the matter. The voice of conscience is then considered as coming from man's own being. It is man's ideal, or the ideal man in us, which here expresses itself commanding or censuring, inciting or reacting in relation to the empirical man, or the imperfect man in actual existence. The ideal demands the universally binding, and through the conscience remonstrates against those representations which originate in egoism—passions and desires. It requires unity and totality in the moral life of the individual; and in the upbraiding conscience we perceive the reaction of the whole man against the egoism of the passions and desires, which seeks to place a single side of humanity, an individual interest, a part in the position of the whole. Conscience is therefore the warden of the marches for the will, the maintainer of unity in the life of the individual; which unity is only possible when the individual, at every point of his life of free-will, subjects himself to the demands of his ideal, or of his eternal being. This explanation has certainly absolute value in opposition to the materialistic or sensualistic explanation of conscience, which is a caricature of the idealistic theory, and about which we shall speak in passing.

Sensualism also explains the conscience as proceeding from man himself. The conscience, according to this theory, differs in no respect from the Ego. It is the whole Ego—not the ideal, which for sensualism does not exist, but the *empiric* Ego; thus exactly such as this has formed itself partly from our physical organization, partly from the influences which in the course of time we have received from the surrounding world (the age we live in, civilisation, etc.). Whatever now harmonizes with this empiric Ego "in its totality," as it has been developed "in accordance with the age," this we call good and right, and the opposite evil and wrong; for which reason these conceptions are so diverse with different races and in different ages. And when this empirical Ego censures itself, because at times it yields to certain temporary feelings and desires, or permits itself certain temporary modes of action, which cannot be approved, because they do not harmonize with this Ego regarded as a totality, we call this conscience. With regard to this empirical explanation of conscience, which bases itself on that "exact" investigation which alone deserves the name of "science," it may simply be said that it strikes all empiricism or experience alike in the face.[1] For it is an incontestable experience, that conscience not merely upbraids us with individual passing inclinations and modes of acting, but often warns us that our whole empirical Ego is in a condition entirely different from what it ought to be; that conscience incessantly disturbs this empiric Ego in its worldly harmony with itself, constantly appears as accuser and adversary of this, which, notwithstanding the greatest exertions, cannot keep away such disturbances from life, any more than Don Juan's empiric Ego can keep the Commandant's spirit from the body. And in the next place, how come I at all to engage in individual passing modes of action which I cannot myself approve, if, as Sensualism teaches, I have only one nature, namely, that of the senses, and merely temporal—if I am only the developed intelligent animal? If I have only one nature, I can never attain to correct or to criticise myself, but must be in harmony with myself in every particular, and know only external limits and disturbances. Very different does the case appear, if we do not close our eyes to experience, and acknowledge that man is not flesh alone, but also spirit, or, as Kant in his own way expressed it, that we are at once beings of outward sense and rational beings, at once belong to two worlds, for which reason our empiric Ego has always a super-empiric postulate, which may be more definitely described as our ideal, eternal Ego. In opposition to Materialism and Sensualism, which deny the simplest and nearest-lying facts of experience, and establish the autonomy of the empirical Ego, the moral principle of which may be expressed in this formula: Do what thou wilt if thou only preservest harmony with thy *entire Ego*, as this is for the time constituted,—a rule which every criminal and reprobate may appropriate to himself;—in opposition to this teaching, the autonomy of idealism has absolute worth and respectability, and Kant will stand to all generations as the great witness of the reality of the ideal world, and against the denial of the spiritual. But however true it may then be that the law is the eternal law of our own being, and that man in his conscience apprehends himself in the deepest unity of his being, yet still that explanation of conscience which is merely autonomic is only a half explanation. Amongst all races of men who are not sunk into a condition of brutality, conscience, however imperfect their idea of God may be, is considered not as the voice of man alone, but as the voice of God; and only thus can the majesty of conscience be adequately expressed.

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[1] Harless, *Christliche Ethik*, 6te Auflage, S. 68 (Harless' *Christian Ethics*, 6th edition, p. 68).

That which specially cannot be explained by our ideal being alone is the majestic *Thou shalt!* Our ideal being by itself can only express itself as an inward and higher craving of nature, which, in opposition to our lower nature and our nature-bound liberty, necessarily comes to an outbreak. Its emotions may in the condition of sin appear as the sighing and cry of distress of a pure and noble being, under great ill-usage. But it has no power to express that majestic imperative which predicates a power which is not merely within, but above man. When we then say that in conscience we hear the voice of God, we do not speak of special revelations and inspirations. But this we do say, that in conscience we perceive an *evidence* which cannot be rejected, independent of ourselves, of a *permanent* relation of dependence in which we are placed,—an evidence which permits man to perceive in his inmost being the existence of a superhuman, supramundane principle, superior to that of the creature,—a light which shines in the darkness, though the darkness perceiveth it not; and which also assures him that this consciousness of his of an invisible authority in his inner being does not originate in himself, nor in the world and his consciousness concerning the world, but *is effected, is given* to him by *this authority itself;* assures him that it is not merely he who is *acquainted* with the law, and his relation to the law, but that he and his relation to the law *are known* by the higher power, namely, by the *Creator.* Therefore we say, and that in a far deeper significance than bare idealism can, that conscience is a fundamental form of man's personal consciousness of eternity, that ineffaceable certainty, breaking through all sophistry, resisting all worldliness — though often only in lightning flashes, the certainty that the *relation* of *duty* with responsibility and judgment is not a relation which stands and falls with our relations to the world and to men, but in its essence is a relation to the holy and almighty God; that even if we were denuded of all our worldly relations, of all our relations to men, which befalls each of us at death, still this *supramundane* fundamental relation would continue to exist; still, by virtue of the indissoluble copula of conscience, we should find ourselves in presence of the holy God, and placed before His bar of judgment. At this judgment bar we already appear in the present life, when we, whilst withdrawing from all worldly relations, enter the sanctuary of our conscience. Here it appears to us as vanity to receive honour of men, and the only honour worthy of attainment is perceived to be that which comes from God. Here the misjudged and innocently persecuted man seeks refuge, whilst from all human bars of judgment he appeals to the highest infallible authority, by whom he is known and appreciated, and who pronounces righteous judgments. Here the sinner finds himself placed before a judgment bar, where the trespass which he committed a long series of years since stands as presently before him as though it had been committed yesterday, as an evidence that our actions only on their phenomenal exoteric side sink in the stream of time, whilst their essential esoteric side, that in them which belongs to our free-will and our obligations, is preserved in an unseen world, where, lifted above the stream of time, they accuse or excuse us. Just because conscience, in the most eminent sense, is the consciousness of eternity, the consciousness of a relation superior to the world, it speaks most clearly when the voices of the world are mute, and often must it say to man in dreams what it cannot succeed in telling him in his waking moments.

§ 118.

If sin had not come into the world, then would the relation of the law to human consciousness, and at the same time to conscience, be entirely different from what it now is. Then would conscience be the tranquil consciousness that our life was a progressive life in God, in which the requirements of the law and the fulfilment of the law rhythmically succeed each other, in which the conscience would be latent, not manifest, and thus there would be no question about conscience as such. Now this is unquestionably also an evidence that our life is rooted in God, but at the same time it proves that it is a life outside of God, which is not the normal position. And the more we advance in self-knowledge, the more opportunities will we have of perceiving reactions of our higher nature in conscience, which does not obtain its due position, and of the sacred authority which we have offended, and which is the sovereign power of existence. This is specially true of the notoriously evil conscience after the commission of crime, that it expresses itself in powerful reactions, which in the most obdurate criminals may often break forth with overwhelming power. However diverse the expression of an evil conscience may be, two principal Moments are always found in it. Thus, in the evil conscience there is an inward disquietude and dispeace, distress and wretchedness (*angustiæ*) in the present. Moreover, there is a miserable anticipation concerning the future. The violated demands of the law weigh on the evil consciousness as an oppressive burden, which literally makes the mind heavy, and puts the will into a condition similar to that of the man who cannot get air. And not only is it felt as a burden, but also as an inward scourge (*flagellum*), which chases the transgressor like a wild beast, as we see in the case of Orestes, who was persecuted by recollections; and in the case of Cain, who, a fugitive and a vagabond on the earth, in vain endeavours to flee from himself, and from the accusation which sounds from the depth of his being, which at the same time is self-accusation. As the transgressor has the avenging power behind him in the recesses of his heart, so, too, he has him also before him, since the violated requirement of the law incessantly in magic presence places itself before him in the shape of the crime committed, as Banquo's ghost before Macbeth. And just as a good conscience has not merely present inward peace, but is always accompanied by a blessed anticipation of the future, even if present circumstances are dark enough; so, too, an evil conscience has not merely present inward misery, is chased not merely by the terrors of memory, but has also a foreboding evil anticipation of the time to come, even when externally surrounded with the means and appliances of enjoyment. There is in the conscience an impression, more or less distinct, that the legislative and sentencing power is also the executive or accomplishing. Although God's righteous judgment is already fulfilled in the inward tortures of the conscience, yet there is besides a conviction that the consequences of the law, duty and responsibility, must be *fully* carried out, or that *retribution* must be manifested in accordance with the external and the internal, with fortune and guilt, with outward circumstances and personal worth. However disposed the transgressor may be to regard nature and the course of the world as indifferent to the conscience and the laws of morality, to regard the law as something merely subjective, the reproaches of conscience as childish fancies and imaginations, which have nothing to do with reality; however many phenomena may appear to show that the law and conscience are destitute of all objective corroboration in the course of the world, which even seems frequently to mock them and continue to go on its own way; yet in the depth of conscience, a secret conviction that the moral government of the world is not the less accomplished through the course of the world—that omnipotence, though for a time it may seem otherwise, is still on the side of justice. And although this conviction is trodden under foot by the obdurate mind, yet it forces itself on the transgressor in his dreams, as with Richard III. the night before the battle. Therefore it recurs so frequently, that the criminal trembles in solitude, is terrified by the rustling of a leaf, imagines that avenging spirits will suddenly rush in upon him and hurl him into woe, that an ambassador from the "secret council" shall abruptly present himself before him; as we see already in Cain, who fears that any one finding him shall slay him. He knows that he has not merely holiness against him, but omnipotence also.

If, therefore, as the functions of conscience have been named, the reminding and pledging, the judging and inwardly rewarding or punishing, we must still add to this list the *warning*, or threatening of future retribution. First in this way conscience bears testimony to our dependence on God and His holy law,—namely, as testimony of the absolute validity of this law in His government of the world, that God will be a rewarder of those that seek Him, and will repay every one according to his deeds (Heb. xi. 6; Rom. ii. 6). And because the conscience is consciousness of eternity, its threatenings do not point merely to the present life, where even with the heathen it has often warned of the avenging Nemesis, but also to the coming life. However imperfect the conception of God was with the heathen, they yet felt the admonitions of conscience regarding the life to come This may be seen, for instance, from that remarkable passage in the beginning of Plato's *Republic*, where the old Kephalos, whilst expressing his view of old age, says among other things, "Thou must know, Socrates, that when man believes death near, there is awakened within him a fear and anxiety to which he was before a stranger. The well-known traditions about the infernal regions, where every one shall suffer punishment for the wrong he has committed while here, and which he before considered absurd, begin now to distress his soul as if they were really true, and he casts now himself a deeper glance into that world, either from the weakness of old age or because he is now closer to it. Full of fear and anxiety, he begins to reflect, and examine if he have wronged any one. He who finds many trespasses in his life, is constantly frightened from sleep, like a child he trembles, and passes his life in sorrowful forebodings; whilst, on the other hand, he who is not conscious of any wrong is always accompanied by a joyous and beautiful hope which, as Pindaros says, is the foster-mother of old age." To this terror of the future here described we can assign no other place in the soul than the conscience. It is the warning conscience which, as consciousness of eternity, awakens thoughts concerning retribution and dread of the future with those who at an earlier period mocked at the traditions of the infernal regions. It is from a good conscience that this joyful hope and expectation spring.

In the prophetic announcement of a coming retribution, conscience is closely associated with another form of man's personal consciousness of eternity, which, however, belongs also to man outside of Christianity, and which is a postulate for the appropriation of the gospel. We mean the deep *craving* which from the beginning exists in the heart of man after a higher eternal *Good*, and which in its essence is the longing of love after God and God's kingdom, after blessedness in the perfected harmony of the world, where all the contradictions of existence are at an end. ("Thou hast created us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless in the world, and can find no repose till they rest in Thee, O Lord!"—*Augustine's Confessions*.) From each of these points of issue the path leads to God. Both mutually strengthen each other, and their lines converge. Conscience testifies concerning the kingdom of holiness and righteousness:

but whilst it expresses conviction of future retribution, it declares at the same time, with greater or less clearness, that the kingdom of holiness is also one of bliss. The longing after a supreme Good, which shall surpass all the relative goods of earth, is an evidence that a kingdom of bliss must be to be found for man, but leaves it undetermined whether this is to be according to merit or of free grace. There may be something in the middle of the way which first clearly explains this. But blessedness, when it is not confounded with earthly happiness, cannot be imaged without holiness, without man's personal perfection in harmony with the law of God and of his own being. Both stand in close connection with the eschatological idea, the content of which is first disclosed by Christianity as the holy and blessed kingdom of love, the advent and completion of which is conditional on the doom of the living and the dead. In their path to God some men take their starting-point pre-eminently from conscience and duty, others from the longing desire of love. But a long portion of the journey cannot be accomplished ere the two paths merge into one. The man of duty and conscience and the man of longing desire (*l'homme de désir*) are not two different men, but the same, created in dependence on God, feeling his need of Him, in Him seeking his perfection.

§ 119.

But if it is the essence of conscience to testify concerning our relation of dependence on the holy will of the Creator, through the law of God and the government of the world, how is it to be explained that the utterances of the conscience are so different in the different ages and among the different races of people, so different with individuals who are contemporary, that frequently things directly opposed to each other are affirmed to be enjoined by conscience?—that often the most fearful crimes are perpetrated under an appeal to the authority of the conscience; often the most inane and most insignificant matters—as, for instance, a vapid ceremonial—are introduced with the sanction of conscience? The readiest answer to this is, that conscience is not from the beginning a perfect organ, but, considered from its subjective side, requires to be developed, formed, and educated, and can only be developed in union with man's whole moral being, and thus in combination with the other faculties of the soul. The development of conscience is specially conditional on the development of knowledge, for which reason we are accustomed to speak of the conscience in connection with the reason. "Without the reason, conscience is blind; without conscience, reason is cold and languid."[1] Therefore human thoughts and reflections on the law, and its application to the individual case, appear before the judgment bar of the conscience, accusing and excusing one another (Rom. ii. 15). Yet not merely is the development of the conscience conditional on knowledge, but also on the *will*, which, unlike, nay contrary to knowledge, throughout the whole history has exerted a restraining, obstructive influence on the cultivation of the conscience. For the human will has a natural disinclination to cultivate and sharpen the conscience in combination with the knowledge of the law, has no desire to look into this mirror, and men as a rule desire to have quite a different picture of themselves from that which conscience shows them. This universal experience is corroborated by the information given us by Scripture concerning the imperfection and abnormality of the phenomena of conscience; that these, namely, must be explained by the fact that man through sin has lost communion with God, and that there has thus been introduced an inharmonious relation between the faculties of the soul, that the perception of the divine is dimmed, that the will has a bias to prefer itself and the world before God and God's kingdom. The apostle shows us this darkening process in the Gentile world, in that he says, that though the Gentiles had a knowledge of God, they honoured Him not as God, nor considered it worthy their attention to preserve the knowledge of God (because they preferred their own wisdom, which in folly they had conceived), and therefore they were given up to a reprobate mind. Yet he admits that, even under this state of corruption, there were those who had the works of the law written on their hearts, whilst their conscience witnessed against them, and their thoughts meanwhile accused or else excused one another.

Therefore we assert that the conscience, not on its divine but on its human side, may err, that it often requires to be corrected and enlightened, and is always to be cultivated. The conscience may be blunt, and require to be sharpened; it may be lethargic, and require to be roused. It may be confined, limited to too narrow a sphere; whilst large portions of the life of man, which ought to be determined by it, fall entirely beyond its dominion. But one thing is common to all the phenomena of conscience. However diverse may be man's apprehension of the law's *content*, still they have all the consciousness of a higher law for their will, which they have not themselves instituted, and which is binding upon all. However diverse their apprehension of the moral government of the world, yet have all, who are not sunk in brutality, and where a human social life has begun to be formed, a consciousness that there is a higher invisible government, which is *superior* to their will. And however diverse, moreover, religious opinions may be, yet all have a feeling of an unseen authority, which is binding on their will, from the demands of which they *dare* not withdraw themselves, although they often do the opposite of what they ought. In this, conscience shows its objective power. Even in the greatest darkness of the soul there continues to be a light which shines in the darkness, even though the darkness comprehendeth it not. Where it is dimmed as knowledge, it continues to work as *impulse*, as a higher natural power, which, both in its incitements and in its reactions, presses on the man as a power of an entirely different nature from that which comes from the impulses of earth.

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[1] Trendelburg, *Naturrecht.*

§ 120.

Conscience does not express itself merely in the individual, but also in society. That there is not merely an individual, but also a social conscience, rests on this, that human individuals are not personal atoms, which have only their own individual duties, but that they are *organically* combined into a social whole, where in regard to *social* duties they are solidarically bound (one for all, and all for one), and thus have a common responsibility, and with each other fall under the same doom. Just as there are destinies which may visit a whole people, and are felt by the whole people as a common destiny, differing from the individual destiny of each; so there is also a common obligation, responsibility, and guilt, though this does not fall equally on all, but on each according to his special calling and position in society, whilst yet all are responsible in common. As the conscience is the sentinel of individual personality, so is it, too, with regard to society as common personality. The *social conscience* must not be confounded with *public opinion*, which may often be without conscience, and in many cases may show that a people's conscience sleeps. But where the social conscience is vigorous and lively, it will also bear testimony to itself through public opinion. It often bears the relation to public opinion of a deep under-current, flowing in an opposite direction; a secret consciousness that that which is defiantly maintained as public opinion, and set forth as such by its organs, is false and mendacious; a calm witness that these organs are false prophets, whose ideals are only idols, and that the pathway which society is threading is not that of truth, and does not lead to peace. Its movements are then perceived in an inward restlessness and dispeace, which permeate the people, even though the surface shows the opposite. Often this calm witness is without power to break through into positive reactions; yet history also shows that conscience may awake in a whole nation, it may be to cast aside the yoke of false authority, it may be to incite the people to arise from unbelief and worldly modes of thinking, from the illusions of arrogance and vanity, and in penitence to repair to the forsaken altars, again to build itself on the foundation of righteousness. The fact that a whole people may prescribe for themselves fast-days, on which they as a people acknowledge their sin and guilt, and humble themselves before God; or the fact that the public voice may express itself powerfully against scandals introduced into society,—are significant evidences of the reality of the social conscience. It expresses itself not merely as judging, but also as admonishing, and speaks then through single individuals as prophetic voices in society, in regard to which history teaches that not infrequently they have the fate of Cassandra, no one believing their warnings and predictions until the fulfilment arrives, bringing dismay. The development of the social conscience, its purity and vigour, depend on the general moral and religious knowledge of society, and on the susceptibility of the general will to ethical motives. That the thoughts mutually accuse and excuse one another, is here shown in a visible manner, when, under public misfortune, parties mutually endeavour to shift the blame from themselves on to the other side, seeking to justify themselves before the bar of social conscience, though there are in all ages those who set no higher aim before them than that of justifying themselves in public opinion. But however diverse and imperfect the phenomena of social conscience may be, its existence implies solidaric obligation, which presupposes community in customs and traditions, community of laws, community of religion, as the highest binding authority. Where society is disorganized, and the bonds loosened; where usages are no longer governing powers, but with impunity are violated without any remonstrance on the part of public opinion; where the laws are framed thoughtlessly and arbitrarily, without the power of winning respect by their innate necessity; where religion has ceased to be the concern of society, and is only considered as the private affair of individuals; where religious convictions are only regarded as "different views," which are without influence on public life, —then social conscience exists only in some individuals, who may with sorrow contemplate the dissolution of society, whilst in the greater portion it is an extinguished light.

THE LAW'S CONTENT.

§ 121.

The content of the law, which embraces the individual and society, is founded in the essence of human personality, appointed by the will of God, or in man as created in the image of God. It is too limited an apprehension of the law's content, to suppose it a mere collection of commands and prescriptions. On the contrary, it is the idea of man himself appearing as the aim and *demand* of man's will, and embraces all man's relations both towards heaven and earth. The great diversity of so-called moral principles (the principle of happiness, the principle of the common weal, the principle of independence, the principle of rationality, the principle of likeness to God, etc.) is founded on the different apprehension of man's being and destiny. But if man is created in God's image, then free communion, free union with God, is man's principal destiny; and the law's chief, all-embracing demand we cannot better express than in the words of Christ: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind" (Matt. xxii. 37). This is that first and great commandment, which somewhat amplified will mean: Thou shalt love Him with a receiving, appropriating, working, and suffering love. Thou shalt love Him in contemplative love (in meditation), in mystic love (in prayer), and in practical love (in acting and in suffering). And in each of these forms, thy love must be one with obedience (*amor obedientiæ*). If by a moral principle is understood the highest unity, to which the multiplicity of duties may be referred, then we have here expressed the moral principle, by which it remains to be observed that love to God, through sin on the one side and redemption on the other, receives new and special modifications. But it is unfair to limit the moral principle to this, and only to understand morality as the doctrine of law or the doctrine of duty. The true principle of morality embraces all three moral spheres; and only God Himself, or Christ in unity with His kingdom, is the true principle wholly determining and embracing the moral life.

Love to God is thus the one all-embracing duty. But the one must strengthen itself in the manifold, and love to God must strengthen itself in the relations of human society, and in relation to the government of created things, which finds in man its centre. Therefore this is the second commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Thou shalt love *God's image* upon earth. And because the conception of neighbour is inseparable from the conception of the realm of humanity, the second commandment also contains this: Thou shalt love humanity in God; thou shalt love the realm of humanity in its unity with the kingdom of God. And since God's kingdom, in its unity with that of humanity, is the ultimate object of the whole order of created things, which is teleogically planned for this, we may sum up all the duties of man in the apostolic formula, "that all must be done to the glory of God" (εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. x. 31). By this is required not mere submission to the *object of the world* fixed by the will of God, not mere submission to the divine *plan* of the world—the ways and leadings of His wisdom towards the race and individuals—which requires resignation on all merely subjective demands and ideals; but also submission to the divine *government* of the world, that everything may be performed in harmony with the innate appointments of God, in harmony with the divine regulations, with the God-appointed *norms.* The love of obedience (*amor obedientiæ*) must, during life in this world, prove itself to be that which fulfils *all righteousness,* and in every respect do that which is right.

Right is the objective content of the law—the Good itself as the law-appointed, ordained, prescribed, and determined, which is binding on all, and must be respected by all. The conception of right (not in a limited or partial sense, but in its wide and fundamental signification) is the conception of the straight line, the direct path, which is prescribed to all, that they should by it approach the goal of their life, and is opposed to the crooked ways of sinners. It is to the *right* that man is bound. But as the conception of right is the conception of the straight line, so is it also the conception of an order of things with a multiplicity of problems which must be solved, of boundary lines and relations which must be observed and maintained by *liberty.* Not merely have men mutual claims of justice against each other, but throughout existence man meets man with a vast, all-embracing demand of right, a great *Suum Cuique,*—a claim the nature of which is different according to the different sphere in which it presents itself. To render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's; to render to our neighbour that which belongs to him, not merely in the relation of citizenship, but in that of pure humanity, in that of philanthropy and friendship; to render to the laws of nature, to unconscious creation, that which is nature's, because the laws and norms of unconscious nature too must be respected, and dare not be violated by man,—these are demands of diverse character and quality, but to which we are all bound. Whilst the conception of duty does not find any *direct* expression in the Holy Scriptures, though the apostle designates us as debtors (ὀφειλέται, Rom. xv. 26, 27), and the Saviour Himself speaks about a "must" for His will (John ix. 4), on the other hand the expression "right" recurs again and again in the Old Testament. "That which is altogether just shalt thou follow," says Moses to Israel (Deut. xvi. 20). "I have chosen the way of truth; Thy judgments have I laid before me," says David (Ps. cxix. 30); and he lauds the blessedness of the man in whose heart are right ways (Ps. lxxxiv. 6).

Love (both human and divine) so little excludes righteousness, that, on the contrary, it cannot exist without it. The middle conception, through which this is perceived, is *wisdom*, practical teleological knowledge, which discriminates the aim and the means, fixes the value of things, and without which love would be blind. In God's justice or righteousness His wisdom appears as *power*, as the law-giving and regulating, ordering and distributing power, which places everything in the position which belongs to it, and preserves measure and boundary; on which account also the divine righteousness manifests itself as judging and retributive, as that which does not permit itself to be mocked, but in the course of earthly events vindicates God's authority. By means of wisdom the love of God is in unity with His justice; for all manifestation of justice has teleologic significance for the highest Good, or for the manifestation of God's love to His creatures. And as love cannot exist without wisdom and justice, so both of these last are attributable to love, and are incomprehensible without it. For what object can wisdom have except the Good? and what is the Good, except the kingdom of personality, except the kingdom of love? And if we acknowledge the demand of justice on man as the demand to render to every one his own (*suum cuique*), in self-denial and self-limitation to devote himself to the community, to the divine regulations; if we acknowledge the demand of justice as the demand for a relation of reciprocity between men, in which they, in self-limitation, and with resignation of egoistic demands, must give to each other and receive from each other whatever is mutually owing, does it not show—unless we stop short at the merely negative claim that we shall not injure one another (*neminem læde*), without advancing to the positive demand of *mutual help and assistance*—that love must be regarded as the very essence of justice, as the fulfilling of the law? (Owe no man anything, but to love one another, Rom. xiii. 8.) And God's absolute claim of right in man,—does it not include God's right not merely to man's outward actions, but to his heart? The more cordially and spiritually justice is apprehended, the more clearly is perceived its unity with love. Undoubtedly this was not known in the pre-Christian world, where the sages stopped short at wisdom and righteousness as an ultimatum, and perceived no higher ideal of personality than the ideal of the wise man and the righteous man, but where neither righteousness nor wisdom were grasped in their depth, because the kernel of personality, namely love, was absent. In Christ, on the contrary, love is revealed with wisdom and righteousness as its special Moments. And the more deeply we meditate on God's law as the law of personality, the more we shall perceive it as the demand of the divine law, that the world of human liberty, also from the side of humanity, must be a world of love, and along with this a world of wisdom and righteousness,—a demand, the eternal obligation of which is not disturbed, because the actual world shows us a world of egoism, of folly, and injustice.

§ 122.

The content of the law is at once universal and individual. Its general content is its eternal and unchangeable appointments; but these receive a characteristic impress with the diversified individualities, since the moral obligations of every individual and of every society are partly determined by their special characteristics, partly by the particular claim which the divine will, through the leadings of providence, makes upon each of us in the sphere of life to which we have been appointed. For in every sphere of life God claims, on the ground of the general, something special from us. It is this individual Moment which the apostle has before his eyes when he counsels the Christians to "prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God" (Rom. xii. 2). The meaning is not merely, that we should know, what we already know, the general decree of love or the ten commandments, but that we should discover what God requires of us according to our innate characteristics, our special gifts, the talents committed to us, and wherewith we are to serve, and next what He requires from us in this particular case, in this situation; in what manner we should accommodate ourselves to this or that sign of the times, to this or that new movement, to this or that new phenomenon. This discrimination of the individual forms the most difficult phase in the discernment of the law. When the Lord said to the rich young man, who believed that he had observed the commandments according to their general content, "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and come and follow me" (Matt. xix. 21), then it became the individual duty of the youth, in the Lord's demand on him, to prove the good and acceptable and perfect will of God.

On the individual side here indicated of the content of the law rests the law's variability. It is unchangeable according to its eternal universal essence, although this is only gradually revealed to man and acknowledged by him; but it is variable in its individual determinations, because its universal demands are modified differently for each individual, and become different for the same individual at the different stages of his development and progress in life. And as the whole moral world finds itself in a progressive development under the guidance of God, as even the moral condition of the world constantly varies, so are the concrete appointments of the law, the concrete tenets of duty, subject to continual modification. But this variability does not disturb the eternal unchangeableness of the law, and its consistency with itself. The *unity* of the law, and that of the divine will manifesting itself in the law, is the all-determining and all-controlling principle in the shifting multiplicity of special duties, in which it continues to unfold its inexhaustible riches. When earlier appointments of duty are abolished, new and higher ones are introduced, which from innate necessity develope themselves on the everlasting basis of the law and providence. The eternal requirements of love, wisdom, and justice remain the same; it is the individual circumstances which change.

§ 123.

That the content of the law is determined by the will of God, does not mean that it is arbitrarily so determined, as if it might also have been different if it had thus pleased God. But just as little is the content of the law determined independently of God's will, or to be regarded as a mere content of reason, independent of personal relation to God (see the Theological Postulate). The onesided apprehension of the law as law of impersonal reason, which in our day is the predominating one, imbues not only pantheistic, but also deistic ethics. Deistic ethics, indeed, postulates a personal Creator's will, but a will which, after having accomplished the creation of the world and of man, has resigned its sovereignty to the laws. As God is only above and beyond the world, and there is no real meeting, no actual contact finds place between God and man: the content of the law, which God has planted in the heart of man, can only become a content of so-called universal reason, which includes everything except living, personal communion with God Himself. That the divine will sanctions the prescriptions of the law will here only mean, that these obtain our reverence by being associated with the idea of God as the holy Lawgiver, by being regarded as dictated by God. This legislation, which has found a classic expression in the moral system of Kant, may be compared to a letter which bears as its seal the divine will, but when it is opened contains nothing at all concerning any personal relation between God and us, but, excluding everything personal, embraces merely bare and abstract necessity of reason,—a system of rules universally binding, and necessary for our conduct in the world. But the question which we in vain seek to answer in this system of ethics is this: How is it conceivable that the divine will, which is the origin of the law, after this first legislation in the beginning of creation, has become an inactive and sluggish principle? how is it conceivable that the *content* of the divine will, which must be realized in and by man, is anything *other* than the divine will itself; whilst yet God can only be conceived as having *Himself*, *His honour*, His manifestation, as His ultimate object, as thus the divine will throughout, which in this view differs from itself, yet can only be conceived as willing *Himself* and His kingdom?

The undeniable fact, that there is a wide-spread apprehension of the content of the law, in which there is no trace of love to God, points back to another undeniable fact, namely sin, by which man has revolted from God, and the perception of the law and conscience has become darkened. Although man has withdrawn from personal relation to God, from the relation of liberty and love, he continues to be bound in a relation of necessity to the Good. The claim of the Good continues as ideal, as impersonal necessity of reason, as impersonal wisdom and justice, to be immanent in human consciousness and in the elements of human existence; and it has therefore a relative truth, that the law of morality is valid also independently of faith in God,—in so far, namely, as the norms of the Good, in the form of impersonal necessity of reason, uncompromisingly press themselves on human consciousness, although man may seek to explain away the divine authority, with which they manifest themselves in the conscience, and to make them the determinations of his own reason. The most abstract expression for this abstract necessity is given in Kant's principle of morality,—that we should act according to universally binding rules, according to such maxims as no one without self-contradiction can desire that they should not be followed by all,—a principle, the validity of which for his own actions every one is constrained to admit, just as he is constrained to admit the validity of the *principium contradictionis* for his thought. We call this principle the most abstract, because every divine and human content is here excluded; every question, *What* shall I do? is here rejected; and we are only referred to the bare form, to the pure *How* of universal validity and universal reason, the only thing from which the practical thought cannot be abstracted. In this abstract relation to the Good, *respect* for the law is the only motive or inducement to morality; for respect is not, like love, a sentiment which rests on liberty, but is imperative and irresistible. Even the transgressor is constrained to respect the law which he has violated. But just as this moral formalism and other kindred legislations of reason do not satisfy the human soul in its inmost being, where it continues to have a consciousness, though darkened, of communion with God as the most essential claim of the law, so, too, they militate against God's revealed law, which enlightens us regarding God's will, and the authority and content of which, in spite of the objections of human wisdom, constantly procure for themselves a fresh admission into men's consciences.

THE REVEALED LAW. MOSES AND CHRIST.

§ 124.

The necessity of a revealed law is admitted with sin. Sinful man has a disposition to depict to himself a God after his own heart, a God who does not reckon closely with sin and with the requirement of holiness, and a disposition to examine, expound, and reason away the averment of the law and of conscience. Therefore God has given a positive revealed law, in which the requirements of God's will are represented to us as in an infallible mirror, which does not flatter, and which shows us our own form in its relation to the law. Whilst the heathen, who seek to work out a moral system of their *own*, only take the law from its immanent side, with Israel the law appears in revelation in its transcendency and majesty. But the revealed law is not given as something isolated or standing alone. It would fare but ill with mankind, if God had only revealed His law to us, and no man could endure to live under the *law alone.* The revelation of the law is a *middle link* in the economy of salvation and redemption; and its inward postulate is grace, which not merely holds good of the revelation of the law by Christ, but also of the revelation of the law which was given by Moses to the people of Israel.

The essential content of the law which was given by Moses is expressed in the decalogue, or the ten commandments. Its principle is love to God, although this is not expressly mentioned in the ten commandments. The design of educating a rude people, who were to be detached from the heathen world, and that worship of nature to which they had an inherent disposition, and who could only be gradually led from the external to the internal and the spiritual, made it imperative that the demand of the law should more fully embrace action than disposition of mind, although this last consideration is the essential meaning of the law; "for the law is spiritual," Rom. vii. 14—it unfolds itself by progressive perception. These circumstances made it imperative that the law should appear predominantly as a prohibition by its restraining "Thou shalt not," which points to sin and evil desires. In vast general outline, the law spans the whole of life as a hedge, a warden of the marches; whilst the three first commandments treat of the relation to God and His worship, the others of the relation to man—duty to parents as the oldest human authority, and to our neighbour, to the life of man, to marriage, to property, to the honour and good name of our neighbour; whilst the ninth and tenth commandments, with the prohibition "Thou shalt not covet!" are directed against the root of sin in the heart, forbidding every invasion or encroachment on the rights of our neighbour. The law was introduced with the words, "I am the *Lord thy God*," and speaks with the majestic authority of the Eternal, dispensing blessings and curses on the fulfilment and transgression of the law. But although this is given amidst the thunder and lightning of Sinai, whose roll seems to be heard constantly in its mighty imperatives, "Thou shalt not!" or "Thou shalt!" yet still it points back to grace; for the God who speaks in the law is He who led the people out of Egypt, freed them from the yoke of bondage—the God who gave the promise to Abraham, and who has prepared a highest good, the Messianic kingdom, for His people. Yet the relation between authority and liberty continues under the Old Testament to be a relation of unsolved contradiction, of estrangement. The will of man is not at one with God's will, is opposed to it; and although the human will submits, yet the heart is not in accordance with the law, so that again and again it is necessary to have recourse to the thundering Thou shalt not! and its behests are obeyed in a spirit of fear, a spirit of bondage very different from the spirit of adoption (Rom. viii. 15). But the design of the law was educative, or that the will of man should be trained to true freedom, should be constantly receiving a deeper sense of the spiritual significance of the law, should in the law of God acknowledge the law of his own being, but also perceive his own inability to perform it, should increase in perception of sin, and thereby become susceptible of grace in Christ. In the Psalms and with the prophets we find this deeper knowledge of the law, and along with it a *delight* in God's law. But this delight in God's law is inseparable from a deep and sincere pain on account of sin, a longing after redemption.

The educative view-point is the principal one from which the revealed law of God to Israel must be apprehended. Education is an influence on the will of man through instruction and *discipline*, since by discipline (παιδεία) we do not merely understand punishment, but everything which serves to break man's natural egoistic will, and form it to obedience to the law. Education seeks to lead, guide, and support those who are minors, who are still not able to direct their own path, and seeks at the same time to influence them by the quiet force of circumstances. All this has its application to God's educative guidance of the people of Israel, though Moses is more of a censor than of a gentle guiding teacher; in which, however, it must not be forgotten that it was said of Moses that he was meek above all the men that were upon the earth (Num. xii. 3). It has its application in the giving of the law, in the entire theocratic constitution. For the law of God is the foundation of the State, and all religious appointments appear at the same time as external appointments of righteousness. From this educative point of view we must also apprehend the so-called ceremonial law, the law of purity and impurity, of clean and unclean articles of food, etc. The outward is here the symbol of the inward. In opposition to paganism, which mixes together mind and matter, oversteps and effaces the boundaries which God has drawn in His creation, Israel was to be accustomed to make a difference, to distinguish, to respect boundaries. Hence we find appointments such as these: "Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind (Lev. xix. 19). Thou shalt not sow thy field with mingled seed; and neither shall a garment mingled of linen and woollen come upon thee."[1] The law encompasses Israel in every direction with its lines of division. The Rabbins have, on examination, discovered 248 commands and 365 prohibitions. But the whole of this education rests on the foundation of preparing grace. By the side of the law stands the symbol of promise and salvation in the high-priesthood, with the sacrifice in the most holy place, which, as shadows and types, point to fulfilment in Christ.

§ 125.

"Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil" (Matt. v. 17). In these words Christ describes His relation to the law of

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[1] See Stahl, *Philosophie des Rechts*, i. p. 39 (second edition).

Moses; whilst He adds, that till heaven and earth pass away, one jot shall not pass from the law till all be fulfilled. The first question which here arises is this: If the Lord here only speaks of the ten commandments, or of the whole Mosaic law, with its great multiplicity of ritual prescriptions? We are not justified in limiting the Lord's words to the decalogue alone. For though the context shows that He speaks with special reference to this, still He speaks of the law as a whole. But how can He then say, that not a tittle shall pass from the law, since the development of the Church shows us that the ceremonial law, that the whole Mosaic dispensation, has been annihilated by the influences proceeding from Christ? We answer: He has fulfilled the law, whilst He has released it from the temporary forms in which its eternal validity was confined; He has unfolded its spiritual essence, its inward perfection. Not even a tittle of the ceremonial law has passed away, if we regard the Mosaic law as a whole; for the ideas which form its basis as the distinction between the unclean and the clean, are confirmed by Christ, and contained in the law of holiness which He teaches men. But the moral law in the stricter sense, or the ten commandments, He has released from its direct association with the judicial law, with the constraint on outward action in which it appears in the theocratic dispensation, and explains it not merely as the law of works, but of the heart, of the frame of mind, teaching hereby a better righteousness than that of the scribes and Pharisees. "It was said to them of olden times, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever killeth shall be in danger of the judgment; but I say unto you, that whoso is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment. It was said to them of olden times, Thou shalt not commit adultery; but I say unto you, that whoso looketh upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart" (Matt. v. 21, 22, 27, 28). Whilst He thus brings the law into the inmost recesses of the mind and disposition, He illuminates it as the law of humanity, which not merely meets man as an external positive commandment, but is acknowledged by man as his own law (νόμος τοῦ νοός, Rom. vii. 23), as the demand of his own being as formed in the image of God. "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them" (Matt. vii. 12). But whilst He thus explains the law as the law of humanity for heart and mind, He explains it at the same time as the demand of God's perfect will, as the law of God's kingdom, which binds man to an invisible order of things, which is higher than the State, even when this appears as the ecclesiastical state, higher than every law of visible temple service, higher than every visible Jerusalem or Gerizim, and places man in relation to the heavenly Father, which seeth in secret.

Yet this is not to be understood as if everything here was only unseen and spiritual, as if men were to be released in every sense from the external authority of the law, and referred to the inward unseen authority in the conscience alone. As Christ came to complete the law, so did He also come to complete authority. He represents Himself as He to whom the Father has committed all authority in heaven and on earth ; and again and again His speech assumes a majestic authority, an authority not of a servant, but that of a son in the house, the Only-begotten of the Father—"I say unto you," by which He shows that He is not a human teacher, a Socrates, who only seeks to lead his disciples to discover the truth for themselves by descending into their own inner being, and who refuses to assert his own personal authority. Christ seeks to bind men to the authority of His word. He will judge them according to these words, which shall not pass away when heaven and earth pass away. But His authoritative demands find an echo in the inmost being of man. It sounds to man as the demand of his own conscience : "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness" (Matt. vi. 33). The claim of authority is at the same time the specially essential claim of freedom.

And Christ not only perfected the law by His teaching ; He completed it, in that He fulfilled it in His own personality, His life. He has left us an example of liberty and love, has shown in His own life that love is the fulfilling of the law, has left in it a summary of the law's demands, and power to fulfil them all. He has fulfilled the law, has fulfilled it in our stead, which is the mystery of atonement. And He continually completes it in us, which is the mystery of redemption. The more clearly we comprehend the demands of the law, the more we perceive that we are not able to satisfy them ; and every one who seeks to prove himself will give it as his experience, that if he acknow ledges the claims which the Lord expresses in His sermon on the mount as the claims of His own being, and heartily concurs in them, still he is not able to imitate them: he will be thoroughly convinced that the men who shape their lives in perfect accordance with the Lord's sermon on the mount, must be entirely different subjects, quite different personalities, from what we are by nature and by our earthly education, and that its demands are not the less absolutely necessary and just. But this is the mystery of redemption, that the same Being who declares the requirements of the law is He who is to fulfil the law in us by His sanctifying and edifying grace in the Holy Spirit. Whilst He as the Redeemer receives us into fellowship with Him, and by means of justifying faith gives us power to become the children of God, He inspires us with the new desire, the new spirit, by which we can *aspire* after the ideal, though only in weakness, and through various stages of development. Christ's legislation rests, therefore, entirely on the presupposition of grace; and the Lord's sermon on the mount is only rightly understood, when it is constantly kept in view that it was delivered from the *Mount of Beatitudes.* He declares that they are blessed who in their relation to God are susceptible of the highest Good, which He will bestow on them from the Father's free grace,—the poor in spirit, they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, they that mourn, who need consolation. His doctrine of holiness is at the same time a doctrine of blessedness; and though He closes His discourse with the impressive exhortation not only to hear His word, but to *do* it, not to build our house upon the sand, but on the rock (Matt. vii. 24–27), yet this doing of the word finds first its true meaning and explanation in that doctrine of blessedness, which only shines through in the sermon on the mount, and which is fully expressed by Him in other contexts.

It is asked if Christ can be called a lawgiver; and the question may be answered affirmatively or negatively, according to the conception which we have of legislation. Whilst Roman Catholic theology describes Him as a lawgiver,[1] whilst it has a tendency to make of the gospel a new law, and of Christ a new

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[1] Concil. Trident. Sessio vi. xxi.: Si quis dixerit Christum Jesum a Deo hominibus datum fuisse ut redemptorem, cui fidant, non etiam ut *legislatorem*, cui obediant, anathema sit.

Moses, our old Lutheran theologians did not call Him so, but regard Him as the person who has expounded and vindicated the law (*Interpres et vindex legis*).[1] The truth is, that Christ is not a lawgiver like Moses, has not established a new theocratic dispensation, in which the ethical is fashioned into a system of external appointments; above all, He has not brought us new tables of the law, has not bestowed on us a new and formal code. And it is a complete mistake, when, as is sometimes done in the Protestant Church, the sermon on the mount is treated as if it contained ecclesiastical and political regulations for direct application, whereas everything in this discourse refers us to the world of temper and disposition. Yet we may speak of Christ's legislation, of the legislation of God's kingdom, which He has established. For not merely has He interpreted the law as it is given by Moses, but He has perfected it: He has given a new commandment, the commandment of love, which is new by the position He has given it towards grace (John xiii. 34); has, by a multiplicity of great and guiding maxims and prescriptions, enunciated the principles and spirit of the law. But when the legislation of Christ is thus designated, it must always be borne in mind that He is at once the giver and the fulfiller of the law, both for us and in us. And when the authority of Christ is in question, it must always be remembered that He is the unity of authority and grace.

THE NEW RELATION TO THE LAW. NOMISM AND ANTINOMIANISM. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ANTINOMIANISM.

§ 126.

Since Christ, as the personal unity of authority and grace, fulfils the law, a new relation is introduced between the law and human liberty. In all those who become partakers of redemption, the law becomes in principle at one with liberty, becomes the special law of liberty, because the principle of the law's fulfilment is bestowed on them by Christ. But also in those who only become partakers of emancipation (see § 59, Redemption and Emancipation), a new relation to the law is introduced, in so far as they accept the negative (protesting) Moment in Christ's position towards the Mosaic law, the release from the merely external authority, the demand for sincerity and spirituality in all things which are binding on men, which is a great effect of the progressive emancipation proceeding from Christ, and which awakens the principle of personality in the human race. Christ Himself verily changes the relation of the law to human consciousness, frees personality from a multiplicity of mere outward, positive, and arbitrary appointments of the law—heals on the Sabbath, defends His disciples who pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, declaring that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath (Mark ii. 27). The appropriation of this protesting and emancipating Moment, this elevation of earnestness and spirituality, of the right of personality, may in some cases become a preparation for the reception of the gospel, of redemption by Christ, and pave the way for these; in others, it may through human sinfulness become the occasion of a series of false tenets of liberty, which we class together under the designation Antinomianism. The Christian apprehension of the law, in its passage through ages of the world, has sometimes had to combat with *Nomism*, which seeks to maintain the Old Testament, external relation to the law, and in opposition to evangelical liberty denies the spirit of the law; at other times with Antinomianism, which in false emancipation and fanatic liberty not merely exalts itself above the subordinate forms of the law, but even over the eternal law sanctioned by Christ, denying its universal obligation and necessity.

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[1] Form. Conc. Solid. decl. de lege et evang.: Christus legem in manus suas sumit eamque *spiritualiter explicat.*

Nomism has under the Old Testament reached its highest point in Pharisaism. It repeats itself in Roman Catholicism, with its multiplicity of human devices (*traditiones humanæ*), which burden the conscience, since salvation is made dependent on their observance. It repeats itself in Pietism, in which we constantly hear the demand: "Touch not, taste not, handle not!" (Col. ii. 21.) In Nomism man is under the law (*sub lege*), and the law is permanently without liberty, is not the law of liberty; for which reason also it is parcelled out into a multitude of individual commands and prescriptions which circumscribe liberty. The opposite extreme, or Antinomianism, was found already in the apostolic age, and we hear the apostles exhort their Christian followers to be "free, yet not as those who use freedom as a cloak to lasciviousness, but as the servants of God" (1 Pet. ii. 16). It repeats itself throughout history, especially in those ages in which there is an aspiration after liberty. In the early period of the Church it appears specially among the Gnostics, those extraordinary minds, which were put in ferment by the spiritual influences issuing from Christianity, and in whom we find an exalted sentiment of liberty, a gushing spirituality, through which they, as if intoxicated, find themselves uplifted above the limits of finiteness, dream of becoming gods. Antinomian Gnostics laud highly Pythagoras and Plato as men, who in paganism raised themselves above human laws and the opinions of the multitude; and in particular they laud Jesus, because He despised the Jewish law, and, by the divine power which was in Him, raised Himself to the highest unity. As they did not allow themselves to be penetrated by the principles of redemption, but, on the contrary, despised the historic facts of revelation, emancipation was perverted into a formal self-exaltation above God's law, and with several of them it gives occasion to the flesh, whilst others devote themselves to a false asceticism (Marcion). Antinomianism appears, moreover, at the time of the Reformation, and in our own days. Yet it must be remarked, that though it associates itself most closely with the tendencies to progress in history, it may also develope itself from reaction. The great type in this case is the high priest Caiaphas, who resists the progressive spirit of Christianity, and at all hazards seeks to maintain the present state of things against the new. He says: "It is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not" (John xi. 50). He does not examine if this man be guilty or innocent, righteous or unrighteous; it is enough for him that this man is dangerous to what he calls the common weal. He says: "The end hallows the means."

Antinomianism is thus not merely breach of the law or transgression of duty, for this holds good with regard to every sin. It is the *doctrine* which seeks to justify breach of the law as authorized by higher purpose, and from a higher standpoint. It is sin which has here formed for itself a system of ethics, as a substitute for that which is founded on the law of

God. Sometimes it announces itself as the truly ideal system of ethics, which alone is capable of satisfying the personality, which is emancipated from antiquated prejudice; at other times it appears as the really practical system of ethics, which takes up its position on the standpoint of life and reality, paying regard to whatever, according to circumstances, is necessary and appropriate, unconcerned about idealistic theories. It appears both as individual and social Antinomianism.

§ 127.

Individual Antinomianism we may describe in general as that which seeks to maintain moral geniality, the right of the God-inspired individual, at the cost of the universal obligation of duty. A difference is thus instituted between every-day morality and a higher morality, in the sense that individuals, on account of their peculiar excellence, are released from the obligations to which the multitude are bound, and thus also get a privilege to sin. Thus, even in the early ages of the Church, an Antinomianism appears in several Gnostics, in that they distinguish between psychical and pneumatic men,—between those who are bound to every-day morality, to the conventional and traditional, the "external," and those who have attained the stage of perfection, where everything external is indifferent. There were those who called themselves "Lords of the Sabbath," and set themselves above the whole worship of God, above the word and the sacraments, as something which was only suited to the inferior multitude. There were also those with whom this contempt for the external passed over into the grossest sensuality, which they in spiritual arrogance sought to justify by a so-called higher system of ethics. The true Gnostic, said they, lives in an uninterrupted contemplation of the divine. And just because he is so highly exalted above the sensual, which with him is reduced to be the indifferent, he can freely addict himself to all the pleasures of the flesh: for this immersion in sensuality cannot introduce any taint into his inmost being. We combat lust by addicting ourselves to lust. It is no great thing to abstain from pleasure when one has not experienced it; but the great thing is to find oneself in the midst of pleasure and enjoyment, and not to be conquered by it. It is only the small stagnant waters which become impure when anything dirty is cast into them. The ocean, on the other hand, can receive anything into its depths without being thereby sullied. The true Gnostic *is an ocean of spiritual power*, and cannot be sullied by anything; for the impurity is at once washed away by his exalted devotion. Representatives of such tenets may be instanced in Carpocrates of Alexandria (second century), and his genial son Epiphanes, who died from the effects of debauchery at the age of seventeen (Faust and Don Juan combined), after having written a work on uprightness (περὶ δικαιοσύνης), in which he expressed the opinion that the law of nature is the highest law,—that the phantasies of sin proceed from those human laws which fight against the law of nature, and the dispositions implanted in man. He had by his oral discourses produced such a powerful effect on the minds of his hearers, that after his death a genius-worship was paid to him in the island of Cephalonia, in the Ionian Sea, and here a temple, a museum, and altars were erected in his honour:[1] by which testimony is borne to the fact that men cannot entirely tear themselves free from "the external," but in one way or other return to it.

In another form Antinomianism shows itself in the abuse of the Christian doctrine of grace to the emancipation of the flesh. Thus in several sects appears the perversion of the apostolic words, "Where sin abounded, there did grace much more abound" (Rom. v.); from which it was deduced, that we should boldly plunge into the depths of sin in order to quicken our perception of grace; and this was even used as an argument for the seduction of women, in order that these last might attain a deeper consciousness of unworthiness, in which they were deficient, and grace thus become more abundant; in direct opposition to the serious warning of the apostle against doing evil that good might come (Rom. iii. 8). But not only in such hideous phenomena as these does the perversion of the gospel of grace appear, but moreover in other forms. In all ages, men may be found in the Church who imagine that they can sin because of grace, that they can permit themselves transgression and neglect, because the forgiveness of sin always stands open, and it is not deeds, but *faith*, on which our safety turns. As one example among many, we quote the following piece of reasoning, which is not imaginary, and in various forms repeats itself in actual life:—"God has remitted to me an infinite debt, has forgiven me all my sins. Then He may certainly also forgive me the five rixdollars which I owe N. N., and which it is inconvenient for me to pay. I don't intend to pay them, although N. N., who looks at things from the standpoint of the law, and as a Philistine and a matter-of-fact man, priding himself on his social uprightness, constantly importunes me for the money. But if the Lord forgives me this trifling debt,—and that of course He will, since He has forgiven me the infinitely great one,—I do not concern myself about what the children of this world call obligations." This reasoning quite overlooks the fact that the essential fruit of faith is new *obedience*, for which the law has not been abrogated, but perfected, in which the sense of duty has indeed been sharpened. The new aspiration is to fulfil the law, and show loyalty also in the smallest matters. (Rom. vi. 1: Shall we *remain* in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid!)

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[1] Clemens Alexandrinus. Neander, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, p. 133; *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. i. sec. 2, p. 511. See also Nitzsch, *Die Gesammterscheinung des Antinomismus* (*Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1846, H. 1).

§ 128.

This Antinomian geniality meets us also in forms that lie much closer to our human consciousness. That egoistic distinction between a higher moral standard for intellectual men, and a lower for the common herd, we recognise also in the more recent development of humanity, in the assertion that geniuses, the highly gifted, are released from observance of the ordinary rules of morality,—by which is understood the doctrine of the universal obligation of duty,—and that there may be permitted to these lofty spirits exemptions from obedience to the moral law which cannot be conceded to the multitude. Genius, it is said, must be judged after its own standard, and is not to be measured by the common ell. Nay, every able individuality is always in the right when it acts in conformity with its nature. It has its limitations, its failings, its weaknesses and passions; but these are inseparable from its excellence and its noble qualities, and it is absurd and unnatural to desire that it should be without them. Every person of superior powers must be taken as he is; we must concede to him the privilege of sinning in certain chapters, which indeed cannot be denied to him, if this distinguished individuality is to be itself, and to rejoice us by its existence. For him, that is not sin which is so for others; as, for instance, to be fickle in love and faithless towards women, not to pay his debts, and to neglect important parts of his official duties, when these are unsuited to his genius. For him in every case this is a very pardonable, trifling fault (*peccatillum*); whilst such points must be taken far more seriously with ordinary men, who have nothing higher to attend to than their duties, and who, just because they do not distinguish themselves by their talents, must be measured by the common ell. Against this reasoning, which may be read at greater length in many books, and is often heard in oral discussions, we must protest most stoutly on the law's account. That individuality must be judged according to its own standards is certainly quite true, but is no more valid in regard to genius than to every other human individual. In all morality, that is to say, there is an individual Moment, in so far as duty individualizes itself for every one. But the individual standard is only valid when it fits into the general, universally binding. Genuine morality rests just on the unity of the individual and the universal. And we degrade genius when we assert that it cannot be judged from the view-point of the universal human, that it is only genius at the expense of personality. The greatest genius must be judged after the same law as the least gifted, which exactly harmonizes with his human dignity; on which, at the same time, it is to be remarked that this diversity between highly gifted and slenderly endowed is but a difference of degree, and no essential difference. For every man is, according to his circumstances, an eternal genius; whether predominantly productive or receptive, is in this case of no consequence. All shall be judged as personalities, that is to say, as beings who in their characteristics must determine themselves in relation to God's eternal law, which at the same time is the law of his own being. In the diversity of individualities and endowments there reigns the most perfect impartiality in the law, because each one is to be judged not according to his gifts, but according to his obedience, his fidelity, his submission to God and God's government of the world, which resents every violation, even the most trifling. And fidelity must be shown not merely in great things, but also in the smallest, the most insignificant. For, as the Lord says in the parable of the unjust steward, "He who is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much. And if ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to you the true riches?" (Luke xvi. 11.) It is from fidelity and obedience that false geniality seeks to emancipate itself. It desires, even when it is enthusiastic for the really good, to be high-minded, but it is not willing to serve; it desires to move on high places, but not to descend into the depths, not to abase itself and bear marks of humiliation. This is very evidently shown in a multitude of Antinomian phenomena, which dazzle by the semblance of the exalted and the noble; in which to act from the bent of the mind, from love, from enthusiasm for the good, is lauded as much more commendable than obedience to duty, which is represented as the lower form of morality, as that which is unworthy when compared with love, unworthy when compared with enthusiasm, when compared with that lofty self-sacrifice which is far above the plain prose of duty. But as little as an obedience without love is the normal condition, just as little is love without obedience a love worth having. Only the union of the two constitutes that which is required of us, as we have seen in the example of Christ. A lawless love, in which there is no loyalty, a love without duty and obedience, is also without uprightness, and will therefore, with all its enthusiasm, be incapable of avoiding the violation, in one way or other, of the divine laws for the government of the world. And by many so-called beautiful and enthusiastic actions, in which the actor has freed himself from the universal demands of justice, we are reminded of the holy Crispinus, who stole leather in order to make with it shoes for the poor.

If we desire to see Antinomianism in a noble and exalted form, perhaps in the noblest in which it is seen in literature, we should read Jacobi's missive to Fichte, in which it appears as a relative correction of error, whilst in our judgment it is itself radically wrong. Fichte and Kant had with great vigour maintained the universal obligation of the law, the absolute command of duty, but without taking adequate heed of the Moment of individuality in duty, of the diversity of individualities and situations, from which cause an ethical formalism appeared in their system. Jacobi cannot be content to regard man as an abstract rational existence, "a reasonable inhabitant of earth," concerning whose actions one can only inquire if they are in accordance with universal obligation and necessity. He prefers man as that fixed individuality, with that heart from which life issues, with these sentiments and passions in this determined situation. And with this heart, which alone is capable of what bare reason is incapable,—namely, to elevate a man above himself, and which in Jacobi beats so high for virtue and the ideal of the Good,—he protests against universally binding rules, from which no exception is allowed, and to which an abstract obedience alone responds; and he bursts forth into fervent enthusiasm in these well-known words: "Nay, I am that atheist, that profane person, who, in despite of the will which wills nothing (that is to say, in despite of the abstract formal precepts of morality), will lie, like the dying Desdemona; prevaricate and deceive, like Pylades representing himself to be Orestes; will murder, like Timoleon; break law and oath, like Epaminondas and Johann de Witt; resolve on suicide, like Otho; commit sacrilege, like David; nay, pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, only because I am hungry, and the law was made for man, and not man for the law. I am that profane person, and scorn the philosophy which calls me profane on that account—scorn it and its highest essence; for, with the holiest certainty which I have in me, I know that it is man's right of majesty, the seal to his dignity, his divine nature, to have *privilegium aggratiandi* (right of pardon) for such offences against the absolute, universal, irrational letter of the law." However great the influence produced by the eloquence of this passage, when read in the context of the missive, we cannot acknowledge any content of truth in it except this, that the abrogation of the letter of duty may be a fulfilment of its spirit; that in all fulfilment of duty there is a Moment of individuality, which does not admit of expression in the general formula of duty; that in actual life duty is modified according to the diversity of individualities and circumstances. But the error which is likely to arise from this, and to which Jacobi gives admission, is that of extending the mutability of duty to the essence of law and duty. For in its essence the law is immutable, knows no exception, is the same for all individuals and all situations, and every Moment of the individual life of liberty must be determined by the one absolute necessity which makes its claim heard throughout the world of liberty. If we examine more closely the passage above quoted from Jacobi, it will become evident that actions of very diverse character are here classed together. For to break the arbitrary Sabbath law of the Pharisees, and pluck ears of corn on the day of rest, certainly belongs to quite another category from that of lying, committing suicide, murder, breaking vows and promises. When Jacobi appears desirous of establishing the lawfulness of the Antinomian modes of action which he cites, by the assertion that the law was made for man, and not man for the law, this may certainly hold good with regard to the Sabbath law and other positive laws, which cannot be considered as of the last importance. But concerning the eternal law of God, it could equally well be said that man was made for the sake of the law, or for the sake of God; that he is appointed to be God's instrument, God's ministering implement, since God desires to be loved and obeyed by man. Whether any action as an act of love is ethically justified, rests on whether at the same time it can be shown to be an act of obedience, which also contains this negative point, that it does not in any respect involve a violation of that which, according to divine decree, must not be violated. But the greater portion of the deeds cited cannot stand this test. A closer examination will lead to the acknowledgment that, however much we may sympathize with the persons in question, and admire their deeds; however willingly we may concede that, regarded from the stage of moral development which they occupied, and under the circumstances in which they were placed, they certainly acted in accordance with their own being; yet there is a taint of sin which adheres to them, which makes them amenable to the sentence of the law, and restrains our admiration, whilst it forbids us to found our system of Ethics on such authorities. Thus, if we contemplate the gentle Desdemona, uttering a falsehood from love at the very moment of death, we must certainly acknowledge that she who thus lies is no common individual, and bears in the main a noble soul. Her touching, misunderstood, self-sacrificing love to Othello, is pure and deep and cordial; she makes her last sacrifice in charging herself with suicide, in order to clear from the crime Othello, who in his jealousy and blindness has murdered her. Not the less is there in her self-sacrificing lie of deep affection a disobedience, a self-willedness in regard to the truth, of which she is sovereign as little as any other individual of the race. Shakespeare, who does not paint angels or patterns for ethical imitation, has also from the beginning shown us that disobedience and self-willedness were the besetting sins of this otherwise pure and amiable character. For she has married Othello without her father's knowledge and against his will, has violated duty by running off from her father's house. And the same self-willedness and recklessness, and the accompanying thoughtlessness and imprudence, she discovers even in her relation to Othello. Herein are the germs of her tragic fate. Jacobi seems also to have felt that in the examples which he cited there lurked something not as it ought to be. For whilst he begins in high tones, "Nay, I am that atheist, that profane person, who will lie like the dying Desdemona, deceive," etc.; whilst he begins by professing to consider these deeds as justifiable, he ends by *apologizing* for them, since he arrogates to himself a right to *pardon.*[1] This is just our opinion, that they require forgiveness, and that this combination of virtue and crime belongs to the tragic in human existence, which testifies to the need of a Saviour. But we cannot, after the Pelagian view of Jacobi, award to man himself the right of majesty to pardon (*privilegium aggratiandi*), but must assign both doom and mercy to a higher source. From the standpoint of Christian Ethics, we continue to maintain that no action is ethically justified if the individual is not included in the holy universally obligatory. God's holy law knows no exceptions, and suffers no transgressions or neglects. With regard to Jacobi, moreover, it must be especially noticed that by his high moral enthusiasm he stands as a rare exception (a *rara avis*), a swan among the many foul and unclean birds of Antinomianism which history shows us, and that in other treatises he has maintained the universal validity of the law, and combats this false geniality.[2] But his mind was entrapped into an Antinomianism from which there was no escape, between the universal and the individual.

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[1] See Julius Müller, *Die Lehre von der Sünde*, i. S. 261, 5te Oplag (Julius Müller, *The Doctrine of Sin*, vol. i. p. 261, 5th edition).

[2] Alwill's *Briefsammlung* (Alwill's *Collected Correspondence*).

§ 129.

When we turn our attention towards social Antinomianism, there meets us again a series of undisguisedly immoral and revolting phenomena, which recall to mind Carpocrates and Epiphanes. We find thus social factions who deny the validity of the institutions appointed by God in human society, and set about the destruction of the Family, the State, and the Church. We are here constantly brought back to the maxim uttered by Epiphanes, in which he anticipated the famous paradox of Rousseau (*Retournons à la nature*), that the law of nature is the highest of laws, and that all misfortunes are due to human laws and institutions, which, more closely carried out, is expressed in the assertion that happiness, earthly prosperity, and enjoyment is the chief end of man: that man has a right to be happy, but that society withholds from him this right. "Why has God implanted in us desires if we have not a right to satisfy them?" On this reasoning is founded the right to emancipate the flesh, and to do away with *marriage* as something merely conventional. And this fallacy is preached in our day in a multitude of romances and dramas (G. Sand, Alex. Dumas, etc.), which set forth "free love" (*amour libre*) and "the lawfulness of passion" in opposition to marriage as a pernicious human institution, an "odious" invention. Duty comes, according to this view, from man's choice alone; the impulses and instincts of love, on the other hand, come from God. God has not given us passions in order that we should abjure them; for passion is good, legitimate, and holy: when man freely resigns himself to them, he becomes at once happy and virtuous. Union between man and woman is profaned by the relation of duty, and the vow of fidelity brings an untruth into it. "For how can we pledge ourselves to love each other to the end of time? If we always continue to love each other, where is the need for the trothplight? And if we will not continue to love each other for all time, of what service will be this bond, which will then become only a hateful tyranny?" Union only receives its truth from mutual passion. Where that is quenched, union should cease in order to give place to fresh combinations. The only crime is falsehood, and to commit breach of the marriage vows is justifiable, if there is but *truth* in the new relation—that is to say, when the lovers really burn with an honest passion for each other. What in this respect is called a woman's frailty, must be charged to society, and not to evil propensities. "Evil propensities are rare, and belong, God be thanked, to the exceptions" (*Les mauvais penchants sont rares, ils sont exceptionels, Dieu merci*). Nay, we see in these novels and dramas fallen women, impenitent Mary Magdalenes, represented in a *nimbus* of virtue as the *élite* of the sex, because, in opposition to the falsehood of society, there is truth and sincerity in their passions, and we hear, under a shameful perversion of Luke vii. 47, that all their sins are forgiven them because they have loved so much.[1] We will not deny that there may be here also something for which society (*la société*) is to be blamed, in so far as marriages may be solemnized in all legal formality, and yet in an entirely immoral manner,—when, for instance, a man, setting aside all other considerations, gives his daughters in marriage in order that they may make good and wealthy matches, and thereby occasions a new demoralization. But this does not do away with the inherent repulsiveness of the doctrine here referred to. For it is evidently the law of the flesh or of the members which is here desired to be substituted for the law of the spirit. The much-lauded *truth* in passion is most frequently mere *impudence*, which does not blush before the law of morality. It is the fleshly sense which denies that marriage is an ordinance *superior* to individuals; that the individuals are pledged not merely to one another, but to a higher authority, namely God; that the object of marriage is not exclusively what is here constantly set forth as such; that the individuals should be happy and be mutually agreeable to each other, but that, moreover, it is not the smallest aim of this institution that individuals through it should be *trained* to mutual growth in excellence, for which reason Christianity also speaks of the cross which God has laid on this condition of life; that marriage is not at all merely for the sake of the individual, but that the individuals are at the same time for the sake of marriage, in order to fulfil the demands which God's government of the world lays upon them. Both the immoral entrance on the married state, and its immoral dissolution, are condemned in the contemplation of marriage as a divine appointment. The doctrines before cited of the law of nature as the highest law, of the lawfulness of impulses and passions, may perhaps partly find an explanation in existing defects of society, but are very unsuited to supply these. For, by corrupting moral principle, by denying the law of morality, and fashioning a system of doctrine by which sin itself is declared to be legitimate, they cast a blight upon the moral world at its very root; they sap its beginning, point of issue, and foundation (the married state and the family), and contribute to the unhealthiness of the whole moral condition.[1]

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[1] The real meaning of the passage is this: Her many sins are forgiven her, and *therefore* (because she has received such great forgiveness) she loves much (she has evinced such deep *gratitude* towards Christ).

In his writings concerning uprightness, the genial youth Epiphanes, anticipating the ideas of false emancipation and of revolution, determined the idea of uprightness as the idea of a society, a community, under the condition of perfect *equality.* He says: "Nature manifests everywhere an effort after unity, communion, equality. Heaven spreads itself in the same manner over all; the stars of night shine alike for all. Therefore men ought to be on an equality; and there ought to be no difference between rich and poor, but community of *property.* It is only through human laws that this corrupting element of inequality has been introduced." This fallacy has repeated itself in the socialist and communist opinions of our age. The so-called law of nature, which demands equality of worldly means and title to enjoyment, is here made the sum and substance of all things, whilst it is forgotten that even nature does not strive merely after similarity, but that there is also a vast dissimilarity and variety in her works, which otherwise could not produce organisms; and it is to deny the moral law, to place an order of society over the individual, in which the individual forms a member. In the interests of the happiness of individuals, these theorists desire to overturn the existing order of society, and strive after an abstract equality in the possession of worldly goods. But just by these means they bring the individual into the worst kind of dependence on the mechanism of their self-constituted society, and the happiness aimed at is destroyed by a new unhappiness. The unpractical element in their schemes consists specially in this, that they entirely omit the consideration of sin, and only seek the source of unhappy events in the imagined faults of organization in existing society. But so long as sin and death cannot be driven out of the world, neither can adversity, suffering, poverty, sickness, and other miseries be dispelled.

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[1] *Du roman et théâtre contemporains et de leur influence sur les mœurs,* par M. Eugéne Poitou (Contemporary Novels and Dramas, and their Influence on Morals, by M. Eugéne Poitou).

In the sixteenth century there appeared among the Anabaptists, in conjunction with a nomistic submission to the revelations of new prophets, a fanatic chiliastic Antinomianism which rejected the authority of the magistrate, military service, oath and judicial process, property and difference of means, whilst they sought to introduce the reign of the saints on earth, —a theocracy in which false spirituality veered round into carnality, whilst even polygamy was introduced. (Compare this with Mormonism.) Whilst we here refer to Church history, we remark in general, that this fanatic delusion rests not merely on a denial of even the moral economy of the world appointed by God, but at the same time on a confusion of the heavenly and the earthly reign of Messiah, a mistaken anticipation of the future condition of the world. Although the appointments and ordinances mentioned shall doubtless pass away in the completion of all things, in the future arrangement which Christianity promises us, yet still they are essentially fitted for the whole economy of the present world. There will not enter into this present worldly condition any season in which the sacredness of marriage, the inviolability of property, the relation of sovereign and subject, of clergy and laity, will cease to be binding on the consciences of men (*Conf. Aug.* 16 and 5 Art.).

§ 130.

But also where intelligent reflection rejects the above-mentioned revolutionary tenets, a social Antinomianism may make itself valid. The moral sophist appeals to a necessity which arises from the many limitations of this earthly economy to justify his breach of the law. To this belongs the maxim, that the end hallows the means, that the good design of furthering the well-being of the whole atones for a wrong-doing in the individual, when this is necessary to the attainment of the end

This famous or notorious maxim is a fundamental article both in political Antinomianism and in Jesuitism.

Political Antinomianism rests on the distinction between a lower system of ethics, which is valid for private life, in which the universal obligation of the law is acknowledged, and in which no one must violate the rights of his neighbour, and a higher code for State life. Here, on the ground of circumstances and the situation, it may often become necessary to commit a violation of justice, to infringe treaties, to break one's word or one's oath, or to swear an oath with no design of keeping it, because that these things are the only means of attaining the object in view, the only means for the execution of great political schemes. But it is this distinction between one system of morality for private life and another for political life which we must unconditionally oppose. The universal obligation and necessity of the moral law must not be circumscribed; all true policy must be founded on ethics, as certainly as politics cannot be disjoined from the idea of right and *justice*. We continue with the apostle, not merely in private life, but also in political life, to condemn the maxim, "Let us do evil that good may come." For as this maxim circumscribes the universal obligation of the law, it is thus also at least a partial denial of the moral government of the world. This is the conception of a moral government of the world, that the same power which in the moral law expresses its demand on us, is also the power which directs and which will judge the world,—that the law of morality is at the same time the *law of the world*, the inmost law of history. But as we dare not act according to such a maxim as this, let us violate the law of the world, let us deny the law of the divine guidance of the world, in order to accomplish good in human life and in man's course. Neither is it difficult to perceive that political Antinomianism is only a very doubtful and uncertain wisdom. The error here is, namely, that the end which hallows the means is here the expected prosperous *result*. But who guarantees to us that prosperous result? And even if we do attain the happy result which we have in view, who will be answerable for it to us, that this may not at some period produce great misfortune, when it enters into new combinations, when fresh waves of time break on it, by which this happy result may become an irreparable injury to the society which we sought to benefit by our breach of the law, and for which injury we have made ourselves responsible by having worked to lead things into this direction? None of us knows the future, and therefore we do well in not trying to play the part of Providence, and interfering with the government of God, but, on the contrary, conscientiously asking ourselves if we are doing what is right, independently of consequences and results, which are not in our own power, and which our short-sighted view is unable to take in. By setting aside the demand of duty in order to obtain some desired good result, one confides to another divinity than that of conscience—namely, to fate and fortune. One thus permits himself to play a game of hazard, to leave the path of duty and to tread that of fatalism.[1]

Kant, who is always a safe guide when the question concerns obedience to duty, or whether there are not cases in which it is allowable to depart from this, makes a distinction which deserves to be repeated. He distinguishes between moral politicians and political moralists. The first are those who bring their policy into harmony with morality. The last, the political moralists, are those who fashion for themselves a system of morality, which for the most part is in accordance with the advantage of the statesman. The moral politicians find that the political rule, "Be wise as serpents," can, and must, be brought into harmony with the demand, "Be harmless as doves." They do not recognise the maxim that honesty is the best policy; but, on the other hand, they hold this incontrovertible one, *that honesty is better than all policy*, and an indispensable *condition* of it; because policy, by forsaking the path of duty and honesty, places itself under the guidance of blind fate, under the power of the result, with all the dark necessities of the future which this may bring, and which cannot be calculated beforehand by human reason. The moral politician also employs discretion in the attainment of the end which stands before him as the right one. But not the result, only the duty, is with him the highest point; and whilst he does his duty, he leaves the result in the hands of

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[1] Fénélon, *Sur le gouvernement civil:* Faut-il pour guérir les maux du corps politique, se servir d'un reméde violent, *qui ne reussira peut être pas*, et dont la réussite pourroit causer des abus qui iroient à la déstruction de tout gouvernement?

Divine Providence. Political moralists (Antinomians), on the other hand, place as their highest point the desired result, to which everything else must be sacrificed. These politicians, according to Kant, are the principal hindrance to permanent peace among the States, that ideal which is always before our eyes, but is never attained. Kant finds these political moralists specially among the great rulers, whose antinomian maxims of government and conquest he sets forth.[1] Still it is not with the great rulers alone that these maxims are found. They are found also with the great majority of petty rulers, are found especially in all political factions. All political partisans are political moralists, or, as we prefer to call them, Antinomists. They fashion for themselves their system of morality according as party aim requires it, and regulate their convictions and their mode of action by this. Even the better class among them are far less particular about the means than the end, if the latter can only be carried through, and where it is required to get the majority. This is just what makes the party, whether it be political or ecclesiastical, a party in the bad sense of the term, that it is an *external* aim which is to be carried out, a public opinion which is to be maintained, an appearance which is to be kept up, and for which, in many cases, the individual conviction must be sacrificed.

The most logical form of the denial of moral law here referred to is found among fatalistic politicians. The deepest distinction in politics is, namely, that of difference in views of life and of the world, or whether one follows the ethical or the fatalistic view of life, which last, in the bosom of Christianity, can only arise from a falling away from the ethical view, and thereby becoming antinomistic.[2] In order to guard here against misunderstanding, we remark that fatalistic views of life may indeed be entertained where the freedom of the human will is acknowledged, though this theory carried out must deny them. The practical question of greatest importance in connection with the present discussion is this: In what power do we confide as ruling in history? whether do we believe in the moral order and guidance of the world; or, besides human will and human genius, do we acknowledge any other power than fate, fortune, and circumstances? This last is the characteristic of political fatalists, who, when they appear on the political theatre of the world, show themselves gamblers at hazard on a great scale. One has already partially and unconsciously entered into their system, when he thinks it necessary to employ any means opposed to duty, in order thereby to attain some praiseworthy historic aim. For therein lies *implicite*, that the God of conscience is not the Almighty, only rules in private life, but not in history, where another deity reigns, to whom must be brought tribute and sacrifice. If I believe unconditionally on the God of conscience as on the Almighty, who has all national destinies in His hand, then I dare not erect and follow a theory which contradicts this, and must, holding fast by duty as the absolute, submit to belong to the suffering party, saying, but in a deeper sense, with the old Roman: *Victrix causa diis* (Fortune) *placuit, sed victa Catoni* (The victorious cause pleases Fortune, the conquered pleases Cato). This is ethical politics. The distinctly fatalistic politician, on the other hand, acknowledges no ethical aim in history; his highest view is progressive "civilisation." He does not guide himself by eternal decrees, but according to circumstances. The highest human powers which move history are, in his idea, force and cunning; and whatever he *can* do, that he also *dares*. For his own person, he confides in his fortunate star; and when this wanes, he comforts himself with this consideration,—if, after all, he determines to survive his fortune, and does not rather commit suicide,—that such is the course of the world. Another and better quietive is unknown to him. In opposition to this, the ethical politician must act according to this maxim, that this world can only be made better by good and upright means, knowing moreover that the special end of history is something different and infinitely higher than anything political, and that all states are only a subordinate and subservient means for this end.

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[1] 1. Fac et excusa; 2. Si fecisti nega; 3. Divide et impera.—*Zum ewigen Frieden*, Werke, 7 B., Rosencrantz' edition.

[2] H. Gelzer, *Prot. Monatsblätter*, 19 B., B. 76.

It need scarcely be said, that much fatalistic and hazard playing policy has made itself valid under ethical disguises; for so great is the power of uprightness, that even they who trample it under foot, at all times give themselves the appearance of fighting under the panoply of uprightness. A policy, moreover, which is in its essence ethical, may in the execution become tainted by impure means. But until the close of the world's history will the opposition between the fatalistic and the ethical continue to be the indwelling, essential opposition, which determines the essential differences in the political phenomena.

Besides the two classes of politicians which have been named, there is yet a third, very numerous class, namely of those that adhere to both sides, hovering between the ethical and the fatalistic view of the world, serving two masters, divided between the God of conscience and circumstances, to which last they usually bring sacrifices, through which they become unfaithful to conscience and their better knowledge, but which they find necessary, in order that the desired aim may not be missed. Parliamentary transactions may here furnish many examples.

That policy which denies the moral government of the world has unquestionably found its most complete representation in Machiavelli's celebrated or notorious book concerning princes: "He seeks in this treatise to show in what manner sovereignty is to be won and maintained, and desires specially to give direction to that prince, who, under its present corrupt, degraded, lawless state of anarchy, shall succeed in liberating Italy. In order to create the new organization, the prince must be armed with unlimited power to act according to the rules of prudence, grounded on great political experience and technical insight, which are here set down. A glowing but pagan love of Fatherland has given the impulse to this treatise, which from first to last insists that the prince ought not to concern himself at all about the moral nature of the means which he employs, for *Fatherland must be saved at any cost;* thus also by acts of injustice and violence, by poison and dagger, by lying and deceit, by the mask of dissimulation and hypocrisy; in short, by any means which, under existing circumstances, may be 'necessary.' He will drive out devils by devils, the devils of anarchy by the devils of tyranny. But just in this manner he discovers his unbelief. He does not believe in the God of conscience, and still less does he believe that the God of conscience is also the God of history. For if the God of conscience also bears sway in history, it may with certainty be perceived that there is no liberation for Fatherland in this way, and that Fatherland must first and foremost be so liberated, that the false spirit, the false doctrines and maxims, which are the sources of its misfortunes, must be driven out by a better spirit and better maxims. But Machiavelli is desirous that his prince should liberate Italy through his own effort, by force and cunning, and that he should rely on the successful result of his undertaking, if he only seizes the favourable opportunity and makes use of circumstances. Just on this account is he a type of the policy which we designate fatalistic. He does, indeed, expressly oppose fatalism, in so far as he exalts free-will, its power to grasp and alter the relations of the world; and he designates the opposite belief as a doctrine for sluggish and dastardly souls. But the principal matter is that he exalts free-will, whilst recklessly setting aside the law, conscience, duty, and responsibility; or that he, as Fr. Schlegel has with perfect truth expressed it, in the midst of modern Christian Europe, establishes a system of politics as if such a thing as Christianity, or even a Deity and divine justice, had no existence. When all these considerations are excluded, no other government of the world remains behind than a merely naturalistic one, in which there is no other right than that of the stronger and more sagacious, in which man with his free-will, bound by no law of morality, is only an intelligent beast. If it be asked, what power is above man? certainly the word 'God' does appear a few times in the book, but immediately interchanged with 'fortune,' 'fate,' 'circumstances,' which last man to a certain extent can master, which the prince indeed is strenuously advised to attempt. Yet he adds that fortune regulates half the concerns of men, that it only fares well with us so long as we bring our doings into harmony with circumstances and the spirit of the age; and just because the wheel of fortune turns so frequently, that it does not always stand in the power of man to regulate his mode of action according to the new circumstances, just for this reason so many of the race are unfortunate."—*The Prince*, chap. xxv. *That power in History*, on which man at last must feel himself dependent, and which he in the last resource cannot sway, because no one can suit himself to every change of circumstance, which would be the same thing as having the ability to change his own nature, is thus for Machiavelli "*the inces-*

santly revolving wheel of fortune or circumstances." However much political sagacity, in harmony with the course of the world, may be contained in his reflections on the relation between the prince and the circumstances which both exalt him and crush him, when he is no longer capable of making himself master of the situation; yet we must designate his view of life as fatalistic, because the last cause on which we here rest in the contemplation of history is a blind, dark, unreasoning power, namely, the incessantly revolving wheel of circumstances, in whose motions no higher plan and object is discerned, and which is indifferent to all ethics, wisdom, and justice,—a mode of thinking quite in accordance with the widespread pagan unbelief then prevalent in Italy. For Machiavelli has only given to the predominant cast of thought a fixed and consistent expression.[1] A bright contrast to Machiavelli appears in his contemporary and countryman Savonarola, with his ethical though visionary policy, which, with his testimony to the law and the gospel, in the corruption of Italy, brought him to the stake. Of him Machiavelli says, that of necessity it fared ill with him. For only armed prophets, as Moses, Cyrus, and Romulus, come off victors; the unarmed must necessarily perish (chap. vi.).

After all these discussions, it may still be asked, under the presupposition of the ethical view of life, if we then in no sense acknowledge a political Antinomianism which is justifiable?—if there may not be a state of society so unhappy and perplexed, in which, if a helping hand is to be put forth for the elevation of the community, it must be by some breach of right, a breach of the formal letter of the law, in order to exalt the higher ideal right of the spirit?—if there may not be a justifiable revolution, in which men tear off a tyrannic yoke, or any justifiable *coup d'état*, in which one single man appropriates to himself the supreme power for the liberation of the whole, of which history from the earliest period gives examples (Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon the First and the Third). We do not at all imagine, that by a universal maxim we can decide individual casuistic cases in history. Revolutions and *coups d'état* are of very diverse characters—are dissimilar already in the views of life which produce them. But we know the maxim which the

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[1] Fr. Schlegel, *Geschichte der Litteratur*, 2d vol. (History of Literature).

Reformers followed—One ought to obey God rather than men; and where this really has its application, we acknowledge as justified the breach of the laws of men, in order to fulfil that of God. The great difficulty in determining the ethical value of such a circumstance, is to point out where this application has its perfect title; and here begins the casuistic examination of the individual concrete case, which must be completely set forth. But since, in our day, men are so much disposed to acknowledge the necessity of all revolutions, and to suppose that everything is justified if it has only received the seal of "necessity," it is to be observed that most political revolutions have certainly been brought about by necessity, in so far as the moral freedom of individuals was enslaved in the *natural processes of the passions*, in so far as there has been there far more Pathos than Ethos, and that in its enslaved condition it has not been able to escape from manifold sins, as it must also be acknowledged, that even those great individuals who take part in these affairs can scarcely avoid being drawn into the general entanglement of sin, and that it is scarcely possible for them to pass untainted and scathless through commotion; because that, in order to escape this, it is necessary that they should be personalities of a very high order of morality, equipped not merely with a higher wisdom, but also with a purer energy of will, a firmer independence of the badness of their surroundings, both in the time present and to come, than they are in reality. It may be acknowledged that some small number from among these individuals may be regarded from the same exculpatory or palliative point of view as we have already admitted as valid in the case of Jacobi's effusion: "Nay, I am that atheist, that profane person." But the element of crime which enters into such historic deeds, whether achieved by the individual or by the mass, even if these deeds in other respects may be regarded as beneficial in their results, is by no means justified before the bar of moral law, *where a higher necessity bears sway, which incessantly demands that sin shall be expiated, that crime shall be punished.* There is a Nemesis, or, to speak in Christian phraseology, a retributive justice, which punishes every crime, not merely that which is committed in private life, but also that which is committed in history, though it may tarry long, and then arrive suddenly and unexpectedly. Such retribution is often indicated in the annals of history, and in that which passes before our eyes. But in so far as it does not appear, we continue to repeat: *Respice finem!* It is only relatively true, that the history of the world is the world's doom. There is yet a higher doom.

We conclude with a word from Kant, with regard to which it cannot be expected that it will receive universal assent, and thus contribute to bring hither everlasting peace, but which, even if this expectation is laid aside, contains a reliable guide for action for the individual who desires to preserve his moral liberty. "True policy cannot take a single step without first having paid homage to morality; and although politics in and for itself is a difficult art, yet its combination with morality is no art at all. For as soon as they come into collision with each other, morality cuts the knot which policy cannot unravel."[1] The great majority of politicians will, of course, shake their heads, and say that this theory will not suit in practice; to which the simplest reply is, that that is just the defect in their practice, that it does not accord with the theory. For what they contemptuously term theory, ideology, and fanaticism, is nothing less than even the eternal, universally obligatory, and necessary law, according to which they and their actions shall be judged at the last day; because this law is not merely the law of their own conscience, but even the law of the world, according to which God governs the world, and will judge the world, because it is the law of His own being. It boots not here to say, with Rousseau, "The most stringent morality costs nothing on paper." For, since this morality is not merely written on paper, or engraven on tables of stone, but also on the conscience, we continue to be its debtors. On the other hand, it will be readily admitted, that in regard to the assertion of Kant, that the combination of politics with morality is no art, it may be observed, that it is not always by any means easy to determine *when* that point of time has been reached when morality should cut the knot; not by any means easy to perceive often the fine boundary line between the accommodation, the gentle dealing, which morality *demands*, and that in which treachery to the law commences (for instance, by compromises). To perceive this is just the art. It also remains to be remarked, that in order to perceive this, and after the perception *to have courage* to cut the knot, in many cases demands not merely a higher talent, but also a higher degree of development of the moral personality and energy of will, than can be taken for granted as possessed by the majority; nay, there are circumstances and decisions in which even the purest and best must stand with fear and trembling in his inmost soul, and with regard to which there is great need to pray: Lead us not into temptation.

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[1] *Zum ewigen Frieden* (To Everlasting Peace).

These considerations are corroborated in many ways in our times, in which so many press forward to a political position for which they are unfit both in talent and disposition. Even individuals of a superior and more distinguished character frequently conduct themselves in the matter of politics, in the same manner as Goethe's Wilhelm Meister conducted himself in regard to dramatic art, to which this highly gifted being devoted himself with enthusiasm, and for which, with the assent of his friends, he believed himself to possess a decided talent. In reality, he lacked the vocation for art, and had deceived himself, so that his productions were not above mediocrity. Whether he, whilst he felt an irresistible impulse to become "a person of public note," would be strong enough in a moral aspect to suffer no injury in his *personality* under the many temptations to be encountered in this path, he had never taken into consideration. Fortunately—which is far from being the case with every æsthetic or political Wilhelm Meister—he understood at last the counsel of his own inner being: "*Flee, young man, flee!*"

JESUITISM. ANTINOMIAN DIRECTIONS TO WORLDLY WISDOM.

§ 131.

We continue our observations with a special reference to Jesuitism, which is a form of Antinomianism near of kin to the political. Jesuitism does not profess the fatalistic but the ethical view of life, nay, apparently carries the last into completion. It does everything in God's name, and to God's glory. But the holy is here but the means and the mask for the execution of a worldly object. It mixes itself also in State politics, but its first and principal sphere is the Church, where it carries forward ecclesiastical policy, and gives counsel in the confessional.

In Jesuitism, Antinomianism is combined with a false Nomism. For Jesuitism is from its origin and aim nomistic. It came forth as a reaction against liberty, against the Reformation and Protestantism. It seeks to maintain a permanent absolute authority, specially that of the Pope, and to convert the world to the one saving Church. This is its one unconditional aim; and if it be asked what are the means which have been hitherto employed for this, they are *appropriate.* For only one absolute and unalterable duty is enjoined: obedience to the Pope. All other duties are variable, and may be modified by circumstances, and must be determined according to *the object in view.* In regard to politics, it is sometimes appropriate to the end in view, to appear as the defender of absolute monarchy and the passive obedience of the subject, sometimes as the defender of revolution and the sovereignty of the people, to teach the right and duty of the people to abjure obedience to non-Catholic princes, nay, to teach the justice of slaying a tyrant. In regard to religion, it is found advisable in the confessional, in order to win the world to the one thing needful, to accommodate itself to circumstances, to free men from the demands of the law, if only it can bind them to this one, to obedience to the Church. Hence its teaching belongs to Probabilism, or the doctrine of moral probability. Jesuitism, that is to say, finds it right and fit to teach men the conviction, that in most of human affairs it is very difficult, nay impossible, for human reason to come to a clear and certain understanding; that, therefore, in his actions a man can only hold by that which is most eligible, most probable, and that, in order to find this out, one should hold to the best authorities. A moral opinion becomes probable, when there can be cited for it the authority of one or more teachers, and this becomes more certain the more learned and pious these authorities have been. As these teachers, however, may be in mutual disagreement, a case may occur, where, in consideration of the circumstances, it becomes advisable to take the less probable opinion as the more probable. In Probabilism, Antinomianism appears in this way, that the mere individual conjecture, the purely arbitrary, makes itself lord and master over the law, that the universal obligation and necessity of the law can be arbitrarily dispensed with. In contrast to the bold Antinomianism of geniality, Probabilism is intelligent, prudent, and modest, forbearing towards human weakness, and therefore commends itself in a higher degree to the great majority. But its arbitrary character is not less rebellious, and shows itself principally in regard to the one great commandment: Love to God. Instead of regarding this as the all-embracing law, which is the life and soul of every other, it is only regarded as an individual command by the side of the many others. Thence arises the question: How often and on what occasions must we love God? To love God *always* would be to demand too much from human weakness; for which reason some teachers have thought that it is sufficient to love Him when death is approaching, or when we find ourselves in any great temptation or danger, or when we have received a benefit from God, or when partaking the sacraments. Again, others have thought that it is sufficient to love God every fifth year, whilst others have maintained that we ought to love God every Sunday. Moreover, there are some who have thought that God does not require of us at all that we should love Him, if we only do His will by fulfilling the rest of the commandments, and that it is sufficient if we only do not hate God.[1] Nomism and Antinomianism here show themselves in monstrous conjunction. The same appears when we examine the notorious doctrine of the Jesuits regarding falsehood, breach of the sixth commandment, and murder. Against the whole of this Probabilism, and its scandalous sporting with God's holy law, from which it can dispense at pleasure, in order to make Christ's burden light, and to win men by a comfortable, pleasant Christianity, in accordance with the world (*devotion aisée*), Pascal wrote his immortal *Lettres Provinciales*, which at the same time mark the epoch when the comic or irony for the first time appears in religious polemics, combined with the deep seriousness of religion.

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[1] According to the Jesuit moralist Escobar. See Pascal, the 10th *Provinciale*, towards the conclusion.

Although the ascetic, rigorous Christianity of Pascal is far behind the teaching of Luther in evangelical liberty, yet with him also the disposition of the mind is the principal thing: the absolute universal obligation and necessity of the law, its spirituality and integrity, are maintained with living energy, and love to God as the fulfilment of the law, as the one all-determining and all-penetrating. As Pascal's system of dogmatics centres in Adam and Christ, so his system of morality centres in sin and grace.

The great extension and entrance which Jesuitism has found, rests on the circumstance that it has a powerful ally in the natural heart of man, and that Jesuitic morality is a striking form of the morality of the sinful heart of man, which Jesuitism has only brought into system. Long before Jesuitism existed, Jesuitic maxims were practised in a greater or less degree, and many practise and will continue to practise them, without knowing the system and its terminology. In the human heart there is a natural tendency to Nomism and Antinomianism on the one side, by observing an external rectitude, an outward ceremonial service, and on the other by a tendency to break the law, and by tranquillizing sophisms to attain dispensation and liberty to sin, whether it be liberty to sin on some particular occasion, or to live entirely in a state of sin. The maxim over which Pascal has swung the scourge of satire, that God is too good to require from us anything so painful as that we should always love Him, nay, that love to God is not at all necessary, if we only do His will by fulfilling the other commandments (thus to fulfil the other commandments *without* the relation of love to God, and setting it aside), and that it is sufficient *not to hate Him;* how many men, who live out their lives destitute of any relation to God, soothe themselves with this maxim, without knowing that Jesuitism has brought it into a system! And, although it sounds absurd, how many men are there within the sphere of Protestantism, who in their religious relation put in practice the doctrine that it is sufficient to love God every Sunday, or at least a few times throughout the year! And how many are there, who, with regard to their worldly objects and schemes, prefer that which is fitted for the *furtherance of the object in view*, to the demands of conscience! And now Probabilism: the name belongs to the Jesuitic system, but the thing so designated is very common, and of every-day experience. For how many find it more fitting and convenient, instead of acting on real principles, to follow, if not the authority of the Church of Rome, yet what we may call the authority of circumstances or of opinion, the authority of the spirit of the age, the authority of the powerful, whether we refer to princes and the great, or to popular feeling expressed in newspapers and periodicals, and who find it the pleasantest mode to follow one or other of the authorities here named, according to circumstances! How many revolutions in the convictions of men rest upon this, that it is now found reasonable, in consequence of certain circumstances, to pass over to another opinion, which is more advantageous! Jesuitism is no new discovery; it is an old invention, and repeats itself from generation to generation.

§ 132.

The Antinomian principles, which more or less consciously permeate the greatest part of the morality of men, which permit certain deviations from the strait path, "on the ground of circumstances and the difficulty of the position,"—certain actions "with regard to which we must not be too nice," and for which "we must forgive ourselves,"—have in many respects found formulated expression in literature, in the various exhortations which are given to worldly prudence (for instance, in Knigge's famous work, *Omgang med Mennesker* (Intercourse with Men).[1] Not as if all that is found in writings of this kind must be false, and to be rejected. We may find, moreover, much that is instructive, rules and warnings which have their value, and which deserve a large measure of attention. None the less certainly may be traced in most points the presence of the Antinomian leaven, for which reason, in the reading of such treatises, we must be very critical. The rules set forth have, in respect to their mixed and ambiguous character, a certain resemblance to the popular proverbs, in which the morality of the people has expressed with much *naïveté* its lessons in prudence, and its shrewd perception gained by experience of how matters go in the world. Although many of these popular maxims contain golden rules of wisdom, yet the great mass of them are ambiguous, just because they move predominantly in the element of prudence, of the *means*, and many of them testify in a high degree to the egoism of the human heart, and its proneness to forge to itself maxims of sin (for instance: A man's closest neighbour is himself; Every man is a thief in his trade; We must sing the song of the birds we live among; Whose bread I eat, his song I trill), and many others of this kind, which, though they *may* bear a double meaning, are principally to be taken in an egoistic sense. Closely allied to these are many of the rules which in an elegant form are developed in the treatises to which we refer, and which are principally designed for the upper, nay, the highest classes. Among these we specially name the Spaniard Gracian's world-renowned *Manual of Worldly Prudence*,[1] translated by Schopenhauer. The highly talented and much experienced author was a Jesuit, and lived in the seventeenth century. He is very far from the extremes of Jesuitry,—does not move in the sphere of religion, but in that of secular matters; and not unfrequently there is in his teaching a tinge of greatness and dignity, which affords him ready entrance to many. His treatise has thus many students, and has been specially recommended to young men who wish to enter the great world, and would prepare themselves for a happy and brilliant career.[2]

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[1] Vinet, *Etudes sur Pascal*, 248: Qu'est ce probabilisme si ce n'est le nom extraordinaire de la chose du monde la plus ordinaire: le culte de l'opinion, la préférence donnée à l'autorité sur la conviction individuelle, aux personnes sur les idées, au hasard des rencontres sur les oracles de la conscience!

He begins his treatise with this maxim: "Everything in our times has attained its summit, but highest of all, the art of making oneself of consequence. More is required now for one wise man than in ancient times for seven." But he concludes his book as summing up all in the exhortation to aspire after "holiness," for in this all is said, since "virtue is the bond of all perfection, and the centre of all happiness." Between this commencement and conclusion the oracles are uttered, in which, intermingled with valuable truths and instructive experiences, we hear a series of exhortations to make our happiness in the world, and draw the greatest possible advantage from men, yet without allowing matters to assume an unpleasant appearance, or losing one's dignity. We are told, for instance, that if one wishes to win honour and respect, to make oneself of consequence in the world,—which throughout is assumed as the desire of all,—one must not associate with those who are in misfortune, but with those who have success with them: for misfortune arises most frequently from men's folly, and by connecting ourselves with such persons as are suffering the results of folly, we are running the risk of being drawn into both their folly and their misfortune; that when we are in uncertainty who has success on his side, we should hold with the prudent, as these have the greatest probability of sooner or later obtaining success; that *we should lay more stress on the successful attainment of our object, than on the rigid observance of the rules which lead to this end:* for when one has conquered, one does not require to render an account, and *a good result gilds over everything.* If we cannot clothe ourselves in the lion's skin, we must next try that of the fox, and carry out through cunning what we cannot accomplish through force. We should speak as the mass do, but think with the few, and win popularity by a discreet silence. To swim against the current only befits a Socrates. It profits nothing to repel error, but only serves to bring oneself into danger; for to differ from the opinion of another is regarded by him as an insult. In great assemblies, the wise man does not speak with his own voice, but only with the general voice of folly, and can only express his real opinion in a small and select circle. One should understand how to shape oneself after every one, like a discreet Proteus: be learned with the learned, pious with the pious; for congeniality works good-will. We should examine the minds of those with whom we have to do, and fit our instruments to each. One should understand also at certain times to practise contradiction, not in order to express one's own opinion, but in order to try other people, and get to know their secrets. A contradiction, a doubt expressed at the right point of conversation, may often act as an emetic which forces secret thoughts to come forth. In one's public life one should permit oneself to be guilty of pardonable errors; for jealousy exercises a base ostracism, and condemns the man who is entirely perfect. Like an Argus, the jealous man searches for the blemishes in the most perfect, for his own consolation. Therefore Homer must sometimes fall asleep (*dormitat quandoque Homerus*), and one must affect little inadvertencies, whether in valour or in genius, in order to mitigate envy, that it may not burst from venom. One should study the art of acting at once *according to the first and second aim*, which is a principal consideration in prudence. One should begin with attending to the affairs of strangers, and end by attending to his own. One must understand how to lay on others the blame of what goes wrong. If one is appointed to govern, one must have a scape-goat on whom to devolve the responsibility of all unfortunate undertakings. One must guard against becoming the setting sun, and never permit oneself to grow dim, unless, like the sun, to rise again. Altogether, one should endeavour to prepare surprises for men in fresh dawnings of the day, and always have something new in reserve, etc.

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[1] Balthasar Gracian's *Hand-Orakel und Kunst der Weltklugheit:* Aus dessen Werken gezogen von Don Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa und aus dem spanischen Original treu und sorgfältig übersetzt von Arthur Schopenhauer. 1862. (Published after Schopenhauer's death by J. Frauenstädt.)

[2] The French translation bears the title, which, however, is not correct, *L'homme de cour de Baltasar Gracian.*

From these few examples, which we have drawn from different parts of the work, it will be seen that this celebrated author knows what is the ordinary way of the world, and he has only expressed as a formula the system of morality which practically is used by many. But in what manner these and other precepts are to be brought into harmony with the demand for holiness which he sets forth, and his representation of virtue as the bond of perfection and the centre of happiness, or with what right he in so many cases dispenses with the requirement of holiness,—which is unavoidably necessary if these precepts are actually to be followed,—he leaves his readers to find out for themselves. It is not, however, difficult to find out. For the principle which he seeks to couple with that of holiness, is nothing else than the eudaimonistic principle so inexorably combated by Kant, which in the present case may be expressed thus: The absolute aim is to attain honour and respect in the world, or as far as possible to be happy in this life. And as this, in the present circumstances of men and of the world, cannot be attained without in many cases setting aside the obligations of holiness, by having a partial exception from the rule, this last becomes necessary. For the principal matter, the chief end,—to be happy and to be of consequence in the world,—must never be lost sight of. But this is just the Antinomian leaven, which is a necessary ingredient in all worldly prudence, which seeks to set itself in the place of wisdom.

It would be a misconception to suppose that Christianity forbids us to institute a doctrine of prudence, since Christ Himself gives us an exhortation to it. The same Lord and Master who says, "Be harmless as doves," says also, "Be wise as serpents" (Matt. x. 16); He who teaches us to love men says, "Beware of men" (Matt. x. 17), by which He warns us against an optimist and naive simplicity in reference to men, through which we can only be deceived. Not merely by His word, but also by His example, He gives us this admonition; and we need here only refer to many of His questions and replies to His adversaries,—for instance, the stamp of the tribute money. But the fundamental principle to which all rules of prudence must be subordinate is this, "Seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you." Whilst every earthly object, if pursued unconditionally, inevitably comes into collision with the law of morality, this supramundane object or aim after the kingdom of God is the only one which can never come thus into collision, for the simple reason that the law of morality is the special law of the kingdom of God, the law which is not of this world, but to which everything in this world must be subordinate. The Christian doctrine of prudence does not set forth earthly happiness, but salvation, as the ultimate destiny of life. In the parable of the unjust steward (Luke xvi. 1), Christ sets before us at once the teaching of prudence and of salvation. The children of light should learn from the children of this world prudence and ingenuity in regard to the means through which they attain their object, and in which they are so often inferior to the children of this world. As these last are ingenious and inexhaustible in means to accomplish their unrighteous ends, so should the children of light have a corresponding abundance of means for the attainment of the blessings of the kingdom of God, the blessings of salvation. To this end the whole life should be applied. But as the end of God's kingdom embraces holiness, the employment of every unholy means is excluded, as this would be to work exactly against the end, and thus be the reverse of a means, it would be a hindrance, which removed us further from the goal.

THE OBLIGATORY AND THE PERMISSIBLE. THE BEFITTING. ETHICAL FORBEARANCE (ACCOMMODATION).

§ 133.

The essential and necessary relation between freedom and law embraces the whole life of liberty; and in the sphere of liberty there is nothing which is indifferent (*adiaphoron*) or permissible, in the sense that it is not to be entirely regulated by duty. Only a one-sided Nomism, which externally comprehends duty as a fixed quantity of commands and prohibitions, can suppose that those modes of action which are neither expressly commanded nor forbidden are indifferent, and that the individual in regard to these may order his conduct *independently of law.* It is then overlooked that duty embraces the whole life of liberty as a *unity,* and is one with the very ideal of personality. But just because duty is one with the ideal of personality itself, expressed as an unconditional requirement, there is also here a true conception of the permissible. As, namely, determined duty is always the unity of the universal and the individual, but the individual cannot be expressed in a universal formula, there arises thence the conception of the ethically permissible—not as that which falls outside the moral, but that the morality of which can only be *individually determined,* and in this sense the permissible has an ineradicable validity. The artistic liberty in moral life, moral beauty, rests on this, that in our actions and in our whole manner of existence there is something—undoubtedly on the foundation of the universally binding and necessary—belonging exclusively to the individual and personal determination.

§ 134.

The permissible in the sense here given has as wide an extent as even human morality, because in all morality there is an individual Moment which does not admit of being formulized in the ordinary manner. It is the right of the individual, within the limits of the universally binding and necessary, to determine himself his mode of acting according to individual instance; and so long as he does not offend against the universally binding and necessary, others are constrained, even if they do not perceive this individual validity, to acknowledge in his deeds the morally permissible. The abundant application of this idea in daily life may specially be seen in one great example,—namely, those actions which move in the æsthetic sphere, just because individual freedom is here so highly conspicuous. The relation between the æsthetic and the ethical has been predominantly the subject of the *pietistic dispute* about the so-called intermediate thing, *adiaphora*—matters of indifference. The Pietists rejected worldly amusements, as the stage, secular music, dancing, cards, as irreconcilable with sanctification, whilst the orthodox regarded these as matters of indifference. Both parties were wrong,—the Pietists because they understood sanctification as predominantly self-denial and renunciation of the world, and did not take into account that sanctification also embraces the ennobling of the worldly and natural, that abuse of the world does not exclude the true use, and because they could ascribe to the æsthetic no validity, except in so far as it serves immediately to the religious and the ethical, and bears the direct impress of this earnestness; the orthodox, because they considered the worldly æsthetic as indifferent, and having no bearing on morality and conscience. For if the æsthetic has, as we on our side maintain, a necessary place in the development of humanity, then it can neither be reckoned among those things which are sinful in themselves—as, in Pontoppidan's treatise, comedy is set down—or among those inherently indifferent, but gets its place among the general subjects of culture which belong to a middle sphere, the object of which has a subordinate significance in the development of man for the ultimate and highest object of life, and therefore they ought *to be ethically and religiously regulated*, in order that they may be performed to the glory of God. It remains then, first, to examine whether the subjects in dispute have æsthetic value or not; for it might possibly be shown of many of these in concrete that they are only seemingly æsthetic, and on this ground inherently inadmissible. Only after such a general examination has been made can there in a right sense be any question of the ethically permissible. For also under the presumption of the æsthetic value of such employment it can only be decided by the purely individual instance, to what extent I, the determinate individual, should engage in it, what temptations to me are therewith associated, what importance they may have for the development of my personality. Here it holds good, "All things are lawful for me; but all things are not expedient" (1 Cor. vi. 12). I have the right to do it, and no one can morally dispute this right; but on my own part the use of this right must be regulated by my individual ideal of personality: for all the individual portion of my life must be determined by that which must be the unity of my life; and nothing individual is indifferent, but has a directing influence on the whole. To myself I must apply the biblical canon, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23), etc. All is sin to me which does not proceed from the fundamental conviction which must be the determining motive of the unity of my life, and is not in harmony with it. If thus, after having partaken of enjoyments of this kind, we cannot with ease pass into the sphere of religion, and do not feel refreshed for the resumption of our work, but observe that we have a struggle in returning to labour and prayer, then we have in this a criterion that what is permissible has not been expedient, and that the purity of conscience has not been preserved.

The embracing significance which must be attributed to the permissible, when the question refers to the relation between the æsthetic and the ethical, may also be seen in a single great example, by the definition of the conception of the *Befitting* or *Seemly*. The Befitting (*Decorum*) is the æsthetic side of moral personality itself,—the external reflection of morality in the entire essence, appearance, and deportment of personality. The Befitting shows itself in tone and gesture, gait and carriage, dress and forms of social life. True decorum does not merely express dignity, but may also express beauty, ease, and gracefulness; as, for instance, it is said of Fénélon that he possessed a courteousness (*politesse*) which overflowed in all forms except in any in which virtue has been lost. The Befitting or Seemly may doubtless be a mere outside, and then it is only a vain show, a mask, as with a stage-player. But the ethically Seemly is a necessary outpouring of the moral interior, and has therefore its highest value when it expresses itself only as the natural and necessary result of this. Now there is certainly one kind of the Beseeming which is binding on all, in so far as it forms part of the code of morality which is valid in society, as that by which individuals are universally guided. But even in this universally binding we may perceive a Moment of the individuality of the different nations and ages of the world, an individual Moment which in a special manner makes its freedom valid in *fashion*, which is the incessant change of the social temper in regard to the æsthetic in dress and outward circumstance, and which may very easily overstep its boundary, especially when it extends to higher matters. But under presupposition of the relatively universally obligatory in society, the Befitting must be determined more closely for each individual according to his particular circumstances; and the permissible does not appear here as absolute arbitrary choice and licence,—which would be just the Unbefitting,—but as that which can be only individually determined. What holds good for one is not so for all. What is befitting for one is not so for another, not merely on the ground of difference in rank and position, or difference in age,—a recreation which is befitting for the younger is not therefore so for the older,—but on the ground of the entire personality. The Permissible may even appear here as a justified Antinomianism, in opposition to the fashion prevalent in society. In opposition to this falsely Befitting or Decorous, I may find myself called upon to maintain that which for me is the truly Befitting.

§ 135.

As the Permissible has its origin in the liberty of the individual, but liberty must be the minister of love, the question arises whether actions which we are otherwise justified in doing, ought not in certain cases to be avoided, because the weak in society might be thereby offended, that is to say, either perplexed in their consciences in regard to what is right and wrong, or become uncertain regarding the character of the person so acting; as it may also be asked if there are not modes of action which we should adopt, though by no means otherwise bound to them, from a simple regard to our neighbour, who might otherwise be offended. There thus arises a question of *accommodation* to the weak, both in the negative and positive direction. In regard to the first case, the Apostle Paul has given a reply, in the manner in which he decides a question which had arisen in the apostolic Church regarding clean and unclean meats; since there was a Jewish ascetic party, who held that the use of animal food should be abandoned, in consequence of the apprehension they entertained of thus partaking of the flesh of animals which had been offered to idols. This flesh was sold in the market indiscriminately with other flesh; and as Christians buying their provisions in the market were exposed to the risk of getting this sacrificial meat, and thus taking part in heathen usages, they entirely abstained from flesh (Rom. xiv. 4, 8; 1 Cor. viii.). The apostle himself favours the freer opinion, because nothing is unclean in itself, and an idol has no real existence; but he insists that from love one should not shock his brother, and says, with special reference to the victims offered to idols, "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend" (1 Cor. viii. 13). In subsequent times the same question repeats itself under many different forms, since in all ages there has been an opposition between an austere party among Christians, who predominantly consider the relation to the world as renunciation, and constantly repeat, "Touch not, taste not, handle not!" and a less austere party, who maintain that the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof, and nothing is impure in itself except sin. Thus there is substituted for sacrificial meat, pagan poetry and art, the theatre, dancing, secular music, entertainments, and social amusements, and in our own day the opposition is the same. If now the law of love necessitates that they who hold the freer opinions should not recklessly use their liberty, and in certain cases must even find themselves called upon to abstain from the disputed modes of action, in order not to shock the weak members, and thus to break down the Church instead of building it up; still love requires, moreover, that this submission be not unlimited. For then the weak would only be confirmed in their mistake, whilst the strong would be hindered in their progress, and the truth would be denied. The requirement that we should accommodate ourselves to the weak must therefore be combined with this, that on the one side we must make it apparent that we are not overcome by these enjoyments, and therefore can dispense with them; but, on the other side, we must seek to lead the weak among us to a clearer knowledge, and show them that these matters may be contemplated from another point of view than the merely worldly and unethical. Accommodation must therefore be combined with correction, the accommodative method with the corrective. This is what the apostle also does. For whilst he inculcates accommodation, he seeks at the same time to make it obvious that the austere practice is founded on an imperfect knowledge. (Rom. xiv. 14: "I know, and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean in itself; yet to him who esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean.") Although, therefore, we ought to guard against offending the weak, yet we ought not to allow ourselves to be placed by the weak under any law of thraldom, and under all circumstances we should maintain the *principle of evangelical liberty*.[1] Every attempt, therefore, to stamp the merely individual as the universal and generally obligatory should be protested against, and the individual must be kept within its proper limits. But within these its validity must be acknowledged. For even when a clearer perception leads to the conviction that the modes of action from which the austere practice abstains are not in themselves sinful, still this abstinence may be perfectly right for the individual at a particular stage of his development and guidance of life. The disputed modes of action ought therefore to be regarded as such, about which the one dare not constitute himself the judge of the other, and for the sake of which he must not break off brotherly intercourse with him, because, as the apostle says, to his *own Master* he standeth or falleth (Rom. xiv. 4). For although there is but one Master, the same for all, yet each one has in him his own master, because the Lord, within the universal law of salvation, guides each one in his own peculiar manner.

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[1] When the Synod at Jerusalem (Acts xv. 20) came to the resolution that the Gentiles should abstain from meat offered to idols, the entire resolution, which does not appear to have been specially adopted except in Palestine, was only a *temporary* regulation, instituted on the ground of the disputes then existing in the Church, and principally designed to secure the liberty of the Gentiles, by releasing them from the other requirements of the Jewish ceremonial law.

§ 136.

Just as it is for the sake of the weak that we must abstain from certain actions (negative accommodation), so, too, we must do some things in order not to offend them (positive accommodation). There are usages and fashions to the observance of which we only find ourselves obliged by the consideration of love to our neighbour. Here also we may go back to Paul, who caused Timothy, who on the mother's side belonged to the Jews, to be circumcised (Acts xvi. 3), in order to promote his usefulness among the Jewish Christians, though he himself could not ascribe to circumcision any permanent obligation, as through the gospel it had lost its significance. Not the less it still had significance for many Jewish Christians, who could not tear themselves loose from the Jewish ceremonies, and thought, moreover, that they ought to observe these in combination with Christianity. Paul became to the Jews a Jew, and accommodated himself to their sentiments by permitting Timotheus to be circumcised, just as he also subjected himself to the Nazarite vow, and sacrificed in the temple at Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 26), in order to show that he reverenced the old customs of Israel descended from the fathers. But, at the same time, he made it evident that he did not ascribe to circumcision any universal necessity, or made it into a law for all. He maintained the liberty of the Gentiles in this respect; and when it was wished to *force* Titus, who was a Gentile Christian, to be circumcised (Gal. ii. 3), and to maintain circumcision as an essential of salvation, he opposed it with all his energy, insisting, as he also does throughout his whole teaching, that in Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which worketh by love (Gal. v. 6). It is this mode of acting of the apostle which formed the model after which the *Formula Concordiæ* was constructed concerning the Leipzig interim, in which Melancthon, with other Protestant theologians, made the concession to the Roman Catholics, that several Catholic ceremonies, which had been laid aside in the evangelical worship, might be again introduced as Adiaphora, because by this accommodation an approach was hoped for between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants. The *Formula Concordiæ* concedes, that in such things as are neither commanded nor forbidden in God's word, Christian liberty may be allowed, and that consideration should be shown towards the weak, and care taken to avoid giving them offence; but that, on the other side, nothing whatever must be yielded, when desired by the adversaries of the gospel, and when a clear and distinct profession is required.[1] For that which in itself is innocent, and which under other circumstances might be conceded, assumes then the significance of a question of principle, in which one dare not yield. And evidently there is a question of principle involved, when the Catholics wished to induce the Reformers to resume Catholic ceremonies (*which had been already laid aside*), and to inveigle them into accepting these as a law. Here the Lutheran Church acted after the example of Paul, who did not suffer that Titus should be circumcised. We are here brought back to the rule mentioned above, that though as far as possible we ought to accommodate ourselves to the weak, still we are not to subject ourselves to any law of thraldom on account of the domineering or self-conceited spirit of such, whatever direction it may take. Thus, when in our own times there are those within the Reformed Church who, in their desire of rule, demand that the National Church should accommodate itself to their individual consciences, and abolish the regulations which are necessary to its subsistence, and thus sap its foundation, such demands should be strenuously opposed. That this consideration applies also to the sphere of politics, will presumably be apparent. Concessions ought only to be made under presupposition of the impossibility of an attack on principles. Again and again a solemn appeal is necessary to resist false compromises, that false *juste-milieu*, which really means midway between *right and wrong*, which in our day is striven after by so many, even by men in power, who wish to come to terms with both parties, and who thereby contribute to undermine all authority and stedfastness, not merely in institutions, but also in modes of thought and dispositions of mind.

False accommodation, in its greatest extreme, appears in Jesuitism. A classic example of this may be found in its missions to China and India, where, in order to procure entrance for the only saving religion, it so modified Christianity according to the moral and religious ideas of heathenism, that Christianity itself became irrecognisable, and there appeared a monstrous blending of Christian and pagan elements.

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[1] *Formula concordiæ, de cærimoniis ecclesiasticis:* "Credimus, docemus et confitemur, quod temporibus persecutionum, quando perspicua et constans confessio a nobis exigitur, hostibus Evangelii in rebus adiaphoris non sit cedendum."

DUTY AND SUPEREROGATORY PERFECTION. EVANGELICAL DELIBERATION AND BEHEST.

§ 137.

Nomism, which only outwardly apprehends duty as a set quantity of commands and prohibitions, and has thereby brought forth the idea of the indifferent and the permissible in the above-described untrue sense, has also produced another conception closely allied to it, which has occasioned much perplexity in the sphere of morality—the conception of modes of action by which more is accomplished than duty demands, and an extraordinary point of perfection is attained. But as little as we can admit the validity of a morally indifferent action, can we sanction the possibility of a moral "more than sufficient;" and not merely in art, but also in morality, we must maintain that the superfluous does injury (*superflua nocent*), because everything that is more than enough in one direction implies too little in another. Both in art and in morality, neither more nor less is required than the ideal, which contains completely the necessity of the law. In order to establish the idea of works of moral supererogation (*opera supererogatoria*), which imply a surplus of virtue and perfection, appeal has been made to the distinction between the commands of the gospel and its exhortations (*consilia et præcepta*). A command is that to which all are bound; an exhortation, on the other hand, is an advice to those who aspire after a higher perfection than that to which they are pledged. Such counsel, it is imagined, may be found in the Lord's words to the rich young man (Matt. xix. 21), and in the advice of Paul to the Christians, after his own example to remain in the state of celibacy (1 Cor. vii.). But this distinction is in this sense a theological device, a misrepresentation of God's law. If duty is the entire life of liberty, embracing unity of the universal and the individual, then no one can do more than fulfil his duty, or, what is the same thing, no one can do more than fulfil his God-given destiny. Gospel exhortations are therefore nothing else than gospel precepts for single *individuals*, and under *special* circumstances, and therefore cannot be expressed in the form of universal and unconditional commands, although they are not less binding on the individual concerned than are the universal precepts which apply to all. This is strikingly true in the case of the Lord's recommendation to the rich young man, who comprehended duty as a determinate number of commandments, which he had kept from his youth up. "Wilt thou be perfect?" says the Lord; "then sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me." The universal requirement, which the Lord makes of all, is certainly that they should not set their heart upon earthly things, and that when the circumstances of the times make a choice necessary between giving up Christ or giving up their possessions, that they should be prepared for this last. But *whether* this case really finds place for the individual, can only be decided by individual circumstances. That it was so in the instance of the rich young man, there is no doubt, since the Lord Himself desired him to part with his possessions that he might be able without obstacle to follow Him, as the Lord knew that the times of persecution were at hand, in which it would be required of His disciples to endure the loss of their earthly possessions, and knew at the same time that this youth could only by enduring this trial become fit for the kingdom of God. The word of the Lord is not therefore a mere counsel, but a command addressed to the individual. The Lord does not express by any means that the youth, by obeying His call, will be able to attain another perfection than that to which he is bound. On the other hand, it must be said that the young man, by not responding to the call which he received, fell under the doom of law and conscience; whilst, if he had responded to it, he would still have been obliged to say, "We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do" (Luke xvii. 10). Under the same point of view we must regard the words of Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7) regarding the unmarried condition. It has the form of an advice; for as he addresses all, the individual formula cannot be adopted. But he who, on the ground of the circumstances of the time and of individuality, remains unmarried, only fulfils his individual duty, and has therefore no higher perfection than he who with a good conscience lives in the married state. The principal thing is, that every one must be what God designed him to be. This superfluous virtue is of the Evil One. What a Paul, an Augustine, a Luther, what a Copernicus, a Kepler, and a Newton, have done for the human race, undoubtedly cannot be the duty of all. Yet each of these, in the actual good he has accomplished, has only done his duty. Examples of works of supererogation are found in rich abundance in the Roman Catholic Church, especially throughout the whole of monastic life, with its ascetic self-inflicted tortures. The truth in these efforts is an enthusiastic aspiration after the ideal, a struggle to get away from the external relation of the law; and herein lies in many cases an element of pathos inspiring reverence, even though associated with moral error.

DUTY AND THE PRESENT MOMENT. THE HARMONIZING OF DUTIES AND MORAL INFLUENCE ON THE AGE. COLLISION AND CASUISTRY.

§ 138.

As man's life of liberty is a life in time, the fulfilment of the law, in so far as this can be accomplished, can only be realized through the successive progressive series of human actions. The one duty appears in a multitude of duties; and of these many duties, which all have their demands on us, there is but a single one that can be fulfilled in the passing moment. Which single one of these many duties I shall at the present moment fulfil, rests on the coincidence of the external requirement and the inward prompting,—a coincidence the real existence of which in many cases can only be known to the actor himself. But as the moral life must be a unity, a connected whole, the normal relation of liberty to the law appears in this, that life is to be so planned that there may be time for the fulfilment of its various duties; and everything must *get its time,* and be done at the right time. The normal relation between liberty and law shows itself, therefore, in the harmonizing of duties; that the different duties are brought into the proper relation of superiority and subordination to each other (one thing must be done, and another not neglected); that our actions in the different circles of moral life may obtain their proper position for the unity of our individual life-tasks; that, in virtue of this unity, the just proportion may be maintained between the principal Moments of life, the practical and the contemplative, solitude and social life, labour and rest, etc. But the harmonizing of duties is inseparable from the moral employment of time, which is also expressed in the universal requirement, that in order to fulfil our duty we must use and improve our time. To employ time morally (*ethisere*) is to transform the natural, in itself *indifferent* time, into time determined and filled up by the mind. Hence it belongs also to the right division of time among the various duties of life, that there be produced a scheme of life, nay, a daily scheme, which excludes the many unfilled pauses, in which there is either complaint over the emptiness of time, or in which it is sought to be got rid of in senseless distractions. An external division of time and arrangement of life, however, according to the sun or the clock, which is merely external and nomistic, is only of subordinate importance,—is only, even if in many cases important, an ascetic *means*, just as also no external system can be invariably executed on account of the disturbances which time, that ceaselessly forth-streaming series of changes and shifting phenomena, brings with it. To use time morally will therefore mean, under all the changes of time, to hold fast our individual life-task, and to use the present moment in the service of the spirit; to fight and overcome the obstacles and restraints which the stream of time incessantly brings with it, whilst it dashes its billows upon us; and to produce a current in the opposite direction,—namely, the moral teleological motion of life,—which issues from freedom's own fountain. When, therefore, men often complain that they have not time to fulfil their duty, that they cannot manage to accomplish that which is incumbent upon them, they are really complaining that they have not strength or will to produce the true time. Æsthetically we may say that want of time is want of genius; for genius accomplishes in a very short time, and in right time, what others cannot accomplish in an unlimited time. But ethically expressed, it is this: want of time is want of moral energy and wisdom. There exists, therefore, an inward and necessary connection between the relation of liberty to *time*, and the relation of liberty to the *law*,—a point to which F. Baader has specially directed attention.[1] Where the law is only a demand, a mere imperative for freedom, which this cannot fulfil, there will not merely the law be felt by men to be an oppression, but time also will have the same effect. For whilst freedom escapes the law of the spirit, it reverts to the law of nature, and along with this to the dominion of indifferent fleeting time, with all its sameness and restlessness, its tautology and wearisomeness, which is *unhappiness* to the mind, and all the more deeply the more consciousness it possesses of its spirituality. For in this transient insipid time, the pressure of which the beast does not feel, the mind finds itself thrust out into misery, as in a foreign element, as a fish on the dry land. Where, on the other hand, the relation of liberty to the law is the normal, where the law is not merely an imperative, but one with love as the fulfilment of the law, where duty is fulfilled with facility and pleasure, there the pressure of time is not felt. Time, indeed, has not disappeared; but its emptiness, its monotony, uneasiness, and excitement are annihilated, because the mind has become master of time, and has changed it to the form of the eternal. Human existence, then, becomes not without time, but *freed from time*. The connection between the relation of liberty to time, and the relation of liberty to the law, shows itself more plainly in the circumstance, that only where the relation to the law is normal does there appear also the normal relation of freedom to the three dimensions of time—present, past, and future. We will then in the true sense live in the present moment, in the fulfilment of the ethical requirements of the present, whether in the direction of production, or in that of reception and appropriation. In contrast to this there recurs again and again the phenomenon of men living principally either in the past or in the future, in recollection or in hope. They imagine that it would fare better with them if they could find themselves existing at another period of time; and in the beautifying light of fancy, they look back either to their own past life, or to one of the vanished periods of history in which they would have wished to live, in order to have been able to accomplish their destiny; or they look forth into the time coming, when they hope that it will be better with them, without considering that only by taking the present moment in the service of eternity can this better future be prepared for the inward man. All men at bottom seek the present time; that is to say, time filled with thought, in which existence is bright and easy, and really free; or, in other words, all men at bottom seek the perfect life, released from all restrictions. But the perfect life is only in love as the fulfilling of the law, which certainly cannot be at once mature in this state of being, but must grow and be perfected through the continued conquest of this passing time. The normal life of freedom may therefore be depicted as a development of love, in which eternity in increasing fulness is united to the present moment, as the living productive centre between remembrance and hope, as a progressive fulfilment of duty, in which time past is preserved as a problem solved, which is a good foundation for time coming, and where the present moment is imbued with the advantages of the future. It may be described as a process of constant renewal of youth, by which the power of time in rendering aged and effete, and which makes everything transitory, and will so serve us too, is continually overcome by the present now, in which love with increasing earnestness grasps the eternal, and stretches forth to the goal. The child in its mother's womb, says Meister Eckart, is old enough to die, but I shall grieve if to-morrow I have not become younger (more free from the world, free from time, more spiritually-minded). The more a man, on the other hand, has permitted himself to be overcome by the world, the more he has neglected to combat obstacles, and to make use of the means and possibilities for his progress which grace offers to him: the older he grows, the more he is constrained to drag his antecedents about with him as an unsatisfied demand, as an old debt, as the unused, unsolved, and undigested time, which presses him as a heavy burden, and which with years becomes more oppressive. For the series of unconquered difficulties generate new and more oppressive difficulties, and by the neglect of the offered aids he becomes more and more bound by the time gone by, and more and more unfit to grasp the new means of help which grace holds out to him.

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[1] *Sur la notion du temps; Vierzig Sätze aus einer religiösen Erotik; Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie.*

At last he is obliged to let go his hold of hope, unless a crisis occurs (conversion and repentance), by which he may be released from his antecedents and make a beginning of a new life, and thus attain to love and find the present time. Therefore it is said in the *Hirten des Hermas* (*Hermæ Pastor*), "They who repent become younger;" that is to say, become freed from the burden of their sin, which makes them old, and gives them an unpleasing appearance. In the perfect sense of the term, Christ is the only one who here on earth ever lived in the real time, in the youth of eternity, because in the perfect sense He is the fulfiller of the law, the only one for whom time has never been too short or too long, because His own free-will was the absolute measure of time,—because He Himself, creating anew, appointed and filled up the time.

What is here said of the ethical relation to time has also its application to society. Most revolutions have been occasioned by the circumstance that unsolved and neglected problems, that unsatisfied demands from the time past, press on society, whose progress is thereby impeded and brought to a stand-still. Revolution is, then, the attempt to get air, to escape from the close atmosphere of former times, in which everything is antiquated, to shape out a present time, make a fresh beginning, and introduce an historic process of renewing youth. All, however, depends on the manner and the spirit in which this attempt is carried through. For it is not accomplished when, as in the French Revolution, men decree a new mode of calculating time, a new calendar, declare that the whole time past, and along with it Christianity, is to be regarded as dead and powerless, and thus rush into the future. Experience teaches that, by this mode of progress, a new and interminable debt is contracted; and the deeper we come into this false relation to time, we but accumulate a fresh series of neglects and transgressions, for which atonement must be made.

§ 139.

As the moral development of the world is not normal, but is only to be rendered so by redemption, it cannot be otherwise than that collisions should occur among the Moments of moral life. Not merely in society may ideas come in collision with ideas, interests with interests, but also in the case of individuals moral collisions may arise. Love may thus in the same individual come into collision with love—love for Fatherland, for instance, with family affection—and cause suffering to the individual. There arises, then, the question, whether there may be also collision between duties; for instance, a concurrence of different duties, demanding fulfilment at the same time, whilst the individual, by fulfilling the one, unavoidably is brought to transgress or to neglect the other, where the fulfilment of duty is thus inseparable from a violation of duty. The greater number of modern writers on ethics deny the possibility of such a collision, and maintain that what is called the collision of duty is only a collision between duty and inclination, or a collision between moral *interests*, but not between duties; just as they also maintain that during every moment in question there is only one thing which ought to be done, and that what is required is to determine what that one is, whilst all the rest which are represented as duties must be acknowledged to have no title to the moment. We certainly concede that duties cannot come into collision when the matter is considered in a purely objective and ideal light. For the demands of the Good on our will, which in the highest sense are the demands of God's will, cannot possibly be in opposition, but must be in the most perfect harmony with one another. In a normal development the collision of duty will never occur. But as the development is not normal, and time has come into disorder, we must maintain the possibility of collision of duty, certainly not in and for itself, but for the subject involved in the present life. On the standpoint of paganism the most collisions of duty occur, because here sin has darkened even the moral conceptions. Greek tragedy turns in a great measure on the collision of duties. Orestes has the sacred duty to avenge his murdered father. But in order to accomplish this imperative duty, he must slay his mother, who is the murderess of his father. In this collision of duties he is finally overwhelmed. Such collisions could not occur in the Christian world, because the moral conceptions are different. Yet the collision of duty has not entirely vanished, and will not vanish so long as salvation has not completely penetrated the development of freedom. In the ordinary course of life, the collision of duties has most frequently its cause in a previous neglect, or because life has not been teleologically planned. He who has not planned his life, and turned his time to moral purpose, may experience the difficulty of two official duties clashing, because they both require to be fulfilled at the same moment The collision might have been avoided, if at some earlier point of time some neglect or improper procrastination had not found place. But now, on the ground of circumstances, the unsatisfied demand of duty from time past clashes with the present demand of the moment. The person concerned is not assisted by the general rule, that the higher duty must be preferred to the lower; for both may be alike important, and equally required by the present situation. The collision becomes then the doom of the individual, the punishment of his faulty relation to the law in time bygone. Or the individual may have made an indiscreet promise. If this is afterwards perceived by himself to be sinful, it ought certainly not to be fulfilled. But, on the other side, am I pledged to keep my word, and may by breaking it come to injure others. Thus, if I fulfil the rash and sinful promise, I commit a sin; if I do not fulfil it, I sin also. Here too collision is the doom of the individual, and sin becomes the punishment of sin. But also where no individual sin in time past produces entanglement in the present, the moment may bring with it a twofold character in the matter in question, which the personality is not able to solve, because it can only accomplish the one part of the matter at the expense of the other; as when, in order to fulfil the duty of love towards a sick person, one must utter a falsehood, because one has neither wisdom nor love sufficient to tell the truth in such a manner that the sick person will be able to bear it. Here the collision becomes a test of the stage of moral development of personality and energy, which the individual has attained. The different rules which are set forth for the solution of collision may serve to exercise the moral reflection, but will show themselves in determinate instances as very unpractical, since every instance has its own dialectic. Thus it is set forth as a rule, that the claims of justice must be preferred to those of affection. One should pay his debts in the first place, and from what remains to him of his means show kindness to the necessitous by the relief of their wants. The opposite course would be after the example of Crispin (the holy Crispinus, who stole leather to make shoes for the poor). But what shall be said, then, to this example from Ferguson:[1] "A boy lay almost naked on the grave of his father, whom he had recently lost. Here he was seen by a man who was on his way to his creditor to pay, as he had promised, the debt he owed. The man lifted the boy from the ground, and expended for his benefit the money which his creditor was expecting; and thus the last-named was disappointed. Who would disapprove of this act of humanity, as if it had been forbidden by a more stringent obligation?" But then the rule that the rights of justice must be preferred to those of affection does not hold good unconditionally. Even as regards the case in question, though we cannot but sympathize with the man's mode of action, we must yet acknowledge that the difficulty is not solved; for the claims of justice have unquestionably been violated, and the man's creditor disappointed. That there thus is introduced into this act of benevolence an element of Antinomianism, cannot be denied. And the compassionate Samaritan in the Gospel, *who was not in debt*, but exposed himself to the risk of his life in order to save the unhappy man who had fallen among thieves, who perhaps were still in the neighbourhood, was far nearer perfection. The only certain means of avoiding the real collision of duty is normal development, or, as of ourselves we have no normal development, that which is determined by redemption. The more a man brings his life under the regulation of redemption, and thereby attains true liberty, the more his life is planned teleologically, and the less he is encumbered and bound by the debts of time past: he is all the stronger to govern circumstances, instead of being governed by them; every moment he will be growing in grace, and he will be all the less exposed to real collision of duty. To Christ there existed nothing answering to this collision of duties, no collision in that which He *ought* to do or suffer, though His adversaries endeavoured to lead Him into it.

§ 140.

In the collision of duties (both actual and apparent), and in the question of limitation concerning the permissible and the unpermissible, *casuistry* makes its appearance, as a sifting examination and decision of difficult and intricate cases of conscience (*casus conscientiæ*),—a dialectic between the general duty and the individual case in question. In the Roman Catholic Church this dialectic has sent forth many offshoots; and as this Church lays more stress on outward actions than on dispositions of mind, it has assumed a character rather juridical than moral. In the Lutheran Church, too, it has been cultivated, and appears, for instance, in a remarkable manner in the theological opinions of the seventeenth century, but specially in Spener's *Theologische Bedenken;* and on account of the individual element in duty, life constantly brings this dialectic along with it. But in so far as casuistry seeks to be a discipline, which is to give rules, according to which we shall be able to frame our conduct in all future cases of difficulty, it is a failure, since the casuistic case, just on account of the individual element, never recurs, but is new each time. In real life, cases of casuistry must be solved either by direct genial tact, that is, by the happy inspiration of the moment, or by sustained reflection. Resolute, impulsive natures are specially fitted for the first mode of decision, cautious and thoughtful natures for the second. But where the decision is normal, each of them must have the testimony of conscience to the obligation and necessity of the action (I cannot do otherwise). False decision will show itself in impulsive natures in this manner, that they confound the momentary disposition of temperament with the disposition of their genius, and act with rashness, which afterwards occasions regret. With cautious natures, on the other hand, false decision will show itself in this, that they act in doubt and scrupulosity, which is not consistent with a good conscience; for all that is not of faith is sin—all that does not spring from inward conviction of the soul, and bearing its sanction. A middle way between these extremes — though not the royal midway—is to act according to Probabilism, and to content oneself with a relatively correct decision, and a relative certainty of having hit the mark. Probabilism, which we have before combated, here receives a relative validity as a help in need. The element to be rejected in Jesuitic Probabilism is, namely, that it makes the highest moral truths, about which absolute certainty must be demanded, doubtful and fluctuating, makes the highest and holiest the subject of a probabilism which incessantly questions with flesh and blood. But even when we acknowledge the immoveable basis of truth, cases may occur where we must be content with an approximate decision, with the decision which appears the most admissible, which has the strongest grounds to be received, although the evidence cannot be considered as absolute and conclusive, and where we must rest satisfied with having conscientiously sought the truth, and acted according to our "best persuasions." But the best persuasion, since it suggests a next best, is not absolute persuasion; probabilism and relative certainty evince relativity in our own moral standpoint. In Christ no probabilism whatever can be imagined. And in the same measure as the personality grows in wisdom and discretion, in love and courage, probabilism will also disappear, and action will take place from perfect conviction. Here it again appears that as we *are*, so we act; although it may be said again, that by acting we may *become* better.

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[1] Jacobi's Works, iii.; in the Missive to Fichte.

CAN THE REGENERATE FULFIL THE LAW? MERIT AND REWARD.

§ 141.

As only love to God in perfect union with obedience can fulfil the law, it is beyond all doubt that the unregenerate cannot fulfil it. On the other hand, it is disputed in the Christian Church whether or not the regenerate can do this, or whether there may not be found among their number such as are able to fulfil the law's demands. The Roman Catholic Church affirms this, and teaches expressly that it is possible in this life perfectly to satisfy the law (*plene satisfacere*), making however the remarkable restriction, "according to the condition of this present life" (*pro hujus vitæ statu*), and condemns those who teach the opposite.[1] The Reformed Church, on the other hand, maintains that no one is able to do this,[2] and that into the good deeds of the regenerate there always enters an element of sin, which Luther expresses in a rather paradoxical manner thus, that in every good deed the righteous man sins *mortaliter*, or at least *venialiter;* but which Schleiermacher expresses adequately when he says, that in our good deeds there is always something which needs forgiveness. Whilst we continue to teach the same, we refer to God's word and to experience. For our Lord's Prayer is given to all, and for every stage of development of the Christian life; and Scripture acknowledges no degree of perfection in the present life, in which the petition: Forgive us our trespasses! is no longer necessary. Experience shows us likewise, that the Roman Catholic Church only attains the imagined advantage of having saints who have perfectly fulfilled the law, partly by lowering the requirements of the law and degrading the ideal, partly by weakening the conception of sin and teaching an innocent concupiscence, an innocent covetousness, which with the saints has its seat in the flesh, without the will being in the least degree polluted by it. As we account it to the honour of the Reformed Church that it has maintained the ideal requirements of the law in their full rigour, we must also affirm with our Church that there is no such thing as innocent covetousness, because the will—even if the evil lusts arise spontaneously from the source of nature—still becomes more or less participant in them. Christ alone could be tempted without sin, because the organs and natural basis of His will were absolutely pure; but temptation without sin cannot be imagined, where the natural basis and organs of the will are polluted, and evil thoughts *from within* arise as lusts. We teach, therefore, that the unsolved Antinomianism, the war between the twofold law, the law of sin in the members and the law of the mind, which Paul describes in Rom. vii., continues throughout life for the regenerate also; which does not preclude, but presupposes, that the regenerate in the midst of his strife has yet in his inmost being peace in the Lord, and that the new man, in spite of partial overthrow and retrogression, yet wins a progressive victory. The impossibility of a perfect holiness in this life rests on the union of soul and body encumbered with the abnormality of man's present organism, originating in the old nature and entangled in the sinfulness of the world. Doubtless, during the progress of sanctification, sin is more and more thrust out from the inward man to the outer, from the centre to the surface, from the most holy place to the outer court of the temple, to the bodily precincts and the lower regions of the soul, from the heart is driven out into the extremities. Doubtless, in the human organization of soul and body, where evil dispositions move, a new principle enters, which more and more takes possession of the man. But not merely the bodily organs of the will, but also the mental organs, thought, fancy, feeling, which form as it were an inward body for the will, are, according to their nature, in many ways in the power of sin. And although the will takes up the position of suffering and struggle against the sin in the members, yet it combats not merely with a pure non-Ego, but also with itself, and the Ego sighs not merely as burdened, but must also accuse itself, because it has a disposition to take part with the adversary, and it feels its need of renewal in the forgiveness of sins and peace in Christ. When a wise man said, "My will is virtuous, but its organ is in the power of the devil," this virtue must have been imperfect, because there exists a constant inward intercourse between the will and its organs, and the will cannot escape complicity with the sin in the members. In order that holiness may be perfect, it is requisite that the will should receive a new *organism*, the transition to which is through death, a transition which is only perfected by the resurrection of the body. (See *Dogmatic Eschatology*.)

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[1] Concil. Trident. Sessio vi. cap. 16. See canon xviii.: Si quis dixerit, dei præcepta homini justificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad observandum impossibilia, anathema sit.

[2] Ap. C. De dilectione et impletione legis, 24: In hac vita non possumus legi satisfacere, quia natura carnalis non desinit malos affectus parere, etsi his resistit spiritus in nobis.

The assertion, that the regenerate in this present life can perfectly fulfil the law, is also made by several Protestant sects, who appeal to 1 John iii. 9, "Whoso is born of God, sinneth not;" by which they overlook the words of the same apostle, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us," 1 John i. 8 (a fraction of the Methodists, Erik-Jansonians, and others).

§ 142.

As in all our good deeds there is still something which requires forgiveness, and as the actual good itself is a work of divine grace, there cannot be in Christianity any mention of merit and reward, if by merit is understood a performance of duty, in consequence of which we have a claim to reward, a right to some benefit which must be paid to us for our work. Such a relation to the law of liberty may have validity in the sphere of human society, but is excluded from the relation to God. One may have merit in the State, in the Church, in the arts and sciences, etc., and these merits may find their acknowledgment in human society; but in relation to the holy God, sinful man is without all merit and dignity. Yet there may be mention of deeds which, in spite of the infirmity cleaving to them, are wrought in God, and which are well-pleasing to God, since the person who performs them is well-pleasing to Him for the sake of Christ, whose progressive work in man the Father recognises; and there may be mention of a *reward of grace*, since grace in its own kingdom has instituted a just relation between deeds and their consequences,—has established the law, that what a man sows, that shall he also reap; whilst man, though referred to his own efforts and exertions, must admit that the sowing of the seed, its growth and harvesting, is nothing without the divine grace. The difference in the reward is described in Scripture (2 Cor. ix. 6) thus, that he that soweth sparingly shall reap sparingly, and he that soweth bountifully shall reap bountifully. The difference in reward is also set forth in the parable of the talents confided to the various servants (Luke xix. 12–28), since he who, with the pound entrusted to him, had gained ten talents, is set over ten cities; he who has gained five talents over five cities,—thus each one in proportion to that which he has received and employed. The unity in reward, on the other hand, is set forth in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Matt. xx. 1–16); since all the labourers, those who began at the third hour, the seventh, ninth, and eleventh, get the same reward, the one penny, for which the Lord had agreed with them. The apparent contradiction between these parables is removed by this consideration, that the parable of the labourers in the vineyard refers to the *general* reward which is common to all faithful labours, the one penny, for which the Master agreed with them; since He agreed with us that we should allow ourselves to be redeemed by grace, without any merit and desert on our side, and for our work in His vineyard ask no other reward than *Himself*, the fellowship of His love. The parable of the confided talents, on the other hand, treats of the *individualized* reward in relation to the different stages in the work of sanctification. The reward is thus both unproportioned and proportionate. It is unproportioned when the question is concerning redemption and salvation, which are given to sinners of pure grace, an invaluable gift, which is quite incommensurable with the deservings of sinful man. It is proportionate, in so far as within the kingdom of grace is arranged a variety of gifts (Charisms), the exercise of which brings with it a variety of rewards, whilst all the faithful servants receive essentially the same reward, since they all enter into the joy of their Lord. As in this life there is the change of seed and harvest, there is also the reward already in this life as peace and joy with our God and Saviour, as the fruit, which is produced by faithful labour, whether it be thirty, seventy, or one hundred fold. But the perfect reward is given yonder in the perfection of God's kingdom, and all faithful labourers work in hope of the harvest of eternity.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW TO THE REGENERATE. THE TRIPLE USE OF THE LAW. THE GRACIOUS INVITATION IN THE GOSPEL, AND THE BINDING AUTHORITY.

§ 143.

Nearly akin to the question if the regenerate can fulfil the law, is this, if the regenerate, after all, have anything to do with the law as such? which has appeared specially in this form, whether the regenerate require the preaching of the law? What has led to this question is the importance which the Evangelical Church ascribes to justifying faith. In justifying faith man has renounced all righteousness and wisdom of his own, and thus has attained true liberty, by which means he is not merely under the law (*sub lege*), but in the law (*in lege*); since the law has become his delight and love, as the fulfilling of the law (the sum of its requirements, and the power for its performance) has begun to well forth in his life as a living fountain. Christ's authority, on which the believer knows himself to be dependent, has grace and love for its principle, and not merely has its demands and obligations, but also imparts and bestows. It has been stated above, that authority is the nearer perfection, the more we who are bound by it can look up to it in admiration and reverence, in piety and gratitude, in faith and confidence, because it not merely limits and controls our liberty, but also establishes and confirms it. This holds good in an absolute sense in regard to the relation to Him to whom the Father has given all authority in heaven and in earth, and concerning whom it is not merely said that "He spake with authority, and not as the scribes" (Mark i. 22), but also that "they marvelled at the gracious words which proceeded out of His mouth" (Luke iv. 22). Just because Christ's authority is full of grace, is it in the highest sense emancipating. And to this emancipating energy of Christ is due, first of all, that He frees us from the thraldom of the law. When Meister Eckart says, "I pray God that He will make me free from God" (*dass er mich quitt mache Gottes*), and when this is understood to mean that he prays God to release him from that false relation of dependence on God, from that external relation to law and authority in which God is to him an oppressive burden, this is fulfilled in Christ, and in the fellowship of Christ.

But it by no means follows from this that this essential unity of law and liberty, of authority and liberty, which by justification is given to man as the germ of a good life, can be harmoniously carried through in every point of the Christian life, or that Christians during their pilgrimage can arrive at such perfection as to have no more need of the law, which was sanctioned and fulfilled by Christ as such, but in every sense have so outgrown the need of the law that they no longer acknowledge the Good as a command, an imperative to which their will and inclination are opposed, but fulfil it from the impulse of the mind alone. This is the basis of Agricola's obscure Antinomianism, or denial of the Christian's need of the law, which made its appearance at the time of the Reformation, and which was combated by Luther. Agricola does not teach liberty to sin, and his doctrine cannot therefore be classed with the forms of Antinomianism discussed above. But whilst he set out from the proposition that we are saved, not by the law, but by the gospel, which has delivered us from the curse of the law, he maintained that a regenerate Christian has nothing to do with the law, but in the whole conduct of his life is determined exclusively by the love of Christ and the influence of His Spirit, both to die to the world, and to walk in the new life, like *a star which by necessity describes its course.* He taught that the preaching of repentance to the unconverted ought not to be a preaching of the law, but of the love of Christ, in His sufferings and death for our sins, in order to touch and to turn the heart. And still less should the law be preached to the already converted Christian, in whose ears the glad tidings alone should be sounded. (Moses belongs only to the council chamber.) Not of orders and commands could there here be question, but only of the invitations and influences of grace. Against this false geniality, which overlooks the consideration that the regenerate are still far from the maturity of the perfect man in Christ, and in many respects only beginners in the way of perfection, Luther maintains that the law should be preached both to the unregenerate and the regenerate: to the first, in order that they may be awakened and alarmed; to the last, that they fall not into a false peace and security. The Lutheran theology maintained sound doctrine by its representation of the triple use of the law. The use of the law is, namely, in part external, social (*usus politicus s. civilis*), to keep order in human society; in part internal, disciplinary (*usus elenchticus s. pædagogicus*), to awaken the conviction of sin, alarm the conscience, and thus become a schoolmaster to bring men to Christ; and lastly, instructive (*usus didacticus, normativus s. tertius*), even for the regenerate.[1] Though these last have the law in their hearts, and though, if the new life could perfectly evince its power in them, they would walk in newness of life like the heavenly bodies which describe their course; yet the old Adam is still in them, and they have not yet attained such maturity in Christ that they can entirely dispense with the warning and discipline of the law. They still require to view themselves in the mirror of the law, and must sometimes constrain themselves to the obedience of Christ: in other words, the union of duty and affection, which is the normal condition in the Christian life, may not be absolutely indissoluble, on account of the sin cleaving to them, which, though broken indeed in the regenerate heart, is not entirely rooted out; and there are times in the life of the redeemed in which the imperative dominion of duty must be maintained, without being one with the impulse of affection. Thus Lutheran Ethics asserts a relative standpoint for the law, even *within* the evangelical standpoint, whilst it unquestionably at the same time is set forth as the duty of the Christian to make *this* use of the law gradually superfluous, by eliminating from his life those Moments in which the law only represents itself before him as an imperative, without being one with the impulse of affection; in which he is obliged to constrain himself to act in accordance with principle, although principle does not accord with inclination.

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[1] Form. conc. de tertio usu legis: *Tertius* usus ad renatos pertinet, non quatenus justi, sed infirmitati adhuc obnoxii sunt.

When in our days the attempt has been made to thrust out the ten commandments from the Catechism, because the law does not belong to the Christian instruction of youth, and Christians shape their lives after the influences of the Spirit, the same want of knowledge of Christ's authority, not merely in bestowing but in imposing obligation, is shown, and the same want of self-knowledge as that with which Luther combated. The truth is, that the ten commandments, which Christ has not destroyed, but fulfilled, should be expounded not in the spirit of the Old Testament, but in that of the New—should be expounded in the spirit of Christ, and according to the guidance He has given us; but the untruth is, that the teachers and preachers of the gospel had any right to lay aside the expounding and preaching of the law both to the unregenerate and the regenerate, and that the regenerate are so perfect that they do not require the before-mentioned threefold uses of the law, or that the regenerate—for even this purely Antinomian turn may be given to the matter—whilst they renounce perfection in a false geniality of faith, can allow themselves a *laisser aller* in regard to the demands of the law. The error which seeks to remove the ten commandments from the Catechism, and in its indistinctness is not far from excluding the very idea of duty from Christianity, is often heard in the maxim that the gospel of Christ is not a command, but a gracious invitation. The truth is, that it undoubtedly is a gracious invitation, and not a compulsory order, which by external force is to be executed in making men Christians. But the great untruth is, that the gospel, as an offer and invitation, does not at the same time contain a command of duty to the conscience, that Christ is only an authority who bestows, and does not at the same time bind and oblige, who lays on men a responsibility for the position they receive in the gospel, lays on men the *duty* of believing, since it is said, *Thou shalt* believe; as it is said, Thou shalt love—shalt give to God that which is God's—give God the honour, since thou believest on Him whom He has sent: it is His right that thou shouldest believe on Him, it is thy duty to allow thyself to be saved; and He Himself will aid us to believe, if we are of the truth. Repent ye, and believe the gospel! (Mark i. 15.) Do we hear in this only inviting grace, and not at the same time binding authority? Was it not a duty to believe, and did faith rest only on the impulse of the Spirit and of love, how then can the Lord say that it is sin not to believe on Him? (John xvi. 9.) How can He then say, He that believeth not is condemned? How can He then, at His second coming, judge the world according to the word which He has spoken? The gracious invitation thus contains a command or a requirement of duty; and if there are those who will ask us whether men should be bound to a blind belief in authority, we reply by asking another question, If it is a *blind* belief which is required, when the Lord says, "Seek, and ye shall find; ask, and ye shall receive;" or when He says, "If any man will do His will that sent me, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself" (John vii. 17); or when the apostle says, "By manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience" (2 Cor. iv. 2). In this sense Christ's authority addresses itself to individuals and to nations, both with His gracious invitation and His obligatory demand. And the demand of duty continues to extend itself over the whole life, in the same measure as there becomes question of the free appropriation of grace.

GOD'S EDUCATING GRACE IN CHRIST. CHRIST AND THE NATIONS.

§ 144.

It has been asked if Christ is a lawgiver. It may in the same manner be inquired if He is an educator, if the economy of salvation instituted by Him has at the same time a *pædagogic* significance? And the answer is as before. He is not a teacher, a censor, like Moses; He has not come to institute a new theocratic dispensation, with new coercive and ceremonial laws, in order through these to educate men for the kingdom of God. Yet, nevertheless, we can and must speak of the educating grace of God in Christ: "For the grace of God *that bringeth salvation* hath appeared to all men, teaching us (παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς), that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world" (Tit. ii. 11, 12). God's grace in Christ edifies us by the guidance and discipline of the Spirit, by external and internal guidance; for which reason another apostolic writer says, "My son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of Him: for whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth" (Heb. xii. 6). "No chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but grievous; nevertheless afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby" (Heb. xii. 11). But the educating grace has its principle in saving grace, and seeks through its influence in man to develope that which grace has implanted in him. And as God's educating grace shows itself in the life of the individual, so also in that *of the nations.*

For it is a great error, an offshoot of false emancipation, to imagine that Christ's authority should only extend to the individual, or at the highest to the house, to the family, but not to the people and State. He affirmed marriage to be a divine ordinance; and in the command to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's, He affirms even heathen states to be a divine ordinance. But the principal declaration by which He asserts His authority in relation to society is His injunction to the disciples, "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). This mighty word contains a world of thought, an infinite abundance of consequences,—although we are very far from saying that all the consequences which men have deduced from it are necessary consequences. He says not, Teach some individuals, Christianize some individuals, among all nations. He says expressly, "Christianize all nations;" and thereby He expresses it as His will that His Church shall be the Church of the nations of the earth, that all nations of the earth, as one great family, should be gathered together under Him, to whom "all authority (ἐξουσία) is given in heaven and on earth:" by which He expresses the idea of a *Christendom.* But we cannot possibly admit, what would be at variance with the rest of our Lord's sayings, that all were to become true Christians, true disciples; so that the idea, the national Church, and the idea, the saints, the society of believers, should coincide and mutually cover each other. For at every time the word holds good, that many are called and few are chosen. Since not the less the Lord desires that His *house should be filled* (Luke xiv. 23), since He desires that all nations as such should be christianized, we cannot understand this otherwise than that the Lord by this command has given His Church the mission to be an *educating power to the people.* And history shows us also that Christ's Church, as the Church of the people, has been, and is, a great educational institution, which, on the ground of infant baptism — for infant baptism and national Churches stand in internal and necessary connection—educates for the kingdom of God; so that they who in the *social* sense belong to the Church as members, as links in the community, may also in a personal sense come to belong to the Church, that is, to the number of true believers, the congregation of saints (*congregatio sanctorum*), which is the Church in its narrower sense, or the Church in its peculiar signification (*ecclesia proprie,* C. A. 8). But the great question of the meaning of our Lord's command, "Teach all nations," and the idea springing from thence of the pædagogic character of the Church, is this: In what manner it is possible for the Church, as a pædagogic institution for the nations, to preserve its *evangelical* character, without sinking down to become a Church of the law, without sinking back to the standpoint of the Mosaic law, in which the religious regulations are at the same time external judicial regulations and coercive regulations, which is not evangelical. The danger and temptation to this last lies near, in so far as the Christian Church in this earthly existence cannot avoid giving itself a constitution, by which it comes under external rules of government, and especially cannot avoid this when it becomes the national Church, in which case it must enter into intimate relation to the State, and the whole external judicial law of this last.

That the solution of this problem, the combination of the evangelizing and pædagogic character of the Church, to which our Lord and the apostles have given no *direct* assistance, but have left to historic development, is not easy, is evident from history. Although we must in no case overlook the providential element in the guidance of the Church, yet history shows that the import of the pædagogic mission of the Church, in many respects, has been conceived more in the spirit of the Old Testament than in that of the New. Ere now, Augustine, the great evangelical teacher, who, concerning sin and grace, though dead, yet speaketh, fell into the error of understanding our Lord's words, Luke xiv. 23, "Compel them to come in" (*compellare intrare*), as a justification of external force in bringing men to enter the Church. And the ecclesiastical sovereignty of the middle ages shows us a theocracy after the Mosaic pattern, in which the Church rules over the State, in which the invisible Christ is regarded as a new Moses, who leads His people through the wilderness to the promised land, is understood rather as a Lawgiver and Judge of the universe than as the Saviour, but in which, in reality, Christ's authority must give place to that of the Church and its visible Stadtholder; in which there is fashioned a comprehensive system of law, not merely for doctrine, but also for the life,—a *canonical* law, in which an infinite number of religious and moral commandments appear as external judicial regulations in which transgression is punished by the secular arm, which lends to the Church its sword. In opposition to this the Reformation protested; whilst from this compulsory education,—the importance of which to the barbarous races of the middle ages, who were scarcely fitted for anything higher, must not be ignored,—from this Old Testament conception of God's educative grace, it returned to God's saving grace, protested against these false authorities and went back to Christ's, to the Redeemer's own authority, by means of faith recovering the true union of authority and liberty in the inner mind. Not the less—although it is sung in Lutheran hymns: Moses now has ceased to reign—does the old Testament education recur in the Protestant *State Church,* in which the State, so to speak, has incorporated the Church into itself, in which the Christian State is itself a censor on the part of Christ, in which it upholds "both tables of the law," maintains the first table of the law, the doctrine and worship of God, by compulsory regulations, by which the members of the Church are kept not merely to external order, but to the word and the sacraments. The theocratic idea of the Old Testament is to be traced here in many points, though it is not here the Pope, but the secular sovereign, who, especially in the seventeenth century, in combination with political absolutism, stands forth as the Vicar of God and Christ.

Not until our own times was the constraint of the State Church abolished by the great principle of *religious liberty.* Religious liberty, which does not tolerate the putting of any constraint upon the conscience, is a consequence not merely of negative emancipation destitute of religion, but also of that emancipation which proceeds from Christianity itself. The gospel, indeed, must demand religious liberty in order that it may be truly appropriated; and when Christ says, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," this world-renowned saying contains also the demand for religious liberty: for no one can render to God that which is God's—namely, his heart, and his heart's acknowledgment—if he has not freedom to determine this. The more the influences of religious liberty extend themselves, the more will men also be called to self-education and self-responsibility, the more will the educative power of Christianity evince its ethical character by the influence it exercises, through word and instruction, through habits and culture, and through institutions which are pervaded by the spirit of Christianity; but just on this account it pays adequate regard to *individual liberty,* which is not at all the same thing as to make concessions to a false individualism subversive of the stability of society. It is a demand of the time, that Church and State should discriminate more clearly and essentially their different functions, which is not at all the same thing as separation or division, which would exclude internal unity and co-operation; and the saying, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," is expressed in our day with the power of a new presence. It is a requirement of the time, that the Church should regain a position of greater *self-government*, and herself fashion out her *organization*, her social order and constitution. But that must not be forgotten, which many are disposed to forget: so long as there can be mention of a constitution or external regulation of the Church,—and there will be mention of this, throughout its earthly existence, whatever may be otherwise thought of its condition,—so long will it also, even when all *constraint of conscience* is excluded, yet continue under judicial regulations, even though these be self-appointed; and to these its members must submit, so far as they wish to continue its members: so long also will there be in the Church an external legal Moment, a nomistic Moment, which does not accord with the ideal of evangelical liberty, of the liberty of God's children. As an earthly society with external ordinances, and a mixture of pure and impure, living and dead, or half-dead members, the Church will always be different from the kingdom of heaven, of which our Lord speaks in His parables, and which never attains perfect manifestation here below. To this diversity and contrast it belongs also, that it never can be perfectly freed from the external law, and all the contingencies which accompany the relation of liberty to these. The external appointments of justice find their most perfect representation in the State, but are imperatively necessary for every earthly society, which as such seeks to enter the outer world, and which has therefore a side which is allied, is analogous, to the State. And external determination of justice always implies, in one sense or another, external compulsion. Excommunication, exclusion from the community, is thus a means of compulsion for the man, who himself desires to remain in the community; Church censure and discipline are means of compulsion for him who does not cordially submit to order, and yet cannot determine to forsake the community. These conditions belong to the imperfection of this earthly economy; and the means of compulsion are like hobgoblins, which accompany the household, however frequently they may change their dwelling. So long as the course of this world continues with its external relation of right, with laws the fulfilment of which is subject to contingency, so long will the unity of authority and freedom, both in Church and State, be only very relative. Only in the millennium can we conceive of States in which, as in a temporary "peace on earth," as in a soothing but soon fading evening red, the conflict between authority and liberty is abolished, in which a universal satisfaction in the relatively most perfect form which under these earthly conditions is possible, is found with both governing and governed, because both bow to the sovereignty of Christ, whilst the devil is bound. In the present course of the world, this absolute unity is found only in the invisible kingdom of grace, in faith and love in the soul's inmost recesses, which lie higher not merely than the State, but also than the visible Church. This earthly patchwork will only be obliterated, when through the last great crisis of the world the Perfect makes its entrance, when the perfect theocracy arrives, in which God alone shall reign and God's Spirit be all in all, in which Church and State as external institutions have ceased, when Christ has restored the kingdom to the Father, when all (relative) authority and power are abolished.

How far distant, under present contingencies, it is from the time when a perfect condition of society can be expected, lies already in this, that in every nation there exists a twofold current of mind running in opposite directions,—the one of belief, the other of unbelief; that by progressive emancipation, unbelief, with its doctrines, seeks to make itself valid as public authority, and to stamp public life and its institutions with its disorganizing impress, of which already many tokens are present,—a contrast in the life of the people, the development of which may, doubtless, at certain periods be repressed and prevented, since the devil may be bound, but which at last must lead everywhere to the breaking asunder of the unity of national life, so that every nation splits itself into two nations or into two camps.

AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY.
CONSERVATISM AND PROGRESS.

§ 145.

On the relation between authority and liberty rests every organized society; for no order of society can be conceived without the relation between sovereign and subject, between governor and governed, leader and followers, which by no means excludes the relative independence of these last. But just as in the case of the law we have affirmed that it is at once changeable and unchangeable, so may the same be said about authority. Although the divine authority is in itself the same, its manifestation has yet subjected itself to a temporary development in accordance with the divine plan of education. The old covenant is dissolved by the new, in which the divine authority first finds its perfect manifestation in Christ. Christ is the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. The divine word, the law and the gospel, is the same at every time. But its interpretation, its application and introduction into reality, is entrusted to the *Church* as steward of the divine mysteries. And although the Lord has promised the Church His Spirit, which guides us into all truth, still He has not given His Church infallibility in the sense in which the Romish Church employs the term. The authority of the Church is therefore, both in regard to doctrine and the arrangements and constitution of God's worship, only relative, has its validity only in its accordance with absolute authority with the divine word, and may from time to time require to be reformed. Although the State is a divine appointment, it has likewise a human and changing side. For neither one form of government nor another, neither these institutions of the State nor those, neither this relation nor that among the different classes of the community, is determined by the divine word. This our Protestant view of the subject, which we have learnt from the Reformers, who divided sharply between divine and human right, and who were still willing to acknowledge an authority with the Pope, if he would only limit himself to demand it as a human historic right and relinquish infallibility, we maintain in opposition to the Papist view of authority, the chief error of which rests on this, that it confounds divine and human right,—the absolute right, valid at all times, with the relative, which is merely historical and temporary. Thus Maistre, who is one of the most celebrated amongst Catholic writers adverse to revolutionary movements, not merely asserts the infallibility of the Pope and of the Church, but also the divine institution of monarchy, and futhermore of aristocracy. The nobility are God's plenipotentiaries in regard to the lower classes of society; princes are God's plenipotentiaries and vicars in regard to the nobility; the priesthood, God's plenipotentiaries in regard to princes,—a system of divine authority, towards which the subjects are only required to exercise passive obedience. It is the ideal of the middle ages which hovers before him, and which he maintains with glowing fancy and romantic feeling in his denunciations of the French Revolution.[1] That which at a certain time, in a given state of society, has only a human, historic, and at the same time fluctuating right, he asserts in the abstract as absolute divine right, offering a scale of measurement for all times; and everything which departs from this scale, or which opposes it, he views as revolt and ungodliness. This confusion of human with divine right, though not in such glaring degrees as in Maistre, may still sometimes be met with in Protestant writers who desire to uphold the existing condition of things. But both in regard to the Holy Scriptures and to history, we must protest against it. God might certainly have made it much easier for us, might have freed us from many ecclesiastic and political party contests, if He had caused to be established by Christ a universal theocracy embracing all races of people, an external condition of right after the Mosaic pattern, which was the dream of the middle ages; for in this a multitude of questions would have found their solution, which for the human race bring painful crises. History shows that He has not willed the establishment of a theocracy in this sense. The more we from history itself learn to know His scheme of education with regard to the human race, the more we acknowledge it as a special feature in His authority to respect man's liberty, we perceive it as His aim to educate man to liberty, that is to say, to free unity with the divine authority; we perceive it as an essential Moment in His scheme of education, that man shall be moulded to co-operation in his own education; that God thus does not prevent men from making immature and false attempts in many directions, in order that they may thus attain experiences which may lead them voluntarily and with full conviction to devote themselves to the truth. Thence the tardiness with which God leads man on step by step, and that not by the straight line, but often by many circuitous routes, as the children of Israel through the desert. And thence the frequent want of rationality which is to be found in history, in spite of the deep providential reason which is manifest to every more serious contemplation. Nothing is more unreasonable than in history to be only willing to see the unfolding of a mere necessity of reason, and to point out everything which occurs in history as rational. Applied to the relation between authority and liberty, this means that God has only given us the absolute principle of authority in Christ, in His word and His Spirit; that God in His arrangements has given us the general *basis* for social life, but has left it to man himself, under the leadings of His providence, and under the guidance of His Spirit, to construct the edifice of society on this foundation. Thence the variableness in the human side of authority. The more the development of freedom advances, the more it climbs from a lower to a higher class, the more it also grows beyond the inferior forms of authority and the accompanying inferior relation of dependence. For freedom can only cordially subject itself to that authority whose legality is not merely external, transmitted throughout generations, and existent, but the inward *ethical* legality of which it recognises. It can, in the full sense of the word, only subject itself *voluntarily* to that authority to which it not merely can look up, but by which it knows itself to be invigorated, in which it comes to itself and wins itself; for true authority is always emancipative. But when freedom is emancipated from obsolete authorities, which can no longer bind the conscience,—as the Romish Church in the times of Luther, and, we add, also in our own time,—then holds good the rule, not merely to subvert, but also to complete, that there may arise a new and higher form of authority. Though the people themselves choose their magistrate, yet when he has been elected they submit to his authority; as also in marriage, though it rests on the free choice of the individuals, yet, when it has once been entered into, it is a law *over* the individuals, which they cannot arbitrarily break. But this, a law *over* individuals, will never become a truth so long as the religious basis is wanting, so long as it is not acknowledged that all authority, and the accompanying relations of supremacy and subordination, are from God. People may grow beyond many forms of human authority, may grow beyond this or that educative form of the divine authority; but beyond the divine authority itself, beyond Christianity itself, they can never grow, though by a fresh fall of man they may emancipate themselves from these,—as, indeed, the most recent history shows us by many examples,—they may devote themselves to the fruitless, Sisyphus labour of trying to create authority without God, of trying to deduce authority from liberty, instead of establishing liberty by authority.

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[1] *Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques.* Soirées de St. Petersbourg, 1821. Stahl, *Philosophie des Rechts*, i. 543.

§ 146.

When an existing condition of society is about to give place to another, there ensues an opposition between the old and the new, which in the great historic turning-points may become a world-renowned shock, an all-exciting crisis, not merely in the outward consciousness, but in the inner. In such times of revolution there may be the greatest difficulty in discriminating between the unchanging and the changing, the permanent and the temporary in the authority which is to rule in society, to discriminate between the true and false authority. And the general crisis of the world or of the nation is repeated in the crises of souls of individuals, who in such times of great change are called upon to make a decisive choice. In political revolutions, sovereign stands against sovereign, authority against authority, and the individual must make the great decision of conscience to which party he will adhere. But in the highest significance these individual crises ensue, when in the sphere of religion authority stands up against authority. This shows itself not merely on the first appearance of Christianity, when Christianity enters the existing society with the demand on men to forsake their former faith, or, as in the case of Israel, to allow it to be merged in Christianity. But these crises are repeated also even in the special development of the Christian Church, as in the apostolic Church, where many of the christianized Jews could not let go their hold of Moses, continued to observe the Mosaic ceremonial law, sought to maintain Moses by the side of Christ, and in regard to the freer evangelical dispensation and its demands passed through struggles of conscience. So, too, at the time of the Reformation, when a Luther had great inward struggles and temptations to undergo before he could be fully emancipated from the old Romish authority which he combated, but which long continued to manifest its power, its influences, and its after effects within him. To such individual crises of the soul, in which the individual must break with some existing institution or condition, which from childhood has had a binding power over the conscience, and to which this was knit by the bond of reverence and piety; or, on the other hand, when the individual feels himself oppressed by existing circumstances as by a yoke of bondage, finds himself in existing circumstances as in an ignoble captivity, and, with an ardent longing for liberty, demands that the prison shall be opened and the mere letter of the law give place to the eternal justice of the spirit and truth—Luther experienced both these;—to these individual crises, which recur under the diversified forms and conditions of society, and both psychologically and ethically are well worthy of attention, we can in the present treatise merely refer. Here, however, we assert that the opposition described between the old and the new, and the accompanying twofold demand for liberty, show themselves not merely in the great turning-points of history, but are essentially present at all times, so long as there can be question of a development of society. For the conception of a development of society is inseparable from the opposition between *conservatism* and *progress*,—an opposition which should by no means be exclusively treated, as is the general custom in teaching of the State, but has its place in the general part of Ethics, which developes the universal appointments pervading all circles of the moral world.

Conservatism and progress have their first suggestion even in the divine government of the world, which is at once conservative and progressive, preserving and advancing. It desires progress and development, for this is the signification of time and the determination of the human mind. But it desires also coherence, steadiness, continuity in development; desires that everything should have its own time, that the new shall come forth only when the fulness of time is come, that nothing good and true which has been won in the earlier stages should be lost,—that even when the form is dissolved and blighted, yet the essence shall be preserved and retained in higher forms. In so far the divine government of the world is conservative. Both the mode of thinking of conservatism and of progress are therefore justified, and each of these only becomes false when it seeks to exclude the other. The conservative turn of mind is that of filial piety, which reverently submits to the course of Providence throughout history, acknowledges that the individual existing generation is but a single link in the great chain of the human race, that the present time is but a single segment in a great economy, in close union with time past and time future; that it therefore does not become us to act as if there were neither past nor future, but that we should preserve connection with time past by keeping the fourth commandment: "Honour thy father and thy mother," whilst at the same time preserving connection with the future, with the unborn generations, to whom we owe the duty of leaving behind us an inheritance, not of castles in the air, in which they could find no shelter, but of realities. The conservative turn of mind is that of loyalty, which desires not to consume but to increase the inheritance left to us by our fathers; the prudent, forbearing, respectful turn of mind, which, so long as the fulness of time has not come, spares the imperfect forms of the past, in which the good is contained, remembering the word, "Destroy it not, for a blessing is in it" (Isa. lxv. 8). It is the mode of thought of patience, which refrains from premature reforms, suffers, and endures the evil for the sake of the good along with which it has grown up, "lest with the tares ye root up also the wheat with them" (Matt. xiii. 29); by which words our Lord puts us in mind, not merely to inquire concerning the necessity of reforms, but also of their suitability as to time, and to await the day of harvest. But not less justified is that turn of mind which looks for progress, the mood of hope and courage, the resolute disposition which is not content to forbear and preserve, but will also break down in order to build up, pluck up in order to plant anew, and proclaim with power that providence is not merely to be acknowledged in what has been or in what *is*, but also in what *ought* to be and must be; that God has not merely been present in time past, but also now witnesses for Himself not merely through His acts and leadings, but also through duty and conscience, which demand that existing boundaries must be overstepped. The mood of progress fixes its sharp glance on the faults and deficiencies of existing things, on that which ought not to be; it fixes its glance on the preparing, on the new germs of life, which appear by the side of the decayed and withered forms of the old condition, from which the spirit is departed, and it has open ears for the whisper of the new spirit: "Let the dead bury their dead; come thou and follow me!" Without this mode of thought Christ could never have made disciples, the Church could never have arrived at a Reformation, in no circle of life could the light of genius have succeeded in penetrating. Each of these modes of thought is thus justified, nay, they are both Moments in one and the same mode of thought, the truly religious. They only become untrue when the one is held to the exclusion of the other, and the false spirit of the times exists then equally in both. Perverted desire for progress, Radicalism, the revolutionary spirit, denies God in the past, if it does not at the same time deny Him in the present and in the future. It acknowledges essentially the divine only in the mere *demand* of what must be, and considers itself as the true providence, and as the acting God on earth. It has its principle in that arrogance which overthrows the fourth commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother," despises the wisdom of the fathers, and thinks that the individual present race, without presupposition, can begin history from this point. It can only break down, but not build up, quite contrary to the example which Christ has left us. It certainly breaks down errors, prejudices, and abuses, but drives out devils by devils—drives out, for example, the devil of monarchical absolutism by the rule of the rabble,—a practice which is widespread in the Radicalism and false Liberalism of our days, and in their organs in the press, in which the old errors are constantly driven out by a new error, the old lies by a new lie, which is set in the place of the old. False conservatism, on the other hand, is that which under all motions and revolutions "has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing," and has its principle in that obduracy, that obstinacy, which desires to hold fast an individual stage of development in history as permanent, whilst by Providence it is appointed to disappear; closes eyes and ears to the signs of the times, which show that the divine government of the world will now lead men to a new and higher stage.

Thus the Pharisees at the time of Christ, who sought to retain that stage of the divine revelation to which God had hitherto brought the children of Israel, but with open eyes yet would not see that now the fulness of time had come for the perfect manifestation, and for the abrogation of that which was only preparation; who would not acknowledge the signs of the times either in John the Baptist or in Christ, and in so far as they turned their eyes towards the future, imagined for themselves a Messiah after their own thoughts, a Messiah and a future which should only be for the glorification of themselves and their nation as it then existed. This obstinate retention of an earthly state of things, combined with hatred, enmity, and persecution against everything which announces a change in this, is the characteristic of false reaction. False reaction, say we; for in itself reaction is a *vox media*, which has not of necessity a bad meaning, because everything depends on the special character of the reaction, and the character of that against which it reacts. No revolution can be cured of its errors except by a fundamental reaction, which always in several respects must accompany a restoration. Stahl, who by the Liberal party is reckoned as belonging to that of reaction, has strikingly characterized *false* reaction, when he says that it consists in ignoring and shutting oneself up against the problems which are actually the necessity of the times, and which revolution has only misunderstood; that it not merely will react against the diseased matter, but also against the *germs of development*.[1] We may also express its characteristics thus, that false reaction is ever on the eve of committing a Bethlehemite massacre of the innocents, in which, by the guidance of Providence, it always happens that the child over which it specially watches is preserved from the violence of the executioners, is saved by flight, and grows up in tranquillity, till the fulness of time is come, when it shall accomplish its mission and vanquish the tyrants. On the other side, revolution is always on the eve of committing parricide and matricide, in which it also, by the overruling of Providence, comes to pass that the spirits of the murdered, after the lapse of a time, arise living from the tomb, to denounce woe on the degenerate race who slew them and devoured their inheritance, and to scatter its work as chaff before the wind. Both extremes, both false reaction and false revolution, false conservatism and false progression, originate from the same source of unrighteousness, and must both be considered as hostile to the kingdoms of God and man. Their crimes in the history of the world are great, and the accusations which the one party casts against the other may always be thrown back again. It is thus not the men of progress, but the Conservatives, who have crucified Christ, because they only acknowledged God in the bygone time, at every price would retain the existing state of things, and followed the Jesuitic counsel given them by Caiaphas: It is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not. It is the Conservatives who introduced the Inquisition, burnt John Huss, and excommunicated Luther. On the other hand, it is the men of progress who not merely have crucified Christ *anew*, have desired that Barabbas should be released, and have trodden under foot the cross, but who have, moreover, set themselves up against everything which is called God, and the worship of God. It is the men of progress who in the place of the Jesuits have introduced the Jacobins with their bloody republic, in place of the heretic's fire and stake have set up the guillotine, and with unspeakable terrorism and fanaticism have persecuted all who would not receive their mark, and fall down and worship the unclean spirit, which was potent in them. It is the same human nature, in its corruption and its combination with the powers of darkness, which is manifested in both systems of thought.

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[1] *Die gegenwärtigen Parteien in Staat und Kirche.* (The Present Parties in the State and the Church.)

Genuine conservatism must of necessity determine itself to progress, for nothing living can be preserved in time except by constant renewal and rejuvenizing, which again is conditioned by a constant struggle with everything which would hinder the process and development of life and produce stagnation. The only certain means against age and decay is the continuance of *growth*. And it is just the privilege of the spiritual life, placed under the influences of Christianity, to be able to continue to grow in time; whilst the natural life in time can only grow to a certain limit, and thereafter must succumb to the forces of time and become obsolete. The nations of antiquity, even the most intellectual, exhibit to us a growth, a progress to a high point, and thereafter a continued dwindling, decay, and destruction. But it is a consideration, which is not refuted by history, that Christian nations who have received baptism possess in this a germ of life, through which after all sicknesses they may be restored, through all adversities may be anew regenerated. Continued growth and regeneration are the imperative conditions of every spiritual life, which will not succumb to death. For everything which enters time present is subject to continual change, whether to life or to death. To let everything remain as it is, is just not to let it remain as it is, not to preserve it as a living thing. And if, in the conservative interest, one would keep watch by a corpse, even there all would not continue to be as it was. For corruption spreads more and more, and the dead forms fall more and more together. On the other side, it may be said that genuine progress has its presupposition, its basis in conservatism. For real progress is an advance in *connected* symmetrical development, and must therefore take footing in existing conditions, which are a result of the development of former times,—must knit the Good which *shall* hereafter be to the Good which is and has been,—must even, when it breaks down the obsolete and false, with careful hand hold fast the thread of continuity and of true tradition. Therefore we find also with the great reforming personalities—for instance, Luther—sharp discriminating power, energy in construction of a new system combined with a deep conservative spirit, reverence for the former ages of the Church, leniency towards whatever had been handed down from thence in so far as the truth did not absolutely demand its abrogation, and an endeavour by moderate measures to lead over into the new circumstances, of which we have already an example in the assembly of the apostles at Jerusalem (Acts xv.) "It is not those weak minds which are struck by every new phase of the gospel that are fitted to shape the true future; this is only to be shaped by the strong, which at the same time grasp former times with firmness."[1]

The harmonious union of both the modes of thought here described is only to be found with very rare great personalities. The majority of men are limited by a predominant disposition for one or other of them, and human society subsists by this opposition. The one must complete itself by the other. Those who, in consequence of their individuality, are predominantly disposed to conservative opinions, are therefore suited to mould the sense and the eye for movement, and to perceive in this not merely what should be resisted and "held hard against," but also what should be acknowledged and supported; and they who, in consequence of their individuality, are suited to keep their eyes open to the condition of things in times gone by and still existing, and to perceive herein not merely what ought to be abolished, but also what ought to be preserved and introduced into the new system.

§ 147.

Both conservatism and progress, however many the forms they may assume, yet at last return to the relation between authority and liberty, because every regulation of society is determined by this relation. But it cannot be too often repeated: the ethical view of the world must not simply apprehend this relation from its changing, its mere *historic* side, but also according to its *eternal*, unchanging essence. In practical life it may in many cases be sufficient to remain stationary at this mere historic apprehension, to respect existing authority, because it is the existing, and thus that which has historically formed itself; in progress to have the attention directed to the continuity, in order that connection in development be preserved, that violent leaps may be avoided, and generally to take all appropriate matters into consideration. Practical statesmen, who with full reason demand that relations should not be regulated by abstract principles and general doctrines, but according to what the circumstances at issue and the actual situation demand, very frequently in their view of the world do not go beyond the *bare* historical and actual. But the mere historical view has this great limitation, that it is destitute of the true ethical motives, and in ultimate instances is without any scale of measurement. The ethical view of the world, to which all true political action must be referred, as certainly as the idea of right has its root in the ethical, cannot remain stationary by this historical relativity and changeableness, by this movement of the billows now rising, now falling, this alternation of action and reaction, this up and down, backwards and forwards, which to the external, merely phenomenal contemplation may appear to be without aim and object, but must fix its eye on the permanent and unshifting basis of human society, on that which is God's decree and God's demand from men at *all* times. The question of new refinements of society, of new forms of government and constitution, the social problems of the mutual relation of the different classes of society to each other, has certainly a great relative importance; and no one who lives, not outside, but in and with his own generation, will be able to withhold from them his sympathy. But the decisive fundamental question is, on which ultimate basis the new structures of society shall be erected, and what it is to which, under all changes and through all intermediate links, we are to advance. The merely historically right is subjected to fashioning in the infinite. But a fundamental conservatism and a fundamental spirit of progress must be aware that, from the ethical view-point, it can never become right, though it may become fact, that a people should rend themselves loose from the principle that the authority of the magistrate does not rest on the will of man, but on the will of God, His decree and guidance; that the magistrate is *over* the people, and that a nation should not be governed from beneath upwards, but from above downwards, which by no means includes that the power of the magistrate is absolute, and may not be limited by the constitution, by the co-operation of the people. At no time will it become right, even if it be clothed in the forms of legislation, for a people to renounce obedience to Christ, and no longer to submit to His authority, no longer to admit that the concerns of His Church are the concerns of the nation, but limit these to be the concern of individuals: at no time will it become right that Christ's authority should be dismissed from public life, and be confined to private and domestic life. But neither will it ever, from the ethical view-point, become right by a false conservatism to obstruct the advance towards the advent of the kingdom of God and of man. Where these great and unchanging principles are denied, where the people will not render unto God that which is God's, human right also becomes denied, and a dissolution of society ensues. It was a forcible repression of the kingdom of humanity, of the development of the rights of men, which led to the French Revolution. But this revolution itself fell into the error of wishing to emancipate from God, from Christianity itself; one consequence of which among others was, that it could not form a government. For as the men of the Revolution were themselves destitute of all authority, they could not, in spite of all orations about the sovereignty of the people, and the will of the people as the source of all authority, give to the governments which they established what they themselves did not possess; and one after another of the authorities which they set up gave way, until at last a dictator, in the feeling that the mere power which he wielded (genius included) in full measure was not adequate to establish a lasting authority, reintroduced a Christian national Church, with the limitations which the principle of religious liberty required. Let one judge as he will of Napoleon and the Concordat of 1801, be it with all reason admitted that the reintroduction of the authority of Catholicism (see John viii. 32, "The truth shall make you free") could avail but little to a people that had passed through the Revolution, and were imbued with the ideas of emancipation; much as is spoken, and with justice, of Napoleon's personal ambition, impure and egoistic motives, etc.; however many dark sides in his operations have been discovered in recent times,[1] it is not the less true that this act of restoration contains the solemn *political* acknowledgment that the "glorious" Revolution, of which Napoleon was the son, just in this fundamental point stood in need of thorough correction even of its *principles*, and that there was here a yawning gulf to fill which human authority was powerless to effect; that he practically confirmed the words of Mirabeau, that God is as necessary to the nation as liberty. The English Revolution, on the other hand, has this great advantage over the French, that in spite of all its aberrations, it did not require such a corrective, because from the first it rested on a religious principle, though this might be one-sided,—a principle under which men bowed as an absolute authority, and which exercised a binding, a theocratic power over their will. It is the religious basis of the English Revolution which, through the Puritans who emigrated from England, has given the free States of North America a strength, a power of resistance against moral dissolution, a preserving salt, which will never be attained by a democracy destitute of religion and apostate from Christianity.

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[1] Schelling, Works, ii. 2, p. 283.

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[1] With regard to these colossal shadows in the settlement of the Concordat, see *Les Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi;* likewise D'Haussonville, *L'église et le premier empire;* and Pressensé, *Die Kirche und die Revolution.*

§ 148.

Whilst we apprehend the relation between authority and liberty, according to its eternal and unchangeable essence, we are brought back to what has been before discussed regarding *redemption* and *emancipation* as the most fundamentally hostile principles of history. Free grace and liberty are only two sides of the same thing. Christianity, albeit from the beginning it subjects to itself the relations and arrangements of society, awakens the principle of personality in the nations, and thereby sows the seed of emancipation, which germinates and unfolds itself throughout centuries, although the growth often proceeds slowly, and during long periods may seem to stand still. It seeks to procure for man the full use of all his faculties, the rights of man, in order that a free kingdom of humanity may be framed; desires to release him from all unauthorized external barriers, which hinder the progress of the human mind to free self-government, from the restrictions of nationalities, in so far as these put division and enmity between the nations, from despotism and slavery, from the yoke of false traditions; but on the other side, represents itself as the absolute authority to which men ought readily to submit themselves. Christianity sharpens and completes every demand of the law, not merely for the individual, but also for society; and it proffers to men the grace of the gospel, whilst at the same time it expresses as a demand of conscience that men should accept the invitation. Authority and grace are thus the two principal parts of the relation of God's kingdom to humanity, since grace is the redeeming will of God's love, which offers and bestows on man the highest Good, authority, the binding and obligatory power of God's will. The history of man, both of the race and individually, therefore receives its ultimate and decisive importance from the relation of liberty to the divine authority and the divine grace, as well as from its relation to salvation and happiness. Every time a new era appears in the history of the world—although to outward contemplation many other widely different matters may be assigned as its chief cause—it is essentially this fundamental relation which enters into a new stage of its development.

TRANSITION TO THE SPECIAL PART.

§ 149.

We have now endeavoured to represent the principles, the ideals, and the norms or rules which determine the ethical view of the world and of life. But since moral life must be regarded in the special and individual fundamental forms of its reality, and in its development through these, a new series of problems present themselves. Our preceding contemplation was chiefly directed to fundamental principles and universal laws (*universalia*); and even when we touched on the special, and to a certain degree drew this into the discussion, it was only by way of illustrating the general, only in the interest of *principles*. Henceforth the consideration must predominantly be turned not towards the universal, but towards the special and individual, since also the separate organizations of society are to be considered as greater individuals, as common personalities, and demand a new point of issue corresponding thereto. That is to say, that if Ethics not merely represents a view of the world and of life in its general outline, but moral life in its individualized development, its growth and increase, its toil and strife, the *stages*, gradations, through which it must actually pass, and not merely represent these, but also be a guide and assistance thereto, a teacher of the means and obstacles (pædagogic and ascetic), to which in the foregoing treatise only general reference has been made, the starting-point must be taken, not from the moral world—though this is an absolutely necessary presupposition—but from the *individual personality*.

Were we, that is to say, to take our starting-point from the moral world, and thus begin the treatise on special Ethics with the separate organizations of society, Family, State, and Church, the complaint would be well-founded that the subjective factor would not get justice. For although in the foregoing treatise we have developed the idea of Christian virtue in general, yet the Christian life in the social relations cannot be adequately understood if sanctification has not been explained in the separate Moments which determine personal *self-education* for the kingdom of God. Should we then begin with the imitation of Christ, knitting our exposition to the fundamental conception of Christian virtue, as it is given in this work, it would certainly be the right beginning for the development of *Christian* personality. But before the development of Christian personality lies not merely another abnormal development, life under the law and sin, with the various circumstances and *stages of development* of sinfulness, but also the *passage* from life under sin to life under grace, or the *process of repentance*, the special Moments, obstacles, and dangers of which demand more minute consideration. Thus it comes that special Ethics proceeds in the reverse order to the general. An ethical view of the world must lay special stress on the aim, and place the ideals in the foreground. The representation of the ethical *development of personality* should, on the other hand, lay stress on *the way* which leads to the goal, on the *means* which should be employed, on the *obstacles* which should be combated. The one is as though from the Mountain of Contemplation we were beholding the land of liberty, with its ideals both of the world and of personality, and only in a general way looked at the high road to the goal, according to the eternal law of liberty. The other is to descend from the mountain and accompany the pilgrim plodding along the road, which in reality is longer and more difficult than it looks from the standpoint of principles; to pass through its different stages, to point out the pitfalls which must be here avoided. It is an obvious remark, that in this pilgrimage we return to points already beheld, where repetition becomes unavoidable. But with regard to this it may again be remarked, that the more complicated a science is, the greater variety and copiousness it embraces,—and there is no more complicated science than Ethics, as certainly as human life is the most complicated we know,—the greater the necessity becomes that the same conceptions should appear frequently, and in several places; with regard to which, it remains to be observed in what *connection* and under what predominant point of view they appear, and also what dependence and tone they assume at the different places.

Special Ethics remains, then, to be treated under these principal divisions:—1. Life under the law and sin; 2. Life in imitation of Christ; 3. The moral life of society and the kingdom of God. As the representation of the ethical organizations of society must close with the ethical prospects of the future, the treatise on Special Ethics will end where that on General Ethics, or the ethical view of life, began,—with the perspective of the completion of God's kingdom and the eschatological ideals therewith connected.

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THE END.

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